Category Archives: Philosophy

Freeness

I write this now while many are suffering. Unfortunately that is always true.

What I am supposed to be focused on is virtue in the use of money. I shall get to this.

Toilet facility covered with the image of a forest sits in a real forest

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Sanity

We are reading the last part of Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. The subject is ἡ σωφροσύνη. This might be given various names in English, such as temperance, moderation, modesty, sobriety, sanity, prudence, continence, chastity. Our question is not so much what the best word for sôphrosyne is, but what Aristotle means by it, and how this fits with our own experience.

A grid of floors and columns rises from the ground, dwarfing the trees in front of it
Hacıosman, Sarıyer, İstanbul
September 22, 2023

Work recently began again, now under the name of Hilton, on our neighborhood’s sole skyscraper, which looms over the Hacıosman metro terminal; this is from the residential street on the other side

Like all virtues, σωφροσύνη has two attendant vices:

  • ἡ ἀκολασία, licence, licentiousness, intemperance, profligacy;
  • ἡ ἀναισθησία, “anaesthesia,” insensitivity.

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Valor

The virtue of courage is seen most clearly

In saying this, we do not mean

  • we should all engage in such contests, or
  • any of us should, or
  • we cannot be brave without it.

Perhaps we should not be brave at all. Still, it is somehow open to us. It is better than the alternatives, but one has to work that out for oneself.

Fallen warrior on cover of Lattimore’s Iliad, lying on Crisp’s Nicomachean Ethics

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Excuses

This post features the first five chapters of Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. Those chapters take up the following subjects.

  • Chapter I. The voluntary and involuntary (ἑκούσιος and ἀκούσιος).
  • Chapter II. Choice (also called intention, preference, and rational or deliberate choice: προαίρεσις).
  • Chapter III. The deliberated (βουλευτός).
  • Chapter IV. The wished-for (βουλητός).
  • Chapter V. Vice (κακία) as being voluntary.

Mostly bare earth with a few weeds, some trash, a tree with two trunks, and a billboard; cars and low-rise buildings behind, on a sunny day
Public space in Maslak, Sarıyer
“One of the main business districts of Istanbul”
September 19, 2023

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Cavafy in Istanbul

The first part of this post concerns a poem by Constantine Cavafy on accepting one’s fate. There are three parts after that:

The Cavafy poem, “The God Abandons Antony,” is based on a passage in Plutarch’s life of that person. Susan Cain wrote about the poem in a newsletter. Her book Quiet gave me a new appreciation for my parents. It so happens that my parents had me by adoption. Unfortunately other people are not happy to be in that situation.

Some people are also not happy with their sex. Cavafy’s poem could have given courage to Ms Cain during a painful birth. Courage is literally manliness in Greek. Plutarch writes of a man’s imitation of a woman in labor. Roberto Calasso’s Marriage of Cadmus and Harmony led me to the story. I talk about all of that.

I have since learned of another good essay, “Personal Integrity in the Poetry of C. P. Cavafy,” in Beshara Magazine, by Andrew Watson. A different Andrew Watson played football for Scotland in 1881, and The Guardian has an article, “‘We looked identical’: one man’s discovery of slavery, family and football” (24 December 2020), by Tusdiq Din, about Malik Al-Nasir, formerly Mark Watson, who discovered, through their physical resemblance, a family relation with Andrew.


When Ayşe and I moved from Fulya to Tarabya last October, we were coming nearer where C. P. Cavafy once lived along the Bosphorus.

Boxes packed for moving. Rolled-up carpets; bubble wrap around bookcases. Light comes from a window on the right and a glowing globe on the upper left. Two more spherical paper shades sit on boxes
Last evening in Fulya
Saturday, October 15, 2022

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Manliness

The scholarship is uncertain, but the Greek word ἀρετή, which we translate as virtue, may not be etymologically related to either of

  • ἀνήρ, ἀνδρός, he-man;
  • Ἄρης, Ἄρεως, the god of war.

However,

  • “virtue” is related to the first part of “werewolf,” were being the old English word for a he-man (as wife was the word for a “she-man,” that is, a she-human, a woman; see “Math, Maugham, and Man”; the Wikipedia article “Indo-European vocabulary” currently gives ἱέραξ “hawk, falcon” as sharing the root of “virtue” and were, but Beekes gives a different root, uncertainly);
  • ἀνήρ yields the adjective ἀνδρεῖος, α, ον and the abstract noun ἀνδρεία (which like many abstract nouns is feminine), denoting respectively the person who has, and that which is, the virtue that in English is called bravery or courage.

This post is the sequel of the previous one, “Eudemony” (now extensively revised), which was on and of the first book of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. The present post is on and of the second book, whose theme is moral virtue in general.

I do wonder to what extent Aristotle thinks of ἀρετή as manliness. Homer may have done so in the Iliad, as in one of the passages (Book XV, lines 641–3) cited in the lexicon of Liddell, Scott, and Jones. This concerns a man slain by Hector, namely Periphetes, son of Copreus:

τοῦ γένετ᾽ ἐκ πατρὸς πολὺ χείρονος υἱὸς ἀμείνων
παντοίας ἀρετάς, ἠμὲν πόδας ἠδὲ μάχεσθαι,
καὶ νόον ἐν πρώτοισι Μυκηναίων ἐτέτυκτο.

Of him, a father baser by far, was begotten a son goodlier in all manner of excellence, both in fleetness of foot and in fight, and in mind he was among the first of the men of Mycenae.

Green cover of Nicomachean Ethics, Crisp translation, against water
Lock and Key of the Bosphorus
opening to the Black Sea
Tuesday, July 11, 2023

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Eudemony

When I was an adolescent, I conceived a desire to know “the definition of happiness.” This was all I wanted, when a friend asked what to give me for my birthday. He took me seriously, but unfortunately I could not take his answer seriously, because what he came up with was, “A puppy.” This friend did not understand that

  • an epitome was not a definition;
  • I was a cat person.

Cat roused from nap in grass next to lavender plants
Atatürk Kent Ormanı, Sarıyer, Istanbul
Friday, July 7, 2023

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Even More on Dialectic

At the beginning of the first post “On Dialectic,” I raised the question of why I put so much into such posts. I propose now a couple of answers.

  1. I want to collect all evidence for what I am investigating – currently dialectic in Plato’s Republic. As Arthur Conan Doyle (1859–1930) has Sherlock Holmes say in A Study in Scarlet (1887; Wordsworth Classics, 2004),

    It is a capital mistake to theorize before you have all the evidence. It biases the judgment.

    And yet in Religion and Philosophy (1916), Collingwood states “the fundamental axiom of all thinking,”

    namely that whatever exists stands in some definite relation to the other things that exist.

    Thus “all the evidence” is everything in the world.

  2. I am engaged in such self-defense as a certain Islamic philosopher is, by the account of Strauss in Persecution and the Art of Writing (1952):

    Fārābī avails himself then of the specific immunity of the commentator or of the historian in order to speak his mind concerning grave matters in his “historical” works, rather than in the works in which he speaks in his own name.

Cloud with several lobes above deciduous trees in leaf
View from our balcony
Sanatçılar Sitesi, Tarabya, Istanbul
Saturday, July 8, 2023

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More on Dialectic

In Book I of Plato’s Republic, Socrates distinguishes between two ways to respond to a disagreement. The two parties can:

  1. Have a debate, to be judged by a third party.
  2. Work with one another to resolve the disagreement.

The latter would seem to be dialectic, although Socrates does not call it that. I said this last time, when I also noted that Socrates does refer to dialectic as such in Book V; but I deferred investigation of the passage till now.

An elaborate flower
Saturday, June 24, 2022
Atatürk Kent Ormanı
Tarabya, Sarıyer, İstanbul

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On Dialectic

This is about dialectic in Plato’s Republic and today. There’s a lot here, and in another post I may investigate why that is; meanwhile, I note words of Serge Lang (1927–2005) in the Foreward of Algebra (third edition, 1993):

Unfortunately, a book must be projected in a totally ordered way on the page axis, but that’s not the way mathematics “is”, so readers have to make choices how to reset certain topics in parallel for themselves, rather than in succession.

From socialism to liberalism and perhaps back

The word “dialectic” has the air of a technical term. It intimidated me in the eighth grade, when I chose communism as my topic for a paper in political geography, and I found myself consulting a big book on dialectical materialism. My main source ended up being the Communist Manifesto, which says nothing of dialectic as such.

The Manifesto may take up dialectic implicitly, as by saying in the beginning (with my bullets),

  • Freeman and slave,
  • patrician and plebeian,
  • lord and serf,
  • guild-master and journeyman, in a word,
  • oppressor and oppressed,

stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.

Perhaps one would refer to the ongoing fight between oppressor and oppressed as dialectical. However, dialogue being conversation, I take dialectic to be the art of conversing; fighting is something else.

Two curled-up cats, one on the seat of a motorcycle parked on the sidewalk in front of two joined houses, the other on top of the low wall between the fronts of the houses
Saturday, April 16, 2022
Muvezzi Caddesi, Serencebey, Beşiktaş, İstanbul

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