Hexis

In Greek and in several English translations, below is the passage of the Nicomachean Ethics where Aristotle

A partner in reading the Ethics has drawn my attention to the importance of these terms for Joe Sachs, who says,

energeia, being-at-work, [is] the most important word in all of Aristotle’s thinking …

One more example of what a translation of the Ethics needs to capture is perhaps the most important word in the whole work, hexis. Like energeia, this is an uncommon word before Aristotle gets hold of it … and the meanings of the two words are related …

… what defines a hexis is that it is not a passive state but an active condition …

This is from the Preface of Sach’s translation of the Ethics, as given in a preview, which unfortunately does not include the Aristotelian passage itself that I am looking at.

In the translation below, Apostle uses “disposition” for hexis. However, he elsewhere uses “habit,” and this is a bad habit, according to Sachs:

Now if you have read the Nicomachean Ethics in the translation of Hippocrates Apostle, you will object that Aristotle says plainly that virtues are habits. Here, though, we have run into one of the many ways in which a Latin tradition has betrayed a translator and distorted Aristotle’s meaning. Aristotle says that moral virtue is a hexis, a word consisting of a noun ending attached to the root of the verb echein. The Latin habeo is equivalent to echein, and the Latin habitus is a perfectly good translation of hexis, and so, by one more easy step we get the English word, “habit.” But this paint-by-the-numbers approach to translation carries us so far astray that every implication of the English word is wrong. A hexis is not only not the same as a habit, but is almost exactly its opposite.

Most translators do not make the mistake of turning virtues into habits, but instead translate hexis as “disposition” … The general word for disposition, diathesis, Aristotle uses only for the passive and shallow ones; for the deep and active ones he reserves the word hexis …

That is from “Three Little Words,” St. John’s Review, vol. 54, no 1, 1997, which became the Introduction to Sach’s translation of the Ethics.

The passage below from the Nicomachean Ethics is I.viii.9, Bekker 1098b31–1099a7 – the numbers link to the pages of Project Perseus from which I took the Greek text. I have inserted line breaks to make reading easier, and bullets to show parallelism.

διαφέρει δὲ ἴσως οὐ μικρὸν ἐν

  • κτήσει ἢ
  • χρήσει

τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν,
καὶ ἐν

  • ἕξει ἢ
  • ἐνεργείᾳ.
     
  • τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἕξιν ἐνδέχεται
    μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσαν,
    οἷον τῷ

    • καθεύδοντι ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως
    • ἐξηργηκότι,
  • τὴν δ᾽ ἐνέργειαν
    οὐχ
    οἷόν τε·

    • πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ
    • εὖ πράξει.
       
  • ὥσπερ δ᾽ Ὀλυμπίασιν
    • οὐχ οἱ
      • κάλλιστοι καὶ
      • ἰσχυρότατοι

      στεφανοῦνται

    • ἀλλ᾽ οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι
      (τούτων γάρ τινες νικῶσιν),
  • οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ
    • καλῶν
    • κἀγαθῶν

    οἱ πράττοντες ὀρθῶς ἐπήβολοι γίνονται.

In order of publication, here now are some translations that I have been able to cut and paste. I thank my reading partners for supplying Sachs’s translation; I obtained the others through Library Genesis. There are more translations at the Internet Archive.

I include some of the translators’ words about their translations (Sachs’s are above).

Ross (1925 [the 2009 revision by Brown in Oxford World’s Classics is identical here]: “There is considerable difficulty in translating terms which are just crystallizing from the fluidity of everyday speech into technical meanings and in my treatment of such words as λόγος or ἀρχή I cannot hope to please everybody. Any attempt to render such a term always by a single English equivalent would produce the most uncouth result”):

But it makes, perhaps, no small difference whether we place the chief good in possession or in use, in state of mind or in activity. For the state of mind may exist without producing any good result, as in a man who is asleep or in some other way quite inactive, but the activity cannot; for one who has the activity will of necessity be acting, and acting well. And as in the Olympic Games it is not the most beautiful and the strongest that are crowned but those who compete (for it is some of these that are victorious), so those who act win, and rightly win, the noble and good things in life.

Rackham (Loeb Classical Library, 1934: “the translation was designed to serve as an assistance to readers of the Greek; it is therefore as interpretative as I was able to make it without its becoming a mere paraphrase. Had I been working for those desirous of studying Aristotle without reading Greek, my method would have been different: I should have aimed at an entirely non-committal version”):

But no doubt it makes a great difference whether we conceive the Supreme Good to depend on possessing virtue or on displaying it – on disposition, or on the manifestation of a disposition in action. For a man may possess the disposition without its producing any good result, as for instance when he is asleep, or has ceased to function from some other cause; but virtue in active exercise cannot be inoperative – it will of necessity act, and act well. And just as at the Olympic games the wreaths of victory are not bestowed upon the handsomest and strongest persons present, but on men who enter for the competitions – since it is among these that the winners are found, – so it is those who act rightly who carry off the prizes and good things of life.

Apostle (Synthese Historical Library, 1975: “The principles used in the translation of the Ethics are the same as those in the translations of the Physics and the Metaphysics, and their main function is to help the reader get Aristotle’s meaning as accurately as possible. Briefly, they are principles of terminology and of thought, some of which will be repeated here. ¶ English terms common to all three translations have the same meanings, with a few exceptions, and many terms proper to ethics are added … ¶ Terms in italics without initial capital letters are used (a) sometimes for emphasis, and (b) sometimes with meanings which are somewhat different from – usually narrower than – those of the same terms without italics”):

It makes perhaps no small difference, however, whether we regard the highest good to be in possession or in use, or to exist as a disposition or as an activity according to that disposition. For a disposition may be present without producing any good at all, as in a man who is asleep or inactive for some reason or other; but with the activity this cannot be the case, for one will of necessity be acting, and acting well. And as at the Olympic Games it is not the most beautiful or the strongest who are crowned but those who compete (for it is some of these who become victors), so in life it is those who act rightly who become the winners of good and noble things.

Crisp (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, 2000: “Aristotle’s Greek is compressed, and his meaning frequently indeterminate. For this reason, a reader of Aristotle in translation is well advised to consult more than one translation, especially of important passages. Perhaps the most useful is that of T. H. Irwin … which contains analyses of the argument, as well as notes and a substantial glossary. An elegant translation is provided by Harris Rackham … The ‘World’s Classics’ translation by W. D. Ross … and that by M. Ostwald … are also deservedly popular”):

Presumably, though, it makes a great difference whether we conceive of the chief good as consisting in possession or in use, that is to say, in a state or in an activity. For while a state can exist without producing any good consequences, as it does in the case of a person sleeping or lying idle for some other reason, this is impossible for an activity: it will necessarily engage in action, and do so well. As in the Olympic Games it is not the most attractive and the strongest who are crowned, but those who compete (since it is from this group that winners come), so in life it is those who act rightly who will attain what is noble and good.

Sachs (Focus Philosophical Library, Hackett, 2002):

But presumably it makes no small difference whether one supposes the highest good to consist in possession or in use, that is, in an actively maintained condition or in a way of being at work. For even if the actively maintained condition is present it is possible for it to accomplish no good thing, for instance in someone who is asleep or in someone who is incapacitated in some other way, but if the being-at-work is present this is not possible, for necessarily the one who is at work in accordance with virtue will act and act well. Just as, with those at the Olympic games, it is not the most beautiful or the strongest who are crowned, but those who compete (for it is some of these who are victors), so too among those who in life are well favored and well mannered it is the ones who act rightly who become accomplished people.

Bartlett and Collins (University of Chicago, 2011: “This translation … attempts to be as literal as sound English usage permits”):

But perhaps it makes no small difference whether one supposes the best thing to reside in possession or use, that is, in a characteristic or an activity. For it is possible that, although the characteristic is present, it accomplishes nothing good – for example, in the case of some one who is asleep or has been otherwise hindered. But this is not possible when it comes to the activity: of necessity, a person will act, and he will act well. For just as it is not the noblest and strongest who are crowned with the victory wreath in the Olympic Games but rather the competitors (for it is certain of these who win), so also it is those who act correctly who attain the noble and good things in life.

Reeve (Hackett, 2014: “Readers … find themselves in territory whose apparent familiarity is often deceptive and inimical to proper understanding: politikê isn’t quite politics … Even what the Ethics is about isn’t quite ethics. A worthwhile translation must try to compensate for this deceptive familiarity without producing too much potentially alienating distance and strangeness in its place. ¶ Accuracy and consistency in translation is essential to achieving this goal, obviously, but so too are extensive annotation and commentary … ¶ I have benefited from the work of previous translators, including David Ross, H. Rackham, Martin Ostwald, Terence Irwin, Roger Crisp, and Christopher Rowe”):

But it makes no small difference, presumably, whether we suppose the best good to consist in virtue’s possession or in its use – that is, in the state or in the activity. For it is possible for someone to possess the state while accomplishing nothing good – for example, if he is sleeping or out of action in some other way. But the same will not hold of the activity, since he will necessarily be doing an action and doing it well. And just as in the Olympic Games it is not the noblest and strongest who get the victory crown but the competitors (since it is among these that the ones who win are found), so also among the noble and good aspects of life it is those who act correctly who win the prizes.