Polytropy

This post features the first five chapters of Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. Those chapters take up the following subjects.

• Chapter I. The voluntary and involuntary (ἑκούσιος and ἀκούσιος).
• Chapter II. Choice (also called intention, preference, and rational or deliberate choice: προαίρεσις).
• Chapter III. The deliberated (βουλευτός).
• Chapter IV. The wished-for (βουλητός).
• Chapter V. Vice (κακία) as being voluntary.

After some general remarks about what I am doing and about the chapters themselves, I summarize them section by section (they are divided into 27, 17, 20, 6, and 23 sections respectively). Then comes Aristotle’s text itself, in Greek, with line breaks and bullets intended to show the structure of the thought (and thus aid my own understanding), along with my comments after some sections.

Technicalities

I am continuing what I have done with Book I and Book II of the Ethics. While reading Book III, I have revised the posts on the earlier books. I am likely to do the same to the present post.

I summarized Books I and II only by chapter. Now in Book III, it seems worthwhile to summarize by section, at least in the first five chapters. I am leaving to a later post or posts the remaining seven chapters of the book, which concern the particular virtues of

• courage (vi–ix) and
• temperance (x–xii).

Meanwhile, I have made the sections of the first five chapters into sections of this page; they are not just list items as sections of the previous two books started out being – now I have changed them too. For the record, I establish my text as follows.

1. Obtain a Greek text by cutting and pasting from Project Perseus into a txt file, opened in the emacs editor.
2. Include Bekker numbers as links to Perseus.
3. Convert the contemporary colon (:) that Perseus uses to the older form (·), the “middle dot” (στιγμὴ μέση) described on Wikipedia and used in Bywater’s Oxford Classical Text (which I have in facsimile on paper, accompanying a Turkish translation).
4. Insert
   • a double line break after each middle dot, low dot, or question mark;
   • a single line break, enforced with backslash (\), after each comma;
   • section and chapter numbers as given in the Oxford Classical Text.
5. Make bold any instances of μέν and δέ.
6. Read the Greek text, trying to bring out the structure as I said, with bullets and additional line breaks.

I make constant use of

• existing translations, in order to make sense of the Greek text;
• the pandoc program, in order to
  • convert the txt file to an html file;
  • clean up the txt file (by converting either itself or the html file to it).

I have been referring to the chapters assigned roman numerals in Bywater’s Greek text. These chapters are used by most of the translators whom I consult (Bartlett and Collins; Crisp; Rackham; Reeve; and Ross), but Apostle uses the arabic chapters, which correspond to the roman thus:

On Translation and Meaning

Translations of Aristotle are inevitably interpretations, adding a lot of words in English in order to clarify what is only adumbrated in the original spare text. However, the added clarity may be misleading. In his Preface, Apostle writes:

The principles used in the translation of the Ethics are the same as those in the translations of the Physics and the Metaphysics, and their main function is to help the reader get Aristotle’s meaning as accurately as possible.

Is there really something that we can call “Aristotle’s meaning”? If there is, then Apostle well describes the difficulty of getting it. He does this in the Preface of his first Aristotle translation, of the Metaphysics; there, Apostle also says,

The success of a translation depends, of course, largely on the extent to which the translator understands the thought, especially in the case of Aristotle’s works, which, though condensed and difficult, are fortunately highly consistent.

Since Apostle does not seem to say otherwise, perhaps he believes he does understand Aristotle’s thought, at least as well as anybody else. However, what can serve as evidence for this understanding?

In his Ethics Preface, Apostle says,

Difficulties arise from some allied terms or terms close in meaning, e.g., the terms φαῦλος, κακός, μοχθηρός, and πονηρός, for the exact differences of their meanings are not ascertainable from the extant works. Each of these terms, however, seems to be used consistently, and we shall assume such consistency.

It is curious that Apostle thinks there are exact differences in the meanings of such words. Apostle’s glossary gives:

φαῦλος

bad

κακός

bad

μοχθηρία

evil habit

πονηρός

wicked

Apostle doesn’t include the adjective form μοχθηρός in his glossary, but does translate an occurrence of ὁ μοχθηρὸς as “evil man.” This is in § i.14 below, where I look more at the word (other translations are “wicked, corrupt,” and “depraved”).

In the Ethics at least, Aristotle would seem to be talking to ordinary people about what they ordinarily do. Ordinarily they do not speak in technical language. Therefore Aristotle should not be either. At any rate, I am not translating Aristotle myself. I need not decide whether φαῦλος, κακός, μοχθηρός, and πονηρός should be translated consistently as four different English words, whose shades of difference are not likely to match those of the Greek words.

Looking ahead to the discussion of courage, I wonder: is there any difference between this and bravery? Believing there ought to be a difference, somebody may be able to come up with one. It seems to me we are more likely to bid somebody

• “Courage!” than “Bravery!”
• “Be brave!” than “Be courageous!”

The reason would simply be syllable count.

What Aristotle Is Doing

A general theme of the first five chapters of Book III of the Ethics is that there is no excuse for shoddy behavior. If you think you’re doing your best, think again. Look at what the best people are doing, and do it yourself; don’t complain that you haven’t got their advantages.

I may be exaggerating, but I think we can see that theme in each of the five chapters in (at least) the following ways.

1. There are ways that others can “make” us do stuff, but we are still the ones actually doing it (§ 6).
2. Not everybody can actually make choices; but unless you are a child, you can (§ 2).
3. Before choosing, you may or must deliberate, but this has to end some time (§ 16), and anyway there are many things, such as scientific truths (§ 9) and what is best for others to do (§ 6), that are not to be deliberated.
4. You may act with the best intentions (§ 3), but still you should know what you are doing; after all, some people do (§ 4).
5. If you want credit for your good deeds, you have to accept blame for your bad ones.

Aristotle takes evidence for his assertions from what we actually do. We occasionally give out praise and blame, prizes and punishments. We may not always do it rightly, but then we cannot always be wrong either.

The Philosopher is explicit that only madmen and fools try to deliberate everything (§ iii.2). Implicitly, it is those kinds of people who would engage in such a debate as was made into an article in Aeon (I looked at it also in “Antitheses”):

Can we be held morally responsible for our actions? Yes, says Daniel Dennett. No, says Gregg Caruso. Reader, you decide.

There’s nothing to deliberate, debate, or decide here. The fact is, we are held responsible for our actions; therefore, we can be. If this happens sometimes in error, this means in particular that it can happen correctly; otherwise the notion of error would be vacuous.

That virtue is a mean between vicious extremes was established in Book II, chapter vi. In Book III, Aristotle continues to seek the mean, so to speak, or perhaps the compromise, if not the synthesis:

• In chapter i, an act can be
  • both voluntary (as means) and involuntary (as end);
  • neither voluntary (because we don’t know what we are doing) nor involuntary (because we don’t care).
• In chapter iii, an object of deliberation is neither predictable (eternal) nor unpredictable (random).
• In chapter iv, what we wish for is not simply what is good or what seems good; it is good, provided we are.

Contents

• Chapter I. 27 §§, grouped as three chapters:
  • Chapter 1.
    • Action and passion as voluntary and involuntary (§ 1).
    • The involuntary as by force or on account of ignorance (§ 2).
    • Force (§§ 3–12).
  • Chapter 2. Ignorance (§§ 13–9).
  • Chapter 3. Desire and anger (§§ 20–7).

  Those chapters, by sections:

• Chapter 1 in Chapter I. Force.
  • § 1. Key terms, most in pairs:
    • Virtue concerns
      • action and
      • passion.
    • To the
      • voluntary (ἑκούσιον) comes
        • praise or
        • blame;
      • involuntary (ἀκούσιον) may come
        • forgiveness and
        • pity.
    • The legislator assigns
      • honors and
      • punishments.
  • § 2. The involuntary is
    • by force (subject of the rest of chapter 1) or
    • on account of ignorance (subject of chapter 2).
  • § 3. The forced has cause outside the actor (or sufferer).
  • § 4. Ambiguous case: acting
    • out of fear or
    • for the sake of something fine.
  • § 5. Example: jettison during a storm.
  • § 6. Such acts are voluntary, though not simply so.
  • § 7. Indeed, for them we can be
    • praised,
    • blamed,
    • pitied.
  • § 8. They could be too bad to be forced.
  • § 9.  
    • To weigh ends and means is hard,
    • to stick to one’s conclusion is harder.
  • § 10. Recap of 6 and 9.
  • § 11. If what is sweet or fine were forcible, everything would be.
  • § 12. Recap of 3.
• Chapter 2 in Chapter I. Ignorance.
  • § 13. What is done
    • on account of ignorance is nonvoluntary (οὐχ ἑκούσιον);
    • with regret, involuntary (ἀκούσιον).
  • § 14. One may act
    • on account of ignorance, and then be corrupt;
    • merely ignorantly.
  • § 15. It is the one ignorant of particulars who acts involuntarily.
  • § 16. There are six particulars:
    1. who,
    2. what,
    3. to whom,
    4. with what,
    5. why,
    6. how.
  • § 17. Examples of these (only the mad would be ignorant of the first).
  • § 18. The ignorant of them, especially C and E, act involuntarily.
  • § 19. However, they should also feel pain and regret.
• Chapter 3 in Chapter I. Desire and anger.
  • § 20. The voluntary
    • originates in the actor,
    • who knows what he or she is doing.
  • § 21. It’s not good to say the involuntary is on account of
    • anger (θυμός) or
    • desire (ἐπιθυμία).
  • § 22. For (1.) then animals and children would never act voluntarily.
  • § 23. Moreover (2.),
    • would nothing we did out of desire or anger be voluntary, or
    • would
      • the good act be voluntary,
      • the bad act be involuntary?
  • § 24. Both would be ridiculous –
    • the latter, because the same person is the cause of both;
    • the former, because doing what we ought would be involuntary.
  • § 25. (3.) Doing
    • the involuntary is painful,
    • the desirable is pleasant.
  • § 26. (4.) We ought [voluntarily] to avoid error, whether done according to
    • reason (λογισμός) or
    • anger.
  • § 27. (5.) What is done from desire or anger is still human [thus voluntary].
• Chapter II = Chapter 4. Choice.
  • § 1. It tells us more than actions do.
  • § 2. It is voluntary, but not the same as the voluntary.
  • § 3. It is not
    1. desire,
    2. anger (for these two are shared with the irrational),
    3. wish,
    4. an opinion.
  • § 4. (A.) The unrestrained act from desire, not choice; the restrained, otherwise.
  • § 5. A desire can be opposed to a choice, but not another desire. Desire, but not choice, concerns the pleasant and painful.
  • § 6. (B.) Even less is anger choice.
  • § 7. (C.) The impossible, you
    • can wish for, but
    • cannot choose.
  • § 8. Likewise, somebody else’s act.
  • § 9. You
    • wish for the end,
    • choose the means.
  • § 10. (D.) Opinion
    • is too broad to be choice;
    • is right or wrong, while a choice is good or bad.
  • § 11. Neither is choice some opinion; for this would not make us who we are.
  • § 12. We choose what to embrace or avoid, while having opinions about all.
  • § 13.
    • Choice is praised as right; opinion, as true.
    • We choose what we know, opine about what we don’t.
  • § 14. You can simultaneously
    • opine what is better,
    • choose what is worse.
  • § 15. Opinion may nonetheless precede or accompany choice.
  • § 16. The chosen is voluntary, but not conversely.
  • § 17. Is choice (προαίρεσις) by prior deliberation (τὸ προβεβουλευμένον)?
• Chapter III = Chapter 5. Deliberation (βουλή).
  • § 1. Is everything to be deliberated?
  • § 2. We ask that about sensible people.
  • § 3. Answer: No. Not the eternal, such as
    • the cosmos,
    • a theorem (as of the incommensurability of side and diagonal of a square).
  • § 4. Nor what always moves the same way, whether by
    • necessity,
    • nature,
    • something else.
  • § 5. Nor what is always different:
    • weather (droughts and rains),
    • chance (striking gold).
  • § 6. Nor what is best for others.
  • § 7. We deliberate on what is
    • on us and
    • practicable,

    since we have eliminated

    • nature,
    • necessity,
    • chance.
  • § 8. We deliberate what comes about
    • through us,
    • not always the same way.
  • § 9. And not what is known scientifically.
  • § 10. We deliberate about what happens
    • for the most part,
    • uncertainly,
    • indeterminately.

    We consult others on important matters.

  • § 11. We deliberate not ends, but from ends to means, analytically.
  • § 12. Deliberation is investigation (ζήτησις), but not conversely (the counterexample being mathematics).
  • § 13. It continues to action or the impossibility thereof.
  • § 14. More on what is investigated:
    • instruments,
    • how they are used,
    • through what,
    • how,
    • through (or by) whom.
  • § 15. Deliberation is of what is
    • practicable for us,
    • for the sake of some other action.
  • § 16. One deliberates the means, not
    • the end,
    • the particulars,
    • forever.
  • § 17. Choice is after deliberation.
  • § 18. Homer shows this.
  • § 19. We desire what we choose.
  • § 20. We have said roughly what choice is.
• Chapter IV = Chapter 6. Wishing.
  • § 1. Wishing is for an end, said to be, respectively, something that
    1. is good or
    2. appears good.
  • § 2. If A., then what mistaken people wish for is not actually desirable.
  • § 3. If B., then nothing is desirable by nature.
  • § 4. Mean position: As with food, so generally, what is desirable
    • to the good (serious) person is good;
    • to the bad (mean, common) person may not be.
  • § 5. There are fine and pleasant things for each habit (hexis), but
    • the good person best sees the truth;
    • the hoi polloi are mislead by pleasure.
  • § 6. They
    • take the pleasant as if good,
    • flee the painful as if bad.
• Chapter V. 23 §§, grouped as
  • Chapter 7. Vice is voluntary (§§ 1–20).
  • Chapter 8. Recap: virtue, action, habit (§§ 21, 22).
  • Chapter 9. Transition to courage (§ 23).

  Those chapters, by sections:

• Chapter 7
  • § 1. Wish being for the end, and deliberation and choice being of the means, relevant actions – such as virtues – are by choice and voluntary.
  • § 2. So virtue is on us, and therefore so is vice. Reason: if we can do something, we can not do it, and vice verse.
  • § 3. In particular, we can alike do or not do good or bad things.
  • § 4.
    • Not οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ᾽ ἄκων μακάριος –
      • “None would be vile, and none would not be blest” (Rackham);
      • “None is voluntarily wicked or involuntarily blessed” (Bartlett and Collins);
    • but μακάριος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἄκων, ἡ δὲ μοχθηρία ἑκούσιον.
  • § 5. Otherwise we are not the origin of our actions.
  • § 6. The beginnings of our actions being in us, they are on us, that is, voluntary.
  • § 7. That this is so is shown in private and public life when we
    • honor or punish an act, but
    • refrain when the act is not in the doer’s power.
  • § 8. We can even hold people responsible for their ignorance, as when drunk or in legal matters.
  • § 9. Also in negligence.
  • § 10. If they are just that kind of person, they let themselves become it.
  • § 11. See how people train themselves, as for contests.
  • § 12. Habits arise from activities: only the insensible (“anaesthetic”) don’t know this.
  • § 13. It’s irrational to think injustice and intemperance do not breed themselves. Knowingly do what will make you unjust, and you are voluntarily unjust.
  • § 14. You cannot then stop being unjust, any more than you can stop an illness you willingly incurred.
  • § 15. Some bodily vices are our responsibility.
  • § 16. We censure those that are.
  • § 17. If we all aim at what appears to be good, we are still responsible for that appearance. Otherwise, to be really good, we would have to be born that way, and virtue would be no more voluntary than vice.
  • § 18. However their end is determined, both good and bad act accordingly.
  • § 19. Vice then would be no less voluntary than virtue.
  • § 20. Vices, like virtues, are voluntary.
• Chapter 8
  • § 21. Review of virtue.
  • § 22. Actions and habits are voluntary, not in the same way: we are in control of actions to the end.
• Chapter 9
  • § 23. Lets talk about the virtues, courage first.

Starting [1109^b]:

Chapter I

Chapter 1

§ i.1

Τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ

• πάθη τε καὶ
• πράξεις

οὔσης, καὶ

• ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διορίσαι
  τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσι,
• χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ
  τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι πρός τε
  • τὰς τιμὰς καὶ
  • τὰς κολάσεις.

§ i.2

[1110^a]

§ i.3

βίαιον δὲ οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν,
τοιαύτη οὖσα ἐν ᾗ μηδὲν συμβάλλεται

• ὁ πράττων ἢ
• ὁ πάσχων,

§ i.4

ἀμφισβήτησιν ἔχει πότερον

• ἀκούσιά ἐστιν ἢ
• ἑκούσια.

§ i.5

• ἁπλῶς μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀποβάλλεται ἑκών,
• ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ δ᾽
  • αὑτοῦ καὶ
  • τῶν λοιπῶν

  ἅπαντες οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες.

§ i.6

• μικταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αἱ τοιαῦται πράξεις,
• ἐοίκασι δὲ μᾶλλον ἑκουσίοις·
  • αἱρεταὶ γάρ εἰσι τότε
    ὅτε πράττονται,
  • τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως
    κατὰ τὸν καιρόν ἐστιν.

καὶ

• τὸ ἑκούσιον δὴ καὶ
• τὸ ἀκούσιον,

ὅτε πράττει,
λεκτέον.

πράττει δὲ ἑκών·

καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κινεῖν τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη
ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσιν
ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστίν·

ὧν δ᾽ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχή,
ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ

• καὶ τὸ πράττειν
• καὶ μή.
   

§ i.7

1. ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσι δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνίοτε καὶ
   ἐπαινοῦνται,
   ὅταν
   • αἰσχρόν τι ἢ
   • λυπηρὸν

   ὑπομένωσιν ἀντὶ

   • μεγάλων καὶ
   • καλῶν·
2. ἂν δ᾽ ἀνάπαλιν,
   ψέγονται·
   τὰ γὰρ αἴσχισθ᾽ ὑπομεῖναι ἐπὶ μηδενὶ
   • καλῷ ἢ
   • μετρίῳ

   φαύλου.

3. ἐπ᾽ ἐνίοις δ᾽
   • ἔπαινος μὲν οὐ
   γίνεται,

   • συγγνώμη δ᾽,

   ὅταν διὰ τοιαῦτα πράξῃ τις

   • ἃ μὴ δεῖ,
   • ἃ
     • τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερτείνει καὶ
     • μηδεὶς ἂν ὑπομείναι.

§ i.8

ἔνια δ᾽ ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι,
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀποθανετέον
παθόντι τὰ δεινότατα·

§ i.9

ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ ἐστι

• τὰ μὲν προσδοκώμενα λυπηρά,
• ἃ δ᾽ ἀναγκάζονται αἰσχρά,

ὅθεν

• ἔπαινοι καὶ
• ψόγοι

γίνονται περὶ τοὺς

• ἀναγκασθέντας ἢ
• μή. [1110^b]

§ i.10

τὰ δὴ ποῖα φατέον βίαια; ἢ

• ἁπλῶς μέν, ὁπότ᾽ ἂν

  • ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ᾖ καὶ
  • ὁ πράττων μηδὲν συμβάλληται;

• ἃ δὲ

  • καθ᾽ αὑτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι,
  • νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε αἱρετά, καὶ
    ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι,
     
  • καθ᾽ αὑτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι,
  • νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἑκούσια.

  μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἔοικεν ἑκουσίοις·

  αἱ γὰρ πράξεις
  ἐν τοῖς καθ᾽ ἕκαστα,
  ταῦτα δ᾽ ἑκούσια.

ποῖα δ᾽ ἀντὶ ποίων αἱρετέον,
οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀποδοῦναι·

πολλαὶ γὰρ διαφοραί εἰσιν
ἐν τοῖς καθ᾽ ἕκαστα.

§ i.11

(ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἔξω ὄντα),

τούτων γὰρ χάριν
πάντες πάντα πράττουσιν.

καὶ

• οἱ μὲν βίᾳ καὶ ἄκοντες λυπηρῶς,
• οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ καλὸν μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς·

γελοῖον δὲ τὸ αἰτιᾶσθαι

• τὰ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ
• μὴ αὑτὸν

εὐθήρατον ὄντα
ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ

• τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἑαυτόν,
• τῶν δ᾽ αἰσχρῶν τὰ ἡδέα.

§ i.12

ἔοικε δὴ τὸ βίαιον εἶναι
οὗ ἔξωθεν ἡ ἀρχή,
μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βιασθέντος.

Chapter 2

§ i.13

ὁ γὰρ δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν πράξας ὁτιοῦν,
μηδέν τι δυσχεραίνων ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει,

• ἑκὼν μὲν οὐ πέπραχεν,
  ὅ γε μὴ ᾔδει,
• οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἄκων,
  μὴ λυπούμενός γε.

ἐπεὶ γὰρ διαφέρει,
βέλτιον ὄνομα ἔχειν ἴδιον.

§ i.14

---

• ἀγνοεῖ μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὁ μοχθηρὸς

  • ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ
  • ὧν ἀφεκτέον,

  καὶ διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἁμαρτίαν

  • ἄδικοι καὶ
  • ὅλως κακοὶ

  γίνονται·

§ i.15

• τὸ δ᾽ ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι
  οὐκ εἴ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὰ συμφέροντα·
  • οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια
    αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου
    ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας,
  • οὐδ᾽ ἡ καθόλου
    (ψέγονται γὰρ διά γε ταύτην)
  • ἀλλ᾽ ἡ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα,
    • ἐν οἷς καὶ
    • περὶ ἃ

    ἡ πρᾶξις· [1111^a]
    ἐν τούτοις γὰρ

    • καὶ ἔλεος
    • καὶ συγγνώμη·

    ὁ γὰρ τούτων τι ἀγνοῶν ἀκουσίως πράττει.

§ i.16

ἴσως οὖν οὐ χεῖρον διορίσαι αὐτά,

• τίνα καὶ
• πόσα ἐστί,
   

1. τίς τε δὴ καὶ
2. τί καὶ
3.  
   1. περὶ τί ἢ
   2. ἐν τίνι

   πράττει,

ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ

4. τίνι,
   οἷον ὀργάνῳ, καὶ
5. ἕνεκα τίνος,
   οἷον σωτηρίας, καὶ
6. πῶς,
   οἷον ἠρέμα ἢ σφόδρα.

§ i.17

1. ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν ταῦτα
   οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀγνοήσειε
   μὴ μαινόμενος,
   δῆλον δ᾽ ὡς οὐδὲ τὸν πράττοντα·
   πῶς γὰρ ἑαυτόν γε;

2. ὃ δὲ πράττει ἀγνοήσειεν ἄν τις,

   οἷον

   • †λέγοντές φασιν ἐκπεσεῖν αὐτούς,† ἢ
   • οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι ἀπόρρητα ἦν,
     ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος τὰ μυστικά, ἢ
   • δεῖξαι βουλόμενος ἀφεῖναι,
     ὡς ὁ τὸν καταπέλτην.

§ i.18

περὶ πάντα δὴ ταῦτα τῆς ἀγνοίας οὔσης,
ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις,
ὁ τούτων τι ἀγνοήσας
ἄκων δοκεῖ πεπραχέναι,
καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις·

κυριώτατα δ᾽ εἶναι δοκεῖ

3. ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ

5. οὗ ἕνεκα.

§ i.19

τοῦ δὴ κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἄγνοιαν ἀκουσίου λεγομένου
ἔτι

Chapter 3

§ i.20

ὄντος δ᾽ ἀκουσίου τοῦ βίᾳ καὶ δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν,

§ i.21

ἴσως γὰρ

§ i.22

 

πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ

• οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων
  ἑκουσίως πράξει,
• οὐδ᾽ οἱ παῖδες·

§ i.23

εἶτα

• πότερον οὐδὲν ἑκουσίως
  πράττομεν τῶν δι᾽
  • ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ
  • θυμόν,
• ἢ
  • τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἑκουσίως
  • τὰ δ᾽ αἰσχρὰ ἀκουσίως;

§ i.24

• ἢ γελοῖον
  ἑνός γε αἰτίου ὄντος;
• ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως
  ἀκούσια φάναι
  ὧν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι·
  δεῖ δὲ

  • καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐπί τισι

  • καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τινῶν,

    οἷον

    • ὑγιείας καὶ
    • μαθήσεως.

§ i.25

δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ

• τὰ μὲν ἀκούσια λυπηρὰ εἶναι,
• τὰ δὲ κατ᾽ ἐπιθυμίαν ἡδέα.

§ i.26

ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρει τῷ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ κατὰ

• λογισμὸν ἢ
• θυμὸν

ἁμαρτηθέντα;

φευκτὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄμφω, [1111^b]

§ i.27

δοκεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἧττον ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι
τὰ ἄλογα πάθη,
ὥστε καὶ αἱ πράξεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
αἱ ἀπὸ

• θυμοῦ καὶ
• ἐπιθυμίας.

ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ τιθέναι ἀκούσια ταῦτα.

Chapter II

Chapter 4

§ ii.1

διωρισμένων δὲ

• τοῦ τε ἑκουσίου καὶ
• τοῦ ἀκουσίου,

περὶ προαιρέσεως ἕπεται διελθεῖν·

• οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ
• μᾶλλον τὰ ἤθη κρίνειν

τῶν πράξεων.

§ ii.2

ἡ προαίρεσις δὴ

• ἑκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται,
• οὐ ταὐτὸν δέ,

ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ ἑκούσιον·

• τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἑκουσίου
  • καὶ παῖδες
  • καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα

  κοινωνεῖ,

• προαιρέσεως δ᾽ οὔ,

καὶ τὰ

• ἐξαίφνης ἑκούσια μὲν λέγομεν,
• κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ᾽ οὔ.

§ ii.3

οἱ δὲ λέγοντες αὐτὴν

1. ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ
2. θυμὸν ἢ
3. βούλησιν ἤ
4. τινα δόξαν

οὐκ ἐοίκασιν ὀρθῶς λέγειν.

• οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν ἡ προαίρεσις καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων,

• • ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ
  • θυμός.

§ ii.4

1. καὶ

   • ὁ ἀκρατὴς
     • ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πράττει,
     • προαιρούμενος δ᾽ οὔ·
   • ὁ ἐγκρατὴς δ᾽ ἀνάπαλιν
     • προαιρούμενος μέν,
     • ἐπιθυμῶν δ᾽ οὔ.

§ ii.5

καὶ

• προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται,
• ἐπιθυμία δ᾽ ἐπιθυμίᾳ οὔ.

καὶ

• ἡ μὲν ἐπιθυμία
  • ἡδέος καὶ
  • ἐπιλύπου,
• ἡ προαίρεσις δ᾽
  • οὔτε λυπηροῦ
  • οὔθ᾽ ἡδέος.

§ ii.6

2. θυμὸς δ᾽ ἔτι ἧττον·

   ἥκιστα γὰρ τὰ διὰ θυμὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ.

§ ii.7

3. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησίς γε,
   καίπερ σύνεγγυς φαινόμενον·

   • προαίρεσις μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων,
     καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαιρεῖσθαι,
     δοκοίη ἂν ἠλίθιος εἶναι·
   • βούλησις δ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων,
     οἷον ἀθανασίας.

§ ii.8

καὶ

• ἡ μὲν βούλησίς ἐστι καὶ
  περὶ τὰ μηδαμῶς δι᾽ αὑτοῦ πραχθέντα ἄν,
  οἷον ὑποκριτήν τινα νικᾶν ἢ ἀθλητήν·
• προαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐδείς,
  ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα οἴεται γενέσθαι ἂν δι᾽ αὑτοῦ.

§ ii.9

ἔτι δ᾽

• ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μᾶλλον,
• ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος,

ὅλως γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν εἶναι.

§ ii.10

4. οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη·

   • ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ
     • οὐδὲν ἧττον περὶ
       • τὰ ἀίδια καὶ
       • τὰ ἀδύνατα
     • ἢ
       • τὰ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν·

     καὶ

     • τῷ
       • ψευδεῖ καὶ
       • ἀληθεῖ

       διαιρεῖται,

     • οὐ τῷ
       • κακῷ καὶ
       • ἀγαθῷ,
   • ἡ προαίρεσις δὲ τούτοις μᾶλλον. [1112^a]

§ ii.11

• ὅλως μὲν οὖν δόξῃ
  ταὐτὸν ἴσως οὐδὲ λέγει οὐδείς.
• ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τινί·
   

• τῷ γὰρ προαιρεῖσθαι
  • τἀγαθὰ ἢ
  • τὰ κακὰ

  ποιοί τινές ἐσμεν,

• τῷ δὲ δοξάζειν οὔ.

§ ii.12

καὶ

• προαιρούμεθα μὲν
  • λαβεῖν ἢ
  • φυγεῖν ἤ
  • τι τῶν τοιούτων,
• δοξάζομεν δὲ
  • τί ἐστιν ἢ
  • τίνι συμφέρει ἢ
  • πῶς·
     
  • λαβεῖν δ᾽ ἢ
  • φυγεῖν

  οὐ πάνυ δοξάζομεν.

§ ii.13

καὶ

• ἡ μὲν προαίρεσις
  ἐπαινεῖται
  • τῷ εἶναι οὗ δεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ
  • τῷ ὀρθῶς,
• ἡ δὲ δόξα
  • τῷ ὡς ἀληθῶς.

καὶ

• προαιρούμεθα μὲν ἃ μάλιστα ἴσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα,
• δοξάζομεν δὲ ἃ οὐ πάνυ ἴσμεν·

§ ii.14

δοκοῦσι δὲ οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ

• προαιρεῖσθαί τε ἄριστα καὶ
• δοξάζειν,

ἀλλ᾽ ἔνιοι

• δοξάζειν μὲν ἄμεινον,
• διὰ κακίαν δ᾽ αἱρεῖσθαι οὐχ ἃ δεῖ.

§ ii.15

εἰ δὲ

• προγίνεται δόξα τῆς προαιρέσεως ἢ
• παρακολουθεῖ,

οὐδὲν διαφέρει·

• οὐ τοῦτο γὰρ σκοποῦμεν,
• ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστι δόξῃ τινί.

§ ii.16

τί οὖν ἢ ποῖόν τι ἐστίν,
ἐπειδὴ τῶν εἰρημένων οὐθέν;

• ἑκούσιον μὲν δὴ φαίνεται,
• τὸ δ᾽ ἑκούσιον οὐ πᾶν προαιρετόν.

§ ii.17

ἀλλ᾽ ἆρά γε τὸ προβεβουλευμένον;

ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις μετὰ

• λόγου καὶ
• διανοίας.

ὑποσημαίνειν δ᾽ ἔοικε καὶ τοὔνομα ὡς ὂν πρὸ ἑτέρων αἱρετόν.

Chapter III

Chapter 5

§ iii.1

βουλεύονται δὲ

• πότερον περὶ πάντων,
  καὶ πᾶν βουλευτόν ἐστιν,
• ἢ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι βουλή;

§ iii.2

λεκτέον δ᾽ ἴσως βουλευτὸν

• ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων.

§ iii.3

• περὶ δὴ τῶν ἀιδίων

οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται,

§ iii.4

• ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ περὶ
  • τῶν ἐν κινήσει,
  • ἀεὶ δὲ κατὰ ταὐτὰ γινομένων,
     
  • εἴτ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης
  • εἴτε καὶ
    • φύσει ἢ
    • διά τινα αἰτίαν ἄλλην,

  οἷον τροπῶν καὶ ἀνατολῶν.

§ iii.5

• οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως,
  οἷον αὐχμῶν καὶ ὄμβρων.
• οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης,
  οἷον θησαυροῦ εὑρέσεως.

§ iii.6

• ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἁπάντων,
  οἷον πῶς ἂν Σκύθαι ἄριστα πολιτεύοιντο οὐδεὶς Λακεδαιμονίων βουλεύεται.

οὐ γὰρ γένοιτ᾽ ἂν τούτων οὐθὲν δι᾽ ἡμῶν.

§ iii.7

ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἔστι λοιπά.

αἰτίαι γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι

• φύσις καὶ
• ἀνάγκη καὶ
• τύχη,

ἔτι δὲ

• νοῦς καὶ
• πᾶν τὸ δι᾽ ἀνθρώπου.

τῶν δ᾽ ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστοι βουλεύονται
περὶ τῶν δι᾽ αὑτῶν πρακτῶν. [1112^b]

§ iii.8

καὶ περὶ μὲν τὰς

• ἀκριβεῖς καὶ
• αὐτάρκεις

τῶν ἐπιστημῶν οὐκ ἔστι βουλή,
οἷον περὶ γραμμάτων (οὐ γὰρ διστάζομεν πῶς γραπτέον)·

ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα γίνεται

• δι᾽ ἡμῶν,
• μὴ ὡσαύτως δ᾽ ἀεί,

περὶ τούτων βουλευόμεθα,

§ iii.9

καὶ ἔτι περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὁμοίως,
μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἢ τὰς ἐπιστήμας·

μᾶλλον γὰρ περὶ ταύτας διστάζομεν.

§ iii.10

τὸ βουλεύεσθαι δὲ

• ἐν τοῖς
  • ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ,
  • ἀδήλοις δὲ πῶς ἀποβήσεται, καὶ
• ἐν οἷς ἀδιόριστον.

συμβούλους δὲ παραλαμβάνομεν εἰς τὰ μεγάλα,
ἀπιστοῦντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐχ ἱκανοῖς διαγνῶναι.

§ iii.11

βουλευόμεθα δ᾽

• οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν
• ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη.

οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν
οὐδεὶς περὶ τοῦ τέλους·

ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τὸ τέλος
τὸ

• πῶς καὶ
• διὰ τίνων

ἔσται σκοποῦσι·

καὶ

• διὰ πλειόνων μὲν φαινομένου γίνεσθαι
  διὰ τίνος
  • ῥᾷστα καὶ
  • κάλλιστα

  ἐπισκοποῦσι,

• δι᾽ ἑνὸς δ᾽ ἐπιτελουμένου
  • πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται
  • κἀκεῖνο διὰ τίνος,
    ἕως ἂν ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ
    • τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον,
    • ὃ ἐν τῇ εὑρέσει ἔσχατόν ἐστιν.

ὁ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικε

• ζητεῖν καὶ
• ἀναλύειν

τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον
ὥσπερ διάγραμμα

§ iii.12

(φαίνεται δ᾽

• ἡ μὲν ζήτησις οὐ πᾶσα εἶναι βούλευσις,
  οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαί,
• ἡ δὲ βούλευσις πᾶσα ζήτησις),

καὶ τὸ

• ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει
• πρῶτον εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει.

§ iii.13

• κἂν μὲν ἀδυνάτῳ ἐντύχωσιν,
  ἀφίστανται,
  οἷον εἰ χρημάτων δεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε πορισθῆναι·

• ἐὰν δὲ δυνατὸν φαίνηται,
  ἐγχειροῦσι πράττειν.

δυνατὰ δὲ
ἃ δι᾽ ἡμῶν γένοιτ᾽ ἄν·

τὰ γὰρ διὰ τῶν φίλων
δι᾽ ἡμῶν πως ἐστίν·

ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν.

§ iii.14

ζητεῖται δ᾽

• ὁτὲ μὲν τὰ ὄργανα
• ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἡ χρεία αὐτῶν·

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς

• ὁτὲ μὲν δι᾽ οὗ
• ὁτὲ δὲ
  • πῶς ἢ
  • διὰ τίνος.

§ iii.15

ἔοικε δή,
καθάπερ εἴρηται,
ἄνθρωπος εἶναι
ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων·

• ἡ δὲ βουλὴ περὶ τῶν αὑτῷ πρακτῶν,
• αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἕνεκα.

§ iii.16

• οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη βουλευτὸν τὸ τέλος

• ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη·

• οὐδὲ δὴ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, [1113^a]

  οἷον εἰ

  • ἄρτος τοῦτο ἢ
  • πέπεπται ὡς δεῖ·

  αἰσθήσεως γὰρ ταῦτα.

§ iii.17

• βουλευτὸν δὲ καὶ
• προαιρετὸν

τὸ αὐτό,
πλὴν ἀφωρισμένον ἤδη τὸ προαιρετόν·

παύεται γὰρ ἕκαστος ζητῶν πῶς πράξει,
ὅταν

• εἰς αὑτὸν ἀναγάγῃ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ
• αὑτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἡγούμενον·

τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ προαιρούμενον.

§ iii.18

§ iii.19

ὄντος δὲ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν,
καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν·

ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι γὰρ κρίναντες
ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν.

§ iii.20

• ἡ μὲν οὖν προαίρεσις τύπῳ εἰρήσθω,
  καὶ
  • περὶ ποῖά ἐστι καὶ
  • ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη.

Chapter IV

Chapter 6

§ iv.1

• ἡ δὲ βούλησις
  • ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν εἴρηται,
  • δοκεῖ δὲ
    • τοῖς μὲν τἀγαθοῦ εἶναι,
    • τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ.

§ iv.2

συμβαίνει δὲ

• τοῖς μὲν τὸ βουλητὸν τἀγαθὸν λέγουσι
  μὴ εἶναι βουλητὸν
  ὃ βούλεται
  ὁ μὴ ὀρθῶς αἱρούμενος
  • (εἰ γὰρ ἔσται βουλητόν,
    καὶ ἀγαθόν·
  • ἦν δ᾽,
    εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε,
    κακόν),

§ iv.3

• τοῖς δ᾽ αὖ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν βουλητὸν λέγουσι
  • μὴ εἶναι φύσει βουλητόν,
  • ἀλλ᾽ ἑκάστῳ τὸ δοκοῦν·

  ἄλλο δ᾽ ἄλλῳ φαίνεται,
  καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε,
  τἀναντία.

§ iv.4

εἰ δὲ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει,
ἆρα φατέον

• ἁπλῶς μὲν καὶ
  κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν
  βουλητὸν εἶναι
  τἀγαθόν,
• ἑκάστῳ δὲ
  τὸ φαινόμενον;

• τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ
  τὸ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν εἶναι,
• τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ
  τὸ τυχόν,

ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνει ὀρθῶς,
καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τἀληθὲς αὐτῷ φαίνεται.

§ iv.5

καθ᾽ ἑκάστην γὰρ ἕξιν
ἴδιά ἐστι

• καλὰ καὶ
• ἡδέα,

καὶ διαφέρει πλεῖστον ἴσως

• ὁ σπουδαῖος
  τῷ τἀληθὲς ἐν ἑκάστοις ὁρᾶν,

  ὥσπερ

  • κανὼν καὶ
  • μέτρον

  αὐτῶν ὤν.

• ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δὲ
  ἡ ἀπάτη
  διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν
  ἔοικε γίνεσθαι·
  οὐ γὰρ οὖσα
  ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται. [1113^b]

§ iv.6

• αἱροῦνται οὖν τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς ἀγαθόν,
• τὴν δὲ λύπην ὡς κακὸν φεύγουσιν.

Chapter V

Chapter 7

§ v.1

• ὄντος δὴ βουλητοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους,
• βουλευτῶν δὲ καὶ προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος,

• αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις
  • κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἂν εἶεν καὶ
  • ἑκούσιοι.
• αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι περὶ ταῦτα.

§ v.2

ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν δὴ

• καὶ ἡ ἀρετή,
  ὁμοίως δὲ
• καὶ ἡ κακία.

ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν

• τὸ πράττειν, καὶ
• τὸ μὴ πράττειν,

καὶ

• ἐν οἷς τὸ μή,
• καὶ τὸ ναί·

ὥστ᾽

•  
  • εἰ τὸ πράττειν καλὸν ὂν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστί,
  • καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἔσται αἰσχρὸν ὄν, καὶ
•  
  • εἰ τὸ μὴ πράττειν καλὸν ὂν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν,
  • καὶ τὸ πράττειν αἰσχρὸν ὂν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν.

§ v.3

εἰ δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν

• τὰ καλὰ πράττειν καὶ
• τὰ αἰσχρά,

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

• τὸ μὴ πράττειν,

τοῦτο δ᾽ ἦν τὸ

• ἀγαθοῖς καὶ
• κακοῖς

εἶναι,

ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ

• ἐπιεικέσι καὶ
• φαύλοις

εἶναι.

§ v.4

τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὡς

ἔοικε

• τὸ μὲν ψευδεῖ
• τὸ δ᾽ ἀληθεῖ·

§ v.5

ἢ τοῖς γε νῦν εἰρημένοις ἀμφισβητητέον,
καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον

• οὐ φατέον ἀρχὴν εἶναι
• οὐδὲ γεννητὴν τῶν πράξεων ὥσπερ καὶ τέκνων.

§ v.6

εἰ δὲ

• ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ
• μὴ ἔχομεν
  εἰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἀναγαγεῖν
  παρὰ τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν,
  ὧν καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν,

καὶ αὐτὰ

• ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ
• ἑκούσια.

§ v.7

τούτοις δ᾽ ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖσθαι

• καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ᾽ ἑκάστων
• καὶ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν νομοθετῶν·

•  
  • κολάζουσι γὰρ καὶ
  • τιμωροῦνται

  τοὺς δρῶντας μοχθηρά,
  ὅσοι μὴ

  • βίᾳ ἢ
  • δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν

  ἧς μὴ αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι,

• τοὺς δὲ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας τιμῶσιν,

ὡς

• τοὺς μὲν προτρέψοντες
• τοὺς δὲ κωλύσοντες.

καίτοι ὅσα

• μήτ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστὶ
• μήθ᾽ ἑκούσια,

οὐδεὶς προτρέπεται πράττειν,
ὡς οὐδὲν πρὸ ἔργου ὂν τὸ πεισθῆναι μὴ

οὐθὲν γὰρ ἧττον πεισόμεθα αὐτά.

§ v.8

καὶ γὰρ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν,
ἐὰν αἴτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας,

§ v.9

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις,
ὅσα δι᾽ ἀμέλειαν ἀγνοεῖν δοκοῦσιν,
ὡς ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς ὂν τὸ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν·

τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι.

§ v.10

ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὥστε μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι.

ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιούτους γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ζῶντες ἀνειμένως,

αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνέργειαι τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν.

§ v.11

τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν μελετώντων πρὸς ἡντινοῦν ἀγωνίαν ἢ πρᾶξιν·

διατελοῦσι γὰρ ἐνεργοῦντες.

§ v.12

• τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι
  ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα
  αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται,
  κομιδῇ ἀναισθήτου.

§ v.13

• ἔτι δ᾽ ἄλογον
• τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ
• τὂν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον.

εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις πράττει
ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἄδικος,
ἑκὼν ἄδικος ἂν εἴη,

§ v.14

οὐ μὴν ἐάν γε βούληται,

• ἄδικος ὢν παύσεται καὶ
• ἔσται δίκαιος.

οὕτω δὲ

• καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ
• καὶ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ

• ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν τοιούτοις μὴ γενέσθαι,
  διὸ ἑκόντες εἰσίν·
• γενομένοις δ᾽ οὐκέτι ἔστι μὴ εἶναι.

§ v.15

• οὐ μόνον δ᾽ αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς κακίαι ἑκούσιοί εἰσιν,
• ἀλλ᾽ ἐνίοις καὶ αἱ τοῦ σώματος,
  οἷς καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν·

• τοῖς μὲν γὰρ διὰ φύσιν αἰσχροῖς οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιμᾷ,

• τοῖς δὲ δι᾽

  • ἀγυμνασίαν καὶ
  • ἀμέλειαν.

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ

• ἀσθένειαν καὶ
• πήρωσιν·

• οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἂν ὀνειδίσειε τυφλῷ

  • φύσει ἢ
  • ἐκ νόσου ἢ
  • ἐκ πληγῆς,

  ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐλεήσαι·

• τῷ δ᾽ ἐξ

  • οἰνοφλυγίας ἢ
  • ἄλλης ἀκολασίας

  πᾶς ἂν ἐπιτιμήσαι.

§ v.16

τῶν δὴ περὶ τὸ σῶμα κακιῶν

• αἱ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐπιτιμῶνται,
• αἱ δὲ μὴ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν οὔ.

εἰ δ᾽ οὕτω,
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἱ ἐπιτιμώμεναι τῶν κακιῶν
ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἂν εἶεν.

§ v.17

εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι

• πάντες
  • ἐφίενται τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ,
  • τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι, [1114^b] ἀλλ᾽
• ὁποῖός ποθ᾽ ἕκαστός ἐστι,
  τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ·

• εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἕξεώς ἐστί πως αἴτιος, καὶ
  • τῆς φαντασίας ἔσται πως αὐτὸς αἴτιος·
• εἰ δὲ μή,
  1. οὐθεὶς αὑτῷ αἴτιος τοῦ κακοποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ
  2. δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα πράττει,
     διὰ τούτων οἰόμενος αὑτῷ τὸ ἄριστον ἔσεσθαι,
  3. ἡ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις οὐκ αὐθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ
  4. φῦναι δεῖ ὥσπερ ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ᾗ
     • κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ
     • τὸ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθὸν αἱρήσεται, καὶ
  5. ἔστιν εὐφυὴς ᾧ τοῦτο καλῶς πέφυκεν·
  6. τὸ γὰρ
     • μέγιστον καὶ
     • κάλλιστον,

     καὶ ὃ

     • παρ᾽ ἑτέρου
       μὴ οἷόν
       • τε λαβεῖν
       • μηδὲ μαθεῖν,
     • ἀλλ᾽
       • οἷον ἔφυ
       • τοιοῦτον ἕξει,
  7. καὶ
     • τὸ εὖ καὶ
     • τὸ καλῶς

     τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἡ

     • τελεία καὶ
     • ἀληθινὴ

     ἂν εἴη εὐφυΐα.

εἰ δὴ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ,
τί μᾶλλον ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἔσται ἑκούσιον;

§ v.18

ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὁμοίως,

• τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ
• τῷ κακῷ,

• τὸ τέλος
  • φύσει ἢ
  • ὁπωσδήποτε
     
  • φαίνεται καὶ
  • κεῖται,
• τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ
  πρὸς τοῦτο ἀναφέροντες
  πράττουσιν ὁπωσδήποτε.

§ v.19

• εἴτε δὴ τὸ τέλος
  • μὴ φύσει ἑκάστῳ φαίνεται οἱονδήποτε,
  • ἀλλά τι καὶ παρ᾽ αὐτόν ἐστιν,
• εἴτε
  • τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικόν,
  • τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πράττειν ἑκουσίως τὸν σπουδαῖον
    ἡ ἀρετὴ ἑκούσιόν ἐστιν,

οὐθὲν ἧττον καὶ ἡ κακία ἑκούσιον ἂν εἴη·

ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει

• τὸ δι᾽ αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ
• εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει.

§ v.20

εἰ οὖν,
ὥσπερ λέγεται,
ἑκούσιοί εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί
(καὶ γὰρ

• τῶν ἕξεων συναίτιοί πως αὐτοί ἐσμεν, καὶ
• τῷ ποιοί τινες εἶναι τὸ τέλος τοιόνδε τιθέμεθα),

καὶ αἱ κακίαι ἑκούσιοι ἂν εἶεν·

ὁμοίως γάρ.

Chapter 8

§ v.21

• κοινῇ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται ἡμῖν τό τε γένος τύπῳ,
  • ὅτι μεσότητές εἰσιν καὶ
  • ὅτι ἕξεις,
  • ὑφ᾽ ὧν τε γίνονται,
  • ὅτι
    • τούτων πρακτικαὶ καὶ
    • καθ᾽ αὑτάς, καὶ
  • ὅτι
    • ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ
    • ἑκούσιοι, καὶ
    • οὕτως ὡς ἂν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος προστάξῃ.

§ v.22

• οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ
  • αἱ πράξεις ἑκούσιοί εἰσι καὶ
  • αἱ ἕξεις·
• τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεων
  • ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς
  • μέχρι τοῦ τέλους

  κύριοί ἐσμεν,
  εἰδότες τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα,

• τῶν ἕξεων δὲ
  • τῆς ἀρχῆς, [1115^a]

  καθ᾽ ἕκαστα δὲ ἡ πρόσθεσις οὐ γνώριμος,
  ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν·

ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἦν

• οὕτως ἢ
• μὴ οὕτω

χρήσασθαι,
διὰ τοῦτο ἑκούσιοι.

Chapter 9

§ v.23

ἀναλαβόντες δὲ
περὶ ἑκάστης εἴπωμεν

• τίνες εἰσὶ καὶ
• περὶ ποῖα καὶ
• πῶς·

ἅμα δ᾽ ἔσται δῆλον καὶ

• πόσαι εἰσίν.

καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας.