Polytropy

We saw the soul divided in two, in Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics. In the present reading, of the first five of the 13 chapters of Book VI, Aristotle returns to the division, and he tells us he is returning. At least, what we are given in the text is,

πρότερον μὲν οὖν ἐλέχθη δύ᾽ εἶναι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς.

It was stated previously, then, that there are two parts of the soul.

“It was stated previously.” The passive voice may mean that somebody else added this comment. We may also ask whether the comment is actually referring to an earlier passage of the work that we are now reading.

This is a difficulty of reading Aristotle. We don’t know, or at least I don’t know, whether Aristotle himself created the Ethics as a single work, comprising ten books, to be read in order; and if he did, whether he finished the work to his own satisfaction; and if he did, how well the text that has come down to us (apparently through Andronicus of Rhodes) represents Aristotle’s work.

The translation above is by Bartlett and Collins, on their page 116, where the four footnotes do not include a reference to Book I, chapter xiii, § 9. In the Loeb edition, Rackham has a bare reference. Sachs has an elaborate footnote on the quoted passage:

This was accepted at 1102a 26-28 as a popular way of speaking that does no harm. A more careful and complex consideration of the question may be found throughout On the Soul. At 411a 27-b 12 … at 429b 11-22 … and at 432a 22-b 8 …

The three passages from De Anima are in chapters I.5, III.4, and III.9, according to Ross’s edition in the series of Oxford Classical Texts. I bought a copy of this edition when joining a 2004 email discussion. This lasted a couple of months, but didn’t get very far into the text. Among my files, I find my transcript of the discussion: it takes up 69 pages, and I have now reread the whole thing, but it evokes almost no memories. If I live another twenty years, what am I going to think of these blog posts on the Ethics?

The first of the three passages of De Anima that Sachs refers to includes a key question:

λέγουσι δή τινες

• μεριστὴν αὐτήν,
• καὶ
  • ἄλλῳ μὲν νοεῖν
  • ἄλλῳ δὲ ἐπιθυμεῖν.

τί οὖν δή ποτε
συνέχει τὴν ψυχήν,
εἰ
μεριστὴ πέφυκεν;

• οὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γε σῶμα·
• δοκεῖ γὰρ τοὐναντίον μᾶλλον
  • ἡ ψυχὴ
  • τὸ σῶμα συνέχειν·
• ἐξελθούσης
  γοῦν
  • διαπνεῖται
  • καὶ σήπεται.

Some hold

• that the soul is divisible,
• and that
  • one part thinks,
  • another desires.

If, then,
its nature admits of its being divided,
what can it be that
holds the parts together?

• Surely not the body;
• on the contrary it seems rather to be
  • the soul
  • that holds the body together;
• at any rate
  when the soul departs
  • the body disintegrates
  • and decays.

Aristotle asks what holds the soul together, if it is divisible. The translator, J. A. Smith, makes him ask explicitly about parts as such. This could be subtly misleading, because of the various ways that one thing can also be two or more. As Aristotle says in Ethics I.xiii.9–10, here again in the translation of Bartlett and Collins (with my formatting, as for the De Anima passage, to align the Greek and English as well as possible),

• λέγεται δὲ
  περὶ αὐτῆς
  καὶ
  ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις
  ἀρκούντως
  ἔνια,
• καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς·

οἷον

• τὸ μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι,
• τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον.

ταῦτα δὲ πότερον

• διώρισται καθάπερ
  • τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια καὶ
  • πᾶν τὸ μεριστόν, ἢ
• τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἐστὶν
  ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα καθάπερ
  ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ
  • τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ
  • τὸ κοῖλον,

οὐθὲν διαφέρει
πρὸς τὸ παρόν.

• But some points [6]
  concerning the soul [2]
  are stated [1]
  sufficiently [5]
  even [3]
  in the exoteric arguments [4],
• and one ought to make use of them –

for example, that

• one part of it is nonrational,
• another possesses reason.

Yet whether

• these things are divided, like
  • the parts of the body and
  • every divisible thing, or
• whether they are two in speech
  but naturally inseparable, like
  • the convex and
  • the concave

  in the circumference of a circle,

makes no difference
with a view to the present task.

The translation of De Anima by J. A. Smith is in The Basic Works of Aristotle (ed. McKeon; Random House, 1941). I bought my copy on September 12, 1983, as a freshman at St John’s College in Annapolis. A hardback of xl + 1487 pages in an elegant box, the book was from the thirty-first printing. The print runs must have been small, unless perhaps a lot of liberal arts colleges were having their students read Aristotle.

From the twenty-fourth printing, made in 1982, of another work, I have a copy purchased on March 9, 1984. Ptolemy Copernicus Kepler is volume 16 of the Great Books of the Western World, copyright 1952. I used the Kepler part (with photos) in the post “What It Takes” in 2018. I first took note of the number of printings when I was a student on the Santa Fe campus of St John’s College. Dean Robert Neidorf remarked on how the College was “nickle-and-diming” Encyclopædia Britannica for that volume. Contractually or morally, Britannica were obliged to keep the College bookstore supplied. We read from the work of all three astronomers, and the translations had been made by College tutors, namely R. Catesby Taliaferro and Charles Glenn Wallis.

I do not know to what extent students today rely on electronic versions of such texts as we are talking about. Some of my own students, when they look for help online, look for it in video form; but they are studying mathematics. Myself, I use electronic texts in various ways, as for these Aristotle posts; but if I am just going to read a book, such as Tom Holland’s Dominion: The Making of the Western Mind (xxx + 594 pages), I pretty much need to have it on paper.

I am glad to have still the books that I bought as a student. However, at St John’s, I did often save money by doing the seminar readings in library books. Today, when I feel as if I was an undergraduate or high-school student only yesterday, I don’t think it is the physical books that bring this about.

I think it is rather my physical brain, and Aristotle suggests this. Whenever remembering happens, it happens now. We may think of past events as being arranged along a timeline; however, this does not really mean that the more remote events have to cover a greater distance when we recall them. Whatever the timestamps say, our memories are all somehow in our heads, right now.

I said in my last post that the physical is what is studied by physics. Perhaps physics could be used to obtain a kind of readout of all of our memories. However, this would be like obtaining legible versions of the Herculaneum papyri. X-rays do not reveal the meaning of these texts.

In the present reading, after dividing the soul into a non-rational and a rational part, Aristotle divides the latter, on the assumption that what is known and what knows it are similar:

πρὸς γὰρ
τὰ τῷ γένει ἕτερα
καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων
ἕτερον τῷ γένει
τὸ πρὸς ἑκάτερον πεφυκός,
εἴπερ καθ᾽

• ὁμοιότητά τινα καὶ
• οἰκειότητα

ἡ γνῶσις ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς.

For when it comes to
beings that differ in kind from one another,
the part of the soul
that naturally relates to each
is also different in kind,
if in fact it is by dint of a

• certain similarity and
• kinship

that knowledge is available [to the rational parts of the soul].

That’s from § i.5 below (again the translation is by Bartlett and Collins, because theirs seems to be the most literal). The soul is supposed to receive an impression of things, as paper does of types in letterpress printing (and I am pleased when I find that an old book of mine was printed this way).

The two parts of the rational soul are as follows; the passage immediately precedes the one above.

• ἓν μὲν ᾧ θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ὅσων
  αἱ ἀρχαὶ μὴ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν,
• ἓν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα·

To reflect Aristotle’s terseness, I propose a translation like the following.

• one whereby we behold such things whose
  origins cannot be otherwise;
• one, can.

The professional translators avoid being so elliptical, and that’s fine; but what they do with ἀρχαί often seems like a needless if not misleading complication. Here are the examples that I have.

Ross (1925; revised 2009 by Brown):

• one by which we contemplate the kind of things whose originative causes are invariable, and
• one by which we contemplate variable things.

Rackham (1926, revised 1934):

• one whereby we contemplate those things whose first principles are invariable, and
• one whereby we contemplate those things which admit of variation.

Apostle (1980):

1. that by which we perceive the kinds of things whose principles cannot be other than they are [i.e., cannot vary], and

2. that by which we investigate the kinds of things whose principles may be other than they are [i.e., can vary];

Crisp (2000):

• one with which we contemplate those things whose first principles cannot be otherwise, and
• another those things whose first principles can be otherwise.

Sachs (2002):

• one part by which we contemplate the sorts of beings of which the governing principles are incapable of being other than they are, and
• one part by which we contemplate things capable of being otherwise.

Bartlett and Collins (2011):

• one part is that by which we contemplate all those sorts of beings whose principles do not admit of being otherwise,
• one part that by which we contemplate all those things that do admit of being otherwise.

Reeve (2014):

• one through which we get a theoretical grasp on those beings whose starting-points do not admit of being otherwise and
• one through which we do so on those that do admit of being otherwise.

I noted for Book I that for ἀρχή, one scholar thought “first principle” was “misleading,” but “starting point” was “best in most contexts.”

The plural noun ἀρχαί or its singular ἀρχή occurs twelve more times in the reading below. Sachs’s glossary, which

is not a complete glossary, but an explanation of some of the words used in the Nicomachean Ethics that are most important or most easily misunderstood,

does not include a translation of ἀρχή. I have highlighted (in pink with broken red underline) all thirteen instances of the word below; also the related verbs ἄρχω and ὑπάρχω (which occur once each), along with the nouns ἕξις and ἀρετή, because they are important too.

The first occurrence of ἀρχή is in the passage just quoted. In the other cases – §§ ii.2, 4, 5; iii.3 (twice) and 4; iv.4 (twice), v.3 and 6 (thrice) – Sachs translates the word as “source,” even in v.3, which parallels i.5 (Sachs seems to adjust the Greek text there so that it makes more sense, but I do not see the adjustment suggested in Bywater’s text or anywhere else).

In the text below, my added comments (in blue) are minimal. I don’t know where Aristotle is going with the so-called intellectual virtues; later readings should tell! Meanwhile, the last sentence of this reading is another example of a passage whose meaning may be obscured in translation.

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἕξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον· σημεῖον δ᾽ ὅτι λήθη μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἔστι, φρονήσεως δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν.

Here are the translations.

Ross:

But yet it is not only a reasoned state; this is shown by the fact that a state of that sort may be forgotten but practical wisdom cannot.

Rackham:

But yet Prudence is not rational quality merely, as is shown by the fact that a purely rational faculty can be forgotten, whereas a failure in Prudence is not a mere lapse of memory.

Apostle:

Finally, prudence is not just a disposition with reason; and a sign of this is the fact that a disposition with reason may be forgotten, but prudence cannot.

Crisp:

Moreover it is not merely a state involving reason; an indication of this is the fact that such a state can be forgotten, but practical wisdom cannot.

Sachs:

But practical judgment is an active condition involving not just reason; a sign of this is that forgetfulness occurs in that sort of active condition, but there is no forgetting of practical judgment.

Bartlett and Collins:

Yet prudence is also not solely a characteristic accompanied by reason, a sign of which is that it is possible to forget such a characteristic, but not to forget prudence.

Reeve:

But it is not a state involving reason only. An indication of this is that there is forgetfulness of a state like that, but of practical wisdom there isn’t.

A state, a quality, a faculty, a disposition, a characteristic, a condition: none of these sound like things that can be forgotten, except maybe a disposition. That is Apostle’s term here for ἕξις, but elsewhere he also uses “habit,” and Sachs criticizes him for this (as I’ve discussed in earlier Ethics posts, even the first). However, if having a habit means putting it on every day, like a suit of clothes, then this is something we can forget to do.

Being a good person is not something one can forget. Good people do go bad, but then we figure (perhaps unjustly) they were bad all along.

Nonetheless, “goodness” would not be precise enough as a translation of φρόνησις. In his glossary, Sachs says, reflecting the practices shown above,

The word phronēsis is generally translated elsewhere as “practical wisdom” or “prudence.” The latter now has connotations of caution that Aristotle does not intend, and that contribute to the misunderstanding of choosing the mean as playing it safe. The former is used by those who believe that Aristotle is imposing a distinction between phronēsis and sophia that was not present before his time, but this is a dubious assumption …

We can see what Sachs is talking about in the Oxford English dictionaries. The sixth concise edition, of 1976, defines “prudent” as

careful to avoid undesired consequences; circumspect, discreet.

The ninth edition, of 1995, repeats that definition. However, the original Oxford English Dictionary has,

Sagacious in adapting means to ends; careful to follow the most politic and profitable course; having or exercising sound judgement in practical affairs; circumspect, discreet, worldy-wise.

That sounds like what what Aristotle means for the person who has φρόνησις.

Contents and Summary

• Chapter I
• Chapter 1 In every habit (ἕξις),
  between excess and defect, there is a mean,
  whose definition is according to right reason (ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθός, § i.1) –
  • That may be true, but it’s not useful (§ i.2).
  • We have to define right reason (§ i.3).
• Chapter 2
  • Virtues of the soul are
    • of character, ethical (τοῦ ἤθους) or
    • of thinking, intellectual (τῆς διανοίας, § i.4).
  • The soul has two parts:
    • the irrational and
    • the rational.
  • The rational part has two parts
    (we suppose, if knower and known are similar),
    which contemplate, respectively, what has principles that
    • admit change and
    • don’t (§ i.5).
  • Those parts are
    • the knowing (τὸ ἐπιστημονικὸν),
    • the calculating (τὸ λογιστικόν) or deliberating (§ i.6).
  • We want to know of each of these
    • the best habit, namely
    • its virtue (§ i.7).
• Chapter II
  • There are in the soul, of
    • action and
    • truth,

    three governors (κύρια):

    • perception (αἴσθησις),
    • intellect (νοῦς),
    • desire (ὄρεξις, § ii.1).
  • Actually, perception is not a principle of action –
    look at animals.
  • Because
    • ethical virtue is a habit of choice, and
    • choice is deliberate desire,

    if indeed choice is serious (εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία),

    • reason must be true, and
    • desire must be right,
       
    • the former affirming
    • what the latter pursues (§ ii.2).
  • That’s for thinking pertaining to action;
    for the other kind, theorizing,
    doing well or ill means
    being true or false (§ ii.3).
  • The principle (ἀρχή) of
    • action is choice,
    • choice is
      • desire and
      • directed reason (λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος, § ii.4).
  • What moves things is
    • not thought alone, but
    • directed, practical thought,
      because this is the origin of
      • making things, which has a purpose,
      • as distinct from doing things, an end in itself (§ ii.5).
  • One does not choose what has already happened (§ ii.6).
• Chapter III
• Chapter 3
  • The soul expresses the truth (ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ)
    • by
      • skill (τέχνη),
      • knowledge or science (ἐπιστήμη),
      • prudence (φρόνησις),
      • wisdom (σοφία),
      • intellect (νοῦς),
    • not by
      • assumption (ὑπολήψις),
      • opinion (δόξα) –

      these can falsify (§ iii.1).

  • The knowable (τὸ ἐπιστητόν)
    • cannot be otherwise and
    • is thus eternal (§ iii.2);
    • is learnable (μαθητόν), by
      • induction or example (ἐπαγωγή),
      • deduction or syllogism (συλλογισμός, § iii.3).
  • Knowledge (ἡ ἐπιστήμη) is thus a demonstrative habit (ἕξις ἀποδεικτική, § iii.4).
• Chapter IV
• Chapter 4
  • What can be otherwise can be
    • made or
    • done (§ iv.1).
  • These are different (§ iv.2).
  • A skill (e.g. housebuilding) is
    a habit of making with true reason
    (ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική, § iv.3).
  • Skill makes things
    • that need not be and
    • whose origin is in
      • the maker,
      • not
        • necessity or
        • nature (§ iv.4).
  • Chance and skill (ἡ τύχη καὶ ἡ τέχνη)
    somehow concern the same things (§ iv.5).
  • Unskilledness is a habit of making with false reason (§ iv.6).
• Chapter V
• Chapter 5
  • The prudent can deliberate beautifully
    about what is good and advantageous for himself generally (§ v.1, § v.2).
  • Prudence is not
    • knowledge (because the thing done can be otherwise),
    • skill (because making is not doing, § v.3).
  • The end of making, but not doing, is something else;
    prudence is a true, rational, practical habit
    concerning what is good and bad for us (§ v.4).
  • Thus people like Pericles are thought prudent.
    Thus we call something temperance (τὴν σωφροσύνην)
    as preserving prudence (ὡς σῴζουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν, § v.5).
  • It does preserve that kind of assumption,
    such as (unlike an assumption about triangles)
    pleasure and pain distort.
    Thus prudence must be the kind of habit we said (§ v.6).
  • Prudence is not a skill, but a virtue;
    there can, but need not, be virtue (excellence) in a skill (§ v.7).
  • Of the two rational parts of the soul,
    prudence is a virtue of the opining part,
    but is not just a rational habit,
    since such admits of being forgotten (§ v.8).

[1138^b]

Chapter I

Chapter 1

§ i.1

ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες
ὅτι

• δεῖ
  • τὸ μέσον αἱρεῖσθαι,
  • μὴ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν
  • μηδὲ τὴν ἔλλειψιν,
• τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐστὶν
  ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει,

τοῦτο διέλωμεν.

ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἕξεσι,
καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων,

• ἔστι τις σκοπὸς
  πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων
  ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων

  • ἐπιτείνει καὶ
  • ἀνίησιν,

  καί

• τις ἔστιν ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων,
  ἃς μεταξύ φαμεν εἶναι

  • τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ
  • τῆς ἐλλείψεως,

  οὔσας κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.

§ i.2

ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὕτως

• ἀληθὲς μέν,
• οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές·

καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις,
περὶ ὅσας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη,

• τοῦτ᾽ ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπεῖν,
  ὅτι

  • οὔτε πλείω
  • οὔτε ἐλάττω

  δεῖ

  • πονεῖν οὐδὲ
  • ῥᾳθυμεῖν,

  ἀλλὰ

  • τὰ μέσα καὶ
  • ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος·

• τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ἔχων ἄν τις οὐδὲν ἂν εἰδείη πλέον,

  οἷον ποῖα δεῖ προσφέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ σῶμα,
  εἴ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι

  • ὅσα ἡ ἰατρικὴ κελεύει καὶ
  • ὡς ὁ ταύτην ἔχων.

§ i.3

διὸ δεῖ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξεις

• μὴ μόνον ἀληθῶς εἶναι τοῦτ᾽ εἰρημένον,
• ἀλλὰ καὶ διωρισμένον
  • τίς ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ
  • τούτου τίς ὅρος.

Chapter 2

§ i.4

τὰς δὴ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὰς διελόμενοι [1139^a]

• περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἠθικῶν διεληλύθαμεν,
• περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν,
  περὶ ψυχῆς πρῶτον εἰπόντες,
  λέγωμεν οὕτως.

§ i.5

πρότερον μὲν οὖν ἐλέχθη δύ᾽ εἶναι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς,

νῦν δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον διαιρετέον.

καὶ ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα,

πρὸς γὰρ τὰ τῷ γένει ἕτερα
καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἕτερον τῷ γένει
τὸ πρὸς ἑκάτερον πεφυκός,
εἴπερ καθ᾽

• ὁμοιότητά τινα καὶ
• οἰκειότητα

ἡ γνῶσις ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς.

§ i.6

λεγέσθω δὲ τούτων

τὸ γὰρ

• βουλεύεσθαι καὶ
• λογίζεσθαι

ταὐτόν,
οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν.

ὥστε τὸ λογιστικόν ἐστιν ἕν τι μέρος τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος.

§ i.7

ληπτέον ἄρ᾽ ἑκατέρου τούτων
τίς ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις·

αὕτη γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρου,
ἡ δ᾽ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον.

Chapter II

§ ii.1

τρία δή ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ κύρια

§ ii.2

τούτων δ᾽ ἡ αἴσθησις οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχὴ πράξεως·

ἔστι δ᾽

ὥστ᾽ ἐπειδὴ

• ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική,
• ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὄρεξις βουλευτική,

καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ

• τὸν μὲν φάναι
• τὴν δὲ διώκειν.

• αὕτη μὲν οὖν
  • ἡ διάνοια καὶ
  • ἡ ἀλήθεια

  πρακτική·

§ ii.3

• τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς διανοίας καὶ

  • μὴ πρακτικῆς
  • μηδὲ ποιητικῆς
  τὸ

  • εὖ καὶ
  • κακῶς

  τ-

  • ἀληθές ἐστι καὶ
  • ψεῦδος

  (τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι παντὸς διανοητικοῦ ἔργον)·

• τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ καὶ διανοητικοῦ
  ἀλήθεια ὁμολόγως ἔχουσα
  τῇ ὀρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ.

§ ii.4

• πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις –

  • ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις ἀλλ᾽
  • οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα –

• προαιρέσεως δὲ

  • ὄρεξις καὶ
  • λόγος
    ὁ ἕνεκά τινος.

διὸ

• οὔτ᾽ ἄνευ
  • νοῦ καὶ
  • διανοίας
• οὔτ᾽ ἄνευ ἠθικῆς ἐστὶν ἕξεως

ἡ προαίρεσις·

• εὐπραξία γὰρ καὶ
• τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν πράξει

ἄνευ

• διανοίας καὶ
• ἤθους

οὐκ ἔστιν.

§ ii.5

• διάνοια δ᾽ αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ,
• ἀλλ᾽ ἡ
  • ἕνεκά του καὶ
  • πρακτική· [1139^b]

αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχει·

ἕνεκα γάρ του ποιεῖ πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν,
καὶ

• οὐ τέλος ἁπλῶς (ἀλλὰ
  • πρός τι καὶ
  • τινός)

  τὸ ποιητόν,

• ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν·

• ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος,
• ἡ δ᾽ ὄρεξις τούτου.

διὸ

• ἢ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ προαίρεσις
• ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική,

καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος.

§ ii.6

οὐκ ἔστι δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐδὲν γεγονός,
οἷον οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται Ἴλιον πεπορθηκέναι·

• οὐδὲ γὰρ βουλεύεται περὶ τοῦ γεγονότος
• ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ
  • ἐσομένου καὶ
  • ἐνδεχομένου,

τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι·

ἀμφοτέρων δὴ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων
ἀλήθεια τὸ ἔργον.

καθ᾽ ἃς οὖν μάλιστα ἕξεις ἀληθεύσει ἑκάτερον,
αὗται ἀρεταὶ ἀμφοῖν.

Chapter III

Chapter 3

§ iii.1

ἀρξάμενοι οὖν ἄνωθεν περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν λέγωμεν.

ἔστω δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ

• καταφάναι ἢ
• ἀποφάναι,

πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν·

ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶ

• ὑπολήψει γὰρ καὶ
• δόξῃ

ἐνδέχεται διαψεύδεσθαι.

§ iii.2

ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὖν τί ἐστιν,
ἐντεῦθεν φανερόν,
εἰ δεῖ

• ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι καὶ
• μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς ὁμοιότησιν.

πάντες γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνομεν,
ὃ ἐπιστάμεθα,
μηδ᾽ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν·

τὰ δ᾽ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως,
ὅταν ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν γένηται,
λανθάνει εἰ

• ἔστιν ἢ
• μή.

τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντα ἁπλῶς πάντα ἀίδια,
τὰ δ᾽ ἀίδια ἀγένητα καὶ ἄφθαρτα.

§ iii.3

ἔτι

• διδακτὴ ἅπασα ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ
• τὸ ἐπιστητὸν μαθητόν.

ἐκ προγινωσκομένων δὲ πᾶσα διδασκαλία,
ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν·

• ἣ μὲν γὰρ δι᾽ ἐπαγωγῆς,
• ἣ δὲ συλλογισμῷ.

• ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή ἐστι καὶ τοῦ καθόλου,
• ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου.

εἰσὶν ἄρα ἀρχαὶ

• ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός,
• ὧν οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμός·

ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα.

§ iii.4

ἡ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἕξις ἀποδεικτική,
καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιοριζόμεθα ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς·

ὅταν γάρ πως πιστεύῃ καὶ γνώριμοι αὐτῷ ὦσιν αἱ ἀρχαί,
ἐπίσταται·

εἰ γὰρ μὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ συμπεράσματος,
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἕξει τὴν ἐπιστήμην.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

[1140^a]

Chapter IV

Chapter 4

§ iv.1

τοῦ δ᾽ ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν ἔστι τι

• καὶ ποιητὸν
• καὶ πρακτόν·

§ iv.2

ἕτερον δ᾽ ἐστὶ

• ποίησις καὶ
• πρᾶξις

(πιστεύομεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις)·

ὥστε καὶ
ἡ μετὰ λόγου ἕξις πρακτικὴ
ἕτερόν ἐστι
τῆς μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆς ἕξεως.

διὸ οὐδὲ περιέχεται ὑπ᾽ ἀλλήλων·

• οὔτε γὰρ ἡ πρᾶξις ποίησις
• οὔτε ἡ ποίησις πρᾶξίς ἐστιν.

§ iv.3

ἐπεὶ δ᾽

• ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ τέχνη τίς ἐστι καὶ ὅπερ ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ποιητική, καὶ
• οὐδεμία οὔτε τέχνη ἐστὶν ἥτις οὐ μετὰ λόγου ποιητικὴ ἕξις ἐστίν,
• οὔτε τοιαύτη ἣ οὐ τέχνη,

§ iv.4

ἔστι δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ

• γένεσιν καὶ

• τὸ

  • τεχνάζειν καὶ
  • θεωρεῖν

  ὅπως ἂν γένηταί

  • τι τῶν ἐνδεχομένων
    • καὶ εἶναι
    • καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ
  • ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ
    • ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἀλλὰ
    • μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ·

• οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης
  • ὄντων ἢ
  • γινομένων

  ἡ τέχνη ἐστίν,

• οὔτε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν·

ἐν αὑτοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσι ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχήν.

§ iv.5

ἐπεὶ δὲ

• ποίησις καὶ
• πρᾶξις

ἕτερον,
ἀνάγκη τὴν τέχνην

• ποιήσεως ἀλλ᾽
• οὐ πράξεως

εἶναι.

καὶ τρόπον τινὰ περὶ τὰ αὐτά ἐστιν

• ἡ τύχη καὶ
• ἡ τέχνη,

§ iv.6

• ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη,
  ὥσπερ εἴρηται,
  ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική ἐστιν,
• ἡ δ᾽ ἀτεχνία τοὐναντίον
  μετὰ λόγου ψευδοῦς ποιητικὴ ἕξις,
  περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν.

Chapter V

Chapter 5

§ v.1

περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν,
θεωρήσαντες τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς φρονίμους.

δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὑτῷ

• ἀγαθὰ καὶ
• συμφέροντα,

• οὐ κατὰ μέρος,

  οἷον ποῖα

  • πρὸς ὑγίειαν,
  • πρὸς ἰσχύν,

• ἀλλὰ ποῖα
  πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως.

§ v.2

σημεῖον δ᾽ ὅτι καὶ
τοὺς περί τι φρονίμους λέγομεν,
ὅταν πρὸς τέλος τι σπουδαῖον εὖ λογίσωνται,
ὧν μή ἐστι τέχνη.

ὥστε καὶ ὅλως ἂν εἴη φρόνιμος
ὁ βουλευτικός.

§ v.3

βουλεύεται δ᾽

• οὐθεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν,
• οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ πρᾶξαι.

ὥστ᾽ εἴπερ

• ἐπιστήμη μὲν μετ᾽ ἀποδείξεως,
• ὧν δ᾽ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν,
  τούτων μή ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις
  (πάντα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν), [1140^b] καὶ
• οὐκ ἔστι βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων,

• οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη
• οὐδὲ τέχνη,

• ἐπιστήμη μὲν ὅτι
  ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρακτὸν ἄλλως ἔχειν,
• τέχνη δ᾽ ὅτι
  ἄλλο τὸ γένος
  • πράξεως καὶ
  • ποιήσεως.

§ v.4

λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν εἶναι

• ἕξιν ἀληθῆ
• μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν
• περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ
  • ἀγαθὰ καὶ
  • κακά.
• τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος,
• τῆς δὲ πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη·
  ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος.

§ v.5

ἔνθεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην
τούτῳ προσαγορεύομεν τῷ ὀνόματι,
ὡς σῴζουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν.

§ v.6

σῴζει δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ὑπόληψιν.

• οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ὑπόληψιν
  • διαφθείρει οὐδὲ
  • διαστρέφει

  τὸ

  • ἡδὺ καὶ
  • λυπηρόν,

  οἷον ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἔχει,

• ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ πρακτόν.

• αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τὰ πρακτά·
• τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι᾽
  • ἡδονὴν ἢ
  • λύπην

  εὐθὺς οὐ φαίνεται ἀρχή,

  • οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἕνεκεν
  • οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦθ᾽
     
  • αἱρεῖσθαι πάντα καὶ
  • πράττειν·

ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς.

ὥστ᾽ ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν

• ἕξιν εἶναι
• μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ
• περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικήν.

§ v.7

• ἀλλὰ μὴν τέχνης μὲν ἔστιν ἀρετή,
• φρονήσεως δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν·

καὶ

• ἐν μὲν τέχνῃ ὁ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων αἱρετώτερος,
• περὶ δὲ φρόνησιν ἧττον,

ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς.

δῆλον οὖν ὅτι

• ἀρετή τις ἐστὶ καὶ
• οὐ τέχνη.

§ v.8

δυοῖν δ᾽ ὄντοιν μεροῖν τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν λόγον ἐχόντων,
θατέρου ἂν εἴη ἀρετή,
τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ·

• ἥ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ
• ἡ φρόνησις.

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἕξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον·

σημεῖον δ᾽ ὅτι

• λήθη μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἔστι,
• φρονήσεως δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν.