I write this now while many are suffering. Unfortunately that is always true.
What I am supposed to be focused on is virtue in the use of money. I shall get to this.
I write this now while many are suffering. Unfortunately that is always true.
What I am supposed to be focused on is virtue in the use of money. I shall get to this.
We are reading the last part of Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. The subject is ἡ σωφροσύνη. This might be given various names in English, such as temperance, moderation, modesty, sobriety, sanity, prudence, continence, chastity. Our question is not so much what the best word for sôphrosyne is, but what Aristotle means by it, and how this fits with our own experience.
Work recently began again, now under the name of Hilton, on our neighborhood’s sole skyscraper, which looms over the Hacıosman metro terminal; this is from the residential street on the other side
Like all virtues, σωφροσύνη has two attendant vices:
The virtue of courage is seen most clearly
In saying this, we do not mean
Perhaps we should not be brave at all. Still, it is somehow open to us. It is better than the alternatives, but one has to work that out for oneself.
This post features the first five chapters of Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. Those chapters take up the following subjects.

Public space in Maslak, Sarıyer
“One of the main business districts of Istanbul”
September 19, 2023
The first part of this post concerns a poem by Constantine Cavafy on accepting one’s fate. There are three parts after that:
The Cavafy poem, “The God Abandons Antony,” is based on a passage in Plutarch’s life of that person. Susan Cain wrote about the poem in a newsletter. Her book Quiet gave me a new appreciation for my parents. It so happens that my parents had me by adoption. Unfortunately other people are not happy to be in that situation.
Some people are also not happy with their sex. Cavafy’s poem could have given courage to Ms Cain during a painful birth. Courage is literally manliness in Greek. Plutarch writes of a man’s imitation of a woman in labor. Roberto Calasso’s Marriage of Cadmus and Harmony led me to the story. I talk about all of that.
I have since learned of another good essay, “Personal Integrity in the Poetry of C. P. Cavafy,” in Beshara Magazine, by Andrew Watson. A different Andrew Watson played football for Scotland in 1881, and The Guardian has an article, “‘We looked identical’: one man’s discovery of slavery, family and football” (24 December 2020), by Tusdiq Din, about Malik Al-Nasir, formerly Mark Watson, who discovered, through their physical resemblance, a family relation with Andrew.
When Ayşe and I moved from Fulya to Tarabya last October, we were coming nearer where C. P. Cavafy once lived along the Bosphorus.
The scholarship is uncertain, but the Greek word ἀρετή, which we translate as virtue, may not be etymologically related to either of
However,
This post is the sequel of the previous one, “Eudemony” (now extensively revised), which was on and of the first book of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. The present post is on and of the second book, whose theme is moral virtue in general.
I do wonder to what extent Aristotle thinks of ἀρετή as manliness. Homer may have done so in the Iliad, as in one of the passages (Book XV, lines 641–3) cited in the lexicon of Liddell, Scott, and Jones. This concerns a man slain by Hector, namely Periphetes, son of Copreus:
τοῦ γένετ᾽ ἐκ πατρὸς πολὺ χείρονος υἱὸς ἀμείνων
παντοίας ἀρετάς, ἠμὲν πόδας ἠδὲ μάχεσθαι,
καὶ νόον ἐν πρώτοισι Μυκηναίων ἐτέτυκτο.Of him, a father baser by far, was begotten a son goodlier in all manner of excellence, both in fleetness of foot and in fight, and in mind he was among the first of the men of Mycenae.
When I was an adolescent, I conceived a desire to know “the definition of happiness.” This was all I wanted, when a friend asked what to give me for my birthday. He took me seriously, but unfortunately I could not take his answer seriously, because what he came up with was, “A puppy.” This friend did not understand that
At the beginning of the first post “On Dialectic,” I raised the question of why I put so much into such posts. I propose now a couple of answers.
I want to collect all evidence for what I am investigating – currently dialectic in Plato’s Republic. As Arthur Conan Doyle (1859–1930) has Sherlock Holmes say in A Study in Scarlet (1887; Wordsworth Classics, 2004),
It is a capital mistake to theorize before you have all the evidence. It biases the judgment.
And yet in Religion and Philosophy (1916), Collingwood states “the fundamental axiom of all thinking,”
namely that whatever exists stands in some definite relation to the other things that exist.
Thus “all the evidence” is everything in the world.
I am engaged in such self-defense as a certain Islamic philosopher is, by the account of Strauss in Persecution and the Art of Writing (1952):
Fārābī avails himself then of the specific immunity of the commentator or of the historian in order to speak his mind concerning grave matters in his “historical” works, rather than in the works in which he speaks in his own name.
In Book I of Plato’s Republic, Socrates distinguishes between two ways to respond to a disagreement. The two parties can:
The latter would seem to be dialectic, although Socrates does not call it that. I said this last time, when I also noted that Socrates does refer to dialectic as such in Book V; but I deferred investigation of the passage till now.