Polytropy

We are reading the last part of Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. The subject is ἡ σωφροσύνη. This might be given various names in English, such as temperance, moderation, modesty, sobriety, sanity, prudence, continence, chastity. Our question is not so much what the best word for sôphrosyne is, but what Aristotle means by it, and how this fits with our own experience.

Like all virtues, σωφροσύνη has two attendant vices:

• ἡ ἀκολασία, licence, licentiousness, intemperance, profligacy;
• ἡ ἀναισθησία, “anaesthesia,” insensitivity.

According to the Philosopher, the latter vice is hardly seen; however, his ad hoc name for it suggests a property that one may not actually choose. We can be anaesthetized against our will, and we can be born with sensory organs that are not very sensitive.

Still, one has the choice of what to do with what one has. We have already seen the former vice, akolasia, described in § 10 of chapter v, whose burden is that vice in general is voluntary:

Yet by living loosely, people are themselves the causes of their becoming such a sort and of their being unjust and licentious (ἀκολάστους) – the former, by doing vicious things; the latter, by passing the time in drinking bouts and the like.

The translation here is by Bartlett and Collins. I note that the Oxford English Dictionary has words

• “acolastic,” found by the readers in reference works, but apparently not in actual use;
• “acolaust,” found rarely, referring to a person to whom the former word would apply.

The latter word is tentatively derived, like the former one, from ἀκόλαστος, but I wonder whether it is influenced by “apolaustic” (with P rather than C or K), from ἀπολαυστικός. Aristotle uses this word in § I.v.2 to describe one of three ways of life (the others being political and contemplative).

Our present reading features no discussion of a problem seen in temperance movements today, not to mention the Hippolytus of Euripides or the Iliad of Homer: putative moderation can be extremism.

We do have a lot of the Ethics yet to read. I have already found reason to mention the Hippolytus and the Iliad in the context of Book II, § vii.14, where Aristotle observes that shame is not a virtue, apparently because of something like the ambiguity in what we call moderation. Shame is normally praised, like a virtue; however, one can have the wrong amount of it. The person who is

• καταπλήξ – “stricken” or bashful – has an excess of shame;
• ἀναίσχυντος, shameless, has a deficiency.

By the account of Apollo in Iliad Book XXIV, shame is a source of both harm and profit.

The whole Iliad is the story of how the intemperance of Agamemnon provokes the intemperance of Achilles. Aristotle’s scope seems too narrow for that kind of intemperance though, or else he is being reductionist. The virtue and vices that he is taking up concern

• ἡ ἡδονή, pleasure, and
• ἡ λύπη, pain,

but only in their bodily versions. Hence we are going to look at αἱ αἰσθήσαι, the senses:

• ἡ ὄψις, seeing;
• ἡ ἀκοή, hearing;
• ἡ ὀσμή (ἡ ὄσφρησις), smelling;
• ἡ γεῦσις, tasting;
• ἡ ἁφή, touching.

The excess that characterizes the licentious person is going to come specifically through the sense of touch, and then only

• in parts of the body, either
  • the genitals, since there is mention of
    • the conjugal bed (§ xi.1) and
    • the pleasures of Aphrodite (§ x.9);
  • the throat, since a gourmand wants his to be longer than a crane’s (§ x.10);
• not over the whole body, as in massage or bathing (§ x.11).

That last exception, concerning the pleasures of the gymnasium or bathhouse: it could be one of the incongruities that Leo Strauss takes for a sign that the author has a secret message. Would it not be immoderate to spend all of your time at the gym?

There may be something wrong with spending your time thus; it just isn’t called immoderate, or at least it isn’t called “acolastic.” Neither is it is acolastic to look too much at things, such as paintings, although here Aristotle explicitly acknowledges the possibility of excess § x.3. Why is only excessive tasting and feeling of things singled out as acolastic? For an answer, I note the following.

• You can hardly taste without swallowing.
• Feeling around the genitals leads to ejaculation – even in women, as it seems Aristotle was aware: see “The history of female ejaculation,” by Joanna B Korda et al., The journal of sexual medicine, vol. 7,5 (2010): 1965–75.

The problem then would seem to be with

• taking things into the body, and
• sending things out.

Thus does Aristotle lead us to a physical or corporal explanation what’s wrong with debauchery, libertinism, alcoholism.

He does proceed to a more mental, or “spiritual,” or “psychic” account, involving consideration of the analogy,

The “ratios” here are of virtuous means to the corresponding vicious excesses, concerning respectively pleasure and fear. The concern is different in either case. Back in Book II, chapter vii, the mean regarding

• fear and boldness is courage,
• pleasure and pain is temperance.

Here,

• fear and boldness are opposites,
• pleasure and pain are opposites,

but not in the same way:

• Fear and boldness are at opposite ends of a spectrum, so that excess in one is deficiency in the other. Actually it is not that simple, since fear has another opposite, which is fearlessness. As Aristotle says (§ II.vii.2), whoever
  • exceeds in fear, but is deficient in boldness, is cowardly;
  • exceeds in boldness, is rash;
  • exceeds in fearlessness, has no particular name.
• Excessive pursuit of pleasure produces pain as well.

Aristotle observed in II.v.2 that pleasure and pain “follow” or “accompany” the passions. The licentious person exceeds not in pleasure, but in passion, at least in the sense of “undergoing,” that is, suffering. The temperate person is free of this suffering.

By contrast, while fear might seem to be a kind of pain, the courageous person is not free of it, but endures it.

In “Thoreau and Anacreon,” I noted how Henry David worked on something like temperance; for he said in Walden, referring metaphorically to his earlier book,

instead of studying how to make it worth men’s while to buy my baskets, I studied rather how to avoid the necessity of selling them.

Instead of studying how to satisfy one’s desires, one might study how not to have them. However, it is not clear that Aristotle is “really” advocating Stoicism or Buddhism.

Contents

Arabic and Latin Chapters

• Chapter 13
  • Chapter X, §§ 1–11
  • Chapter XI, §§ 1–5
• Chapter 14
  • Chapter XI, §§ 6–8
• Chapter 15
  • Chapter XII, §§ 1–10

Roman Chapters and Their Sections

• Chapter X
  • TEMPERANCE (ΣΩΦΡΟΣΥΝΗ) is
    • like courage, a virtue of the irrational part of the soul;
    • thus, a mean;
    • like licence (licentiousness, profligacy, intemperance), concerned
      • with pleasure mainly,
      • less with pain, and differently (§ 1).
  • PLEASURES (ΗΔΟΝΑΙ) are the concern of temperance and licence:
    • not
      • psychic (mental) pleasures (§ 2), or
      • certain somatic (bodily) pleasures –
        • the visual, though there can be rightness, excess, and defect here (§ 3);
        • the aural (§ 4);
        • the olfactory, except accidentally, as a reminder of what one really desires (§§ 5 and 6) –

        other animals take none of those pleasures, except accidentally (§ 7);

    • but only the pleasures of
      • taste and
      • touch,

      which, being shared with the other animals, are slavish and bestial (§ 8);
      what gives pleasure is

      • not the tasting as such (for the licentious, at least),
      • but the enjoyment, be it of
        • food,
        • drink, or
        • what is called “aphrodisiac” (§ 9).
  • LICENCE (ΑΚΟΛΑΣΙΑ) is
    • reproachable, as belonging to us
      • not quâ human,
      • but quâ animal;
    • concerned with pleasures
      • of the most common senses (§ 10), but
      • not the overall kind, as in the gymnasium:
        • massage (scratching),
        • warmth (§ 11).
• Chapter XI
  • DESIRES (ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑΙ).
    • Some are
      • common and
      • “physical” (natural),

      as for

      • nourishment
        • dry or
        • wet, or
      • the conjugal bed.
    • Others are
      • peculiar and
      • “epithetic” (adventitious) (§ 1),
      • yet still somewhat natural (§ 2).
  • NATURAL (ΦΥΣΙΚΑΙ) DESIRES are abused
    • by few people,
    • in only one way:
      • excess, as in gluttony (§ 3).
  • SPECIAL (ΙΔΙΟΙ) DESIRES are abused
    • by many people,
    • in many ways: by being
      • the wrong ones, or
      • pursued
        • more than by most people, or
        • in the wrong way (§ 4).
  • PAINS (ΛΥΠΑΙ).
    • Pleasure in excess is clearly
      • licentious and
      • blameworthy.
    • Pain is
      • not as with courage,
        • the temperate enduring pain,
        • the licentious not;
      • but rather, when pleasure is absent, or abstained from,
        • the temperate are not pained;
        • the licentious
          • suffer more pain than one ought (§ 5),
          • paradoxically, being pained by pleasure (§  6).
  • DEFECTIVE PLEASURE (ΑΝΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΑ).
    • It is rare and inhuman.
    • Even animals haven’t got it.
    • It has no name (§ 7).
  • THE MODERATE ONE (ΣΩΦΡΩΝ) holds the mean:
    • not taking pleasure
      • in what the licentious do, or
      • in what one ought not, or
      • in anything too much;
    • when pleasure is absent,
      • not pained,
      • but desiring according to right reason:
        • moderately,
        • not
          • more than one ought,
          • when one ought not,
          • what one ought not: only
            • what is good for
              • health and
              • conditioning, and
            • of other things, what is not
              • an impediment to those, or
              • contrary to beauty, or
              • too costly (§ 8).
• Chapter XII
  • COWARDICE (ΔΕΙΛΙΑ). Than this, licence seems more voluntary:
    • licence concerns pleasure, which is taken;
    • cowardice concerns pain, which is avoided (§ 1).

    Moreover,

    • Pain
      • changes, even
      • destroys,

      the nature of one’s habit (τὴν τοῦ ἔχοντος φύσιν);

    • Pleasure does not and is thus more
      • voluntary, hence
      • reproachable, because
      • more easily habituated to,
        • pleasures being numerous,
        • the habituation, without danger,

        unlike with pain (§ 2).

  • PARTICULARS (ΤΑ ΚΑΘ’ ΕΚΑΣΤΑ).
    • Cowardice
      • itself is
        • painless and thus
        • voluntary;
      • in instances is
        • painful, thus seeming
        • forced (§ 3).
    • Licence is
      • voluntary in instances, since one is
        • desiring and
        • longing;
      • less so overall, since
        • nobody wants to be licentious (§ 4).
  • CHILDREN (ΠΑΙΔΙΑ).
    • The terminology is the same:
      • ἀκολασία means
        • licentiousness;
        • lack of discipline, as in a child (§  5).
      • κεκολάσθαι, being chastised or trimmed, is needed for
        • longing for the ugly,
        • excessive growth (§ 6).
    • Longing grows too great, as in a child, if not
      • obedient and
      • under control.

      For the thoughtless person:

      • Longing for pleasure is insatiable and ubiquitous.
      • Acting on desire increases it.
      • Reasoning is overpowered, if desires grow too
        • great and
        • strong.
      • These then must be
        • measured,
        • few, and
        • not contrary to reason (§ 7).
    • In sum,
      • as a child must live according the command of a pedagogue,
      • so desire (the “epithymetic,” τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν) according to reason (§  8).
  • THE TEMPERATE ONE: in him (or her), since
    • desire and
    • reason

    both aim for beauty, they must be in harmony:

    • the person desires
      • what,
      • as, and
      • when

      one ought;

    • that’s what reason commands anyway (§ 9).

  That’s it for temperance (§ 10).

[1117^b]

Chapter 13

Chapter X

§ x.1

μετὰ δὲ ταύτην περὶ σωφροσύνης λέγωμεν·

δοκοῦσι γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὗται εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί.

• ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης
  ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς
  ἡ σωφροσύνη,
  εἴρηται ἡμῖν·

  • ἧττον γὰρ καὶ
  • οὐχ ὁμοίως

  ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας·

• ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ
  ἡ ἀκολασία
  φαίνεται.

περὶ ποίας οὖν τῶν ἡδονῶν,
νῦν ἀφορίσωμεν.

§ x.2

διῃρήσθωσαν δὴ

• αἱ ψυχικαὶ καὶ
• αἱ σωματικαί,

ἑκάτερος γὰρ τούτων χαίρει,
οὗ φιλητικός ἐστιν,

• οὐδὲν πάσχοντος τοῦ σώματος,
• ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς διανοίας·

οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς

• οὔτε σώφρονες
• οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι

λέγονται.

ὁμοίως δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ οἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὅσαι μὴ σωματικαί εἰσιν·

• τοὺς γὰρ
  • φιλομύθους καὶ
  • διηγητικοὺς καὶ
  • περὶ τῶν τυχόντων κατατρίβοντας τὰς ἡμέρας ἀδολέσχας,

ἀκολάστους δ᾽ οὐ λέγομεν, [1118^a]

• οὐδὲ τοὺς λυπουμένους ἐπὶ
  • χρήμασιν ἢ
  • φίλοις.

§ x.3

περὶ δὲ τὰς σωματικὰς εἴη ἂν ἡ σωφροσύνη,

• οὐ πάσας δὲ
• οὐδὲ ταύτας·

οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὄψεως,

• οὔτε σώφρονες
• οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι

λέγονται·

καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι

• καὶ ὡς δεῖ

χαίρειν καὶ τούτοις,

• καὶ καθ᾽
  • ὑπερβολὴν καὶ
  • ἔλλειψιν.

§ x.4

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν·

• τοὺς γὰρ ὑπερβεβλημένως χαίροντας
  • μέλεσιν ἢ
  • ὑποκρίσει

οὐθεὶς ἀκολάστους λέγει,

• οὐδὲ τοὺς ὡς δεῖ
  σώφρονας.

§ x.5

οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὀσμήν,
πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός·

χαίρουσι γὰρ τούτοις οἱ ἀκόλαστοι,
ὅτι διὰ τούτων ἀνάμνησις γίνεται αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιθυμημάτων.

§ x.6

ἴδοι δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους,
ὅταν πεινῶσι,
χαίροντας ταῖς τῶν βρωμάτων ὀσμαῖς·

τὸ δὲ τοιούτοις χαίρειν ἀκολάστου·

τούτῳ γὰρ ἐπιθυμήματα ταῦτα.

§ x.7

οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις
κατὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰσθήσεις
ἡδονὴ
πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

§ x.8

ἐστὶν

• ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα κοινωνεῖ,
• ὅθεν
  • ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ
  • θηριώδεις

  φαίνονται·

§ x.9

φαίνονται δὲ καὶ τῇ γεύσει ἐπὶ

• μικρὸν ἢ
• οὐθὲν

χρῆσθαι·

τῆς γὰρ γεύσεώς ἐστιν ἡ κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν,

• οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαίρουσι τούτοις, ἢ
• οὐχ οἵ γε ἀκόλαστοι,
• ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπολαύσει,
  ἣ γίνεται πᾶσα δι᾽ ἁφῆς
  • καὶ ἐν σιτίοις
  • καὶ ἐν ποτοῖς
  • καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις λεγομένοις.

§ x.10

[1118^b]

§ x.11

τὸ δὴ τοιούτοις

• χαίρειν καὶ
• μάλιστα ἀγαπᾶν

θηριῶδες.

καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐλευθεριώταται τῶν διὰ τῆς ἁφῆς ἡδονῶν ἀφῄρηνται,

• οὐ γὰρ περὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἡ τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἁφή,
• ἀλλὰ περί τινα μέρη.

Chapter XI

§ xi.1

τῶν δ᾽ ἐπιθυμιῶν

• αἳ μὲν κοιναὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι,
• αἳ δ᾽ ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι·

οἷον

• ἡ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς φυσική·

  πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ

  • ὁ ἐνδεὴς

    • ξηρᾶς ἢ
    • ὑγρᾶς

    τροφῆς, ὁτὲ δὲ

    • ἀμφοῖν,

    καὶ

  • εὐνῆς,
    φησὶν Ὅμηρος,

    ὁ

    • νέος καὶ
    • ἀκμάζων·

• τὸ δὲ

  • τοιᾶσδε ἢ
  • τοιᾶσδε,

  οὐκέτι πᾶς,
  οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν.

§ xi.2

διὸ φαίνεται ἡμέτερον εἶναι.

οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἔχει γέ τι καὶ φυσικόν·

• ἕτερα γὰρ ἑτέροις ἐστὶν ἡδέα, καὶ
• ἔνια πᾶσιν ἡδίω τῶν τυχόντων.

§ xi.3

• ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἐπιθυμίαις

  • ὀλίγοι

  ἁμαρτάνουσι καὶ

  • ἐφ᾽ ἕν,
  • ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον·

  τὸ γὰρ

  • ἐσθίειν τὰ τυχόντα ἢ
  • πίνειν ἕως ἂν ὑπερπλησθῇ,

  ὑπερβάλλειν ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ πλήθει·

  ἀναπλήρωσις γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας
  ἡ φυσικὴ ἐπιθυμία.

  διὸ λέγονται οὗτοι γαστρίμαργοι,
  ὡς παρὰ τὸ δέον πληροῦντες αὐτήν.

  τοιοῦτοι δὲ γίνονται
  οἱ λίαν ἀνδραποδώδεις.

§ xi.4

• περὶ δὲ τὰς ἰδίας τῶν ἡδονῶν

  • πολλοὶ καὶ
  • πολλαχῶς

  ἁμαρτάνουσιν.

  τῶν γὰρ φιλοτοιούτων λεγομένων

  • ἢ τῷ χαίρειν οἷς μὴ δεῖ,
  • ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί,
  • ἢ μὴ ὡς δεῖ,

  κατὰ πάντα δ᾽
  οἱ ἀκόλαστοι ὑπερβάλλουσιν·

  • καὶ γὰρ χαίρουσιν ἐνίοις οἷς οὐ δεῖ
    (μισητὰ γάρ),
  • καὶ εἴ τισι δεῖ χαίρειν τῶν τοιούτων,
    μᾶλλον
    • ἢ δεῖ καὶ
    • ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ χαίρουσιν.

§ xi.5

• ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβολὴ
  ὅτι
  • ἀκολασία καὶ
  • ψεκτόν,

  δῆλον·

• περὶ δὲ τὰς λύπας
  • οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας
    • τῷ ὑπομένειν λέγεται σώφρων οὐδ᾽
    • ἀκόλαστος τῷ μή,
  • ἀλλ᾽
    • ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος τῷ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ
      ὅτι τῶν ἡδέων οὐ τυγχάνει
      (καὶ τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ ἡδονή),
    • ὁ δὲ σώφρων
      • τῷ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ καὶ
      • τῷ ἀπέχεσθαι

      τοῦ ἡδέος. [1119^a]

Chapter 14

§ xi.6

ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀκόλαστος ἐπιθυμεῖ

• τῶν ἡδέων πάντων ἢ
• τῶν μάλιστα,

καὶ ἄγεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὥστε
ἀντὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ταῦθ᾽ αἱρεῖσθαι·

διὸ καὶ λυπεῖται

• καὶ ἀποτυγχάνων
• καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν·

μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία·

ἀτόπῳ δ᾽ ἔοικε τὸ δι᾽ ἡδονὴν λυπεῖσθαι.

§ xi.7

• ἐλλείποντες δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ
• ἧττον ἢ δεῖ χαίροντες

οὐ πάνυ γίνονται·

οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπική ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία·

καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα διακρίνει τὰ βρώματα, καὶ

• τοῖς μὲν χαίρει
• τοῖς δ᾽ οὔ·

εἰ δέ

• τῳ μηδέν ἐστιν ἡδὺ
• μηδὲ διαφέρει ἕτερον ἑτέρου,

πόρρω ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἄνθρωπος εἶναι·

οὐ τέτευχε δ᾽ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὀνόματος
διὰ τὸ μὴ πάνυ γίνεσθαι.

§ xi.8

ὁ δὲ σώφρων μέσως μὲν περὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἔχει·

• οὔτε γὰρ ἥδεται
  • οἷς μάλιστα ὁ ἀκόλαστος,
    ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δυσχεραίνει,
  • οὐδ᾽ ὅλως οἷς μὴ δεῖ
  • οὐδὲ σφόδρα τοιούτῳ οὐδενί,
• οὔτ᾽ ἀπόντων
  • λυπεῖται οὐδ᾽
  • ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἢ
    • μετρίως,
    • οὐδὲ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ,
    • οὐδ᾽ ὅτε μὴ δεῖ,
    • οὐδ᾽ ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν·
      • ὅσα δὲ
        • πρὸς ὑγίειάν ἐστιν ἢ
        • πρὸς εὐεξίαν

        ἡδέα ὄντα,
        τούτων ὀρέξεται

        • μετρίως καὶ
        • ὡς δεῖ, καὶ
      • τῶν ἄλλων ἡδέων
        • μὴ ἐμποδίων τούτοις ὄντων ἢ
        • παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ
        • ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν.

ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων
μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς
τῆς ἀξίας·

ὁ δὲ σώφρων

• οὐ τοιοῦτος,
• ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος.

Chapter 15

Chapter XII

§ xii.1

ἑκουσίῳ δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν
ἡ ἀκολασία
τῆς δειλίας.

• ἣ μὲν γὰρ δι᾽ ἡδονήν,
• ἣ δὲ διὰ λύπην,

ὧν

• τὸ μὲν αἱρετόν,
• τὸ δὲ φευκτόν·

§ xii.2

καὶ

• ἡ μὲν λύπη
  • ἐξίστησι καὶ
  • φθείρει

  τὴν τοῦ ἔχοντος φύσιν,

• ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτο ποιεῖ.
  • μᾶλλον δὴ ἑκούσιον. διὸ καὶ
  • ἐπονειδιστότερον·
  • καὶ γὰρ ἐθισθῆναι ῥᾷον πρὸς αὐτά·
    • πολλὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα,
      καὶ οἱ ἐθισμοὶ ἀκίνδυνοι,
    • ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν ἀνάπαλιν.

§ xii.3

δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν οὐχ ὁμοίως ἑκούσιον
ἡ δειλία εἶναι
τοῖς καθ᾽ ἕκαστον·

• αὐτὴ μὲν γὰρ ἄλυπος,
• ταῦτα δὲ διὰ λύπην ἐξίστησιν,
  ὥστε
  • καὶ τὰ ὅπλα ῥιπτεῖν
  • καὶ τἆλλα ἀσχημονεῖν·

διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ βίαια εἶναι.

§ xii.4

τῷ δ᾽ ἀκολάστῳ ἀνάπαλιν

• τὰ μὲν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα ἑκούσια
  • (ἐπιθυμοῦντι γὰρ καὶ
  • ὀρεγομένῳ),
• τὸ δ᾽ ὅλον ἧττον·
  • οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ
    ἀκόλαστος εἶναι.

§ xii.5

τὸ δ᾽ ὄνομα τῆς ἀκολασίας
καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς παιδικὰς ἁμαρτίας φέρομεν· [1119^b]

ἔχουσι γάρ τινα ὁμοιότητα.

πότερον δ᾽ ἀπὸ ποτέρου καλεῖται,
οὐθὲν πρὸς τὰ νῦν διαφέρει,
δῆλον δ᾽ ὅτι τὸ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προτέρου.

οὐ κακῶς δ᾽ ἔοικε μετενηνέχθαι·

§ xii.6

κεκολάσθαι γὰρ δεῖ τὸ

• τῶν αἰσχρῶν ὀρεγόμενον καὶ
• πολλὴν αὔξησιν ἔχον,

τοιοῦτον δὲ μάλιστα

• ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ
• ὁ παῖς·
  κατ᾽ ἐπιθυμίαν γὰρ ζῶσι καὶ τὰ παιδία, καὶ
  μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις.

§ xii.7

εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται

• εὐπειθὲς καὶ
• ὑπὸ τὸ ἄρχον,

ἐπὶ πολὺ ἥξει·

•  
  • ἄπληστος γὰρ

  ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις καὶ

  • πανταχόθεν

  τῷ ἀνοήτῳ, καὶ

• ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια
  αὔξει τὸ συγγενές,
• κἂν
  • μεγάλαι καὶ
  • σφοδραὶ

  ὦσι, καὶ
  τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρούουσιν.

• διὸ δεῖ
  • μετρίας

  εἶναι αὐτὰς καὶ

  • ὀλίγας, καὶ
  • τῷ λόγῳ μηθὲν ἐναντιοῦσθαι –

§ xii.8

τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον

• εὐπειθὲς

λέγομεν καὶ

• κεκολασμένον –

• ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν παῖδα δεῖ κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ζῆν,
• οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸν λόγον.

§ xii.9

διὸ

καὶ

• ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ σώφρων
  • ὧν δεῖ καὶ
  • ὡς δεῖ καὶ
  • ὅτε·
• οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ λόγος.

§ xii.10

ταῦτ᾽ οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω περὶ σωφροσύνης.