Polytropy

This is about intellect, wisdom, and prudence. They are strange subjects for discussion.

• If you have them, are you going to spend time talking about them?
• If you haven’t got them, what can you say about them?

Apparently I did talk about them with my classmates when we were undergraduates, even freshmen: too young for prudence, although not for wisdom, by Aristotle’s account below, at least in special pursuits such as geometry and mathematics.

Does that sound like wisdom? According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary (6th edition, 1976), wisdom is

experience and knowledge together with the power of applying them critically or practically; sagacity, prudence, common sense.

Aristotle is talking about σοφία though, and this can mean cleverness. Intellect and prudence are νούς and φρόνησις. Last time we saw the claim that the latter is prudence only in the older sense of “practical judgment,” not the sense of “playing it safe” that is current today.

We are doing the middle of three readings into which Book VI of the Nichomachean Ethics can be divided. The general subject is the intellectual virtues (αἱ τῆς διανοίας ἀρεταί), as distinct from the character virtues (αἱ τῆς ἤθους ἀρεταί) taken up in the earlier books. A key passage for the organization of Book VI may be in § iii.1, here with the translation of Bartlett and Collins:

ἔστω δὴ
οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ
τῷ

• καταφάναι ἢ
• ἀποφάναι,

πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν·
ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶ

• τέχνη
• ἐπιστήμη
• φρόνησις
• σοφία
• νοῦς·

• ὑπολήψει γὰρ καὶ
• δόξῃ

ἐνδέχεται διαψεύδεσθαι.

So let those things
by which the soul attains the truth,
by way of

• affirmation and
• denial,

be five in number.
These are

• art,
• science,
• prudence,
• wisdom, and
• intellect

• (for through conviction* and
• opinion,

one can be mistaken†).

* Or, “supposition” (hypolēpsis); the related verb (hypolambanomai) is translated as “suppose” …
† Or, perhaps, “deceived” (diapseudesthai).

An alternative for “art” is “skill”; for “science,” “knowledge” (or “scientific knowledge”). The real question is what is meant by all the words.

What “prudence” means was taken up last time. This time, Aristotle applies what RationalWiki calls the “Holmesian fallacy,” originating in words given to Sherlock Holmes by Arthur Conan Doyle in The Sign of the Four, chapter 6:

How often have I said to you that when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth?

Somehow Aristotle has decided that if one is going to ἀληθεύειν – speak or arrive at the truth – then there are five ways of doing it (and two ways to fail). The first four ways have “starting points.” Therefore only the fifth way, nous, can get at the truth about the starting points. That’s the conclusion of Chapter VI, the first in the reading below from Book VI.

We must have some way of getting at our starting points, and perhaps intellect or nous is as good a name for it as any. But what is a starting point, an ἀρχή? The translators have it as follows.

For Collingwood in An Essay on Metaphysics, ἀρχαί would seem to be absolute presuppositions.

Wikipedia has an article “First principle” saying this is ἀρχή in Greek. The article opens by giving, as a non-example, the conclusion of the standard syllogism about Socrates. Implicitly then, the major and minor premisses would seem to be first principles. Explicitly, Euclid’s definitions, postulates, and common notions are first principles.

A difficulty for us then is that Euclid was writing after Aristotle, but was the first (as far as we or at least I know) to give geometry such first principles.

By the way, John Stuart Mill is cited for the standard syllogism, and the only mention of Socrates that I find in the Prior Analytics, at least in the translation by A. J. Jenkinson posted at MIT Internet Classics Archive, is in I.xxvii, 43^a32–6:

It is clear then that some things are naturally not stated of anything: for as a rule each sensible thing is such that it cannot be predicated of anything, save incidentally: for we sometimes say that that white object is Socrates, or that that which approaches is Callias.

If always the same example of something is used, this could be a sign that the concept is not in active use. To the question, “What is a syllogism?” one may answer by quoting Aristotle’s definition from the Prior Analytics I.i, 24^b19–21:

A syllogism is discourse (λόγος) in which, certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so.

Then one can give the standard example (Aristotle doesn’t give one at all): All men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal.

Why not give a new example? All infections come from somebody else, and I saw nobody else but my students, therefore one of them gave me Covid.

As for translating ἀρχή as “first principle,” what does one mean by that? It seems “principle” and “first principle” are possible translations of Tao, 道. One of the 101 Zen Stories of Reps and Senzaki is called “The First Principle,” and I remembered figured out that this was Tao. Possibly my memory was faulty.

In the boxed hardback letterpress edition that I have of Zen Flesh, Zen Bones, compiled by Paul Reps (Charles E. Tuttle Co; first printing, 1957; twenty-first printing, 1985), the English title of each of the 101 Zen Stories (as well as of each koan in The Gateless Gate) has next to it a Chinese character. The character given with “The First Principle” is displayed near the top of this post, and it appears at the head of the list below; I obtained the image of the character as a screenshot from a copy of the book at the Internet Archive.

I fed my image to an online Chinese OCR program and was given the next character on the list, 障. This seems to be closest to the original character; however, Wiktionary gives it such meanings as “to block, obstruct; obstacle.”

The Wikipedia article “First principle” links to 第一原理 in both Chinese and Japanese. The meaning seems to be, character by character,

The first two characters together mean “first.” Perhaps the fourth character gives an abstract meaning to the third, 原, meaning originally things like “meadow,” and then “source.”

There are variants 源 and 厡 of the third character, with original meaning “spring (of water).”

Finally, I put the character Tao 道 on the list; it seems more different from the first character than the others are, but this is very hard to judge (for me).

I am left then with a mystery. Maybe the typesetters at Charles E. Tuttle Co. picked the wrong character to stand for “The First Principle”: by the interpretation of the saying that I learned as a child, though it may not represent the true origin, they couldn’t mind their p’s and q’s.

We also have the mystery of where Aristotle is going. Particularly interesting is the idea of § viii.9 that prudence is an opposite or perhaps complement of intellect for pursuing ultimate things while the latter goes for first things.

Contents

• Chapter VI = Chapter 6. INTELLECT (ΝΟΥΣ).
  Of the ἀρχή of the knowable (τὸ ἐπιστητόν),
  • there is no
    • science (ἐπιστήμη),
    • art (τέχνη),
    • prudence (φρόνησις), or
    • wisdom (σοφία) –

    since e.g.

    • science involves demonstrations,
      which have ἀρχαί, and
    • wisdom concerns what can be otherwise, while
      knowledge is of the
      • universal and
      • necessary (§ vi.1) –
  • but there is intellect (νοῦς, § vi.2).
• Chapter VII
• Chapter 7. WISDOM (ΣΟΦΙΑ). This is,
  • in one sense,
    • artistic excellence (ἀρετὴ τέχνης, § vii.1);
  • in the general sense,
    • the most precise of the sciences (§ vii.2);
    • both intellect and science,
    • a science with a “head,”
    • of the most honorable things (§ vii.3);
    • not
      • politics or
      • prudence,

      since

      • wisdom is the same for all,
      • prudence and politics depend on your species
        (some being more divine than man, § vii.4).
  • Thales and Anaxagoras were
    • wise,
    • not prudent (§ vii.5).
• Chapter 8. PRUDENCE (ΦΡΟΝΗΣΙΣ) concerns things
  • human and
  • deliberated on – namely things that
    • can be otherwise,
    • have a purpose (§ vii.6);
  • not only universal,
  • but acted on, thus particular –
    there should still be something architectonic (§ vii.7), namely:
• Chapter VIII. POLITICS (ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ).
  • Politics and prudence are
    • the same habit (ἕξις),
    • not the same in being (§ viii.1).
  • Concerning the πόλις, prudence
    • is legislative,
      when considered as architectonic;
    • has the common name, politics,
      when concerning particulars,
      namely decrees,
      the ultimate practical things,
      like handicrafts (§ viii.2).
  • Prudence is
    • called that,
      when concerned with the individual;
    • otherwise it’s
      • domestic economy (οἰκονομία),
      • lawmaking,
      • politics
        • deliberative,
        • judicial (§ viii.3).
• Chapter 9
  • People concerned with
    • politics seem busybodies;
    • self-knowledge seem prudent,
      though perhaps one cannot have this without
      • domestic economy,
      • a polity (πολιτεία, § viii.4).
  • A sign is that the young are
    • not prudent, because this,
      involving particulars,
      would require experience;
    • wise in geometry and mathematics (§ viii.5),
      because these are abstract (δι᾽ ἀφαιρέσεώς, § viii.6).
  • Deliberation can err in
    • universals (“dirty water is bad”)
    • particulars (“this water is dirty,” § viii.7).
  • Being of ultimate practical things,
    prudence is
    • not science (§ viii.8);
    • opposite to intellect, which is
      of ineffable limits (τῶν ὅρων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος);
    • perception (as it were),
      • not by the senses,
      • but as of the triangle
        as being mathematically ultimate (§ viii.9).
• Chapter IX = Chapter 10. DELIBERATION (ΒΟΥΛΗ).
  • Good or skilled deliberation (ἡ εὐβουλία, eubulia) is
    • a kind of investigating or inquiring (τὸ ζητεῖν, § ix.1);
    • not science, i.e. knowing (ἐπιστήμη),
      because you don’t investigate what you know;
    • not good guesswork (ἡ εὐστοχία),
      because this is quick and without reason (§ ix.2);
    • not shrewdness or “intellectual imagination” (ἡ ἀγχίνοια),
      because this is a kind of guesswork;
    • not any sort of opinion (δόξα);
    • some kind of rightness (ὀρθότης τις), albeit
      • not of knowledge
        (there’s no such thing, nor error),
      • not of opinion
        (that would be truth, and anyway,
        what there’s opinion of is already determined);
        therefore
      • of thinking (διανοία, § ix.3).
  • Rightness of deliberation (ἡ βουλή) is
    • skilled deliberation,
    • attaining a good end (§ ix.4).
  • It would be skilled deliberation
    • not
      • to reach the good end
        by bad reasoning (§ ix.5), or,
      • to be dilatory
        when another could be brief,
    • but to be right
      • according to what is beneficial,
      • of what,
      • how, and
      • as one must (§ ix.6).
  • If deliberating well (τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι)
    is what the prudent do,
    then skilled deliberation would be
    rightness for the end;
    prudence is the true conception (ὑπόληψις) of this (§ ix.7).
• Chapter X. COMPREHENSION (ΣΥΝΕΣΙΣ), SHREWDNESS (ΕΥΣΥΝΕΣΙΑ).
• Chapter 11
  • Comprehension (σύνεσις) or shrewdness (εὐσυνεσία) is not
    • opinion;
    • knowledge in general;
    • any particular science;
    • prudence, although it concerns the same things (§ x.1) –
      • prudence is commanding (ἐπιτακτική),
      • comprehension is only critical (κριτική) –
    • having or getting prudence (§ x.2).
  • As using knowledge in learning is called understanding,
    so using opinion in making distinctions where prudence is concerned
    is comprehending well, i.e. beautifully (§ x.3).
  • That’s how “comprehension” arises,
    with reference to learning (§ x.4).

[1140^b]

Chapter VI

Chapter 6

§ vi.1

ἐπεὶ δ᾽

• ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ
  • τῶν καθόλου

  ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις καὶ

  • τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων,
• εἰσὶ δ᾽ ἀρχαὶ
  • τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν καὶ
  • πάσης ἐπιστήμης
    (μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη),

τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ

• οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἐπιστήμη εἴη
• οὔτε τέχνη
• οὔτε φρόνησις·

• τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν ἀποδεικτόν, [1141^a]
• αἳ δὲ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν.

οὐδὲ δὴ σοφία τούτων ἐστίν·

τοῦ γὰρ σοφοῦ περὶ ἐνίων ἔχειν ἀπόδειξίν ἐστιν.

§ vi.2

εἰ δὴ

• οἷς
  • ἀληθεύομεν καὶ
  • μηδέποτε διαψευδόμεθα

  περὶ τὰ

  • μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἢ καὶ
  • ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν,
     
  • ἐπιστήμη καὶ
  • φρόνησίς ἐστι καὶ
  • σοφία καὶ
  • νοῦς,
• τούτων δὲ τῶν τριῶν μηδὲν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι
  (λέγω δὲ τρία
  • φρόνησιν
  • ἐπιστήμην
  • σοφίαν),

λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν.

Chapter VII

Chapter 7

§ vii.1

τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἔν τε ταῖς τέχναις
τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις τὰς τέχνας
ἀποδίδομεν,

ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν οὐθὲν ἄλλο σημαίνοντες τὴν σοφίαν
ἢ ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐστίν·

§ vii.2

εἶναι δέ τινας σοφοὺς οἰόμεθα

• ὅλως
• οὐ κατὰ μέρος
• οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο τι σοφούς,

ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἡ σοφία.

§ vii.3

δεῖ ἄρα τὸν σοφὸν

• μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰδέναι,
• ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν.

ὥστ᾽ εἴη ἂν ἡ σοφία

ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμιωτάτων.

ἄτοπον γὰρ εἴ τις

• τὴν πολιτικὴν ἢ
• τὴν φρόνησιν

σπουδαιοτάτην οἴεται εἶναι,
εἰ μὴ τὸ ἄριστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ
ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν.

§ vii.4

καὶ

τὰ γὰρ περὶ αὑτὸ ἕκαστα τὸ εὖ θεωροῦν
φησὶν εἶναι φρόνιμον,
καὶ τούτῳ ἐπιτρέψει αὐτά.

διὸ καὶ τῶν θηρίων ἔνια φρόνιμά φασιν εἶναι,
ὅσα περὶ τὸν αὑτῶν βίον ἔχοντα φαίνεται δύναμιν προνοητικήν.

φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι

εἰ γὰρ τὴν περὶ τὰ ὠφέλιμα τὰ αὑτοῖς ἐροῦσι σοφίαν,
πολλαὶ ἔσονται σοφίαι·

οὐ γὰρ μία περὶ τὸ ἁπάντων ἀγαθὸν τῶν ζῴων,
ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέρα περὶ ἕκαστον,
εἰ μὴ καὶ ἰατρικὴ μία περὶ πάντων τῶν ὄντων.

εἰ δ᾽ ὅτι βέλτιστον ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων,
οὐδὲν διαφέρει·

καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ἄλλα πολὺ θειότερα τὴν φύσιν, [1141^b]

οἷον φανερώτατά γε ἐξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκεν.

§ vii.5

ἐκ δὴ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σοφία ἐστὶ

• καὶ ἐπιστήμη
• καὶ νοῦς

τῶν τιμιωτάτων τῇ φύσει.

Chapter 8

§ vii.6

τοῦ γὰρ φρονίμου μάλιστα τοῦτ᾽ ἔργον εἶναί φαμεν,
τὸ εὖ βουλεύεσθαι,

βουλεύεται δ᾽ οὐδεὶς περὶ

• τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδ᾽
• ὅσων μὴ
  • τέλος τι ἔστι, καὶ τοῦτο
  • πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν.

ὁ δ᾽ ἁπλῶς εὔβουλος
ὁ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνθρώπῳ τῶν πρακτῶν στοχαστικὸς
κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν.

§ vii.7

ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις περὶ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα.

διὸ

• καὶ ἔνιοι οὐκ εἰδότες
  ἑτέρων εἰδότων πρακτικώτεροι,
• καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οἱ ἔμπειροι·

ἡ δὲ φρόνησις πρακτική·

ὥστε δεῖ ἄμφω ἔχειν,
ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον.

εἴη δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀρχιτεκτονική.

Chapter VIII

§ viii.1

ἔστι δὲ

§ viii.2

τῆς δὲ περὶ πόλιν

αὕτη δὲ

• πρακτικὴ καὶ
• βουλευτική·

τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα

• πρακτὸν
• ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον.

διὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τούτους μόνον λέγουσιν·

μόνοι γὰρ πράττουσιν οὗτοι
ὥσπερ οἱ χειροτέχναι.

§ viii.3

δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ φρόνησις μάλιστ᾽ εἶναι ἡ περὶ

• αὐτὸν καὶ
• ἕνα·

καὶ ἔχει αὕτη

• τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα,
• φρόνησις·

ἐκείνων δὲ

• ἣ μὲν οἰκονομία
• ἣ δὲ νομοθεσία
• ἣ δὲ πολιτική,
  καὶ ταύτης
  • ἣ μὲν βουλευτικὴ
  • ἣ δὲ δικαστική.

Chapter 9

§ viii.4

εἶδος μὲν οὖν τι ἂν εἴη γνώσεως
τὸ αὑτῷ εἰδέναι·

ἀλλ᾽ ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν· [1142^a]

καὶ δοκεῖ

• ὁ τὰ περὶ αὑτὸν εἰδὼς καὶ διατρίβων φρόνιμος εἶναι,
• οἱ δὲ πολιτικοὶ πολυπράγμονες·

• ζητοῦσι γὰρ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθόν, καὶ
• οἴονται τοῦτο δεῖν πράττειν.

ἐκ ταύτης οὖν τῆς δόξης ἐλήλυθε
τὸ τούτους φρονίμους εἶναι·

καίτοι ἴσως οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὑτοῦ εὖ

• ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδ᾽
• ἄνευ πολιτείας.

ἔτι δὲ τὰ αὑτοῦ πῶς δεῖ διοικεῖν,

• ἄδηλον καὶ
• σκεπτέον.

§ viii.5

σημεῖον δ᾽ ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ διότι

αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι καὶ

• τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστά ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις,
  ἃ γίνεται γνώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας,
• νέος δ᾽ ἔμπειρος οὐκ ἔστιν·

πλῆθος γὰρ χρόνου ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν·

§ viii.6

ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἄν τις σκέψαιτο,
διὰ τί δὴ

• μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ᾽ ἄν,
• σοφὸς δ᾽ ἢ φυσικὸς οὔ.

ἢ ὅτι

• τὰ μὲν δι᾽ ἀφαιρέσεώς ἐστιν,
• τῶν δ᾽ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ἐμπειρίας·

καὶ

• τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύουσιν οἱ νέοι ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν,
• τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἄδηλον;

§ viii.7

ἔτι ἡ ἁμαρτία

• ἢ περὶ τὸ καθόλου

ἐν τῷ βουλεύσασθαι

• ἢ περὶ τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον·

§ viii.8

ὅτι δ᾽ ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ ἐπιστήμη,
φανερόν·

τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν,
ὥσπερ εἴρηται·

τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον.

§ viii.9

ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῷ·

• ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὅρων,
  ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος,
• ἣ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχάτου,
  οὗ
  • οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη
  • ἀλλ᾽ αἴσθησις,
    • οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων,
    • ἀλλ᾽ οἵᾳ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι
      τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον τρίγωνον·

στήσεται γὰρ κἀκεῖ.

ἀλλ᾽ αὕτη

• μᾶλλον αἴσθησις
• ἢ φρόνησις,

ἐκείνης δ᾽ ἄλλο εἶδος.

Chapter IX

Chapter 10

§ ix.1

• τὸ ζητεῖν δὲ καὶ
• τὸ βουλεύεσθαι

διαφέρει·

τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι
ζητεῖν τι ἐστίν.

• τί ἐστι,
• πότερον
  • ἐπιστήμη τις ἢ
  • δόξα ἢ
  • εὐστοχία ἢ
  • ἄλλο τι γένος.

§ ix.2

• ἐπιστήμη μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἔστιν·

  • οὐ γὰρ ζητοῦσι περὶ ὧν ἴσασιν, [1142^b]

  • • ἡ δ᾽ εὐβουλία βουλή τις,
    • ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος ζητεῖ καὶ λογίζεται.
• ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ εὐστοχία·
  • • ἄνευ τε γὰρ λόγου καὶ
    • ταχύ τι

    ἡ εὐστοχία,

  • • βουλεύονται δὲ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ
    • φασὶ
      • πράττειν μὲν δεῖν ταχὺ τὰ βουλευθέντα,
      • βουλεύεσθαι δὲ βραδέως.

§ ix.3

ἔτι

• ἡ ἀγχίνοια

ἕτερον καὶ

• ἡ εὐβουλία·

ἔστι δ᾽ εὐστοχία τις
ἡ ἀγχίνοια.

οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα
ἡ εὐβουλία οὐδεμία.

ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεὶ

• ὁ μὲν κακῶς βουλευόμενος ἁμαρτάνει,
• ὁ δ᾽ εὖ ὀρθῶς βουλεύεται,

δῆλον ὅτι
ὀρθότης τις
ἡ εὐβουλία ἐστίν,

• οὔτ᾽ ἐπιστήμης δὲ
• οὔτε δόξης·

• ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ
  • οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθότης
  • (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἁμαρτία),
• δόξης δ᾽ ὀρθότης ἀλήθεια·
  ἅμα δὲ καὶ
  ὥρισται ἤδη
  πᾶν οὗ δόξα ἐστίν.

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ λόγου
ἡ εὐβουλία.

διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται·

αὕτη γὰρ οὔπω φάσις·

καὶ γὰρ

• ἡ δόξα
  • οὐ ζήτησις
  • ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἤδη,
• ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος,
  • ἐάν τε εὖ
  • ἐάν τε καὶ κακῶς

  βουλεύηται,

  • ζητεῖ τι καὶ
  • λογίζεται.

§ ix.4

ἀλλ᾽ ὀρθότης τίς ἐστιν
ἡ εὐβουλία
βουλῆς·

διὸ ἡ βουλὴ ζητητέα πρῶτον

• τί καὶ
• περὶ τί.

ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἡ ὀρθότης πλεοναχῶς,
δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πᾶσα·

• ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατὴς καὶ
• ὁ φαῦλος

ὃ προτίθεται †ἰδεῖν†
ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ
τεύξεται,
ὥστε

• ὀρθῶς ἔσται βεβουλευμένος,
• κακὸν δὲ μέγα εἰληφώς.

δοκεῖ δ᾽ ἀγαθόν τι
τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι·

ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη ὀρθότης βουλῆς

• εὐβουλία,
• ἡ ἀγαθοῦ τευκτική.

§ ix.5

ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι καὶ τούτου ψευδεῖ συλλογισμῷ τυχεῖν,
καὶ

• ὃ μὲν δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν,
• δι᾽ οὗ δ᾽ οὔ,
  ἀλλὰ ψευδῆ
  τὸν μέσον ὅρον εἶναι·

ὥστ᾽ οὐδ᾽ αὕτη πω εὐβουλία,
καθ᾽ ἣν

• οὗ δεῖ μὲν τυγχάνει,
• οὐ μέντοι δι᾽ οὗ ἔδει.

§ ix.6

ἔτι ἔστι

• πολὺν χρόνον βουλευόμενον

τυχεῖν,

• τὸν δὲ ταχύ.

οὐκοῦν

• οὐδ᾽ ἐκείνη πω

εὐβουλία,

• ἀλλ᾽ ὀρθότης ἡ
  • κατὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον, καὶ
  • οὗ δεῖ καὶ
  • ὣς καὶ
  • ὅτε.

§ ix.7

ἔτι ἔστι

• καὶ ἁπλῶς

εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι

• καὶ πρός τι τέλος.

• ἣ μὲν δὴ ἁπλῶς
  ἡ πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ ἁπλῶς κατορθοῦσα,
• τὶς δὲ
  ἡ πρός τι τέλος.

εἰ δὴ τῶν φρονίμων τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι,
ἡ εὐβουλία εἴη ἂν
ὀρθότης
ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς τὸ τέλος,

οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψίς ἐστιν.

Chapter X

Chapter 11

§ x.1

ἔστι δὲ καὶ

[1143^a] καθ᾽ ἃς λέγομεν

• συνετοὺς καὶ
• εὐσυνέτους,

• οὔθ᾽ ὅλως τὸ αὐτὸ
  • ἐπιστήμῃ ἢ
  • δόξῃ

  (πάντες γὰρ ἂν ἦσαν συνετοί)

• οὔτε τις μία τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστημῶν,
  οἷον
  • ἡ ἰατρικὴ περὶ ὑγιεινῶν,
  • ἡ γεωμετρία περὶ μεγέθη·

• ¶ οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν
  • ἀεὶ ὄντων καὶ
  • ἀκινήτων

  ἡ σύνεσίς ἐστιν

• οὔτε περὶ τῶν γιγνομένων ὁτουοῦν,
• ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις καὶ βουλεύσαιτο.

διὸ

• περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν τῇ φρονήσει ἐστίν,
• οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ
  • σύνεσις καὶ
  • φρόνησις.

§ x.2

• ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτική ἐστιν·
  τί γὰρ δεῖ
  • πράττειν ἢ
  • μή,

  τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἐστίν·

• ἡ δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον.
  ταὐτὸ γὰρ
  • σύνεσις καὶ
  • εὐσυνεσία

  καὶ

  • συνετοὶ καὶ
  • εὐσύνετοι.

¶ ἔστι δ᾽

• οὔτε τὸ ἔχειν τὴν φρόνησιν
• οὔτε τὸ λαμβάνειν

ἡ σύνεσις·

§ x.3

ἀλλ᾽

• ὥσπερ τὸ μανθάνειν λέγεται
  συνιέναι,
  ὅταν χρῆται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ,
• οὕτως
  ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι τῇ δόξῃ
  ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν
  περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν,
  ἄλλου λέγοντος, καὶ
  κρίνειν καλῶς·

• τὸ γὰρ εὖ
• τῷ καλῶς τὸ αὐτό.

§ x.4

καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐλήλυθε τοὔνομα ἡ σύνεσις,
καθ᾽ ἣν εὐσύνετοι,
ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν·

λέγομεν γὰρ

• τὸ μανθάνειν
• συνιέναι πολλάκις.