Polytropy

The virtue of courage is seen most clearly

• in single combat,
• to the death,
• between equals.

In saying this, we do not mean

• we should all engage in such contests, or
• any of us should, or
• we cannot be brave without it.

Perhaps we should not be brave at all. Still, it is somehow open to us. It is better than the alternatives, but one has to work that out for oneself.

That is all something I conclude from Aristotle’s analysis of courage, ἡ ἀνδρεία – etymologically speaking, manliness. The analysis takes up chapters vi–ix of Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle’s text is below, as in the previous installments on, and of, the Ethics in this series:

1. Eudemony. Book I, on happiness as an activity of the soul in accordance with
   • virtue, simply, or
   • the best and most complete of virtues, if they are multitudinous,

   in a complete life.

2. Manliness. Book II, on virtue in general as a habit (hexis) that
   • involves making choices and
   • takes up, between vicious extremes, a position in the middle
     • regarding ourselves (as distinct from external things),
     • as determined by
       • reason, namely
       • what a prudent person would determine.
3. Excuses. Book III, chapters i–v, on what is
   1. voluntary,
   2. chosen,
   3. deliberated,
   4. wished, and
   5. vicious.

Aristotle describes courage not quite as I did above, but perhaps his intended audience didn’t need it. He is clear on the following.

• Courage is shown in the face of the fearsome (passim,
  especially § ix.1).
• Death is the most fearsome thing (§ vi.6).
• Willingness to engage in a contest (as in a war) may be attributed to various things, none of which is really courage (chapter viii):
  • civic or national pride (or threat of legal punishment),
  • experience,
  • rage,
  • confidence,
  • ignorance.
• A contest may instead be entered for the sake of beauty (§§ vii.2 and 6 and ix.4).

In using “beauty” here, rather than something like “nobility,” I’m agreeing with Sachs, who, in “Three Little Words,” ridicules the translators who shy away from it:

Aristotle says plainly and repeatedly what it is that moral virtue is for the sake of, but the translators are afraid to give it to you straight. Most of them say it is “the noble.” One of them says it is “the fine.” If these answers went past you without even registering, that is probably because they make so little sense … The word the translators are afraid of is to kalon, “the beautiful.”

Of the contest entered only for beauty’s sake, I propose that it should be each of the following.

1. To the death, because that is the ultimate test of disinterestedness.

2. Single combat, because joint activity would be for the sake of the group. Indeed, according to Aristotle (§ ix.6), the warrior who is truly courageous may be the worse for that, as far as the goals of the commander-in-chief are concerned.

3. Between equals, because the other case is not sporting. In explaining why a storm at sea is not a true test of courage, Aristotle points out the lack of a pair of possibilities that must be faced together (§ vi.12):

   … ἀνδρίζονται ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀλκὴ ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν·

   The ellipsis stands for ἅμα δὲ καὶ, which I’m not too concerned about. I think the rest means,

   … the brave reveal themselves when it’s be strong or die beautifully trying.

Other translations of that last passage do not necessarily confirm my understanding; those of Rackham and of Crisp may come closest:

• Ross (1925)

  We show courage in situations where there is the opportunity of showing prowess or where death is noble.

• Rackham (1926)

  Courage is shown in dangers where a man can defend himself by valour or die nobly.

• Apostle (1975)

  Brave men behave in a manly fashion where there is room for prowess and where death is noble.

• Crisp (2000)

  People act courageously in situations where there is a possibility of sturdy resistance or a noble death.

• Sachs (2002)

  The courageous show courage at once in situations in which there is a defence, or in which dying is a beautiful thing.

• Bartlett and Collins (2011)

  The courageous act like men in circumstances where prowess in battle is possible or dying is noble.

• Reeve (2014)

  People show courage in circumstances in which a display of prowess is possible or in which it is noble to die.

What really can Aristotle mean in the passage in question? Sachs in particular seems to take Aristotle as describing two situations in which courage is shown:

1. “Situations in which there is a defence.”
2. “Situations … in which dying is a beautiful thing.”

What kind of situations would the latter be, if they are not at the same time of the former kind?

When indeed is dying a beautiful thing? A high-school English teacher of mine, Stanley Willis, was excited by the following lines, horribly beautiful, in Fitzgerald’s translation of the Odyssey, Book XXII:

Odysseus’ arrow hit him under the chin
and punched up to the feathers through his throat.
Backward and down he went, letting the winecup fall
from his shocked hand. Like pipes his nostrils jetted
crimson runnels, a river of mortal red,
and one last kick upset his table
knocking the bread and meat to soak in dusty blood.

Surely this is not the kind of beautiful death that shows the courage of the victim (here Antinous, or as Fitzgerald has him Antínoös).

Neither do I suppose Gorgythion has shown particular courage when hit in the chest by the arrow of Teucer, who had been aiming for Hector, even though Homer describes the result as follows in Iliad Book VIII (lines 306–8, Lattimore translation):

He bent drooping his head to one side, as a garden poppy
bends beneath the weight of its yield and the rains of springtime;
so his head bent slack to one side beneath the helm’s weight.

With such an analogy, possibly Homer is showing us that we can see beauty anywhere, at least if we adopt the kind of indifference that the gods show us; perhaps we need to throw off what Maugham in The Razor’s Edge (chapter five, iv) calls

the bitter burden of the sense of sin that has darkened the beauty of the starry night and cast a baleful shadow on the passing pleasures of a world to be enjoyed.

I don’t suppose this is what Aristotle is getting at, unless in a very subtle way.

In chapter viii below, Aristotle uses three passages from the Iliad to illustrate the concept of political courage. Four more passages illustrate passionate courage. Is there a Homeric example of true courage? I’m not sure Hector supplies one in saying (Iliad Book XXII, lines 303–5):

… But now my death is upon me.
Let me at least not die without a struggle, inglorious,
but do some big thing first, that men to come shall know of it.

Hector would seem to expect death at the hands of Achilles, as a civilian at sea might from a raging storm.

Exposing yourself calmly to death is one thing; doing that, and at the same time, trying to avoid death, because you think you have a chance, and you do want to stay alive – this seems like what Aristotle means by courage.

It sounds a bit like toleration, which requires you “to actively sustain your moral beliefs at the same time as you actively resist acting on them,” in the words of Daniel Callcut that I looked at in the context of § II.vii.16, the conclusion of the chapter where Aristotle reviews a list of virtues and other means between extremes.

I wonder if toleration is what allows a tennis match not to degenerate into a an actual duel to the death.

In a serious match, the tennis players defer to the authority of an external referee. In a proper seminar, the members should collectively be referees of themselves. As a participant, is one willing

• to lay one’s thoughts on the table, though they may get cut to pieces?
• to listen to another’s thoughts, though they may supplant one’s own?

I should like to read Aristotle as urging the consideration of these questions.

Let me finally note that I do wonder what Aristotle makes of Socrates’s teachings about the immortality of the soul. If he says somewhere, then I must have read it as a student, but I don’t remember it.

Contents

The arabic chapters are here, in case one wants to refer to Apostle’s translation (among those that I know). The section numbers are within the roman chapters.

• INTRODUCTION (last §§ of Chapter V).
  • Chapter 8
    • Review of virtue (§ 21).
    • Voluntary are both
      • actions, which we control to the end, and
      • habits, which we don’t (§ 22).
  • Chapter 9
    • Lets talk about the virtues, courage first (§ 23).
• COURAGE IN PRACTICE (Chapter VI).
  • It is a mean between
    • fears and
    • rashnesses (§ 1).
  • Does that make it expectation of evil (§ 2)?
  • Fear is appropriate
    • for some things, such as disgrace (§ 3);
    • not for things (such as poverty and disease) not due to one’s own vice – however, these are not matters of courage, which would be shown in war (§ 4).
  • Neither is it
    • cowardly to fear insolence to one’s family, nor
    • brave to face punishment boldly (§ 5).
  • Death
    • is the most terrible thing (§ 6);
    • is not a matter of courage, when at sea or by disease (§ 7).
  • Courage concerns the greatest, most beautiful dangers – in war (§ 8).
  • Honors given by cities and monarchs confirm this (§ 9).
  • Definition. Courage is fearlessness in the face of
    1. a beautiful death and
    2. as much as puts death close at hand, especially
    3. war (§ 10).
  • At sea (or in disease)
    • the professional may be fearless through
      • sanguinity borne of
      • experience (§ 11);
    • there is none of the manliness of the alternative of
      • showing one’s strength or
      • dying beautifully (§ 12).
• COURAGE IN THEORY (Chapter VII).
  • Chapter 10
  • The brave get it right.
    • As
      • fearful things vary (likewise the daring), and
      • some things are fearful for everybody (§ 1),
    • so the courageous person fears them
      • as one ought,
      • as reason has it,
      • for the sake of the beautiful (§ 2).
  • One can go wrong.
    • One can fear
      • more or less,
      • the not fearful as if fearful (§ 3).
    • One can err by fearing (or daring)
      • what one ought not,
      • not as one ought,
      • at the wrong time,
      • etc. (§ 4).
  • How the brave get it right.
    • They act and suffer
      • according to worth,
      • as reason would have it (§ 5).
    • The end of every activity is according to the habit (hexis); the brave person acts and suffers
      • for the sake of the beautiful,
      • according to courage (§ 6).
  • How the others go wrong.
    • If they exceed in
      • fearlessness, they are nameless;
      • rashness,
        • they are rash (§ 7),
        • they are faking it (§§ 8, 9);
      • fearing, they are cowardly … (§§ 10, 11).
    • All together, there are three kinds:
      • cowardly,
      • rash,
      • brave,

      who

      • exceed,
      • fall short,
      • hold the mean.
         
      • The rash are impetuous,
      • the brave are calm (§ 12).
  • Chapter 11
  • Recap. Courage
    • is a mean between
      • the daring and
      • the frightening;
    • respectively
      • chooses and endures, or
      • not,

      what is

      • beautiful or
      • shameful.

      Thus dying is cowardly if it is to avoid poverty, love, pain (§ vii.13).

• FALSE COURAGE (Chapter VIII).
  1. Civic courage.
     • This is
       • effected by penalties and honors (§§ 1, 2),
       • through a virtue, because through shame (§ 3).
     • The like is
       • effected by force,
       • through pain (§§ 4, 5).
  2. Courage of experience. The professional soldier is
     • better at making a show (§ 6),
     • efficient at his job (§ 7),
     • more efficient than the brave § 8),
     • more cowardly than the citizen § 9).
  3. Courage of passion (anger, spirit, thumos).
     • Even animals show this (§ 10).
     • It is motivated
       • not by beauty, like courage proper,
       • but by pain (§ 11).
     • Still, it may support true courage (§ 12).
  4. Courage of sanguinity.
     • The sanguine are confident through belief in their superiority (§ 13).
     • When events prove otherwise, they flee (§ 14).
     • Thus
       • fearlessness and
       • calm

       show courage more in the face of fearful things that are

       • unexpected than
       • expected,

       because then they arise by habit – hexis (§ 15).

  5. Courage of ignorance. The ignorant are
     • like the sanguine, but
     • lacking their self-confidence (§ 16).
  • Thus we see the courageous
    • in appearance and
    • in fact (§ 17).
• PAIN OF COURAGE (Chapter IX).
  • Chapter 12
  • It is more brave to do right with respect to the fearful than to the “daring” (§ 1).
  • Courage is praised because painful – harder to endure than foregoing pleasure (§ 2)
  • Not but that the end of courage is pleasant, like the end of boxing (§ 3).
  • The courageous person suffers the pain of wounding and death
    • unwillingly, but
    • because it is beautiful, and
    • not to would be shameful.
  • The more virtuous and happy,
    • the more pained at death, hence
    • the more courageous (§ 4).
  • Thus of virtue,
    • the activity need not be pleasant, though
    • the end be (§ 5).
  • The better soldier may be the
    • less brave, for having
    • less to give up (§ 6).
  • That’s it for courage (§ 7).

Chapter V

(§§ 1–20 omitted)

[1115^a]

Chapter 8

§ v.21

• κοινῇ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται ἡμῖν τό τε γένος τύπῳ,
  • ὅτι μεσότητές εἰσιν καὶ
  • ὅτι ἕξεις,
  • ὑφ᾽ ὧν τε γίνονται,
  • ὅτι
    • τούτων πρακτικαὶ καὶ
    • καθ᾽ αὑτάς, καὶ
  • ὅτι
    • ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ
    • ἑκούσιοι, καὶ
    • οὕτως ὡς ἂν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος προστάξῃ.

§ v.22

• οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ

  1. αἱ πράξεις

  ἑκούσιοί εἰσι καὶ

  2. αἱ ἕξεις·

  1. τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεων

     • ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς
     • μέχρι τοῦ τέλους

     κύριοί ἐσμεν,
     εἰδότες τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα,

  2. τῶν ἕξεων δὲ

     • τῆς ἀρχῆς, [1115^a]

     καθ᾽ ἕκαστα δὲ ἡ πρόσθεσις οὐ γνώριμος,
     ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν·
     ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἦν

     • οὕτως ἢ
     • μὴ οὕτω

     χρήσασθαι,
     διὰ τοῦτο ἑκούσιοι.

Chapter 9

§ v.23

ἀναλαβόντες δὲ

ἅμα δ᾽ ἔσται δῆλον καὶ

• πόσαι εἰσίν.

καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας.

Chapter VI.

§ vi.1

ὅτι μὲν οὖν

ἤδη φανερὸν γεγένηται·

§ vi.2

φοβούμεθα δὲ δῆλον ὅτι τὰ φοβερά,
ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακά·

διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὁρίζονται
προσδοκίαν κακοῦ.

Appetite, Passion, Desire

I note the flexibility of word-order shown in the first clause: “We fear – it is evident that – the fearful” (or perhaps the fearsome).

• φοβέω, originally “put to flight,” hence “terrify”; Beekes derives this, like φόβος, from φέβομαι.
• φοβερός, ά, όν “fearful” in either sense, as suffering or causing fear.
• ἡ προσδοκία “looking for, expectation.”

Aristotle is relating fear to boldness, but we can relate it also to wishing with an analogy:

fear : evil :: wishing : good.

How thorough is this?

In § III.iv.1, Aristotle raised the question of whether the end of wishing was goodness or the apparently good. We can ask then:

• Do we fear evil or the apparently evil? Presumably, as the serious man (ὁ σπουδαῖος) wishes for goodness, so he fears evil; everybody else, the apparently evil. (Presumably there is a serious woman (σπουδαία) too, but Aristotle hasn’t mentioned her.)
• Does this tell us what good and evil are, or what wishing and fear are?
• Can we describe evil as an end of fear?

In The New Leviathan, Collingwood counts fear is a passion, as Aristotle does (if indeed we can count πάθος as passion). More precisely, for Collingwood, fear one of two forms of passion, the other being anger. These are, respectively,

• giving in to opposition,
• rebelling against it.

When he analyzed the soul, Plato was correct in making anger a kind of bridge between appetite and reason. In particular, an appetite or want, which has no object, can become a desire or wish, which does, only by first becoming a passion; for a passion, by passing from fear to anger, shows the possibility of alternatives.

At the top of the list of passions quoted above (under § vi.1),

• ἐπιθυμία is translated as both “desire” and “appetite”;
• ὀργή is translated as “natural impulse, disposition,” but also “anger.”

Here is how Collingwood starts his Chapter XI, called “Desire.”

11. 1. The word ‘desire’ is sometimes used as a synonym for ‘appetite’. But when properly used it means wishing as distinct from wanting. In appetite or mere wanting a man does not know what he wants, or even that he wants anything; in desire or wishing, he not only knows that he wants something, but he knows what it is that he wants.

11. 11. How does this happen? Knowing a thing is more than merely being conscious of it. Knowing involves asking questions and answering them.¹

1. In this chapter I use the word ‘knowing’, as people often do, for something that is, strictly speaking, rather less than knowing; what, later on, I call propositional thinking. For the distinction between propositional thinking and knowing, see 14. 22.

11. 12. Asking a question implies contemplating alternatives …

If Aristotle accepts the definition of fear as expectation of evil, he would seem to be a rationalist like Hobbes and Spinoza, by Collingwood’s account in Chapter X, “Passion”:

10. 21. ‘Feare’, says Hobbes, ‘is Aversion’ (that is, ‘the Endeavour fromward something’) ‘with opinion of Hurt from the object’.¹ This is a rationalistic account in the seventeenth-century manner, making a thing out to be rational which is not rational. It accounts for fear by reference to our supposed reasons for being afraid. Spinoza makes the same mistake.²

1. Leviathan, p. 35 (‘aversion’, p. 23).
2. Ethica, iii, prop. 39, schol., and Affectuum definitiones,

10. 22. It is a mistake because, although some fears can be partly explained in this manner (for example my fear of a poisonous snake or something I believe to be a poisonous snake), some cannot be thus explained (for example a woman’s fear of a mouse or a boy’s fear of the dark, where there is no ‘opinion of Hurt from the object’, or if there is it is a rationalization of the fear, not a constituent of it or a cause of it), and none cane be wholly thus explained: for if there is belief in danger the right reaction is to keep calm and avoid it, not to fall into that strange paralysis of mind which is called fear.

Even to say that fear has an object, called the fearful, is rationalist, for giving a reason for the fear.

I note earlier mentions of fear (all bolded here by me) in The New Leviathan:

• Chapter VIII, “Hunger and Love”

  8. 27. The ancients said that fear made the gods; and this old error has been refurbished of late with general applause by Rudolf Otto.

  8. 28. The first notion of a god which arises untaught in every man’s mind is much older than fear. It is born of hunger. It is the notion of what a hungry man is pursuing: the infinitely magnified image of himself.

• Chapter IV, “Feeling”

  4. 1. A feeling consists of two things closely connected: first, a sensuous element such as a colour seen, a sound heard, an odour smelt; secondly, what I call the emotional charge on this sensation: the cheerfulness with which you see the colour, the fear with which you hear the noise, the disgust with which you smell the odour.

• Chapter III, “Body As Mind”

  3. 45. I do not call hunger, fear, or love a feeling, though each is rich in elements of feeling; hunger I call an appetite, fear a passion, love a desire or an appetite according to whether it does or does not involve the recognition that ‘this is love’.

• Chapter I, “Body and Mind”

  1. 17. We know, or at least we have been told, a great deal about Man … that he is assured of God, freedom, and immortality, and endowed with means of grace, which he prefers to neglect, and the hope of glory, which he prefers to exchange for the fear of hell-fire …

§ vi.3

φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά,

ἀλλ᾽ οὐ περὶ πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι·

ἔνια γὰρ καὶ

• δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν,
• τὸ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρόν,

ἄφοβος γάρ τις καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος.

§ vi.4

• πενίαν δ᾽ ἴσως οὐ

δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι

• οὐδὲ νόσον,
• οὐδ᾽ ὅλως ὅσα
  • μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας
  • μηδὲ δι᾽ αὑτόν.

ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὁ περὶ ταῦτα ἄφοβος ἀνδρεῖος.

λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτον καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα·

ἔνιοι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις δειλοὶ ὄντες

• ἐλευθέριοί εἰσι καὶ
• πρὸς χρημάτων ἀποβολὴν
  εὐθαρσῶς ἔχουσιν.

§ vi.5

οὐδὲ δὴ εἴ τις

• ὕβριν περὶ
  • παῖδας καὶ
  • γυναῖκα

φοβεῖται ἢ

• φθόνον ἤ
• τι τῶν τοιούτων,

δειλός ἐστιν·

οὐδ᾽ εἰ θαρρεῖ μέλλων μαστιγοῦσθαι,
ἀνδρεῖος.

§ vi.6

• περὶ ποῖα οὖν τῶν φοβερῶν

ὁ ἀνδρεῖος; ἢ

• περὶ τὰ μέγιστα;

οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὑπομενετικώτερος τῶν δεινῶν.

φοβερώτατον δ᾽ ὁ θάνατος·

• πέρας γάρ, καὶ
• οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ
  • οὔτ᾽ ἀγαθὸν
  • οὔτε κακὸν

  εἶναι.

§ vi.7

δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν οὐδὲ περὶ θάνατον τὸν

• ἐν παντὶ

ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι,

§ vi.8

• ἐν τίσιν οὖν; ἢ
• ἐν τοῖς καλλίστοις;

τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ

• ἐν πολέμῳ·

• ἐν
  • μεγίστῳ

  γὰρ καὶ

  • καλλίστῳ

  κινδύνῳ.

§ vi.9

ὁμόλογοι δὲ τούτοις εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ αἱ

• ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ
• παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις.

§ vi.10

§ vi.11

• οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ
  • καὶ ἐν θαλάττῃ
  • καὶ ἐν νόσοις

  ἀδεὴς ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, [1115^b]

• οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς οἱ θαλάττιοι·

• οἳ μὲν γὰρ
  • ἀπεγνώκασι τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ
  • τὸν θάνατον τὸν τοιοῦτον δυσχεραίνουσιν,
• οἳ δὲ εὐέλπιδές εἰσι παρὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν.

§ vi.12

ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίζονται ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν

• ἀλκὴ ἢ
• καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν·

ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δὲ φθοραῖς
οὐδέτερον ὑπάρχει.

Chapter VII

Chapter 10

§ vii.1

τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν

• οὐ πᾶσι μὲν τὸ αὐτό,
• λέγομεν δέ τι καὶ ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον.

• τοῦτο μὲν οὖν παντὶ φοβερὸν τῷ γε νοῦν ἔχοντι·
• τὰ δὲ κατ᾽ ἄνθρωπον διαφέρει
  • μεγέθει
  • καὶ τῷ
    • μᾶλλον καὶ
    • ἧττον·

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα.

§ vii.2

ὁ δὲ ἀνδρεῖος ἀνέκπληκτος ὡς ἄνθρωπος.

φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα,

• ὡς δεῖ δὲ καὶ
• ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑπομενεῖ
• τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα·
  τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς.

§ vii.3

ἔστι δὲ

• • μᾶλλον καὶ
  • ἧττον

  ταῦτα φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἔτι

• τὰ μὴ φοβερὰ
  ὡς τοιαῦτα φοβεῖσθαι.

§ vii.4

γίνεται δὲ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν

• ἣ μὲν ὅτι ὃ οὐ δεῖ,
• ἣ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὡς δεῖ,
• ἣ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὅτε,

ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων·

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα.

§ vii.5

• ὁ μὲν οὖν

  • ἃ δεῖ καὶ
  • οὗ ἕνεκα
     
  • ὑπομένων καὶ
  • φοβούμενος, καὶ
     
  • ὡς δεῖ καὶ
  • ὅτε,

• ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν,

ἀνδρεῖος·

• κατ᾽ ἀξίαν γάρ, καὶ
• ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος,

• πάσχει καὶ
• πράττει

ὁ ἀνδρεῖος.

§ vii.6

τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ
τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν.

†καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν.†

τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος·

ὁρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει.

καλοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος

• ὑπομένει καὶ
• πράττει

τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν.

§ vii.7

τῶν δ᾽ ὑπερβαλλόντων

• ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος
  (εἴρηται δ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρότερον ὅτι πολλά ἐστιν ἀνώνυμα),
  εἴη δ᾽ ἄν τις

  • μαινόμενος ἢ
  • ἀνάλγητος,

  εἰ μηδὲν φοβοῖτο,

  • μήτε σεισμὸν
  • μήτε κύματα,

  καθάπερ φασὶ τοὺς Κελτούς·

• ὁ δὲ τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ θρασύς.

§ vii.8

δοκεῖ δὲ

• καὶ ἀλαζὼν

εἶναι ὁ θρασὺς

• καὶ προσποιητικὸς ἀνδρείας·

• ὡς γοῦν ἐκεῖνος περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ ἔχει,
• οὗτος βούλεται φαίνεσθαι·

ἐν οἷς οὖν δύναται, μιμεῖται.

§ vii.9

διὸ καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν θρασύδειλοι·

ἐν τούτοις γὰρ θρασυνόμενοι
τὰ φοβερὰ οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν.

§ vii.10

ὁ δὲ τῷ φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων δειλός·

καὶ γὰρ

• ἃ μὴ δεῖ καὶ
• ὡς οὐ δεῖ,

καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῷ. [1116^a]

ἐλλείπει δὲ καὶ τῷ θαρρεῖν·

ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ταῖς λύπαις ὑπερβάλλων
μᾶλλον καταφανής ἐστιν.

§ vii.11

δύσελπις δή τις
ὁ δειλός·

πάντα γὰρ φοβεῖται.

ὁ δ᾽ ἀνδρεῖος ἐναντίως·

τὸ γὰρ θαρρεῖν εὐέλπιδος.

§ vii.12

• περὶ ταὐτὰ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν

  • ὅ τε δειλὸς καὶ
  • ὁ θρασὺς καὶ
  • ὁ ἀνδρεῖος,

• διαφόρως δ᾽ ἔχουσι πρὸς αὐτά·

• οἳ μὲν γὰρ
  • ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ
  • ἐλλείπουσιν,
• ὃ δὲ
  • μέσως ἔχει καὶ
  • ὡς δεῖ·

καὶ

• οἱ μὲν θρασεῖς
  • προπετεῖς, καὶ
  • βουλόμενοι πρὸ τῶν κινδύνων
    ἐν αὐτοῖς δ᾽ ἀφίστανται,
• οἱ δ᾽ ἀνδρεῖοι
  • ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ὀξεῖς,
  • πρότερον δ᾽ ἡσύχιοι.

Chapter 11

§ vii.13

καθάπερ οὖν εἴρηται,
ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ

• θαρραλέα καὶ
• φοβερά,

ἐν οἷς εἴρηται, καὶ

• ὅτι καλὸν
  • αἱρεῖται καὶ
  • ὑπομένει, ἢ
• ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή.

τὸ δ᾽ ἀποθνήσκειν φεύγοντα

• πενίαν ἢ
• ἔρωτα ἤ
• τι λυπηρὸν

• οὐκ ἀνδρείου,
• ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δειλοῦ·

μαλακία γὰρ τὸ φεύγειν τὰ ἐπίπονα, καὶ

• οὐχ ὅτι καλὸν ὑπομένει,
• ἀλλὰ φεύγων κακόν.

ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτόν τι,

Chapter VIII

§ viii.1

λέγονται δὲ καὶ ἕτεραι κατὰ πέντε τρόπους·

πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτική·

μάλιστα γὰρ ἔοικεν.

δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους
οἱ πολῖται
διὰ

• τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιτίμια καὶ
• τὰ ὀνείδη καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμάς·

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνδρειότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι παρ᾽ οἷς

• οἱ δειλοὶ ἄτιμοι καὶ
• οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἔντιμοι.

§ viii.2

τοιούτους δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ,

§ viii.3

ὡμοίωται δ᾽ αὕτη μάλιστα τῇ πρότερον εἰρημένῃ,
ὅτι δι᾽ ἀρετὴν γίνεται·

• δι᾽ αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ
• διὰ
  • καλοῦ ὄρεξιν
    (τιμῆς γάρ) καὶ
  • φυγὴν ὀνείδους,
    αἰσχροῦ ὄντος.

§ viii.4

τάξαι δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ
τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀναγκαζομένους
εἰς ταὐτό·

χείρους δ᾽,
ὅσῳ

• • οὐ δι᾽ αἰδῶ
  • ἀλλὰ διὰ φόβον

  αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ

• φεύγοντες

  • οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν
  • ἀλλὰ τὸ λυπηρόν·

ἀναγκάζουσι γὰρ οἱ κύριοι,

§ viii.5

• καὶ οἱ
  • προστάττοντες, κἂν ἀναχωρῶσι
  • τύπτοντες,

τὸ αὐτὸ δρῶσι, [1116^b]

• καὶ οἱ πρὸ
  • τῶν τάφρων καὶ
  • τῶν τοιούτων

  παρατάττοντες·

πάντες γὰρ ἀναγκάζουσιν.

§ viii.6

δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ
ἡ ἐμπειρία ἡ περὶ ἕκαστα
ἀνδρεία εἶναι·

τοιοῦτοι δὲ

• ἄλλοι μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις,
• ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δ᾽ οἱ στρατιῶται·
  δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου,
  ἃ μάλιστα συνεωράκασιν οὗτοι·

φαίνονται δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι,
ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν οἱ ἄλλοι
οἷά ἐστιν.

§ viii.7

εἶτα

• ποιῆσαι καὶ
• μὴ παθεῖν

μάλιστα δύνανται ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας,

• δυνάμενοι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ
• τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ὁποῖα ἂν εἴη
  • καὶ πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι
  • καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ παθεῖν

  κράτιστα·

§ viii.8

ὥσπερ οὖν

• ἀνόπλοις ὡπλισμένοι

μάχονται καὶ

• ἀθληταὶ ἰδιώταις·

καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀγῶσιν

• οὐχ οἱ ἀνδρειότατοι μαχιμώτατοί εἰσιν,
• ἀλλ᾽
  • οἱ μάλιστα ἰσχύοντες καὶ
  • τὰ σώματα ἄριστα ἔχοντες.

§ viii.9

οἱ στρατιῶται δὲ δειλοὶ γίνονται,
ὅταν

• ὑπερτείνῃ ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ
• λείπωνται
  • τοῖς πλήθεσι καὶ
  • ταῖς παρασκευαῖς·

• πρῶτοι γὰρ φεύγουσι,
• τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ μένοντα ἀποθνήσκει,
  ὅπερ κἀπὶ τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ συνέβη.

• τοῖς μὲν γὰρ
  • αἰσχρὸν τὸ φεύγειν καὶ
  • ὁ θάνατος τῆς τοιαύτης σωτηρίας αἱρετώτερος·
• οἳ δὲ καὶ
  • ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκινδύνευον
    ὡς κρείττους ὄντες,
  • γνόντες δὲ
    φεύγουσι,
    τὸν θάνατον μᾶλλον τοῦ αἰσχροῦ
    φοβούμενοι·

ὁ δ᾽ ἀνδρεῖος οὐ τοιοῦτος.

§ viii.10

καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν φέρουσιν·

ἀνδρεῖοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ
οἱ διὰ θυμὸν
ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς τρώσαντας φερόμενα,
ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θυμοειδεῖς·

ἰτητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς
πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους,

πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔοικε σημαίνειν τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ

• ἔγερσιν καὶ
• ὁρμήν.

§ viii.11

• οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὸ καλὸν πράττουσιν,
• ὁ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς·

• τὰ θηρία δὲ διὰ λύπην·
  • διὰ γὰρ τὸ πληγῆναι ἢ
  • διὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι,

  ἐπεὶ ἐάν γε

  • ἐν ὕλῃ ἢ
  • ἐν ἕλει

  ᾖ, οὐ προσέρχονται.

οὐ δή ἐστιν ἀνδρεῖα
διὰ τὸ ὑπ᾽

• ἀλγηδόνος καὶ
• θυμοῦ

ἐξελαυνόμενα
πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον
ὁρμᾶν,
οὐθὲν τῶν δεινῶν προορῶντα,

§ viii.12

οὐ δή ἐστιν ἀνδρεῖα
τὰ δι᾽

• ἀλγηδόνος ἢ
• θυμοῦ

ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον.

• φυσικωτάτη δ᾽

ἔοικεν
ἡ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν εἶναι,
καὶ

• προσλαβοῦσα
  • προαίρεσιν καὶ
  • τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα

  ἀνδρεία εἶναι.

καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι δὴ

• ὀργιζόμενοι μὲν ἀλγοῦσι,
• τιμωρούμενοι δ᾽ ἥδονται·

οἱ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα μαχόμενοι

• μάχιμοι μέν,
• οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι δέ·

• οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ καλὸν
• οὐδ᾽ ὡς ὁ λόγος,
• ἀλλὰ διὰ πάθος·

παραπλήσιον δ᾽ ἔχουσί τι.

§ viii.13

οὐδὲ δὴ οἱ εὐέλπιδες ὄντες ἀνδρεῖοι·

διὰ γὰρ τὸ

• πολλάκις καὶ
• πολλοὺς

νενικηκέναι
θαρροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις·

παρόμοιοι δέ,
ὅτι ἄμφω θαρραλέοι·

ἀλλ᾽

• οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὰ πρότερον εἰρημένα θαρραλέοι,
• οἳ δὲ διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι
  • κράτιστοι εἶναι καὶ
  • μηθὲν ἂν παθεῖν.

§ viii.14

τοιοῦτον δὲ ποιοῦσι καὶ
οἱ μεθυσκόμενοι·

εὐέλπιδες γὰρ γίνονται.

ὅταν δὲ αὐτοῖς μὴ συμβῇ τὰ τοιαῦτα,
φεύγουσιν·

ἀνδρείου δ᾽ ἦν τὰ φοβερὰ ἀνθρώπῳ

• ὄντα καὶ
• φαινόμενα

ὑπομένειν, ὅτι

• καλὸν καὶ
• αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή.

§ viii.15

διὸ καὶ ἀνδρειοτέρου δοκεῖ εἶναι
τὸ

• ἐν τοῖς αἰφνιδίοις φόβοις
  • ἄφοβον καὶ
  • ἀτάραχον

  εἶναι

• ἢ ἐν τοῖς προδήλοις·

• ἀπὸ ἕξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον ἦν,
• ὅτι ἧττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς·

• τὰ προφανῆ μὲν γὰρ κἂν ἐκ λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις προέλοιτο,
• τὰ δ᾽ ἐξαίφνης κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν.

§ viii.16

ἀνδρεῖοι δὲ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες,
καὶ εἰσὶν

• οὐ πόρρω τῶν εὐελπίδων,
• χείρους δ᾽
  ὅσῳ ἀξίωμα
  • οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν,
  • ἐκεῖνοι δέ.

διὸ καὶ μένουσί τινα χρόνον·

οἱ δ᾽ ἠπατημένοι, ἐὰν γνῶσιν ὅτι ἕτερον ἢ ὑποπτεύσωσι, φεύγουσιν·

ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἔπαθον περιπεσόντες τοῖς Λάκωσιν ὡς Σικυωνίοις.

§ viii.17

• οἵ τε δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι

εἴρηνται ποῖοί τινες, καὶ

• οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀνδρεῖοι.

Chapter IX

Chapter 12

§ ix.1

περὶ

• θάρρη δὲ καὶ
• φόβους

ἡ ἀνδρεία οὖσα

• οὐχ ὁμοίως περὶ ἄμφω ἐστίν,
• ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά·

• ὁ γὰρ
  • ἐν τούτοις ἀτάραχος καὶ
  • περὶ ταῦθ᾽ ὡς δεῖ ἔχων

  ἀνδρεῖος μᾶλλον

• ἢ ὁ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα.

§ ix.2

• καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινεῖται·

χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν ἢ τῶν ἡδέων ἀπέχεσθαι. [1117^b]

§ ix.3

οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ,
ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλῳ δ᾽ ἀφανίζεσθαι,

§ ix.4

εἰ δὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν,

• • ὁ μὲν θάνατος καὶ
  • τὰ τραύματα
     
  • λυπηρὰ

  τῷ ἀνδρείῳ καὶ

  • ἄκοντι

  ἔσται,

• ὑπομενεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ

  • ὅτι καλὸν ἢ
  • ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή.

¶

καὶ

• ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχῃ πᾶσαν καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερος ᾖ,
• μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ λυπήσεται·

τῷ τοιούτῳ γὰρ μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον, καὶ
οὗτος μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἀποστερεῖται εἰδώς,
λυπηρὸν δὲ τοῦτο.

ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀνδρεῖος,
ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον,
ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ καλὸν ἀντ᾽ ἐκείνων αἱρεῖται.

§ ix.5

οὐ δὴ ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς
τὸ ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει,
πλὴν ἐφ᾽ ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται.

§ ix.6

στρατιώτας δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει

• μὴ τοὺς τοιούτους

κρατίστους εἶναι,

• ἀλλὰ τοὺς
  • ἧττον μὲν ἀνδρείους,
  • ἄλλο δ᾽ ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν ἔχοντας·
     
  • ἕτοιμοι γὰρ οὗτοι πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, καὶ
  • τὸν βίον πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη καταλλάττονται.

§ ix.7

περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω·

τί δ᾽ ἐστίν, οὐ χαλεπὸν τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.