Polytropy

I write this now while many are suffering. Unfortunately that is always true.

What I am supposed to be focused on is virtue in the use of money. I shall get to this.

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant takes up three proofs of the existence of God, the last being the physico-theological. Basically, the world is so awesome, there must be a deity (B650):

The present world discloses to us such an immeasurable showplace of manifoldness, order, purposiveness, and beauty, whether one pursues these in the infinity of space or in the unlimited division of it, that in accordance with even the knowledge about it that our weak understanding can acquire, all speech concerning so many and such unfathomable wonders must lose its power to express, all numbers their power to measure, and even our thoughts lack boundaries, so that our judgment upon the whole must resolve itself into a speechless, but nonetheless eloquent, astonishment. Everywhere we see a chain of effects and causes, of ends and means, regularity in coming to be and perishing, and because nothing has entered by itself into the state in which it finds itself, this state always refers further to another thing as its cause, which makes necessary just the same further inquiry, so that in such a way the entire whole would have to sink into the abyss of nothingness if one did not assume something subsisting for itself originally and independently outside this infinite contingency, which supports it and at the same time, as the cause of its existence, secures its continuation.

Given what we hear from news media and social media, we may turn the argument around, saying the world is so awful, there cannot be a god, or if there is, then he/she/it is a principle of evil. That argument is no sounder than the one that Kant ultimately refutes. He does like the physico-theological argument (B651):

This proof always deserves to be named with respect. It is the oldest, clearest and the most appropriate to common human reason. It enlivens the study of nature, just as it gets its existence from this study and through it receives ever renewed force. It brings in ends and aims where they would not have been discovered by our observation itself, and extends our information about nature through the guiding thread of a particular unity whose principle is outside nature. But this acquaintance also reacts upon its cause, namely the idea that occasioned it, and increases the belief in a highest author to the point where it becomes an irresistible conviction.

That conviction can only be of so much (B655; bolding in the original, which is the 1998 translation of Guyer and Wood):

the proof could at most establish a highest architect of the world, who would always be limited by the suitability of the material on which he works, but not a creator of the world, to whose idea everything is subject, which is far from sufficient for the great aim that one has in view, namely that of proving an all-sufficient original being.

I am not giving Kant full consideration now. He would seem to be right that an “all-sufficient original being” is not something that one proves – not, at least, as one proves a mathematical theorem. One may prove the conception in the sense of testing it, as Descartes describes in the Discourse on Method and the Meditations. Perhaps my friend Neha Zaidka is doing something like this in her new blog post, “It does not matter to what religion you belong, as long as you believe in God”:

Religion is a human construct and a much more recent historical term, but belief in god has existed ever since we have existed.

This belief in god, though it might bring diversity to mortals, allows us to create stable political societies that do not seek to divide the world but rather to appreciate its diversity. We know that god almighty is going to either call upon us or use us to bring good into the world.

I would also refer to Collingwood’s argument, which I took up in “Happiness” (November, 2016) and later (February, 2017), that unhappiness is parasitic on happiness, despair on hope, sin on justification, and perhaps even the vice of timidity on the virtue of courage.

At the moment of drafting the current paragraph (on October 17, 2023, by Washington time), the headline on the Washington Post website is, “Hundreds killed in strike on Gaza hospital, Palestinian officials say: Officials in Israel and Gaza trade blame for attack; Biden won’t visit Jordan.” Lower down, we turn to money: “White House weighs $100 billion package for Israel, Ukraine; plans in flux.”

I said I was going to talk about the virtue that involves money. We may think this is charity, and what we ought to do with our money is spend it on our neighbors, as if they were ourselves.

However, we are reading Aristotle’s account of the virtue of money, in the first two of the nine (roman-numbered) chapters of Book IV of the Nicomachean Ethics. The English word “charity” is derived from the Latin caritas, used to translate the Greek ἀγάπη. In our reading, Aristotle does not use this noun. Once (in § i.20), he uses the derived verb, ἀγαπάω “to treat with affection,” because this is what one tends to do with a self-made fortune, which one is therefore unlikely to give away freely.

Aristotle reminds us of the doctrine that virtuous acts are intentionally beautiful (§ i.12). The Greek here is καλαὶ καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, “beautiful and for the sake of beauty,” but many translators refer to nobility instead of beauty. We should recall that the virtue of courage involved facing death in such a way that it would be beautiful.

The beauty that we can achieve with money is neither

• proportional to what we spend, nor even
• in the ratio of what we spend to what we have.

These two alternatives are rejected, because there are two virtues of money:

• liberality (or generosity: ἐλευθεριότης) and
• magnificence (or munificence: μεγαλοπρεπεία).

Two key features are as follows.

• Liberality is found in the habit of giving, not the amount of what is given; thus the poorer person may be the more liberal (§ i.19).
• The more magnificent person is the one who achieves the greater result with the same expenditure (§ ii.10).

For a crude example from my daily life, when a building is going to sit in a public forest, I think the façade is more magnificently covered with plain wood (as just above) than with a photographic image of what one can already see in the forest itself (as in the earlier photo; both are from the Atatürk Kent Ormanı). Unfortunately then, the aesthetic here in Istanbul can sometimes seem to be Western, in comparison with the Far-Eastern one described by Okakura Kakuzō, as I recounted in “Early Tulips” in the late winter of 2016.

As for what Aristotle says about magnificence, I have noticed that translators do a lot of different things with it. After the Greek below of the section (§ ii.10) cited above, I quote the translations that I have access to; meanwhile, here is what those translations have for one part of the section, in chronological order by original publication.

κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ πλείστου ἄξιον τιμιώτατον,
ἔργον δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ καλόν.

The most valuable possession is that which is worth most,
but the most valuable work of art is that which is great and beautiful.

With possessions the thing worth the highest price is the most honoured,
but the achievement most honoured is one that is great and noble.

A possession which is worth most is that which has the highest value,
but a work which is worth most is that which has greatness and is noble.

The most honourable possession is that which is worth most,
while the most honourable result is that which is great and noble.

A possession that is worth the highest price is the most valued,
but the work that is valued most is one that is great and beautiful.

The possession whose price is greatest is the most valued,
but the most valued work is the great and noble one.

A possession that is worth the most is the most estimable,
whereas the most estimable work is the one that is great and noble.

The translators are Ross, Rackham, Apostle, Crisp, Sachs, Bartlett and Collins, and Reeve. Ross and Apostle seem to translate in harmony with the analogy,

However, other translators effectively reverse the order of one of the pairs. I don’t think the Greek adjectives are so interchangeable as the English nouns “value” and “worth.” Of the former pair,

• ἄξιος is “Generally assumed to be derived from ἄγω in the sense of ‘to weigh’” (Beekes);
• τίμιος is from the noun τιμή, of which “price” and “value” are translations, but the root sense seems to be “honor”; the noun seems to come from the verb τίω “to honor, estimate, appreciate”; the IE root is
  • *k^u̯ei(-t)- for the Linguistics Research Center in Austin, who give it the meaning “to observe with respect, pay attention to”;
  • *k^weh₁-i- for Beekes, who gives it the meaning “observe, hold back, honor,” while noting, “For the shift [in] meaning in Greek, Lat. observāre ‘to observe, honor, etc.’ has been compared.”

In the passage translated many ways, Aristotle’s point seems to be that

• a possession as such is worth just so much money;
• the “work” that the possession somehow represents has another kind of value, such as the one that we call “sentimental value.”

An attempt to distinguish the English nouns “value” and “worth” is made in the American Heritage Dictionary (which I possess as the Grolier International Dictionary, 1981, though I still have not found acknowledgment that the two dictionaries are the same):

Synonyms: worth, value. These nouns refer to the sum of qualities that make a thing desirable and consequently may determine what it commands in an exchange. They are largely interchangeable when the reference is monetary. Otherwise, worth is especially appropriate in denoting qualities in persons or things that add up to moral excellence or to merit considered as an intangible apart from utility. Value suggests a more practical, objective scale of measurement. It is most often applied to what is demonstrably useful.

This would make more sense to me if the concept of market value were mentioned as being

• what worth is independent of, and
• what value alone may mean.

However, with or without my adjustment, the dictionary account would seem to conflict with the words attributed to Oscar Wilde,

What is a cynic? A man who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing.

My adjustment of the dictionary account would bring it more in line with what Karl Marx reports in a footnote on the second page of Capital (volume 1):

In English writers of the 17th century we frequently find “worth” in the sense of value in use, and “value” in the sense of exchange value. This is quite in accordance with the spirit of a language that likes to use a Teutonic word for the actual thing, and a Romance word for its reflexion.

I have remembered that footnote since reading it in college, though I may not have retained, if I understood it at all, the basic point of the whole book, that the capitalist is able to get more labor out of workers than they would otherwise have to exert. The capitalist thus lives on stolen labor. I do remember the objection of a classmate, who was apparently familiar with the anxiety of investing: isn’t it worth something, a sleepless night of worry over whether your gamble will pay off, especially when made on behalf of a client who trusts you?

I don’t recall anybody’s responding by asking whether there was similar worth in worrying over whether you would earn enough this month to pay the rent. In any case, for Aristotle, the liberal, generous person is immune from both kinds of worry; he or she

• doesn’t have to worry about making a living (§ i.20),
• doesn’t care to be rich (§ i.18).

True liberals don’t just throw their money away indiscriminately, as the profligate do (§ i.22). I contrast this with what Jesus recommends to the rich man in Matthew 19:16–30 (quoted below at the section just cited). The rich man is anxious to get into heaven, as perhaps Cephalus is at the beginning of the Republic; the liberal is not anxious.

Contents and Summary

• Chapter I. LIBERALITY, STINGINESS, PRODIGALITY.
• Chapter 1. (Liberality, part one of two.)
  • §§ 1–5. TERMS DEFINED.
    • Liberality (ἐλευθεριότης) is the mean concerning
      • the giving especially, and
      • the getting,

      of riches (χρήματα) (§ i.1),
      which are measured by currency (§ i.2).

    • Stinginess (ἀνελευθερία) is too serious about riches.
    • “Prodigality” (ἀσωτία) is used for being
      • uncontrolled (ἀκρατής),
      • extravagant (δαπανηρός)
        to the point of intemperance (ἀκολασία) (§ i.3).

      Those are bad, but
      the word is used badly for them (§ i.4).

    • Prodigality proper is bad enough,
      a waste of one’s substance (οὐσία) (§ i.5).
  • §§ 6–11. LIBERALITY AS GIVING.
    • The best user of riches is the liberal, since
      the best user of something has its relevant virtue (§ i.6).
    • The use of riches is in the spending and giving (§ i.7).
    • Giving
      • accompanies doing well and enacting beauty;
      • receives thanks and praise (§ i.8);
      • is harder than just not taking (§ i.9).
    • Givers are called liberal;
      non-takers are praised rather for their justice (§ i.10).
    • The liberal are most beloved for being advantageous,
      and this comes from their giving (§ i.11).
• Chapter 2. (Liberality, part two of two.)
  • §§ 12–4. LIBERAL GIVING is done
    • as virtuous acts are,
      • intentionally beautifully and rightly (§ i.12),
      • with pleasure, without pain (§ 13);
    • not
      • to the wrong person,
      • for the wrong reason, or
      • regretfully (§ i.14).
  • §§ 15–8. LIBERAL GETTING is
    • not
      • for honor of riches (§ i.15) or
      • by asking others for them (§ i.16), or
      • for beauty,
    • but
      • out of necessity,
      • for giving,
        • not at random,
        • but well (§ i.17),
        • even excessively,

        the liberal not looking after themselves (§ i.18).

  • §§ 19–23. LIBERALITY IS RELATIVE, being
    • dependent on the riches you start with (§ i.19);
    • easier for heirs, who are
      • unused to want,
      • not attached to what they have,
      • not interested in keeping it (§ i.20),
        of course (§ i.21);
    • not shown to everybody (§ i.22),
      unless by tyrants,
      who have too much to be excessive in spending (§ i.23).
  • §§ 24–7. THE LIBERAL
    • must both get and spend right (§ i.24);
    • are pained appropriately when spending wrong (§ i.25);
    • are easy to deal with (§ i.26);
    • are easy to cheat, because
      • not honoring money,
      • pained by spending
        • too little, more than
        • too much (§ i.27).
• Chapter 3
  • §§ 28–9. The prodigal and the stingy.
    • The prodigal are
      • not pained and pleased correctly (§ i.28);
      • excessive in giving and not taking,
      • deficient in taking;
    • the stingy are
      • deficient in giving,
      • excessive in taking (§ i.29).
  • §§ 30–2. Excess in spending and in not getting
    • are in conflict (§ i.30), but
    • make the prodigal better than the stingy, because they
      • are found in the liberal and
      • can be trained by age and need;

    the prodigal are

    • not wicked or ill-born,
    • but foolish (§ i.31), and
    • a benefit to many,

    while the stingy are not, even to themselves (§ i.32).

  • §§ 33–6. Excess in spending
    • usually leads to excess in getting, and thus
    • makes the prodigal stingy (§ i.33);
    • leads to
      • indifference about getting (§ i.34), hence
      • non-liberal spending,
        on the wrong people, thus
      • profligacy (§ i.35);
    • can be cured (§ i.36).
  • §§ 37–8. Stinginess
    • cannot be cured,
    • is caused by old age and weakness,
    • is more ingrained than prodigality (§ i.37),
    • is [again] either or both of
      • deficiency in giving and
      • excess in taking (§ i.38).
  • § 39. Deficiency in giving is either
    • just that or
    • due to inability to take (§ i.39).
  • §§ 40–3. Excess in taking is
    • done by such stingy or mean people as
      • brother keepers and
      • usurers (§ i.40);
    • when the taking is of
      • small things, due to avarice (§ i.41);
      • great things,
        • not stinginess,
        • but
          • wickedness,
          • impiety,
          • injustice (§ i.42);
    • stinginess when in
      • dice-players,
      • footpads,
      • brigands (§ i.43).
  • § 44. To liberality is opposed stinginess because
    • a greater evil and
    • more common

    than prodigality (§ i.44).

  • § 45. Conclusion of
    • liberality and
    • its opposing vices (§ i.45).
• Chapter II. MAGNIFICENCE, VULGARITY, PARSIMONY.
• Chapter 4. (Magnificence, part one of two.)
  • §§ 1–4. TERMS DEFINED.
    • Magnificence (μεγαλοπρεπεία) is
      suitable spending on a great scale (ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα δαπάνη) (§ ii.1).
      Relative are
      • the greatness,
      • the suitability to
        • the buyer,
        • the purchase,
        • the occasion (§ ii.2).

      The magnificent are liberal, not conversely (§ ii.3).

    • The corresponding
      • deficiency is parsimony (μικροπρέπεια),
      • excess, namely
        • vulgarity (βαναυσία),
        • tastelessness (ἀπειροκαλία),
        • etc.,

        is in

        • not the scale,
        • but the how and where (§ ii.4).
  • §§ 5–10. THE MAGNIFICENT PERSON is
    • a scientist, able to theorize the suitable;
    • a spender (the habit being defined by the activity) of
      • a great amount (§ ii.5)
      • if not more than enough (§ ii.6),
      • for beauty’s sake (§ ii.7),
      • with pleasure (§ ii.8),
      • not worried about the cost (§ ii.9),
      • liberally,
        thus achieving more with the same amount (§ ii.10).
• Chapter 5. (Magnificence, part two of two.)
  • §§ 11–19. MAGNIFICENT EXPENDITURES are
    • on certain public things (§ ii.11),
    • by people who can afford them (§ ii.12),
      • not the poor (§ ii.13),
      • but those with riches or fame,
        inherited or self-made (§ ii.14);
    • also on
      • private affairs arousing general interest (§ ii.15),
      • houses (§ ii.16);
    • appropriate to the purchase and occasion (§ ii.17);
    • even on small things (§ ii.18),
      the point being the making of them (§ ii.19).
• Chapter 6. (The vulgar and parsimonious.)
  • §§ 20–2. THE VICES.
    • The vulgar spend
      • too much on the wrong things,
      • too little on the right things,
      • to show off (§ ii.20).
    • The parsimonious ruin the beauty of the expense by trying to lessen it (§ ii.21).
    • Neither vice is too reproachable, being
      • neither harmful
      • nor too unseemly (§ ii.22).

[1119^b]

Chapter I

Chapter 1

§ i.1

λέγωμεν δ᾽ ἑξῆς περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος.

δοκεῖ δὴ εἶναι ἡ περὶ χρήματα μεσότης·

ἐπαινεῖται γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος

• οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς,
• οὐδ᾽ ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων,
• οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν,
• ἀλλὰ περὶ
  • δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ
  • λῆψιν,

  μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἐν τῇ δόσει.

§ i.2

χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν πάντα ὅσων ἡ ἀξία νομίσματι μετρεῖται.

§ i.3

καὶ

• τὴν μὲν ἀνελευθερίαν προσάπτομεν ἀεὶ
  τοῖς
  • μᾶλλον ἢ
  • δεῖ

  περὶ χρήματα σπουδάζουσι,

• τὴν δ᾽ ἀσωτίαν ἐπιφέρομεν ἐνίοτε
  συμπλέκοντες·
  τοὺς γὰρ
  • ἀκρατεῖς καὶ εἰς ἀκολασίαν
  • δαπανηροὺς

  ἀσώτους καλοῦμεν.

§ i.4

διὸ καὶ φαυλότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι·

• πολλὰς γὰρ
• ἅμα

κακίας ἔχουσιν.

οὐ δὴ οἰκείως προσαγορεύονται·

§ i.5

βούλεται γὰρ ἄσωτος εἶναι
ὁ ἓν κακὸν ἔχων, [1120a]
τὸ φθείρειν τὴν οὐσίαν·

ἄσωτος γὰρ ὁ δι᾽ αὑτὸν ἀπολλύμενος,
δοκεῖ δ᾽

• ἀπώλειά τις αὑτοῦ εἶναι καὶ
• ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά,

ὡς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τούτων ὄντος.

οὕτω δὴ τὴν ἀσωτίαν ἐκδεχόμεθα.

§ i.6

ὧν δ᾽ ἐστὶ χρεία,
ἔστι τούτοις χρῆσθαι

• καὶ εὖ
• καὶ κακῶς·

ὁ πλοῦτος δ᾽ ἐστὶ τῶν χρησίμων·

• ἑκάστῳ δ᾽ ἄριστα χρῆται
  ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τοῦτο ἀρετήν· καὶ
• πλούτῳ δὴ χρήσεται ἄριστα
  ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τὰ χρήματα ἀρετήν·

οὗτος δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος.

§ i.7

• ἡ δὲ λῆψις καὶ
• ἡ φυλακὴ

κτῆσις μᾶλλον.

διὸ μᾶλλόν ἐστι τοῦ ἐλευθερίου

• τὸ διδόναι οἷς δεῖ ἢ
• λαμβάνειν ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ
• μὴ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ.

τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον

• τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ
• τὸ εὖ πάσχειν,

καὶ

• τὰ καλὰ πράττειν μᾶλλον ἢ
• τὰ αἰσχρὰ μὴ πράττειν·

§ i.8

οὐκ ἄδηλον δ᾽ ὅτι

• τῇ μὲν δόσει ἕπεται
  • τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ
  • τὸ καλὰ πράττειν,
• τῇ δὲ λήψει
  • τὸ εὖ πάσχειν ἢ
  • μὴ αἰσχροπραγεῖν.

• καὶ ἡ χάρις
  • τῷ διδόντι,
  • οὐ τῷ μὴ λαμβάνοντι,
• καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος δὲ μᾶλλον.

§ i.9

• τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἧττον προΐενται μᾶλλον ἢ
• οὐ λαμβάνουσι τὸ ἀλλότριον.

§ i.10

καὶ

• ἐλευθέριοι δὲ λέγονται οἱ διδόντες·
• οἱ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντες
  • οὐκ εἰς ἐλευθεριότητα ἐπαινοῦνται,
  • ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἧττον εἰς δικαιοσύνην·
• οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες οὐδ᾽ ἐπαινοῦνται πάνυ.

§ i.11

φιλοῦνται δὲ σχεδὸν μάλιστα
οἱ ἐλευθέριοι
τῶν ἀπ᾽ ἀρετῆς·

ὠφέλιμοι γὰρ,
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐν τῇ δόσει.

Chapter 2

§ i.12

αἱ δὲ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν πράξεις

• καλαὶ καὶ
• τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα.

καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὖν δώσει

• τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ
• ὀρθῶς·
  • οἷς γὰρ δεῖ καὶ
  • ὅσα καὶ
  • ὅτε, καὶ
  • τἆλλα ὅσα ἕπεται τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει·

§ i.13

καὶ ταῦτα

• ἡδέως ἢ
• ἀλύπως·

τὸ γὰρ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν

• ἡδὺ ἢ
• ἄλυπον,

ἥκιστα δὲ λυπηρόν.

§ i.14

• ὁ δὲ διδοὺς
  • οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ
  • μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ
  • διά τιν᾽ ἄλλην αἰτίαν,
     
  • οὐκ ἐλευθέριος
  • ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλος τις

  ῥηθήσεται.

• οὐδ᾽ ὁ
  • λυπηρῶς·
  μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕλοιτ᾽ ἂν

  • τὰ χρήματα
  • τῆς καλῆς πράξεως,

  τοῦτο δ᾽

  • οὐκ ἐλευθερίου.

§ i.15

οὐδὲ λήψεται δὲ ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ·

§ i.16

οὐκ ἂν εἴη δὲ οὐδ᾽ αἰτητικός·

οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ εὖ ποιοῦντος
εὐχερῶς εὐεργετεῖσθαι.

§ i.17

ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ,
λήψεται, [1120b]
οἷον ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων κτημάτων,

• οὐχ ὡς καλὸν
• ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον,

ὅπως ἔχῃ διδόναι.

• οὐδ᾽ ἀμελήσει τῶν ἰδίων,
  βουλόμενός γε διὰ τούτων τισὶν ἐπαρκεῖν.
• οὐδὲ τοῖς τυχοῦσι δώσει,
  ἵνα ἔχῃ διδόναι
  • οἷς δεῖ καὶ
  • ὅτε καὶ
  • οὗ καλόν.

§ i.18

ἐλευθερίου δ᾽ ἐστὶ σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν ἐν τῇ δόσει,
ὥστε καταλείπειν ἑαυτῷ ἐλάττω·

τὸ γὰρ μὴ βλέπειν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἐλευθερίου.

§ i.19

κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δ᾽
ἡ ἐλευθεριότης λέγεται·

• οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν διδομένων

τὸ ἐλευθέριον,

• ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῇ τοῦ διδόντος ἕξει,
  αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δίδωσιν.

ἐὰν ἀπ᾽ ἐλαττόνων διδῷ.

§ i.20

1. ἄπειροί τε γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας, καὶ
2. πάντες ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον τὰ αὑτῶν ἔργα,
   ὥσπερ
   • οἱ γονεῖς καὶ
   • οἱ ποιηταί.
3. πλουτεῖν δ᾽ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὸν ἐλευθέριον,
   • μήτε ληπτικὸν ὄντα
   • μήτε φυλακτικόν,
   • προετικὸν δὲ

   καὶ

   • μὴ τιμῶντα δι᾽ αὐτὰ τὰ χρήματα
   • ἀλλ᾽ ἕνεκα τῆς δόσεως.

§ i.21

διὸ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖται τῇ τύχῃ ὅτι

• οἱ μάλιστα ἄξιοι ὄντες
• ἥκιστα πλουτοῦσιν.

συμβαίνει δ᾽ οὐκ ἀλόγως τοῦτο·

οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε χρήματ᾽ ἔχειν
μὴ ἐπιμελόμενον ὅπως ἔχῃ,
ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

§ i.22

οὐ μὴν δώσει γε

• οἷς οὐ δεῖ οὐδ᾽
• ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ᾽
• ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα·

οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι πράττοι κατὰ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, καὶ

• εἰς ταῦτα ἀναλώσας

οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι

• εἰς ἃ δεῖ ἀναλίσκειν.

§ i.23

ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται,

• ἐλευθέριός ἐστιν ὁ
  • κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν

  δαπανῶν καὶ

  • εἰς ἃ δεῖ·
• ὁ δ᾽
  • ὑπερβάλλων

  ἄσωτος.

§ i.24

τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος δὴ μεσότητος οὔσης
περὶ χρημάτων

• δόσιν καὶ
• λῆψιν,

ὁ ἐλευθέριος

• καὶ δώσει
• καὶ δαπανήσει

• εἰς ἃ δεῖ καὶ
• ὅσα δεῖ,

ὁμοίως ἐν

• μικροῖς καὶ
• μεγάλοις,

καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως·

καὶ λήψεται δ᾽

• ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ
• ὅσα δεῖ.

τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ περὶ ἄμφω οὔσης μεσότητος,
ποιήσει ἀμφότερα ὡς δεῖ·

• ἕπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐπιεικεῖ δόσει ἡ τοιαύτη λῆψις,
• ἡ δὲ μὴ τοιαύτη ἐναντία ἐστίν.

• αἱ μὲν οὖν ἑπόμεναι γίνονται
  • ἅμα
  • ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ,
• αἱ δ᾽ ἐναντίαι δῆλον ὡς οὔ. [1121a]

§ i.25

ἐὰν δὲ παρὰ

• τὸ δέον καὶ
• τὸ καλῶς ἔχον

συμβαίνῃ αὐτῷ ἀναλίσκειν,
λυπήσεται,

• μετρίως δὲ καὶ
• ὡς δεῖ·

τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ

• καὶ ἥδεσθαι
• καὶ λυπεῖσθαι

• ἐφ᾽ οἷς δεῖ καὶ
• ὡς δεῖ.

§ i.26

καὶ εὐκοινώνητος δ᾽ ἐστὶν
ὁ ἐλευθέριος
εἰς χρήματα·

§ i.27

δύναται γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι,
μὴ τιμῶν γε τὰ χρήματα, καὶ

• μᾶλλον ἀχθόμενος εἴ τι δέον μὴ ἀνάλωσεν
• ἢ λυπούμενος εἰ μὴ δέον τι ἀνάλωσεν,

καὶ τῷ Σιμωνίδῃ οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος.

Chapter 3

§ i.28

ὁ δ᾽ ἄσωτος καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαμαρτάνει·

• οὔτε γὰρ ἥδεται
  • ἐφ᾽ οἷς δεῖ οὐδὲ
  • ὡς δεῖ
• οὔτε λυπεῖται·

ἔσται δὲ προϊοῦσι φανερώτερον.

§ i.29

εἴρηται δὴ ἡμῖν ὅτι

• ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ
• ἐλλείψεις εἰσὶν

• ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ
• ἡ ἀνελευθερία,

καὶ ἐν δυσίν, ἐν

• δόσει καὶ
• λήψει·

καὶ

• τὴν δαπάνην γὰρ

εἰς

• τὴν δόσιν

τίθεμεν.

• ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀσωτία
  • τῷ
    • διδόναι καὶ
    • μὴ λαμβάνειν

    ὑπερβάλλει,

  • τῷ δὲ λαμβάνειν ἐλλείπει,
• ἡ δ᾽ ἀνελευθερία
  • τῷ διδόναι μὲν ἐλλείπει,
  • τῷ λαμβάνειν δ᾽ ὑπερβάλλει,

  πλὴν ἐν μικροῖς.

§ i.30

τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀσωτίας οὐ πάνυ συνδυάζεται·

οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον

• μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνοντα
• πᾶσι διδόναι·

ταχέως γὰρ ἐπιλείπει ἡ οὐσία
τοὺς ἰδιώτας διδόντας,
οἵπερ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἄσωτοι εἶναι·

§ i.31

ἐπεὶ ὅ γε τοιοῦτος
δόξειεν ἂν οὐ μικρῷ βελτίων εἶναι
τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου.

εὐίατός τε γάρ ἐστι

• καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας
• καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας,

καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον δύναται ἐλθεῖν.

ἔχει γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου·

• καὶ γὰρ δίδωσι
• καὶ οὐ λαμβάνει,

• οὐδέτερον δ᾽ ὡς δεῖ
• οὐδ᾽ εὖ.

εἰ δὴ τοῦτο

• ἐθισθείη ἤ
• πως ἄλλως μεταβάλοι,

εἴη ἂν ἐλευθέριος·

• δώσει γὰρ οἷς δεῖ, καὶ
• οὐ λήψεται ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ.

διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι φαῦλος τὸ ἦθος·

• οὐ γὰρ μοχθηροῦ
• οὐδ᾽ ἀγεννοῦς

τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν

• διδόντα καὶ
• μὴ λαμβάνοντα,

• ἠλιθίου δέ.

§ i.32

ὁ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἄσωτος
πολὺ δοκεῖ βελτίων
τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου
εἶναι
διά τε τὰ εἰρημένα,
καὶ ὅτι

• ὃ μὲν ὠφελεῖ πολλούς,
• ὃ δὲ οὐθένα,
  ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ αὑτόν.

§ i.33

ἀλλ᾽ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀσώτων,
καθάπερ εἴρηται,

• καὶ λαμβάνουσιν ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ,
• καὶ εἰσὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀνελεύθεροι.

§ i.34

ληπτικοὶ δὲ γίνονται διὰ τὸ

• βούλεσθαι μὲν ἀναλίσκειν,
• εὐχερῶς δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν μὴ δύνασθαι·

ταχὺ γὰρ ἐπιλείπει αὐτοὺς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα.

ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἑτέρωθεν πορίζειν. [1121b]

ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν τοῦ καλοῦ φροντίζειν

• ὀλιγώρως καὶ
• πάντοθεν

λαμβάνουσιν·

διδόναι γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦσι,
τὸ δὲ

• πῶς ἢ
• πόθεν

οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς διαφέρει.

§ i.35

διόπερ οὐδ᾽ ἐλευθέριοι αἱ δόσεις αὐτῶν εἰσίν·

• οὐ γὰρ καλαί,
• οὐδὲ τούτου ἕνεκα,
• οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ·

ἀλλ᾽ ἐνίοτε οὓς δεῖ πένεσθαι,
τούτους πλουσίους ποιοῦσι,
καὶ

• τοῖς μὲν μετρίοις τὰ ἤθη οὐδὲν ἂν δοῖεν,
• τοῖς δὲ κόλαξιν ἤ τιν᾽ ἄλλην ἡδονὴν πορίζουσι πολλά.

διὸ καὶ ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί·

• εὐχερῶς γὰρ
  • ἀναλίσκοντες καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκολασίας
  • δαπανηροί

  εἰσι, καὶ

• διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῆν
  πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουσιν.

§ i.36

• ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄσωτος
  • ἀπαιδαγώγητος γενόμενος
    • εἰς ταῦτα

    μεταβαίνει,

  • τυχὼν δ᾽ ἐπιμελείας
    • εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ
    • εἰς τὸ δέον

    ἀφίκοιτ᾽ ἄν.

§ i.37

• ἡ δ᾽ ἀνελευθερία
  • ἀνίατός τ᾽ ἐστίν
    (δοκεῖ γὰρ
    • τὸ γῆρας καὶ
    • πᾶσα ἀδυναμία

    ἀνελευθέρους ποιεῖν), καὶ

  • συμφυέστερον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀσωτίας·
    οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ
    • φιλοχρήματοι μᾶλλον ἢ
    • δοτικοί.

§ i.38

• καὶ διατείνει δ᾽ ἐπὶ πολύ,
• καὶ πολυειδές ἐστιν·

πολλοὶ γὰρ τρόποι δοκοῦσι τῆς ἀνελευθερίας εἶναι.

ἐν δυσὶ γὰρ οὖσα,

• τῇ τ᾽ ἐλλείψει τῆς δόσεως καὶ
• τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς λήψεως,

• οὐ πᾶσιν ὁλόκληρος παραγίνεται,
• ἀλλ᾽ ἐνίοτε χωρίζεται, καὶ
  • οἳ μὲν τῇ λήψει ὑπερβάλλουσιν,
  • οἳ δὲ τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσιν.

§ i.39

• οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις προσηγορίαις
  οἷον φειδωλοὶ γλίσχροι κίμβικες,
  πάντες τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσι,
  τῶν δ᾽ ἀλλοτρίων
  • οὐκ ἐφίενται
  • οὐδὲ βούλονται λαμβάνειν,
     
  • οἳ μὲν διά τινα
    • ἐπιείκειαν καὶ
    • εὐλάβειαν τῶν αἰσχρῶν
       
    • (δοκοῦσι γὰρ ἔνιοι ἢ
    • φασί γε

    διὰ τοῦτο φυλάττειν,
    ἵνα μή ποτ᾽ ἀναγκασθῶσιν αἰσχρόν τι πρᾶξαι·
    τούτων δὲ

    • καὶ ὁ κυμινοπρίστης
    • καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοιοῦτος·

    ὠνόμασται δ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ μηδὲν ἂν δοῦναι)·

  • οἳ δ᾽ αὖ διὰ φόβον ἀπέχονται τῶν ἀλλοτρίων
    ὡς οὐ ῥᾴδιον
    • αὐτὸν μὲν τὰ ἑτέρων λαμβάνειν,
    • τὰ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἑτέρους μή·

    ἀρέσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ

    • μήτε λαμβάνειν
    • μήτε διδόναι.

§ i.40

• οἳ δ᾽ αὖ κατὰ τὴν λῆψιν ὑπερβάλλουσι
  τῷ
  • πάντοθεν

  λαμβάνειν καὶ

  • πᾶν,
  οἷον οἱ τὰς ἀνελευθέρους ἐργασίας ἐργαζόμενοι,

  • πορνοβοσκοὶ καὶ
  • πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ
  • τοκισταὶ
    • κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ
    • ἐπὶ πολλῷ. [1122a]

  πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι

  • ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ

  λαμβάνουσι, καὶ

  • ὁπόσον οὐ δεῖ.

§ i.41

κοινὸν δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἡ αἰσχροκέρδεια φαίνεται·

πάντες γὰρ ἕνεκα

• κέρδους, καὶ
• τούτου μικροῦ,

ὀνείδη ὑπομένουσιν.

§ i.42

τοὺς γὰρ τὰ μεγάλα

• μὴ ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ

λαμβάνοντας,

• μηδὲ ἃ δεῖ,

• οὐ λέγομεν ἀνελευθέρους,

  οἷον τοὺς τυράννους

  • πόλεις πορθοῦντας καὶ
  • ἱερὰ συλῶντας,

• ἀλλὰ

  • πονηροὺς μᾶλλον καὶ
  • ἀσεβεῖς καὶ
  • ἀδίκους.

§ i.43

• ὁ μέντοι κυβευτὴς καὶ
• ὁ λωποδύτης καὶ
• ὁ λῃστὴς

τῶν ἀνελευθέρων εἰσίν·

αἰσχροκερδεῖς γάρ.

κέρδους γὰρ ἕνεκα ἀμφότεροι

• πραγματεύονται καὶ

• ὀνείδη ὑπομένουσιν, καὶ

• οἳ μὲν κινδύνους τοὺς μεγίστους ἕνεκα τοῦ λήμματος,

• οἳ δ᾽ ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων κερδαίνουσιν,
  οἷς δεῖ διδόναι.

ἀμφότεροι δὴ
ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ κερδαίνειν βουλόμενοι
αἰσχροκερδεῖς·

καὶ πᾶσαι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦται λήψεις ἀνελεύθεροι.

§ i.44

εἰκότως δὲ τῇ ἐλευθεριότητι ἀνελευθερία ἐναντίον λέγεται·

• μεῖζόν τε γάρ ἐστι κακὸν τῆς ἀσωτίας, καὶ
• μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην ἁμαρτάνουσιν
  ἢ κατὰ τὴν λεχθεῖσαν ἀσωτίαν.

§ i.45

περὶ μὲν οὖν

• ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ
• τῶν ἀντικειμένων κακιῶν

τοσαῦτ᾽ εἰρήσθω.

Chapter II

Chapter 4

§ ii.1

δόξαι δ᾽ ἂν ἀκόλουθον εἶναι
καὶ περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας διελθεῖν.

δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ περὶ χρήματά τις ἀρετὴ εἶναι·

• οὐχ ὥσπερ δ᾽ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης διατείνει
  περὶ πάσας τὰς ἐν χρήμασι πράξεις,
• ἀλλὰ
  περὶ τὰς δαπανηρὰς μόνον·

ἐν τούτοις δ᾽ ὑπερέχει τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος μεγέθει.

καθάπερ γὰρ τοὔνομα αὐτὸ ὑποσημαίνει,
ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν.

§ ii.2

τὸ δὲ μέγεθος πρός τι·

οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ δαπάνημα

• τριηράρχῳ καὶ
• ἀρχιθεωρῷ.

τὸ πρέπον δὴ

• πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ
• ἐν ᾧ καὶ
• περὶ ὅ.

§ ii.3

• ὁ δ᾽
  • ἐν μικροῖς ἢ
  • ἐν μετρίοις

  κατ᾽ ἀξίαν δαπανῶν
  οὐ λέγεται μεγαλοπρεπής,
  οἷον τὸ “πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτῃ,” [Hom. Od. 17.420]

• ἀλλ᾽ ὁ ἐν μεγάλοις οὕτως.

§ ii.4

τῆς τοιαύτης δ᾽ ἕξεως

• ἡ μὲν ἔλλειψις μικροπρέπεια καλεῖται,
• ἡ δ᾽ ὑπερβολὴ
  • βαναυσία καὶ
  • ἀπειροκαλία καὶ
  • ὅσαι τοιαῦται,
     
  • οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσαι
    • τῷ μεγέθει περὶ ἃ δεῖ,
  • ἀλλ᾽
    • ἐν οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ
    • ὡς οὐ δεῖ

    λαμπρυνόμεναι·

ὕστερον δ᾽ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν.

§ ii.5

ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν·

• τὸ πρέπον γὰρ δύναται θεωρῆσαι καὶ
• δαπανῆσαι μεγάλα ἐμμελῶς. [1122b]

§ ii.6

ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴπομεν,
ἡ ἕξις

• ταῖς ἐνεργείαις

ὁρίζεται, καὶ

• ὧν ἐστίν.

αἱ δὴ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι

• μεγάλαι καὶ
• πρέπουσαι.

τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα·

οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται μέγα δαπάνημα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ.

ὥστε

• τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς δαπάνης ἄξιον δεῖ εἶναι,
• τὴν δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου,
  ἢ καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν.

§ ii.7

δαπανήσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα·

κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς.

§ ii.8

καὶ ἔτι

• ἡδέως καὶ
• προετικῶς·

ἡ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία μικροπρεπές.

§ ii.9

καὶ πῶς

• κάλλιστον καὶ
• πρεπωδέστατον,

σκέψαιτ᾽ ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ

• πόσου καὶ
• πῶς ἐλαχίστου.

§ ii.10

ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον τὸν μεγαλοπρεπῆ εἶναι.

καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσει

• ἃ δεῖ καὶ
• ὡς δεῖ·

ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς,
οἷον μέγεθος,
περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὔσης,
καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον.

οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ

• κτήματος καὶ
• ἔργου.

• κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ πλείστου ἄξιον τιμιώτατον,
  οἷον χρυσός,
• ἔργον δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ καλόν
  (τοῦ γὰρ τοιούτου ἡ θεωρία θαυμαστή,
  τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυμαστόν)·

καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετή,
μεγαλοπρέπεια,
ἐν μεγέθει.

Chapter 5

§ ii.11

ἔστι δὲ τῶν δαπανημάτων οἷα λέγομεν τὰ τίμια,

ὁμοίως δὲ

• καὶ περὶ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον,
• καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτίμητά ἐστιν,

§ ii.12

ἐν ἅπασι δ᾽ ὥσπερ εἴρηται,
καὶ πρὸς τὸν πράττοντα ἀναφέρεται τὸ

• τίς ὢν καὶ
• τίνων ὑπαρχόντων·

ἄξια γὰρ δεῖ τούτων εἶναι, καὶ

• μὴ μόνον τῷ ἔργῳ
• ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ποιοῦντι

πρέπειν.

§ ii.13

διὸ

• πένης μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεγαλοπρεπής·
  οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀφ᾽ ὧν πολλὰ δαπανήσει πρεπόντως·
• ὁ δ᾽ ἐπιχειρῶν ἠλίθιος·

• παρὰ
  • τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ καὶ
  • τὸ δέον,
• κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς.

§ ii.14

πρέπει δὲ

• καὶ οἷς τοιαῦτα προϋπάρχει δι᾽
  • αὐτῶν ἢ
  • τῶν προγόνων ἢ
  • ὧν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν,
• καὶ τοῖς εὐγενέσι
• καὶ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις
• καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα·

πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα

• μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ
• ἀξίωμα.

§ ii.15

μάλιστα μὲν οὖν

• τοιοῦτος ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής, καὶ
• ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δαπανήμασιν ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια,

ὥσπερ εἴρηται·

• μέγιστα γὰρ καὶ
• ἐντιμότατα·

τῶν δὲ ἰδίων ὅσα εἰσάπαξ γίνεται, [1123a]
οἷον γάμος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον,

• καὶ εἰ περί τι
  • ἡ πᾶσα πόλις σπουδάζει ἢ
  • οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι,
• καὶ περὶ ξένων δὲ
  • ὑποδοχὰς καὶ
  • ἀποστολάς,
• καὶ
  • δωρεὰς καὶ
  • ἀντιδωρεάς·

• οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἑαυτὸν δαπανηρὸς ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς
• ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τὰ κοινά,

τὰ δὲ δῶρα τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν ἔχει τι ὅμοιον.

§ ii.16

μεγαλοπρεποῦς δὲ καὶ

• οἶκον κατασκευάσασθαι πρεπόντως τῷ πλούτῳ
  • (κόσμος γάρ τις καὶ
  • οὗτος), καὶ
• περὶ ταῦτα μᾶλλον δαπανᾶν
  ὅσα πολυχρόνια τῶν ἔργων
  • (κάλλιστα γὰρ ταῦτα), καὶ
• ἐν ἑκάστοις τὸ πρέπον·

§ ii.17

• οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ ἁρμόζει
  • θεοῖς καὶ
  • ἀνθρώποις,
• οὐδ᾽ ἐν
  • ἱερῷ καὶ
  • τάφῳ.

• καὶ ἐπεὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων ἕκαστον μέγα ἐν τῷ γένει,
• καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατον
  • ἁπλῶς μὲν τὸ ἐν μεγάλῳ μέγα,
  • ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν τούτοις μέγα,

§ ii.18

καὶ διαφέρει

• τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μέγα
• τοῦ ἐν τῷ δαπανήματι·

§ ii.19

διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς,
ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῇ γένει,

• μεγαλοπρεπῶς

ποιεῖν
(τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐκ εὐυπέρβλητον) καὶ

• ἔχον κατ᾽ ἀξίαν τοῦ δαπανήματος.

Chapter 6

§ ii.20

τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής·

ὁ δ᾽

• ὑπερβάλλων καὶ
• βάναυσος

τῷ παρὰ τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκειν ὑπερβάλλει,
ὥσπερ εἴρηται.

ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μικροῖς

• τῶν δαπανημάτων πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει καὶ
• λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος,

καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήσει

• οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα,
• ἀλλὰ
  • τὸν πλοῦτον ἐπιδεικνύμενος, καὶ
  • διὰ ταῦτα οἰόμενος θαυμάζεσθαι,

καὶ

• οὗ μὲν δεῖ πολλὰ ἀναλῶσαι,
  ὀλίγα δαπανῶν,
• οὗ δ᾽ ὀλίγα,
  πολλά.

§ ii.21

ὁ δὲ μικροπρεπὴς περὶ πάντα ἐλλείψει,

• καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας ἐν μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ,
• καὶ ὅ τι ἂν ποιῇ
  • μέλλων καὶ
  • σκοπῶν

  πῶς ἂν ἐλάχιστον ἀναλώσαι,

• καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ὀδυρόμενος,
• καὶ πάντ᾽ οἰόμενος μείζω ποιεῖν ἢ δεῖ.

§ ii.22

εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἕξεις αὗται κακίαι,
οὐ μὴν ὀνείδη γ᾽ ἐπιφέρουσι διὰ τὸ

• μήτε βλαβεραὶ τῷ πέλας εἶναι
• μήτε λίαν ἀσχήμονες.

Edited November 6, 2023