Polytropy

There was a remark near the end of the last reading, in § v.18:

τοῦ δὲ ἀδικήματος
τὸ μὲν ἔλαττον ἀδικεῖσθαί ἐστι,
τὸ δὲ μεῖζον τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

And with an unjust transaction,
having injustice done to one is less than the mean,
and doing the injustice is in excess of it.
(Sachs)

Of the injustice done,
the smaller part is the suffering
and the larger part is the doing of injustice.
(Rackham)

At first glance – my first glance, anyway – Aristotle alludes here to the teaching of Socrates, which I tried to work out in “Doing and Suffering”: suffering injustice is less bad than doing it.

Aristotle may only be saying what he observes now in the current reading, of chapters vi–viii of Book V the Nicomachean Ethics. This is from § vi.4:

τὸ ἀδικεῖν … ἐστὶ
τὸ πλέον αὑτῷ νέμειν τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν,
ἔλαττον δὲ τῶν ἁπλῶς κακῶν.

… to act unjustly meaning
to assign oneself too large a share of things generally good
and too small a share of things generally evil.
(Rackham)

… the doing of injustice … this is
distributing more to oneself of what is simply good,
and less of what is simply bad.
(Sachs)

This would seem to be a simple-minded view of justice, as if there were a finite amount of stuff in the world, and justice meant making sure everybody had the right amount.

As I remarked on last time though, Aristotle is addressing a particular audience. They have preconceptions, which Aristotle has to work with. As I omitted to remark on, the time before that, the Philosopher has something more subtle to say in § i.8 of Book V: people want what is simply good, but what they ought to want is for it to be good for them.

οἱ δ᾽ ἄνθρωποι ταῦτα εὔχονται καὶ διώκουσιν·
δεῖ δ᾽ οὔ,
ἀλλ᾽ εὔχεσθαι μὲν τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὰ εἶναι,
αἱρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθά.

Human beings pray for these and pursue them,
but they ought not,
but ought instead to pray that the things that are good simply be good also for them,
and choose the things that are good for them.
(Sachs)

Yet these are the goods men pray for and pursue,
although they ought not to do so;
they ought,
while choosing the things that are good for them,
to pray that what is good absolutely may also be good for them.
(Rackham)

Sachs has a good note here, recalling Book I, § iii.8:

τοιαύτην δέ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τἀγαθὰ
διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν·
ἤδη γάρ τινες ἀπώλοντο διὰ πλοῦτον,
ἕτεροι δὲ δι᾽ ἀνδρείαν.

And a similar uncertainty surrounds the conception of the Good,
because it frequently occurs that good things have harmful consequences:
people have before now been ruined by wealth,
and in other cases courage has cost men their lives.
(Rackham)

And the things that are good also involve some inconsistency of this sort,
because harm results from them for many people,
for before now some people have been ruined by wealth,
and others by courage.
(Sachs)

Referring to the Metaphysics, Sachs remarks also in his note,

Dialectical learning begins with one’s present opinions, but examines them to penetrate to the truths that they partly contain and partly obscure.

Concerning the passage now in question, on how people ought to pray that what is simply good be good for them, Sachs suggests that Socrates’s own prayer at the end of the Phaedrus “strikes the note Aristotle recommends”:

ὦ φίλε Πάν τε καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῇδε θεοί,
δοίητέ μοι καλῷ γενέσθαι τἄνδοθεν·
ἔξωθεν δὲ ὅσα ἔχω,
τοῖς ἐντὸς εἶναί μοι φίλια.
πλούσιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν·
τὸ δὲ χρυσοῦ πλῆθος εἴη μοι ὅσον
μήτε φέρειν μήτε ἄγειν δύναιτο ἄλλος ἢ ὁ σώφρων.

O beloved Pan and all ye other gods of this place,
grant to me that I be made beautiful in my soul within,
and that all external possessions
be in harmony with my inner man.
May I consider the wise man rich;
and may I have such wealth as
only the self-restrained man can bear or endure.

I have been raising the question, the last couple of times, of just what kind of equality Aristotle is talking about, when he connects it to justice. He tells us in the current reading (§ i.4) that our subject is political justice, namely justice

ἐπὶ … ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων

as between free and … equal persons
(Rackham)

among those who are free and are equal.
(Sachs)

The equality here is qualified though:

ἢ κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ᾽ ἀριθμόν·

(actually or proportionately)
(Rackham)

either proportionally or numerically.
(Sachs)

I can only imagine that Aristotle is alluding to some of the mathematics that I looked at last time. Justice means everybody gets the same amount of something, sometimes; other times, they get it in some ratio. In either case, every free citizen gets something of what everybody else gets, because everybody in question has a ratio to everybody else. By contrast, the child and the slave are nullities: they have no ratio to a free citizen, and therefore Aristotle sets them aside.

What he says (§ vi.8) is that the child and the slave are parts of oneself, so to speak, and

αὑτὸν δ᾽ οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται βλάπτειν·

no one chooses to harm himself.
(Rackham and Sachs both)

This would seem to be highly questionable, unless one really stresses the “choosing” part. People do harm themselves.

Another highly questionable assertion comes later (§ viii.9), when Aristotle mentions something he finds beautiful. He makes only one more reference to beauty in Book V, according to Sachs; it will come in the next reading. Meanwhile, what is beautiful now is letting people off the hook for crimes of passion:

καλῶς
τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται·
οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν,
ἀλλ᾽ ὁ ὀργίσας.

It is beautifully
judged that acts that arise out of spiritedness are not from forethought,
for it is not the one who acts with spirit who is the source of it,
but the one who made him angry.
(Sachs)

Acts due to sudden anger are rightly
held not to be done of malice aforethought,
for it is the man who gave the provocation that began it,
not he who does the deed in a fit of passion.
(Rackham)

Aristotle seems to justify the citizen who says,

• “What I do with my children and my slaves is my business!”
• “I had to kill that person, he insulted me!”

I can only suggest, or hope, that Aristotle is addressing people who would say such things, and the point is to get those people to recognize at least that such assertions are not automatically correct.

Physics today gives us four “fundamental forces,” and some people seem to think these are the explanation for everything that we do. In particular, they say, so called “free will” is an illusion. However, where do we get the idea that there can be forces, such as gravity, in the first place? We get it from being forced to do things against our will. In that case, we must have free will to start with. In short, doing physics requires free will.

That’s my summary, anyway, of an argument that perhaps a lot of people will reject, obstinately, of their own free will!

I don’t know who would deny sometimes doing things they didn’t really want to do. As Aristotle puts it, we can do things that are unjust, for example, without actually being unjust people – or just things, without being just.

Another thing that makes physics possible is, Τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις καίει: “Fire burns both here and in Persia” (§ vii.2). Nature is the same everywhere. It is not this that lets us do physics, but our conviction that nature is so.

Another fact of nature is that one of our two hands is the stronger. Aristotle says it’s the right hand – φύσει γὰρ ἡ δεξιὰ κρείττων (§ vii.4). We may object that sometimes it’s the left. On the other hand, so to speak, we can distinguish right from left in the first place, only because of some asymmetry, as for example that one of our two hands is the stronger.

One hand is naturally stronger; some people are naturally better. Aristotle may expect us to draw this conclusion. And yet there will have to be such a qualification as mitigates the Noble Lie of Plato’s Republic: we cannot know who is naturally better without judging for ourselves.

Etymologically speaking, the Greek word δεξιός, as well as the Latin word dexter and thus the English word “dexter,” for being on the right-hand side – these words may be cognate with the first verb that Aristotle uses in the sequel of the comment last quoted. It seems we get “pandect” and “synecdoche” from δέχομαι “to take, receive.” Aristotle uses the derivative ἐνδέχομαι “to take upon oneself, admit, be possible.” What he says is, καίτοι ἐνδέχεται πάντας ἀμφιδεξίους γενέσθαι, “and yet it is possible for everybody to become ambidextrous.” Maybe we are not all created equal, but we can become equal.

Contents

• Chapter VI
• Chapter 10
  • One can do injustice, as through passion,
    without being injust (§§ vi.1, 2).
  • We have seen reciprocity related to [political] justice (§ vi.3).
  • Political justice
    • concerns those who
      • share life for the sake of autarky,
      • are free,
      • are equal
        • proportionally or
        • arithmetically;
    • exists where there is law,
      while law exists where there is injustice,
      which is taking
      • too much of the good,
      • too little of the bad (§ vi.4),

      which is why we are ruled

      • by reason or rather (as in one manuscript) law,
      • not by men (§ vi.5);
    • is good for others (§ vi.6);
      those who are not satisfied by rule’s
      • honor and
      • dignity

      become tyrants (§ vi.7).

  • Similar to this, but different, are justice
    • despotic (slaveholding),
    • patriarchal (fatherly),

    since one cannot do harm to oneself (§ vi.8).

  • Economic justice, between husband and wife, is closer (§ vi.9).
• Chapter VII
  • With political justice, there is
    • the natural (τὸ φυσικόν), good everywhere, willy-nilly;
    • the conventional (τὸ νομικόν), as in
      • arbitrary rules that, once made, must be followed;
      • special rules for special cases (§ vii.1).
  • You might think
    • nature never changes (fire burns in Persia as here), but
    • justice always does (§ vii.2).
  • Actually,
    • it doesn’t, with the gods;
    • even with us, there is natural justice,
      though changeable (§ vii.3),
      as the hands are:
      • one of them is stronger by nature, but
      • we can become ambidextrous (§ vii.4).
  • Conventional justice is like standard measures,
    which differ everywhere, like constitutions.
  • Nonetheless, there is a natural constitution – the best (§ vii.5).
  • Each instance of the just and lawful
    is as a universal to particulars, the actions (§ vii.6).
  • Thus there are differences
    • between
      • the unjust act (τὸ ἀδίκημα) and
      • the unjust [thing] (τὸ ἄδικον),
    • between
      • the act that is just, τὸ
        • δικαίωμα or rather
        • δικαιοπράγημα, and
      • the just [thing] (τὸ δίκαιον) (§ vii.7).
• Chapter VIII
  • For the just or unjust thing to be a just or unjust act,
    it has to be voluntary (§§ viii.1, 2),
    that is, done with knowledge of
    • object,
    • instrument,
    • purpose (§ viii.3).
  • You can be just or unjust accidentally (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) (§ viii.4).
  • What is voluntary is
    • by choice, from prior deliberation, or
    • not (§ viii.5).
  • Communal harms happen in several ways (namely three):
    • (1.) with ignorance (μετ᾽ ἀγνοίας) (§ viii.6),
      as
      • accidents (ἀτύχημα) or
      • negligent acts (ἁμάρτημα) (§ viii.7);
    • knowingly (εἰδὼς), either
      • (2.) without forethought (μὴ προβουλεύσας),
        – and now the acts are ἀδίκημα;
      • (3.) by deliberate choice (ἐκ προαιρέσεως)
        – and now the person is unjust and wicked (ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός) (§ viii.8).
  • It is beautifully judged (καλῶς … κρίνεται) that what is done
    • by passion is
    • not by forethought,

    the person who provoked it being the origin (§ viii.9).
    The question is

    • not what happened,
    • but whether it was just (§§ viii.10, 11).
  • Acts done by the ignorant on account of (διά)
    • ignorance are pardonable (συγγνωμονικά);
    • unnatural, inhuman passion, not (§ viii.12).

[1134^a]

Chapter VI

Chapter 10

§ vi.1

ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἔστιν ἀδικοῦντα
μήπω ἄδικον εἶναι,

• ὁ ποῖα ἀδικήματα ἀδικῶν ἤδη

• ἄδικός ἐστιν ἑκάστην ἀδικίαν,
  οἷον

  • κλέπτης ἢ
  • μοιχὸς ἢ
  • λῃστής;

ἢ οὕτω μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει;

§ vi.2

• ἀδικεῖ μὲν οὖν,
• ἄδικος δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν,

§ vi.3

πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον,
εἴρηται πρότερον·

§ vi.4

δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι
τὸ ζητούμενόν ἐστι

• καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον
• καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον.

ὥστε ὅσοις μή ἐστι τοῦτο,

• οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον,
• ἀλλά
  • τι δίκαιον καὶ
  • καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα.

ἡ γὰρ δίκη κρίσις

• τοῦ δικαίου καὶ
• τοῦ ἀδίκου.

ἐν οἷς δ᾽ ἀδικία,
καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐν τούτοις
(ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν,
οὐ πᾶσιν ἀδικία),
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ

§ vi.5

διὸ

ὅτι

• ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ [1134^b] καὶ
• γίνεται τύραννος.

ἔστι δ᾽ ὁ ἄρχων φύλαξ

• τοῦ δικαίου,
  εἰ δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ
• τοῦ ἴσου.

§ vi.6

ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οὐθὲν αὐτῷ πλέον εἶναι δοκεῖ,
εἴπερ δίκαιος
(οὐ γὰρ νέμει πλέον τοῦ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ αὑτῷ,
εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν·

διὸ ἑτέρῳ πονεῖ·

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
ἀλλότριον εἶναί φασιν ἀγαθὸν τὴν δικαιοσύνην,
καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον)·

§ vi.7

μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος,
τοῦτο δὲ

• τιμὴ καὶ
• γέρας·

§ vi.8

• οὐ ταὐτὸν τούτοις
• ἀλλ᾽ ὅμοιον·

οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀδικία πρὸς τὰ αὑτοῦ ἁπλῶς,

• τὸ δὲ κτῆμα καὶ
• τὸ τέκνον,
  ἕως ἂν ᾖ
  • πηλίκον καὶ
  • χωρισθῇ,

ὥσπερ μέρος αὑτοῦ,
αὑτὸν δ᾽ οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται βλάπτειν·

§ vi.9

διὸ

• οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικία πρὸς αὑτόν·

• • οὐδ᾽ ἄρα ἄδικον
  • οὐδὲ δίκαιον

  τὸ πολιτικόν·

• κατὰ νόμον γὰρ ἦν, καὶ
• ἐν οἷς ἐπεφύκει εἶναι νόμος,
  οὗτοι δ᾽ ἦσαν οἷς ὑπάρχει ἰσότης τοῦ
  • ἄρχειν καὶ
  • ἄρχεσθαι.

διὸ

• μᾶλλον πρὸς γυναῖκά ἐστι δίκαιον
• ἢ πρὸς
  • τέκνα καὶ
  • κτήματα·

τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον·

ἕτερον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ πολιτικοῦ.

Chapter VII

§ vii.1

τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου

• τὸ μὲν φυσικόν ἐστι
• τὸ δὲ νομικόν,

• φυσικὸν μὲν τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν,
  καὶ οὐ τῷ δοκεῖν ἢ μή,
• νομικὸν δὲ ὃ

  • ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρει

    • οὕτως ἢ
    • ἄλλως,

  • ὅταν δὲ θῶνται,
    διαφέρει, οἷον

    • τὸ μνᾶς λυτροῦσθαι, ἢ
    • τὸ αἶγα θύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο πρόβατα,

  • ἔτι ὅσα ἐπὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα νομοθετοῦσιν, οἷον

    • τὸ θύειν Βρασίδᾳ, καὶ
    • τὰ ψηφισματώδη.

§ vii.2

δοκεῖ δ᾽ ἐνίοις εἶναι πάντα τοιαῦτα,
ὅτι

• τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν,

  ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ

  • καὶ ἐνθάδε
  • καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις

  καίει,

• τὰ δὲ δίκαια κινούμενα ὁρῶσιν.

§ vii.3

τοῦτο δ᾽

• οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ἔχον,
• ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν ὥς·

καίτοι

• παρά γε τοῖς θεοῖς ἴσως οὐδαμῶς,
• παρ᾽ ἡμῖν δ᾽ ἔστι μέν τι καὶ φύσει,
  κινητὸν μέντοι πᾶν,
  ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἐστὶ
  • τὸ μὲν φύσει
  • τὸ δ᾽ οὐ φύσει.

§ vii.4

• ποῖον δὲ φύσει τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ
• ποῖον οὒ ἀλλὰ
  • νομικὸν καὶ
  • συνθήκῃ,

  εἴπερ ἄμφω κινητὰ ὁμοίως,

δῆλον.

καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ αὐτὸς ἁρμόσει διορισμός·

§ vii.5

τὰ δὲ κατὰ

• συνθήκην καὶ τὸ
• συμφέρον

τῶν δικαίων [1135^a]
ὅμοιά ἐστι τοῖς μέτροις·

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

§ vii.6

• τὰ μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενα πολλά,
• ἐκείνων δ᾽ ἕκαστον ἕν·
  καθόλου γάρ.

§ vii.7

διαφέρει δὲ

• τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ
• τὸ ἄδικον καὶ

• τὸ δικαίωμα καὶ
• τὸ δίκαιον·

• ἄδικον μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῇ
  • φύσει ἢ
  • τάξει·
• αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο,
  ὅταν πραχθῇ,
  ἀδίκημά ἐστι,
  πρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι,
  • οὔπω,
  • ἀλλ᾽ ἄδικον.

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δικαίωμα·

• καλεῖται δὲ μᾶλλον δικαιοπράγημα τὸ κοινόν,
• δικαίωμα δὲ τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος.

καθ᾽ ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν,

• ποῖά τε εἴδη καὶ
• πόσα καὶ
• περὶ ποῖα τυγχάνει ὄντα,

ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον.

Chapter VIII

§ viii.1

ὄντων δὲ τῶν

• δικαίων καὶ
• ἀδίκων

τῶν εἰρημένων,

• ὅταν δ᾽ ἄκων,

  • οὔτ᾽ ἀδικεῖ
  • οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖ
  • ἀλλ᾽ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός·

οἷς γὰρ συμβέβηκε

• δικαίοις εἶναι ἢ
• ἀδίκοις,

πράττουσιν.

§ viii.2

• ἀδίκημα δὲ καὶ
• δικαιοπράγημα

ὥρισται τῷ

• ἑκουσίῳ καὶ
• ἀκουσίῳ·

ὅταν γὰρ ἑκούσιον ᾖ,

• ψέγεται, ἅμα δὲ καὶ
• ἀδίκημα τότ᾽ ἐστίν·

§ viii.3

λέγω δ᾽ ἑκούσιον μέν,
ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, ὃ ἄν τις τῶν ἐφ᾽ αὑτῷ ὄντων

• εἰδὼς καὶ
• μὴ ἀγνοῶν

ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον διωρίσθω

• καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα,
• καὶ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ὅλην.

• τὸ δὴ ἀγνοούμενον, ἢ

• • μὴ ἀγνοούμενον μὲν
  • μὴ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ δ᾽ ὄν, ἢ

• βίᾳ,

ἀκούσιον.

πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχόντων [1135^b] εἰδότες

• καὶ πράττομεν
• καὶ πάσχομεν,

ὧν οὐθὲν

• οὔθ᾽ ἑκούσιον
• οὔτ᾽ ἀκούσιόν

ἐστιν,

§ viii.4

§ viii.5

• προελόμενοι μὲν ὅσα προβουλευσάμενοι,
• ἀπροαίρετα δὲ ὅσ᾽ ἀπροβούλευτα.

§ viii.6

τριῶν δὴ οὐσῶν βλαβῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις,

• τὰ μὲν μετ᾽ ἀγνοίας
  ἁμαρτήματά ἐστιν,
  ὅταν

  • μήτε ὃν
  • μήτε ὃ
  • μήτε ᾧ
  • μήτε οὗ ἕνεκα

  ὑπέλαβε πράξῃ·

  • ἢ γὰρ οὐ βάλλειν
  • ἢ οὐ τούτῳ
  • ἢ οὐ τοῦτον
  • ἢ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα

  ᾠήθη,
  ἀλλὰ συνέβη οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα ᾠήθη,
  οἷον

  • οὐχ ἵνα τρώσῃ
  • ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα κεντήσῃ, ἢ
  • οὐχ ὅν, ἢ
  • οὐχ ᾧ.

§ viii.7

• ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλόγως ἡ βλάβη γένηται,
  ἀτύχημα·
• ὅταν δὲ
  • μὴ παραλόγως,
  • ἄνευ δὲ κακίας,

  ἁμάρτημα

• (ἁμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ
  ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ᾖ τῆς αἰτίας,
• ἀτυχεῖ δ᾽
  ὅταν ἔξωθεν)·

§ viii.8

• ὅταν δὲ

  • εἰδὼς μὲν
  • μὴ προβουλεύσας δέ,

  ἀδίκημα,

  οἷον ὅσα τε διὰ

  • θυμὸν καὶ
  • ἄλλα πάθη,
    ὅσα
    • ἀναγκαῖα ἢ
    • φυσικὰ

    συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις·

  • ταῦτα γὰρ βλάπτοντες καὶ
  • ἁμαρτάνοντες
     
  • ἀδικοῦσι μέν, καὶ
  • ἀδικήματά ἐστιν,
     
  • οὐ μέντοι πω ἄδικοι διὰ ταῦτα
  • οὐδὲ πονηροί·

  οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν
  ἡ βλάβη·

• ὅταν δ᾽ ἐκ προαιρέσεως,

  • ἄδικος καὶ
  • μοχθηρός.

§ viii.9

διὸ καλῶς

§ viii.10

ἔτι δὲ

• οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ
  • γενέσθαι ἢ
  • μὴ

  ἀμφισβητεῖται,

• ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου·

ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ γὰρ ἀδικίᾳ ἡ ὀργή ἐστιν.

• οὐ γὰρ
  ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι
  περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητοῦσιν,
  ὧν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι μοχθηρόν,
  ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ δρῶσιν·
• ἀλλ᾽ ὁμολογοῦντες περὶ τοῦ πράγματος,
  περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποτέρως δίκαιον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν
  (ὁ δ᾽ ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ),
  ὥστε
  • ὃ μὲν οἴεται ἀδικεῖσθαι,
  • ὃ δ᾽ οὔ. [1136^a]

§ viii.11

• ἐὰν δ᾽ ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάψῃ,
  ἀδικεῖ·

  καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἤδη τὰ ἀδικήματα
  ὁ ἀδικῶν
  ἄδικος,
  ὅταν

  • παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον ᾖ ἢ
  • παρὰ τὸ ἴσον.

• ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δίκαιος,
  ὅταν προελόμενος δικαιοπραγῇ·

  δικαιοπραγεῖ δέ, ἂν μόνον ἑκὼν πράττῃ.

§ viii.12

τῶν δ᾽ ἀκουσίων

• τὰ μέν ἐστι συγγνωμονικὰ
• τὰ δ᾽ οὐ συγγνωμονικά.

• ὅσα μὲν γὰρ

  • μὴ μόνον ἀγνοοῦντες
  • ἀλλὰ καὶ δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν

  ἁμαρτάνουσι,
  συγγνωμονικά,

• ὅσα δὲ

  • μὴ δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν,
  • ἀλλ᾽

    • ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν

    • διὰ πάθος δὲ

      • μήτε φυσικὸν
      • μήτ᾽ ἀνθρώπινον,

  οὐ συγγνωμονικά.