Polytropy

When I was an adolescent, I conceived a desire to know “the definition of happiness.” This was all I wanted, when a friend asked what to give me for my birthday. He took me seriously, but unfortunately I could not take his answer seriously, because what he came up with was, “A puppy.” This friend did not understand that

• an epitome was not a definition;
• I was a cat person.

Would I have been happier with Aristotle’s definition, whereby happiness is “a certain sort of activity of soul in accord with virtue”? This comes in Book I the Nicomachean Ethics. The bulk of the present post is the Greek text of that book, marked up and annotated.

Contents

Here is what is in the book itself, whose text starts after some general comments of mine.

• Chapter 1
  • Chapter I: Every activity aims at some good.
    • Some activities are their own end.
    • Different activities have different ends.
    • Some activities are subservient to others.
  • Chapter II: Understanding that much, we conclude that there must be a best (we come back to this in chapter vii). This best is studied by politics.
  • Chapter III: Politics has to be studied in the right way, which is not for the young or indeed anybody who is
    • inexperienced,
    • not in control of their passions.
• Chapter 2 = Chapter IV: There is general agreement,
  • not on what happiness is, but
  • that it is best.

  Aside on Plato: We should start our investigation from principles known to us. Thus we should at least know them!

• Chapter 3 = Chapter V: There are lives
  1. apolaustic,
  2. political, and
  3. contemplative, and also
  4. money-making.
• Chapter 4 = Chapter VI: Back to Plato. Despite what he says, the class of goods is not a set, so to speak: it is not one thing in every possible way.
• Chapter VII
  • Chapter 5: Happiness is
    • complete,
    • self-sufficient.
  • Chapter 6: Happiness (now called the human good) is
    • an activity of the soul in accordance with the best and most complete virtue, in a complete life.
  • Chapter 7:
    • We are carpenters, not geometers.
    • The beginning is more than half the whole.
• Chapter VIII
  • Chapter 8: Confirmation of our definition. Happiness involves (1) the soul and is (2) an activity.
  • Chapter 9: Happiness involves also (3) virtue and
    4. external goods.
• Chapter IX = Chapter 10: Happiness is divine, but we are convinced that it is by our efforts.
• Chapter 11
  • Chapter X: What about Solon’s inability to judge a person happy before death?
  • Chapter XI: Can’t the dead be influenced by their friends?
• Chapter XII = Chapter 12: Do we praise happiness, or honor it?
• Chapter XIII = Chapter 13: Transition to Book II. A psycho-analysis.
  • To the soul there is a rational and irrational.
  • To the irrational there is
    • a vegetative,
    • an appetitive, which can heed reason.
  • The virtues corresponding to
    • the latter are moral (ἠθική), e.g.
      • liberality (ἐλευθεριότης),
      • temperance (σωφροσύνη);
    • to the (wholly) rational are intellectual (διανοητική), e.g.
      • wisdom (σοφία),
      • intelligence (σύνεσις),
      • prudence (φρόνησις).

  A virtue is a praiseworthy hexis.

Within the text, some of my own notes are thus:

• Anselm’s Proof Before Anselm. I think that’s what Aristotle gives in ii.1.
• Art and Craft. There are targets, perhaps including Aristotle’s “chief good” or “best,” that to know is to have already hit.
• Eudemony As Happiness. Happiness is a fine translation of the Greek word anglicized as the title of this post.
• The Prize and Losing It. The prize is τὸ ἆθλον. Losing it is ἄθλιος α ον, and this is the opposite of being happy, but then this would seem to come from striving for a prize in the first place.
• Beginnings and Principles. How should we understand ἀρχή?
• Apolausticity. C. P. Snow used the word for what Ramanujan did not pursue at Cambridge.
• Hexis. Is it habit or not?

---

After high school, I attended St John’s College, where freshmen

• studied Greek in the language tutorial, in order to read Plato’s Meno in the original;
• read Aristotle’s Ethics in translation for seminar, despite the warning that Aristotle himself gives in Book I – in chapter iii, § 5, and again in chapter iv, §§ 6 and 7 – that his subject is not for the young.

Collingwood recalls the warning in his 1940 lectures, “Goodness, Rightness, Utility,” as I recall in “‘It Was Good’.”

In the summer after graduation from college, I picked up the Ethics again, but then I set it aside, perhaps when I reached Aristotle’s warning. I didn’t know what I should do next; however, something told me I was not going to find the answer in the Ethics after all.

I found the answer in a dream the following summer, when I was working on a farm. I spent free time there reading Aristotle’s Physics, Herbert Read’s Concise History of Modern Painting, and Apostol’s Mathematical Analysis.

I am reading Aristotle’s Ethics now, thirty-six years later, for the Catherine-Project discussion that I mentioned in “Even More on Dialectic.” One may ask why I have joined that discussion. My last five blog-posts all came out of a year-long discussion of Plato’s Republic. When that was over, the leader wanted to spend the next year discussing Aristotle’s Ethics. I agreed to join in – as did everybody else who had made it to the end of the Republic discussions, along with some others whom the leader knew from her other Plato reading groups.

For the reader of Plato, reading Aristotle too is a good idea, if only as a reminder that the former did take students, such as the latter. If one believes that Plato hides his own true beliefs in the Dialogues, as I considered in that last post, then perhaps one ought to explain whether he hid those beliefs from the students of the Academy.

It may also be that Plato’s evasive style can be detected in the Nicomachean Ethics, even though this may consist of notes from Aristotle’s own lectures in the Lyceum.

The theme of those lectures, or at least of those that constitute Book I, is what in English is called happiness.

When I graduated from St John’s College, I said I had learned to be happy – as I reported in an essay written for fellow mathematicians and called simply “St. John’s College” (De Morgan Gazette, Vol. 2, issue 2, 2012). When I searched with DuckDuckGo for david pierce st john's college, the first link that came up was to my essay. I am pretty happy with the qualifications and elaborations that I gave to my bold claim. The following may show the influence of my undergraduate reading of Aristotle:

Not everything can be good for something else. Some things are good, simply. The more people have those goods, the more the world is better. You can measure a society by average income, or car ownership, or cell phone use, or years of education. What measure is best? Is there a best measure?

Compare with § 1 of chapter ii below, here in the literal translation of Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins (University of Chicago, 2011):

If, therefore, there is some end of our actions that we wish for on account of itself, the rest being things we wish for on account of this end, and if we do not choose all things on account of something else – for in this way the process will go on infinitely such that the longing involved is empty and pointless – clearly this would be the good, that is, the best.

Freedom is not an explicit theme of Aristotle, at least not in Book I of the Ethics. Habit is a theme; at least, hexis is a theme, and for the Greek term, “habit” is a possible translation, albeit a disputed one, as discussed below under the section (I.viii.9) where Aristotle introduces the term ἕξις. In the essay in the De Morgan Gazette, I went on to say,

I can propose freedom as the best measure, except that freedom itself is not really measurable or even definable. The last seminar reading for my class at St John’s was The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. Who is free in that book? Jim becomes free from legal slavery; but for him and Huck and Tom, becoming free from the habits of slavery is not something that can be accomplished by legal decree.

The main theme of Book I of the Ethics is happiness, as I said. Because of this, and since also

• blessedness is nearly a synonym of happiness, while
• misery is an antonym,

I give red dashed underlines and pink backgrounds below to

• εὐδαίμων (happy),
• μακάριος (blessed),
• ἄθλιος (wretched),

and formally related words. The underlines are

• there at all, in case the colored backgrounds are invisible;
• dashed, to be different from the underlines given to links.

The three Greek words above are linked to their definitions in the lexicon of Liddell, Scott, and Jones – the LSJ – as transcribed at ΛΟΓΕΙΟΝ. Other words in the text below may be so linked, if I looked them up on line. In such a case, I probably also supplied a “tool tip” (which should be displayed on hovering) that gives the lemma and a short definition.

I give yellow backgrounds and blue dashed underlines to examples and proverbial or figurative expressions – notably, “One swallow does not a summer make.”

I may bold some key ideas, or else set them in khaki with green broken underlines.

The first aim of the marking up is to make Aristotle’s own words easier to read or at least easier to learn or perhaps memorize. Words on a single line should make some kind of whole. Parallelism is shown with bullets. These may only emphasize the parallelism already shown by μέν and δέ. I have bolded all instances of these particles (along with οὐδέ and μηδέ). In some instances, I indicate parallelism (or perhaps chiasmus) with bolding or coloring of correlated words.

The text is Bywater’s from 1894, cut and pasted from Project Perseus (to which the bracketed Bekker numbers below are links). I also possess a photographic copy of the Bywater text (dated to 1890), as supplied with facing Turkish translation by Saffet Babür in Nikomakhos’a Etik (Ankara: Klasik Metinler, Ayraç Yayınevi, 1998). In that text,

• Book I is partitioned into thirteen chapters in two ways, using Roman and Arabic numerals respectively;
• the sentences of each Roman chapter are numbered.

I indicate all of this below. Of some of the translations that I consult,

• Ross (in The Basic Works of Aristotle) and Crisp follow the Roman numerals;
• Rackham (in the Loeb Classical Library) follows the Roman numerals and the enumeration of the sentences;
• Apostle follows the Arabic.

I add my own notes (in blue, with light gray background) at the end of some chapters and sections; longer notes were listed above. The notes can always be added to.

I edit this page in emacs as a txt file and convert to html with the pandoc program. I may view the results with

• the eww browser, which comes with emacs, but does not show my underlines;
• the Lynx browser, which does not show my underlines or colors.

Discussions had the following schedule (meetings were 6–8 PM, Turkish time).

[1094^a]

Chapter I

Chapter 1

§ i.1

• πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ
• πᾶσα μέθοδος,

ὁμοίως δὲ

• πρᾶξίς τε καὶ
• προαίρεσις,

ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ·

διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο

§ i.2

διαφορὰ δέ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν·

• τὰ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι,
• τὰ δὲ παρ᾽ αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά.

ὧν δ᾽ εἰσὶ τέλη τινὰ παρὰ τὰς πράξεις,
ἐν τούτοις

§ i.3

πολλῶν δὲ

• πράξεων

οὐσῶν καὶ

• τεχνῶν καὶ
• ἐπιστημῶν

πολλὰ γίνεται καὶ τὰ τέλη·

• ἰατρικῆς μὲν γὰρ ὑγίεια,
• ναυπηγικῆς δὲ πλοῖον,
• στρατηγικῆς δὲ νίκη,
• οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος.

§ i.4

• ὅσαι δ᾽ εἰσὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑπὸ μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν,
  καθάπερ

  • ὑπὸ τὴν ἱππικὴν
    • χαλινοποιικὴ καὶ
    • ὅσαι ἄλλαι τῶν ἱππικῶν ὀργάνων

    εἰσίν,

  • αὕτη δὲ καὶ πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις
    ὑπὸ τὴν στρατηγικήν,
  • κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἄλλαι
    ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρας·

• ἐν ἁπάσαις δὲ

  • τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη πάντων

  ἐστὶν αἱρετώτερα

  • τῶν ὑπ᾽ αὐτά·

  τούτων γὰρ χάριν κἀκεῖνα διώκεται.

§ i.5

διαφέρει δ᾽ οὐδὲν

• τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτὰς εἶναι τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ἢ
• παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλο τι,
  καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν.

Chapter II

§ ii.1

• εἰ δή τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν

  • ὃ δι᾽ αὑτὸ βουλόμεθα,
  • τἆλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ
  • μὴ πάντα δι᾽ ἕτερον αἱρούμεθα
    (πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ᾽ εἰς ἄπειρον,
    ὥστ᾽ εἶναι
    • κενὴν καὶ
    • ματαίαν

    τὴν ὄρεξιν),

• δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη

  • τἀγαθὸν καὶ
  • τὸ ἄριστον.

Anselm’s Proof Before Anselm

Grammatically, each of the three διά is followed by an accusative. According to Smyth, “διά with accus. is used of a person, thing, or state beyond our control (accidental agency)”; see “Even More on Dialectic.”

The whole sentence is framed conditionally. The way I analyze it, making all of the διά parallel, the sentence seems to have three hypotheses (or protases):

1. Something is an end on its own account.
2. Other things are ends on its account.
3. Not everything is only an end on account of something else.

One could analyze differently, taking 1 and 2 as part of one hypothesis:

εἰ δή

• τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν
  • ὃ δι᾽ αὑτὸ βουλόμεθα,
  • τἆλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ
• μὴ πάντα δι᾽ ἕτερον αἱρούμεθα …

Also, 3 is a restatement of 1. I would even call 3 a proof of 1. It would then be an “ontological proof”; However, I accept Collingwood’s remark and recommendation concerning this expression:

The name is Kant’s. Invented seven centuries later than the thing named, and by a man who did not understand that thing, it has no authority. As a description it is not felicitous. Let us, or those of us who are not polysyllable-addicts, speak in future of ‘Anselm’s proof’.

That is the footnote on page 189 of An Essay on Metaphysics (1940), in the chapter called “The Proposition ‘God Exists’,” which is the first of the four chapters constituting Part IIIa, called “The Existence of God”; and I have annotated this. As Collingwood explains, “God exists” is not really a proposition, but an absolute supposition; however, “We believe that God exists” is an historical proposition, and this is what Anselm proves – and proves only to an actual believer, as he himself admits.

I read Aristotle similarly. From the principle that we seek some ends on account of others, we conclude that there must be at least one end that we seek on its own account; otherwise there would be infinite regress, and it would make no sense to seek an end at all.

Aristotle suggests further that only one end is sought on its own account. This could be meant in a particular field of activity, but Aristotle belies this restriction in the next two §§.

Concerning Anselm’s argument, let me note the development in Collingwood’s understanding of it. Earlier, he accepted Kant’s term “ontological” and thought Kant had understood the argument, even while rejecting it.

Indeed, Collingwood’s 1940 Essay on Metaphysics was preceded in 1933 by An Essay on Philosophical Method, and in the revised edition of 2005, editors James Connelly and Guiseppina D’Oro note,

The brief discussion of the history of the ontological argument between pp. 124-7 summarizes the more extended discussion in Collingwood’s 1919 Lectures on the Ontological Proof of the Existence of God, pp. 22-44.

On page 124 of the 1933 Essay, Collingwood says that Anselm, combining

the original Platonic principle that when we really think (but when do we really think, if ever?) we must be thinking of a real object, and the neo-Platonic idea of a perfect being (something which we cannot help conceiving in our minds; but does that guarantee it more than a mere idea?), or rather, pondering on the latter thought until he rediscovered the former as latent within it, realized that to think of this perfect being at all was already to think of him, or it, as existing.

The two thoughts being combined may be something like the following.

1. When people talk about the “real world,” they are referring to the world that occupies their most serious thought.
2. Even to talk about serious thought is to imagine that it is possible.

§ ii.2

ἆρ᾽ οὖν

• καὶ

  πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ γνῶσις αὐτοῦ
  μεγάλην ἔχει ῥοπήν,

• καὶ

  καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπὸν ἔχοντες
  μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δέοντος;

Art and Craft

If there is a “chief good” or a “best,” which is our target, would we not be more likely to hit it if we knew what it was?

Now we have tacit acknowledgment of the possibility of failure: missing the target.

Compare Republic Book VI (505a, Bloom), where Socrates addresses Adeimantus, precisely on the value of knowing what is good:

you have many times heard that the idea of the good is the greatest study and that it’s by availing oneself of it along with just things and the rest that they become useful and beneficial. And now you know pretty certainly that I’m going to say this and, besides this, that we don’t have sufficient knowledge of it. And, if we don’t know it and should have ever so much knowledge of the rest without this, you know that it’s no profit to us, just as there would be none in possessing something in the absence of the good. Or do you suppose it’s of any advantage to possess everything except what’s good?

I think it should be pointed out that, sometimes, knowing the target is precisely having hit it. For example, if you really know what you want to say, then you must already have said it, at least to yourself. Think of Socrates’s midwifery, as in the Theaetetus: to know what a brainchild is going to be is already to have given it birth.

Other times, before being produced, our target may be minutely specified in a blueprint.

Briefly, we have (something like) the distinction between art (in the modern sense) and craft that Collingwood works out in The Principles of Art.

Chapter vi then, §§ 14–16, will suggest that architectonic pursuits are like art in the modern sense: if they had a good that could be specified, it would have been. Thus Aristotle may be disagreeing with Socrates.

By the way, even if Collingwood’s account of what is called art is inadequate or obsolete, the distinction remains between the kinds of activities that he calls art and craft.

§ ii.3

εἰ δ᾽ οὕτω,
πειρατέον τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν

• αὐτὸ τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ
• τίνος τῶν
  • ἐπιστημῶν ἢ
  • δυνάμεων.

§ ii.4

δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν τῆς

• κυριωτάτης καὶ
• μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς.

§ ii.5

τοιαύτη δ᾽ ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται·

§ ii.6

• τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρεὼν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν
  ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, [1094^b] καὶ
• ποίας ἑκάστους μανθάνειν καὶ
• μέχρι τίνος,

αὕτη διατάσσει·

ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ
τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην οὔσας,
οἷον

• στρατηγικὴν
• οἰκονομικὴν
• ῥητορικήν·

§ ii.7

• χρωμένης δὲ ταύτης
  ταῖς λοιπαῖς πρακτικαῖς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν,
• ἔτι δὲ νομοθετούσης
  • τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ
  • τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι,

τὸ ταύτης τέλος περιέχοι ἂν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων,
ὥστε τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη τἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν.

§ ii.8

• εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταὐτόν ἐστιν

  • ἑνὶ καὶ
  • πόλει,
• • μεῖζόν γε καὶ
  • τελειότερον

  τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται

  • καὶ λαβεῖν
  • καὶ σῴζειν·

• ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ
  καὶ ἑνὶ μόνῳ,

• • κάλλιον δὲ καὶ
  • θειότερον

  ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν.

ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται,
πολιτική τις οὖσα.

Chapter III

§ iii.1

λέγοιτο δ᾽ ἂν ἱκανῶς,
εἰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην διασαφηθείη·

τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς

• οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς λόγοις

ἐπιζητητέον, ὥσπερ

• οὐδ᾽ ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις.

§ iii.2

• τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ
• τὰ δίκαια,

περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται,
πολλὴν ἔχει

• διαφορὰν καὶ
• πλάνην,

ὥστε δοκεῖν

• νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι,
• φύσει δὲ μή.

§ iii.3

τοιαύτην δέ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τἀγαθὰ
διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν·

ἤδη γάρ

• τινες ἀπώλοντο διὰ πλοῦτον,
• ἕτεροι δὲ δι᾽ ἀνδρείαν.

§ iii.4

ἀγαπητὸν οὖν

• • περὶ τοιούτων καὶ
  • ἐκ τοιούτων

  λέγοντας

  • παχυλῶς καὶ
  • τύπῳ

  τἀληθὲς ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ

• • περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ
  • ἐκ τοιούτων

  λέγοντας
  τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι.

τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ
ἀποδέχεσθαι χρεὼν ἕκαστα τῶν λεγομένων·

πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστιν
ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τἀκριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν

• καθ᾽ ἕκαστον γένος,
• ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται·

§ iii.5

ἕκαστος δὲ

• κρίνει καλῶς ἃ γινώσκει, καὶ
• τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτής. [1095^a]
   
• καθ᾽ ἕκαστον μὲν ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευμένος,
• ἁπλῶς δ᾽ ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος.

διὸ

• ἄπειρος γὰρ
  τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων,
• οἱ λόγοι δ᾽
  • ἐκ τούτων καὶ
  • περὶ τούτων·

§ iii.6

ἔτι δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς ὢν

• ματαίως ἀκούσεται καὶ
• ἀνωφελῶς,

ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν

• οὐ γνῶσις
• ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις.

§ iii.7

διαφέρει δ᾽ οὐδὲν

• νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ
• τὸ ἦθος νεαρός·

• οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἡ ἔλλειψις,
• ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ
  • κατὰ πάθος ζῆν καὶ
  • διώκειν ἕκαστα.
     
• τοῖς γὰρ τοιούτοις
  ἀνόνητος ἡ γνῶσις γίνεται,
  καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσιν·
• τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον
  • τὰς ὀρέξεις ποιουμένοις καὶ
  • πράττουσι

  πολυωφελὲς ἂν εἴη τὸ περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι.

§ iii.8

• καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀκροατοῦ,
• καὶ πῶς ἀποδεκτέον,
• καὶ τί προτιθέμεθα,

πεφροιμιάσθω ταῦτα.

Chapter IV

Chapter 2

§ iv.1

λέγωμεν δ᾽ ἀναλαβόντες,
ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα

• γνῶσις καὶ
• προαίρεσις

ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ὀρέγεται,

§ iv.2

• ὀνόματι μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων ὁμολογεῖται·

  • τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν

    • καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ
    • καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες

    λέγουσιν,

  • • τὸ δ᾽ εὖ ζῆν καὶ
    • τὸ εὖ πράττειν

    ταὐτὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν·

• περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, τί ἐστιν,

  • ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ
  • οὐχ ὁμοίως
    • οἱ πολλοὶ
    • τοῖς σοφοῖς

    ἀποδιδόασιν.

Eudemony As Happiness

It may be that the words εὐδαιμονία and “happiness” have different connotations. However, the former alone, as Aristotle says here, has different connotations for different people. If we take εὐδαιμονία simply as the name that everybody uses for the highest practicable good, without any presumption as to what that is, then “happiness” would seem to be a fine translation.

A Jesuit priest of Campion Hall, Oxford, called Gerard J. Hughes disagrees. In the Glossary (page 243) of The Routledge Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (2013), judging “happiness” and “well-being” to be “unsatisfactory,” Hughes proposes for eudaimonia the translation “living a fulfilled life.” He explains his preference, early in the text, first saying (page 20):

One of the first things we have to decide when trying to understand Aristotle is how to understand his technical terms, and hence how to translate what he says into English.

This seems completely wrong-headed. For one thing, deciding is a kind of imposing, which is not something to do on an author we are setting out to understand. Hughes has already imposed, to the extent of deciding that Aristotle is using technical terms. As scientists today, we may use technical terms, but I don’t think we should presume that Aristotle is doing anything similar. In any case, if we want to understand what Aristotle means by a word, we need to pay attention to all of his other words; then we may be able fill in the meaning of the word in question. We cannot do this at the outset.

Hughes continues:

Passages that seem to make no sense at all using one translation of the key words can often seem perfectly clear if one translates differently.

Perhaps a seeming clarity is our enemy, if we really want to understand what Aristotle is getting at.

Here, at the very outset, we need to consider carefully how to translate two words which turn out to be key terms in the Ethics.

Those terms will be eudaimonia and aretê. Without naming the latter, Hughes passes immediately to consideration of the former.

Eudaimonia is almost always translated as ‘happiness’, but this translation can easily give a misleading impression. ‘Happiness’ in English suggests a feeling of one kind or another, perhaps a feeling of contentment, or delight, or pleasure.

Pleasure – or hêdonê – is precisely one of the meanings that people give to eudaimonia, according to Aristotle himself (in § 3, next, and again in v.1). I don’t know why Hughes overlooks this now, since he has already said (page 6),

Aristotle would have thought it astonishing if thinking animals like ourselves had no way of expressing to themselves what was good for them. So, at many points in the Ethics, he starts by considering what people usually or frequently think about various questions connected with morality, on the assumption that their views must either be right or at least contain some considerable kernel of truth which would explain why people hold them.

The adjective εὐδαίμων has the etymological sense of “blessed with a good genius,” thus fortunate, which is just what “happy” literally means. I noted in “Automatia” that the goddess of the title (to whom the Corinthian general Timoleon had a shrine in his house, by the account of Plutarch) was also Tyche in Greek, Fortuna in Latin, and Good Hap in (archaic) English. Aristotle will suggest in chapter IX below, §§1 and 2, that if anything is the gift of Tyche, it is happiness.

§ iv.3

• οἳ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον
  • ἡδονὴν ἢ
  • πλοῦτον ἢ
  • τιμήν,
• ἄλλοι δ᾽ ἄλλο –
• πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕτερον·
  • νοσήσας μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν,
  • πενόμενος δὲ πλοῦτον·
  • συνειδότες δ᾽ ἑαυτοῖς ἄγνοιαν
    τοὺς
    • μέγα τι καὶ
    • ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς

    λέγοντας
    θαυμάζουσιν.

• ἔνιοι δ᾽ ᾤοντο
  • παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ
  • ἄλλο τι
    • καθ᾽ αὑτὸ εἶναι,
    • ὃ καὶ τούτοις πᾶσιν
      αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθά.

§ iv.4

• ἁπάσας μὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν τὰς δόξας
  ματαιότερον ἴσως ἐστίν,
• ἱκανὸν δὲ τὰς
  • μάλιστα ἐπιπολαζούσας ἢ
  • δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον.

§ iv.5

μὴ λανθανέτω δ᾽ ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν

• οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ
• οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς.

εὖ γὰρ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων

• ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ
• ἐζήτει,

πότερον

• ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ
• ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς

ἐστιν ἡ ὁδός, [1095^b]

 

• ἀρκτέον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων,
• ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς·
  • τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν
  • τὰ δ᾽ ἁπλῶς.

ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον
ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων.

§ iv.6

διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἦχθαι καλῶς
τὸν περὶ

• καλῶν
• καὶ δικαίων
• καὶ ὅλως τῶν πολιτικῶν

ἀκουσόμενον ἱκανῶς.

§ iv.7

ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι, καὶ
εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως,
οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι·
ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος

• ἔχει ἢ
• λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥᾳδίως.

ᾧ δὲ μηδέτερον ὑπάρχει τούτων, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου·

οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ,
ἐσθλὸς δ᾽ αὖ κἀκεῖνος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται.
ὃς δέ κε μήτ᾽ αὐτὸς νοέῃ μήτ᾽ ἄλλου ἀκούων
ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται, ὃ δ᾽ αὖτ᾽ ἀχρήιος ἀνήρ.

Chapter V

Chapter 3

§ v.1

ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν.

• τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν καὶ
• τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν

οὐκ ἀλόγως ἐοίκασιν
ἐκ τῶν βίων ὑπολαμβάνειν
οἱ μὲν

• πολλοὶ καὶ
• φορτικώτατοι

τὴν ἡδονήν·

§ v.2

διὸ καὶ

§ v.3

• οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ

  • παντελῶς ἀνδραποδώδεις φαίνονται
    βοσκημάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι,
  • τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου
    διὰ
    τὸ πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις ὁμοιοπαθεῖν
    Σαρδαναπάλλῳ.

§ v.4

• οἱ δὲ

  • χαρίεντες καὶ
  • πρακτικοὶ

  τιμήν·
  τοῦ γὰρ πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τοῦτο τέλος.

  φαίνεται δ᾽ ἐπιπολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου·
  δοκεῖ γὰρ

  • ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ
  • ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ,

  τἀγαθὸν δὲ

  • οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ
  • δυσαφαίρετον

  εἶναι μαντευόμεθα.

§ v.5

ἔτι δ᾽ ἐοίκασι τὴν τιμὴν διώκειν
ἵνα πιστεύσωσιν ἑαυτοὺς
ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι·
ζητοῦσι γοῦν

• ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ
• παρ᾽ οἷς γινώσκονται, καὶ
• ἐπ᾽ ἀρετῇ·

δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κατά γε τούτους
ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων.

§ v.6

τάχα δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἄν τις
τέλος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ βίου
ταύτην ὑπολάβοι.

φαίνεται δὲ ἀτελεστέρα καὶ αὕτη·
δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι

• καὶ
  • καθεύδειν

  ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ

  • ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου,
• καὶ πρὸς τούτοις
  • κακοπαθεῖν καὶ
  • ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα· [1096^a]

  τὸν δ᾽ οὕτω ζῶντα
  οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειεν,
  εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων.

καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἅλις·
ἱκανῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν.

§ v.7

• τρίτος δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ θεωρητικός,
  ὑπὲρ οὗ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἑπομένοις ποιησόμεθα.

§ v.8

ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς βίαιός τις ἐστίν,
καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν·
χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάριν.

διὸ μᾶλλον τὰ πρότερον λεχθέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι·
δι᾽ αὑτὰ γὰρ ἀγαπᾶται.

φαίνεται δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖνα·
καίτοι πολλοὶ λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὰ καταβέβληνται.

ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω.

Chapter VI

Chapter 4

§ vi.1

τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον ἴσως

• ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ
• διαπορῆσαι πῶς λέγεται,

καίπερ προσάντους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γινομένης
διὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἴδη.

δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν ἴσως

• βέλτιον εἶναι
• καὶ δεῖν

ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας
καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν,
ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὄντας·

ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν φίλοιν
ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

§ vi.2

οἱ δὴ κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην

• οὐκ ἐποίουν ἰδέας
  ἐν οἷς
  • τὸ πρότερον
  • καὶ ὕστερον

  ἔλεγον, διόπερ

• οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἰδέαν κατεσκεύαζον·

τὸ δ᾽ ἀγαθὸν λέγεται

• καὶ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι
• καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ
• καὶ ἐν τῷ πρός τι,

• τὸ δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ
• ἡ οὐσία

πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρός τι

• (παραφυάδι γὰρ τοῦτ᾽ ἔοικε καὶ
• συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος)·

ὥστ᾽ οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινή τις ἐπὶ τούτοις ἰδέα.

§ vi.3

ἔτι δ᾽ ἐπεὶ
τἀγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται
τῷ ὄντι

• (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί λέγεται, οἷον
  ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς,
• καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ
  αἱ ἀρεταί,
• καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ
  τὸ μέτριον,
• καὶ ἐν τῷ πρός τι
  τὸ χρήσιμον,
• καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ
  καιρός,
• καὶ ἐν τόπῳ
  δίαιτα
• καὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα),

δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη

• κοινόν τι καθόλου καὶ
• ἕν·

• οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐλέγετ᾽
  ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις, ἀλλ᾽
• ἐν μιᾷ μόνῃ.

§ vi.4

ἔτι δ᾽

• ἐπεὶ τῶν κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν
  μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη,
• καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων ἦν ἂν
  μία τις ἐπιστήμη·

νῦν δ᾽ εἰσὶ πολλαὶ
καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν,
οἷον

• καιροῦ,
  • ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν γὰρ στρατηγικὴ
  • ἐν νόσῳ δ᾽ ἰατρική, καὶ
• τοῦ μετρίου
  • ἐν τροφῇ μὲν ἰατρικὴ
  • ἐν πόνοις δὲ γυμναστική.

§ vi.5

ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις
τί ποτε καὶ βούλονται λέγειν αὐτοέκαστον,
εἴπερ

• ἔν τε αὐτοανθρώπῳ [1096^b] καὶ
• ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ

• εἷς καὶ
• ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος

ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.

ᾗ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος,
οὐδὲν διοίσουσιν·

εἰ δ᾽ οὕτως,
οὐδ᾽ ᾗ ἀγαθόν.

§ vi.6

ἀλλὰ μὴν

• οὐδὲ τῷ ἀίδιον εἶναι
  μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἔσται,
  εἴπερ
• μηδὲ λευκότερον
  • τὸ πολυχρόνιον
  • τοῦ ἐφημέρου.

§ vi.7

πιθανώτερον δ᾽ ἐοίκασιν
οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ,
τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἕν·

οἷς δὴ καὶ Σπεύσιππος ἐπακολουθῆσαι δοκεῖ.

§ vi.8

ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος·

τοῖς δὲ λεχθεῖσιν ἀμφισβήτησίς τις ὑποφαίνεται
διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους εἰρῆσθαι,

• λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ᾽ ἓν εἶδος τὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ
  • διωκόμενα καὶ
  • ἀγαπώμενα,
• τὰ δὲ
  • ποιητικὰ τούτων ἢ
  • φυλακτικά πως ἢ
  • τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικὰ

  διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι
  καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον.

§ vi.9

δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διττῶς λέγοιτ᾽ ἂν τἀγαθά, καὶ

• τὰ μὲν καθ᾽ αὑτά,
• θάτερα δὲ διὰ ταῦτα.

χωρίσαντες οὖν

• ἀπὸ τῶν ὠφελίμων
• τὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ

σκεψώμεθα εἰ λέγεται κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν.

§ vi.10

καθ᾽ αὑτὰ δὲ ποῖα θείη τις ἄν;

• ἢ ὅσα καὶ μονούμενα διώκεται,
  οἷον
  • τὸ φρονεῖν
  • καὶ ὁρᾶν
  • καὶ ἡδοναί τινες
  • καὶ τιμαί;

  ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δι᾽ ἄλλο τι διώκομεν,
  ὅμως τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ἀγαθῶν θείη τις ἄν.

• ἢ οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο οὐδὲν πλὴν τῆς ἰδέας;
  ὥστε μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος.

§ vi.11

εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτά,

• τὸν τἀγαθοῦ λόγον ἐν ἅπασιν αὐτοῖς
  τὸν αὐτὸν ἐμφαίνεσθαι δεήσει,
  καθάπερ

  • ἐν χιόνι
  • καὶ ψιμυθίῳ

  τὸν τῆς λευκότητος.

• • τιμῆς δὲ καὶ
  • φρονήσεως καὶ
  • ἡδονῆς

  ἕτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι
  ταύτῃ ᾗ ἀγαθά.

οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν τι κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν.

§ vi.12

ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται;

οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμωνύμοις.

ἀλλ᾽ ἆρά γε

• τῷ ἀφ᾽ ἑνὸς εἶναι
• ἢ πρὸς ἓν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν,
• ἢ μᾶλλον κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν; ὡς γὰρ
  • ἐν σώματι ὄψις,
  • ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ
  • ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ.

§ vi.13

• ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως ταῦτα μὲν ἀφετέον τὸ νῦν·
  ἐξακριβοῦν γὰρ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν
  ἄλλης ἂν εἴη φιλοσοφίας οἰκειότερον.
• ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἰδέας·
  εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἕν τι
  • τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον ἀγαθὸν
  • ἢ χωριστὸν αὐτό τι καθ᾽ αὑτό,

  δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρακτὸν οὐδὲ κτητὸν ἀνθρώπῳ·
  νῦν δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖται.

§ vi.14

τάχα δέ τῳ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον εἶναι γνωρίζειν αὐτὸ [1097^a]
πρὸς τὰ κτητὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν·

οἷον γὰρ παράδειγμα τοῦτ᾽ ἔχοντες

• μᾶλλον εἰσόμεθα καὶ τὰ ἡμῖν ἀγαθά,
• κἂν εἰδῶμεν, ἐπιτευξόμεθα αὐτῶν.

§ vi.15

• πιθανότητα μὲν οὖν τινα ἔχει ὁ λόγος,
• ἔοικε δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις διαφωνεῖν·
  πᾶσαι γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφιέμεναι καὶ
  • τὸ ἐνδεὲς ἐπιζητοῦσαι
  • παραλείπουσι τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ.

  καίτοι βοήθημα τηλικοῦτον τοὺς τεχνίτας ἅπαντας

  • ἀγνοεῖν καὶ
  • μηδ᾽ ἐπιζητεῖν

  οὐκ εὔλογον.

§ vi.16

ἄπορον δὲ καὶ τί

• ὠφεληθήσεται
  • ὑφάντης ἢ
  • τέκτων

  πρὸς τὴν αὑτοῦ τέχνην εἰδὼς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαθόν,

• ἢ πῶς
  • ἰατρικώτερος ἢ
  • στρατηγικώτερος

  ἔσται ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος.

φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ

• οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἰατρός,
• ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπου,
• μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε·

καθ᾽ ἕκαστον γὰρ ἰατρεύει.

καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.

Chapter VII

Chapter 5

§ vii.1

πάλιν δ᾽ ἐπανέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν,
τί ποτ᾽ ἂν εἴη.

φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ τέχνῃ·
ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν

• ἰατρικῇ καὶ
• στρατηγικῇ καὶ
• ταῖς λοιπαῖς ὁμοίως.

τοῦτο δ᾽

• ἐν ἰατρικῇ μὲν ὑγίεια,
• ἐν στρατηγικῇ δὲ νίκη,
• ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δ᾽ οἰκία,
• ἐν ἄλλῳ δ᾽ ἄλλο,
• ἐν ἁπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸ τέλος·

τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσι πάντες.

ὥστ᾽

• εἴ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἁπάντων ἐστὶ τέλος,
  τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν,
• εἰ δὲ πλείω,
  ταῦτα.

§ vii.2

μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀφῖκται·

τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔτι μᾶλλον διασαφῆσαι πειρατέον.

§ vii.3

ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω φαίνεται τὰ τέλη,
τούτων δ᾽ αἱρούμεθά τινα δι᾽ ἕτερον,
οἷον

• πλοῦτον
• αὐλοὺς καὶ ὅλως
• τὰ ὄργανα,

δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πάντα τέλεια·
τὸ δ᾽ ἄριστον τέλειόν τι φαίνεται.

ὥστ᾽

• εἰ μέν ἐστιν ἕν τι μόνον τέλειον,
  τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον,
• εἰ δὲ πλείω,
  τὸ τελειότατον τούτων.

§ vii.4

• τελειότερον δὲ λέγομεν
  • τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ διωκτὸν
    τοῦ δι᾽ ἕτερον καὶ
  • τὸ μηδέποτε δι᾽ ἄλλο αἱρετὸν
    τῶν
    • καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ
    • καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὸ αἱρετῶν, καὶ

§ vii.5

[1097^b]

• ταύτην γὰρ
  • αἱρούμεθα ἀεὶ δι᾽ αὐτὴν καὶ
  • οὐδέποτε δι᾽ ἄλλο,
• • τιμὴν δὲ καὶ
  • ἡδονὴν καὶ
  • νοῦν καὶ
  • πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν
     
  • αἱρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δι᾽ αὐτά
    (μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος ἑλοίμεθ᾽ ἂν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν),
  • αἱρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν,
    διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν.

τὴν δ᾽ εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδεὶς αἱρεῖται

• τούτων χάριν,
• οὐδ᾽ ὅλως δι᾽ ἄλλο.

§ vii.6

φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν·

τὸ δ᾽ αὔταρκες λέγομεν

• οὐκ
  • αὐτῷ μόνῳ,
  • τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην,
• ἀλλὰ
  • καὶ γονεῦσι
  • καὶ τέκνοις
  • καὶ γυναικὶ
  • καὶ ὅλως τοῖς
    • φίλοις καὶ
    • πολίταις,

  ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

§ vii.7

τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὅρος τις·
ἐπεκτείνοντι γὰρ ἐπὶ

• τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ
• τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ
• τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους

εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν.

ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαῦθις ἐπισκεπτέον·

τὸ δ᾽ αὔταρκες τίθεμεν ὃ μονούμενον

• αἱρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ
• μηδενὸς ἐνδεᾶ·

τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰόμεθα εἶναι·

§ vii.8

ἔτι δὲ πάντων αἱρετωτάτην μὴ συναριθμουμένην –
συναριθμουμένην δὲ δῆλον ὡς
αἱρετωτέραν μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν·
ὑπεροχὴ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ προστιθέμενον,
ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ μεῖζον αἱρετώτερον ἀεί.

• τέλειον δή τι φαίνεται καὶ
• αὔταρκες ἡ εὐδαιμονία,
• τῶν πρακτῶν οὖσα τέλος.

Chapter 6

§ vii.9

ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν
ὁμολογούμενόν τι φαίνεται,
ποθεῖται δ᾽ ἐναργέστερον τί ἐστιν ἔτι λεχθῆναι.

§ vii.10

τάχα δὴ γένοιτ᾽ ἂν τοῦτ᾽,
εἰ ληφθείη τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.

• ὥσπερ γὰρ
  • αὐλητῇ καὶ
  • ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ
  • παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως
  • ὧν ἔστιν ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις,

  ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ

  • τἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ
  • τὸ εὖ,
• οὕτω δόξειεν ἂν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ,
  εἴπερ ἔστι τι ἔργον αὐτοῦ.

§ vii.11

πότερον οὖν

• τέκτονος μὲν καὶ σκυτέως
  ἔστιν ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις,
• ἀνθρώπου δ᾽
  οὐδέν ἐστιν,
  ἀλλ᾽ ἀργὸν πέφυκεν;

ἢ

• καθάπερ
  • ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ
  • χειρὸς καὶ
  • ποδὸς καὶ ὅλως
  • ἑκάστου τῶν μορίων

  φαίνεταί τι ἔργον,

• οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου
  παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα θείη τις ἂν ἔργον τι;

τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη ποτέ;

§ vii.12

• τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς,
• ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον. [1098^a]

ἀφοριστέον ἄρα

• τήν τε θρεπτικὴν καὶ
• τὴν αὐξητικὴν

ζωήν.

ἑπομένη δὲ αἰσθητική τις ἂν εἴη,
φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ κοινὴ

• καὶ ἵππῳ
• καὶ βοῒ
• καὶ παντὶ ζῴῳ.

§ vii.13

λείπεται δὴ πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος·

τούτου δὲ

• τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ,
• τὸ δ᾽ ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον.
  διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης
  τὴν κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν θετέον·
  κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι.

§ vii.14

εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια

• κατὰ λόγον ἢ
• μὴ ἄνευ λόγου,

τὸ δ᾽ αὐτό φαμεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γένει

• τοῦδε καὶ
• τοῦδε σπουδαίου,

ὥσπερ

• κιθαριστοῦ καὶ
• σπουδαίου κιθαριστοῦ,

καὶ ἁπλῶς δὴ τοῦτ᾽ ἐπὶ πάντων,
προστιθεμένης τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν
ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον·

• κιθαριστοῦ μὲν γὰρ κιθαρίζειν,
• σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὖ·

εἰ δ᾽ οὕτως,
ἀνθρώπου δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον ζωήν τινα,
ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς

• ἐνέργειαν καὶ
• πράξεις

μετὰ λόγου,
σπουδαίου δ᾽ ἀνδρὸς

• εὖ ταῦτα καὶ
• καλῶς,

ἕκαστον δ᾽ εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται·

§ vii.15

εἰ δ᾽ οὕτω,

§ vii.16

• ἔτι δ᾽ ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ.
  • μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἔαρ οὐ ποιεῖ,
  • οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα·
• οὕτω δὲ
  • οὐδὲ
    • μακάριον καὶ
    • εὐδαίμονα

    μία ἡμέρα

  • οὐδ᾽ ὀλίγος χρόνος.

Chapter 7

§ vii.17

περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τἀγαθὸν ταύτῃ·
δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως

• ὑποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον,
• εἶθ᾽ ὕστερον ἀναγράψαι.

δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν

• παντὸς εἶναι
  • προαγαγεῖν καὶ
  • διαρθρῶσαι

  τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα τῇ περιγραφῇ, καὶ

• ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων
  • εὑρετὴς ἢ
  • συνεργὸς

  ἀγαθὸς εἶναι·

ὅθεν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν γεγόνασιν αἱ ἐπιδόσεις·
παντὸς γὰρ προσθεῖναι τὸ ἐλλεῖπον.

§ vii.18

μεμνῆσθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν προειρημένων χρή,
καὶ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν

• μὴ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν ἐπιζητεῖν,
• ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἑκάστοις
  • κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην καὶ
  • ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφ᾽ ὅσον οἰκεῖον τῇ μεθόδῳ.

§ vii.19

καὶ γὰρ

• ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ᾽ ὅσον χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον,
• ὃ δὲ τί ἐστιν ἢ ποῖόν τι·
  θεατὴς γὰρ τἀληθοῦς.

τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιητέον,
ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα τῶν ἔργων πλείω γίνηται. [1098^b]

§ vii.20

οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον δ᾽ οὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν ἅπασιν ὁμοίως,
ἀλλ᾽ ἱκανὸν ἔν τισι τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι καλῶς,
οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς·
τὸ δ᾽ ὅτι

• πρῶτον καὶ
• ἀρχή.

§ vii.21

τῶν ἀρχῶν δ᾽

• αἳ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται,
• αἳ δ᾽ αἰσθήσει,
• αἳ δ᾽ ἐθισμῷ τινί, καὶ
• ἄλλαι δ᾽ ἄλλως.

§ vii.22

μετιέναι δὲ πειρατέον ἑκάστας ᾗ πεφύκασιν,
καὶ σπουδαστέον ὅπως διορισθῶσι καλῶς·

§ vii.23

μεγάλην γὰρ ἔχουσι ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὰ ἑπόμενα.

• δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἢ ἥμισυ τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ
• πολλὰ συμφανῆ γίνεσθαι δι᾽ αὐτῆς τῶν ζητουμένων.

Chapter VIII

Chapter 8

§ viii.1

σκεπτέον δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς

• οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος,
• ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς·

• τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνᾴδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα,
• τῷ δὲ ψευδεῖ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τἀληθές.

§ viii.2

νενεμημένων δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τριχῇ, καὶ

• τῶν μὲν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων

• τῶν δὲ περὶ

  • ψυχὴν καὶ
  • σῶμα,
     

• τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν

  • κυριώτατα
    λέγομεν καὶ
  • μάλιστα ἀγαθά,
• • τὰς δὲ πράξεις καὶ
  • τὰς ἐνεργείας

  τὰς ψυχικὰς
  περὶ ψυχὴν τίθεμεν.

ὥστε καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο κατά γε ταύτην τὴν δόξαν

• παλαιὰν οὖσαν καὶ
• ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων.

§ viii.3

ὀρθῶς δὲ καὶ ὅτι

• πράξεις τινὲς λέγονται καὶ
• ἐνέργειαι

τὸ τέλος·

• οὕτω γὰρ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν γίνεται καὶ
• οὐ τῶν ἐκτός.

§ viii.4

συνᾴδει δὲ τῷ λόγῳ

• καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν
• καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν

τὸν εὐδαίμονα·
σχεδὸν γὰρ

• εὐζωία
  τις εἴρηται καὶ
• εὐπραξία.

Chapter 9

§ viii.5

φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα τὰ περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν
ἅπανθ᾽ ὑπάρχειν τῷ λεχθέντι.

§ viii.6

• τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ
• τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις
• ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις

εἶναι δοκεῖ,

• τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τι
  • μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς ἢ
  • οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς·

ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν.

§ viii.7

τούτων δὲ

• τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν,
• τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ἔνδοξοι ἄνδρες·

οὐδετέρους δὲ τούτων εὔλογον

• διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις,
• ἀλλ᾽ ἕν γέ τι ἢ καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κατορθοῦν.

§ viii.8

• τοῖς μὲν οὖν λέγουσι
  • τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ
  • ἀρετήν τινα

  συνῳδός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος·

ταύτης γάρ ἐστιν
ἡ κατ᾽ αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια.

§ viii.9

διαφέρει δὲ ἴσως οὐ μικρὸν ἐν

• κτήσει ἢ
• χρήσει

τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν, καὶ ἐν

• ἕξει ἢ
• ἐνεργείᾳ.

• τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἕξιν ἐνδέχεται μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσαν, [1099^a]
  οἷον τῷ

  • καθεύδοντι ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως
  • ἐξηργηκότι,

• τὴν δ᾽ ἐνέργειαν
  οὐχ οἷόν τε·

  • πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ
  • εὖ πράξει.

• ὥσπερ δ᾽ Ὀλυμπίασιν

  • οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι στεφανοῦνται
  • ἀλλ᾽ οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι (τούτων γάρ τινες νικῶσιν),

• οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ

  • καλῶν
  • κἀγαθῶν

  οἱ πράττοντες ὀρθῶς ἐπήβολοι γίνονται.

Hexis

Happiness involves virtue, but not just having it; it needs to be used.

This is the § where Aristotle

• first uses the term hexis (ἕξις),
• distinguishes it from energeia (ἐνέργεια).

A partner in reading the Ethics has drawn my attention to the importance of these terms for Joe Sachs, who says,

energeia, being-at-work, [is] the most important word in all of Aristotle’s thinking …

One more example of what a translation of the Ethics needs to capture is perhaps the most important word in the whole work, hexis. Like energeia, this is an uncommon word before Aristotle gets hold of it … and the meanings of the two words are related …

… what defines a hexis is that it is not a passive state but an active condition …

This is from the Preface of Sach’s translation of the Ethics, as given in a preview, which unfortunately does not include the Aristotelian passage itself that I am looking at.

In the translation given below, Apostle uses “disposition” for hexis. However, he elsewhere uses “habit,” and this is a bad habit, according to Sachs:

Now if you have read the Nicomachean Ethics in the translation of Hippocrates Apostle, you will object that Aristotle says plainly that virtues are habits. Here, though, we have run into one of the many ways in which a Latin tradition has betrayed a translator and distorted Aristotle’s meaning. Aristotle says that moral virtue is a hexis, a word consisting of a noun ending attached to the root of the verb echein. The Latin habeo is equivalent to echein, and the Latin habitus is a perfectly good translation of hexis, and so, by one more easy step we get the English word, “habit.” But this paint-by-the-numbers approach to translation carries us so far astray that every implication of the English word is wrong. A hexis is not only not the same as a habit, but is almost exactly its opposite.

Most translators do not make the mistake of turning virtues into habits, but instead translate hexis as “disposition” … The general word for disposition, diathesis, Aristotle uses only for the passive and shallow ones; for the deep and active ones he reserves the word hexis …

That is from “Three Little Words,” St. John’s Review, vol. 54, no 1, 1997, which became the Introduction to Sach’s translation of the Ethics.

In order of publication, here now are some translations of Ethics I.viii.9 that I have been able to cut and paste. I thank my reading partners for supplying Sachs’s translation; I obtained the others through Library Genesis. There are more translations at the Internet Archive.

I include some of the translators’ words about their translations (Sachs’s are above).

Ross (1925 [the 2009 revision by Brown in Oxford World’s Classics is identical here]: “There is considerable difficulty in translating terms which are just crystallizing from the fluidity of everyday speech into technical meanings and in my treatment of such words as λόγος or ἀρχή I cannot hope to please everybody. Any attempt to render such a term always by a single English equivalent would produce the most uncouth result”):

But it makes, perhaps, no small difference whether we place the chief good in possession or in use, in state of mind or in activity. For the state of mind may exist without producing any good result, as in a man who is asleep or in some other way quite inactive, but the activity cannot; for one who has the activity will of necessity be acting, and acting well. And as in the Olympic Games it is not the most beautiful and the strongest that are crowned but those who compete (for it is some of these that are victorious), so those who act win, and rightly win, the noble and good things in life.

Rackham (Loeb Classical Library, 1934: “the translation was designed to serve as an assistance to readers of the Greek; it is therefore as interpretative as I was able to make it without its becoming a mere paraphrase. Had I been working for those desirous of studying Aristotle without reading Greek, my method would have been different: I should have aimed at an entirely non-committal version”):

But no doubt it makes a great difference whether we conceive the Supreme Good to depend on possessing virtue or on displaying it – on disposition, or on the manifestation of a disposition in action. For a man may possess the disposition without its producing any good result, as for instance when he is asleep, or has ceased to function from some other cause; but virtue in active exercise cannot be inoperative – it will of necessity act, and act well. And just as at the Olympic games the wreaths of victory are not bestowed upon the handsomest and strongest persons present, but on men who enter for the competitions – since it is among these that the winners are found, – so it is those who act rightly who carry off the prizes and good things of life.

Apostle (Synthese Historical Library, 1975: “The principles used in the translation of the Ethics are the same as those in the translations of the Physics and the Metaphysics, and their main function is to help the reader get Aristotle’s meaning as accurately as possible. Briefly, they are principles of terminology and of thought, some of which will be repeated here. ¶ English terms common to all three translations have the same meanings, with a few exceptions, and many terms proper to ethics are added … ¶ Terms in italics without initial capital letters are used (a) sometimes for emphasis, and (b) sometimes with meanings which are somewhat different from – usually narrower than – those of the same terms without italics”):

It makes perhaps no small difference, however, whether we regard the highest good to be in possession or in use, or to exist as a disposition or as an activity according to that disposition. For a disposition may be present without producing any good at all, as in a man who is asleep or inactive for some reason or other; but with the activity this cannot be the case, for one will of necessity be acting, and acting well. And as at the Olympic Games it is not the most beautiful or the strongest who are crowned but those who compete (for it is some of these who become victors), so in life it is those who act rightly who become the winners of good and noble things.

Crisp (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, 2000: “Aristotle’s Greek is compressed, and his meaning frequently indeterminate. For this reason, a reader of Aristotle in translation is well advised to consult more than one translation, especially of important passages. Perhaps the most useful is that of T. H. Irwin … which contains analyses of the argument, as well as notes and a substantial glossary. An elegant translation is provided by Harris Rackham … The ‘World’s Classics’ translation by W. D. Ross … and that by M. Ostwald … are also deservedly popular”):

Presumably, though, it makes a great difference whether we conceive of the chief good as consisting in possession or in use, that is to say, in a state or in an activity. For while a state can exist without producing any good consequences, as it does in the case of a person sleeping or lying idle for some other reason, this is impossible for an activity: it will necessarily engage in action, and do so well. As in the Olympic Games it is not the most attractive and the strongest who are crowned, but those who compete (since it is from this group that winners come), so in life it is those who act rightly who will attain what is noble and good.

Sachs (Focus Philosophical Library, Hackett, 2002):

But presumably it makes no small difference whether one supposes the highest good to consist in possession or in use, that is, in an actively maintained condition or in a way of being at work. For even if the actively maintained condition is present it is possible for it to accomplish no good thing, for instance in someone who is asleep or in someone who is incapacitated in some other way, but if the being-at-work is present this is not possible, for necessarily the one who is at work in accordance with virtue will act and act well. Just as, with those at the Olympic games, it is not the most beautiful or the strongest who are crowned, but those who compete (for it is some of these who are victors), so too among those who in life are well favored and well mannered it is the ones who act rightly who become accomplished people.

Bartlett and Collins (University of Chicago, 2011: “This translation … attempts to be as literal as sound English usage permits”):

But perhaps it makes no small difference whether one supposes the best thing to reside in possession or use, that is, in a characteristic or an activity. For it is possible that, although the characteristic is present, it accomplishes nothing good – for example, in the case of some one who is asleep or has been otherwise hindered. But this is not possible when it comes to the activity: of necessity, a person will act, and he will act well. For just as it is not the noblest and strongest who are crowned with the victory wreath in the Olympic Games but rather the competitors (for it is certain of these who win), so also it is those who act correctly who attain the noble and good things in life.

Reeve (Hackett, 2014: “Readers … find themselves in territory whose apparent familiarity is often deceptive and inimical to proper understanding: politikê isn’t quite politics … Even what the Ethics is about isn’t quite ethics. A worthwhile translation must try to compensate for this deceptive familiarity without producing too much potentially alienating distance and strangeness in its place. ¶ Accuracy and consistency in translation is essential to achieving this goal, obviously, but so too are extensive annotation and commentary … ¶ I have benefited from the work of previous translators, including David Ross, H. Rackham, Martin Ostwald, Terence Irwin, Roger Crisp, and Christopher Rowe”):

But it makes no small difference, presumably, whether we suppose the best good to consist in virtue’s possession or in its use – that is, in the state or in the activity. For it is possible for someone to possess the state while accomplishing nothing good – for example, if he is sleeping or out of action in some other way. But the same will not hold of the activity, since he will necessarily be doing an action and doing it well. And just as in the Olympic Games it is not the noblest and strongest who get the victory crown but the competitors (since it is among these that the ones who win are found), so also among the noble and good aspects of life it is those who act correctly who win the prizes.

§ viii.10

ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὸν ἡδύς.

• τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἥδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν,
• ἑκάστῳ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται φιλοτοιοῦτος,
  οἷον
  • ἵππος μὲν τῷ φιλίππῳ,
  • θέαμα δὲ τῷ φιλοθεώρῳ·
    τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ
  • τὰ δίκαια τῷ φιλοδικαίῳ καὶ ὅλως
  • τὰ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν τῷ φιλαρέτῳ.

§ viii.11

• τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς
  τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται
  διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοιαῦτ᾽ εἶναι,
• τοῖς δὲ φιλοκάλοις
  ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα·
  τοιαῦται δ᾽ αἱ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν πράξεις,
  ὥστε
  • καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν ἡδεῖαι
  • καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτάς.

§ viii.12

• οὐδὲν δὴ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς
  ὁ βίος αὐτῶν
  ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός,
• ἀλλ᾽ ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ.

πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις γὰρ

• οὐδ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς
  ὁ μὴ χαίρων ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν·
• οὔτε γὰρ δίκαιον οὐθεὶς ἂν εἴποι
  τὸν μὴ χαίροντα τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν,
• οὔτ᾽ ἐλευθέριον
  τὸν μὴ χαίροντα ταῖς ἐλευθερίοις πράξεσιν·
• ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

§ viii.13

εἰ δ᾽ οὕτω,
καθ᾽ αὑτὰς ἂν εἶεν αἱ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδεῖαι.

ἀλλὰ μὴν

• καὶ ἀγαθαί γε
• καὶ καλαί,
• καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἕκαστον,

εἴπερ καλῶς κρίνει περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος·
κρίνει δ᾽ ὡς εἴπομεν.

§ viii.14

• ἄριστον ἄρα καὶ
• κάλλιστον καὶ
• ἥδιστον

ἡ εὐδαιμονία,
καὶ οὐ διώρισται ταῦτα
κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπίγραμμα·

κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιότατον, λῷστον δ᾽ ὑγιαίνειν·
ἥδιστον δὲ πέφυχ᾽ οὗ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν.

ἅπαντα γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα ταῖς ἀρίσταις ἐνεργείαις·

• ταύτας δέ, ἢ
• μίαν τούτων τὴν ἀρίστην,

φαμὲν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν.

§ viii.15

φαίνεται δ᾽ ὅμως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένη,
καθάπερ εἴπομεν·

• ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ
• οὐ ῥᾴδιον

τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα.

πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται, [1099^b]
καθάπερ

• δι᾽ ὀργάνων,
• διὰ
  • φίλων καὶ
  • πλούτου καὶ
  • πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως·

§ viii.16

ἐνίων δὲ τητώμενοι ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον,
οἷον

• εὐγενείας
• εὐτεκνίας
• κάλλους·

οὐ πάνυ γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν

• παναίσχης ἢ
• δυσγενὴς ἢ
• μονώτης καὶ
• ἄτεκνος,

ἔτι δ᾽ ἴσως ἧττον,
εἴ τῳ

• πάγκακοι
  • παῖδες εἶεν ἢ
  • φίλοι, ἢ
• ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες τεθνᾶσιν.

§ viii.17

καθάπερ οὖν εἴπομεν,
ἔοικε προσδεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας·
ὅθεν εἰς ταὐτὸ τάττουσιν

• ἔνιοι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ,
• ἕτεροι δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν.

Chapter IX

Chapter 10

§ ix.1

ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται πότερόν ἐστι

• • μαθητὸν ἢ
  • ἐθιστὸν ἢ καὶ
  • ἄλλως πως ἀσκητόν, ἢ

• κατά τινα θείαν μοῖραν ἢ καὶ

• διὰ τύχην

παραγίνεται.

§ ix.2

εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλο τί ἐστι θεῶν δώρημα ἀνθρώποις,
εὔλογον καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν θεόσδοτον εἶναι,
καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὅσῳ βέλτιστον.

§ ix.3

ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως ἄλλης ἂν εἴη σκέψεως οἰκειότερον,
φαίνεται δὲ κἂν εἰ

• μὴ θεόπεμπτός ἐστιν
• ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ἀρετὴν
• καί τινα
  • μάθησιν ἢ
  • ἄσκησιν

παραγίνεται,
τῶν θειοτάτων εἶναι·
τὸ γὰρ τῆς ἀρετῆς

• ἆθλον καὶ
• τέλος

• ἄριστον εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ
• θεῖόν τι καὶ
• μακάριον.

§ ix.4

εἴη δ᾽ ἂν καὶ πολύκοινον·
δυνατὸν γὰρ ὑπάρξαι
πᾶσι τοῖς μὴ πεπηρωμένοις πρὸς ἀρετὴν
διά τινος

• μαθήσεως καὶ
• ἐπιμελείας.

§ ix.5

εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν

• οὕτω βέλτιον
• ἢ τὸ διὰ τύχην

εὐδαιμονεῖν,
εὔλογον ἔχειν οὕτως,
εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν,
ὡς οἷόν τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν,
οὕτω πέφυκεν,

§ ix.6

ὁμοίως δὲ

• καὶ τὰ κατὰ
  • τέχνην καὶ
  • πᾶσαν αἰτίαν,
• καὶ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην.

τὸ δὲ

• μέγιστον καὶ
• κάλλιστον

ἐπιτρέψαι τύχῃ λίαν πλημμελὲς ἂν εἴη.

§ ix.7

συμφανὲς δ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸ ζητούμενον·
εἴρηται γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ποιά τις.

τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν

• τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον,
• τὰ δὲ
  • συνεργὰ καὶ
  • χρήσιμα

  πέφυκεν ὀργανικῶς.

§ ix.8

ὁμολογούμενα δὲ ταῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ·

• τὸ γὰρ τῆς πολιτικῆς τέλος
  ἄριστον ἐτίθεμεν,
• αὕτη δὲ πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται
  • τοῦ ποιούς τινας
  • καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοὺς πολίτας ποιῆσαι
  • καὶ πρακτικοὺς τῶν καλῶν.

§ ix.9

εἰκότως οὖν

• οὔτε βοῦν
• οὔτε ἵππον
• οὔτε ἄλλο τῶν ζῴων οὐδὲν

εὔδαιμον λέγομεν· [1100^a]
οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οἷόν τε κοινωνῆσαι τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας.

§ ix.10

διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν
οὐδὲ παῖς εὐδαίμων ἐστίν·
οὔπω γὰρ πρακτικὸς τῶν τοιούτων διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν·
οἱ δὲ λεγόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακαρίζονται.

δεῖ γάρ,
ὥσπερ εἴπομεν,
καὶ ἀρετῆς τελείας καὶ βίου τελείου.

§ ix.11

• πολλαὶ γὰρ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται καὶ
• παντοῖαι τύχαι

κατὰ τὸν βίον,
καὶ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μάλιστ᾽ εὐθηνοῦντα
μεγάλαις συμφοραῖς περιπεσεῖν ἐπὶ γήρως,
καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Τρωικοῖς περὶ Πριάμου μυθεύεται·

• τὸν δὲ τοιαύταις χρησάμενον τύχαις καὶ
• τελευτήσαντα ἀθλίως

οὐδεὶς εὐδαιμονίζει.

Chapter X

Chapter 11

§ x.1

πότερον οὖν οὐδ᾽
ἄλλον οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμονιστέον
ἕως ἂν ζῇ,
κατὰ Σόλωνα δὲ χρεὼν τέλος ὁρᾶν;

§ x.2

εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ θετέον οὕτως,

• ἆρά γε καὶ ἔστιν εὐδαίμων τότε ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ;
• ἢ τοῦτό γε παντελῶς ἄτοπον,
  ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνέργειάν τινα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν;

§ x.3

εἰ δὲ

• μὴ λέγομεν τὸν τεθνεῶτα εὐδαίμονα,
• μηδὲ Σόλων τοῦτο βούλεται,
  ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι τηνικαῦτα ἄν τις ἀσφαλῶς μακαρίσειεν ἄνθρωπον
  ὡς ἐκτὸς ἤδη τῶν κακῶν ὄντα καὶ τῶν δυστυχημάτων,

ἔχει μὲν καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἀμφισβήτησίν τινα·
δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι

• τῷ τεθνεῶτι
  • καὶ κακὸν
  • καὶ ἀγαθόν,

  εἴπερ καὶ

• τῷ ζῶντι μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ δέ,

οἷον

• τιμαὶ καὶ

• ἀτιμίαι καὶ

• • τέκνων καὶ ὅλως
  • ἀπογόνων
     
  • εὐπραξίαι τε καὶ
  • δυστυχίαι.

§ x.4

ἀπορίαν δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παρέχει·
τῷ γὰρ

• μακαρίως βεβιωκότι μέχρι γήρως
• καὶ τελευτήσαντι κατὰ λόγον

ἐνδέχεται πολλὰς μεταβολὰς συμβαίνειν περὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους,
καὶ

• τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν
  • ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ
  • τυχεῖν βίου τοῦ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν,
• τοὺς δ᾽ ἐξ ἐναντίας·

δῆλον δ᾽ ὅτι καὶ
τοῖς ἀποστήμασι πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς
παντοδαπῶς ἔχειν αὐτοὺς ἐνδέχεται.

• ἄτοπον δὴ γίνοιτ᾽ ἄν, εἰ
  • συμμεταβάλλοι καὶ ὁ τεθνεὼς καὶ
  • γίνοιτο
    • ὁτὲ μὲν εὐδαίμων
    • πάλιν δ᾽ ἄθλιος·

§ x.5

• ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ
  τὸ μηδὲν μηδ᾽ ἐπί τινα χρόνον συνικνεῖσθαι
  τὰ τῶν ἐκγόνων τοῖς γονεῦσιν.

§ x.6

ἀλλ᾽ ἐπανιτέον ἐπὶ τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθέν·
τάχα γὰρ ἂν θεωρηθείη καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον ἐξ ἐκείνου.

§ x.7

εἰ δὴ

• τὸ τέλος ὁρᾶν
  δεῖ καὶ
• τότε μακαρίζειν ἕκαστον
  • οὐχ ὡς ὄντα μακάριον
    • ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι πρότερον ἦν,

πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον,
εἰ ὅτ᾽ ἔστιν εὐδαίμων,
μὴ ἀληθεύσεται κατ᾽ αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον [1100^b]
διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι τοὺς ζῶντας εὐδαιμονίζειν

• διὰ τὰς μεταβολάς, καὶ
• διὰ
  • τὸ μόνιμόν τι
    τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπειληφέναι καὶ
  • μηδαμῶς εὐμετάβολον,

τὰς δὲ τύχας πολλάκις ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς αὐτούς;

§ x.8

δῆλον γὰρ ὡς
εἰ συνακολουθοίημεν ταῖς τύχαις,
τὸν αὐτὸν

• εὐδαίμονα καὶ πάλιν
• ἄθλιον

ἐροῦμεν πολλάκις,

• χαμαιλέοντά τινα τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἀποφαίνοντες καὶ
• σαθρῶς ἱδρυμένον.

§ x.9

ἢ τὸ μὲν ταῖς τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν οὐδαμῶς ὀρθόν;
οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ

• εὖ ἢ
• κακῶς,

ἀλλὰ προσδεῖται τούτων ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος,
καθάπερ εἴπομεν,
κύριαι δ᾽ εἰσὶν

• αἱ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας,
• αἱ δ᾽ ἐναντίαι τοῦ ἐναντίου.

§ x.10

μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν.

• περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ
  οὕτως ὑπάρχει τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἔργων βεβαιότης
• ὡς περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς κατ᾽ ἀρετήν·

μονιμώτεραι γὰρ
καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν
αὗται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι·

τούτων δ᾽ αὐτῶν αἱ τιμιώταται μονιμώτεραι
διὰ τὸ

• μάλιστα καὶ
• συνεχέστατα

καταζῆν ἐν αὐταῖς τοὺς μακαρίους·

τοῦτο γὰρ ἔοικεν αἰτίῳ
τοῦ μὴ γίνεσθαι περὶ αὐτὰς λήθην.

§ x.11

• ὑπάρξει δὴ τὸ ζητούμενον τῷ εὐδαίμονι, καὶ
• ἔσται διὰ βίου τοιοῦτος·

ἀεὶ γὰρ ἢ μάλιστα πάντων

• πράξει καὶ
• θεωρήσει τὰ κατ᾽ ἀρετήν, καὶ
• τὰς τύχας οἴσει
  • κάλλιστα καὶ
  • πάντῃ πάντως ἐμμελῶς

ὅ γ᾽ ὡς

• ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ
• τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου.

§ x.12

• πολλῶν δὲ γινομένων κατὰ τύχην καὶ
• διαφερόντων
  • μεγέθει καὶ
  • μικρότητι,
     
• τὰ μὲν μικρὰ
  • τῶν εὐτυχημάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
  • τῶν ἀντικειμένων,

  δῆλον ὡς οὐ ποιεῖ ῥοπὴν τῆς ζωῆς,

• τὰ δὲ
  • μεγάλα καὶ
  • πολλὰ

  γινόμενα

  • μὲν εὖ μακαριώτερον τὸν βίον ποιήσει
    • (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ συνεπικοσμεῖν πέφυκεν,
    • καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν καλὴ καὶ σπουδαία γίνεται),
  • ἀνάπαλιν δὲ συμβαίνοντα
    • θλίβει καὶ
    • λυμαίνεται

  τὸ μακάριον·

  • λύπας τε γὰρ ἐπιφέρει καὶ
  • ἐμποδίζει πολλαῖς ἐνεργείαις.

ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν,
ἐπειδὰν φέρῃ τις εὐκόλως

• πολλὰς καὶ
• μεγάλας

ἀτυχίας,

• μὴ δι᾽ ἀναλγησίαν,
• ἀλλὰ
  • γεννάδας ὢν καὶ
  • μεγαλόψυχος.

§ x.13

εἰ δ᾽ εἰσὶν αἱ ἐνέργειαι κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς,
καθάπερ εἴπομεν,
οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο τῶν μακαρίων ἄθλιος·
οὐδέποτε γὰρ πράξει

• τὰ μισητὰ καὶ
• τὰ φαῦλα. [1101^a]

τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς

• ἀγαθὸν καὶ
• ἔμφρονα

πάσας οἰόμεθα

• τὰς τύχας εὐσχημόνως φέρειν καὶ
• ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀεὶ τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν,

καθάπερ

• καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν τῷ παρόντι στρατοπέδῳ χρῆσθαι πολεμικώτατα
• καὶ σκυτοτόμον ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων σκυτῶν κάλλιστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν·
  τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον
• καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τεχνίτας ἅπαντας.

§ x.14

εἰ δ᾽ οὕτως,
ἄθλιος μὲν οὐδέποτε γένοιτ᾽ ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων,

• οὐ μὴν μακάριός γε,
  ἂν Πριαμικαῖς τύχαις περιπέσῃ.
• οὐδὲ δὴ ποικίλος γε καὶ εὐμετάβολος·

• οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας κινηθήσεται ῥᾳδίως,
• οὐδ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ἀτυχημάτων
• ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν,

ἔκ τε τῶν τοιούτων
οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο πάλιν εὐδαίμων ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ,
ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ,

• ἐν
  • πολλῷ τινὶ καὶ
  • τελείῳ,
• • μεγάλων καὶ
  • καλῶν

  ἐν αὐτῷ γενόμενος ἐπήβολος.

§ x.15

τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαίμονα

• τὸν κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν τελείαν ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ
• τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένον

• μὴ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον
• ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον;

ἢ προσθετέον

• καὶ βιωσόμενον οὕτω
• καὶ τελευτήσοντα κατὰ λόγον;

ἐπειδὴ

• τὸ μέλλον ἀφανὲς ἡμῖν ἐστίν,
• τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ
  • τέλος καὶ
  • τέλειον

  τίθεμεν

  • πάντῃ
  • πάντως.

§ x.16

εἰ δ᾽ οὕτω,
μακαρίους ἐροῦμεν τῶν ζώντων οἷς

• ὑπάρχει καὶ
• ὑπάρξει

τὰ λεχθέντα,
μακαρίους δ᾽ ἀνθρώπους.

καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωρίσθω.

Chapter XI

§ xi.1

τὰς δὲ

• τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχας καὶ
• τῶν φίλων ἁπάντων

τὸ μὲν μηδοτιοῦν συμβάλλεσθαι

• λίαν ἄφιλον φαίνεται καὶ
• ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον·

§ xi.2

• πολλῶν δὲ καὶ
• παντοίας ἐχόντων διαφορὰς

τῶν συμβαινόντων, καὶ

• τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον συνικνουμένων
• τῶν δ᾽ ἧττον,

• καθ᾽ ἕκαστον μὲν διαιρεῖν
  • μακρὸν καὶ
  • ἀπέραντον

  φαίνεται,

• καθόλου δὲ λεχθὲν καὶ τύπῳ τάχ᾽ ἂν ἱκανῶς ἔχοι.

§ xi.3

εἰ δή, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὑτὸν ἀτυχημάτων

• τὰ μὲν ἔχει τι βρῖθος καὶ ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὸν βίον
• τὰ δ᾽ ἐλαφροτέροις ἔοικεν,

οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς φίλους ὁμοίως ἅπαντας,

§ xi.4

διαφέρει δὲ τῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον περὶ

• ζῶντας ἢ
• τελευτήσαντας

συμβαίνειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ
τὰ

• παράνομα καὶ
• δεινὰ

• προϋπάρχειν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις
• ἢ πράττεσθαι,

§ xi.5

συλλογιστέον δὴ καὶ

• ταύτην τὴν διαφοράν, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἴσως
• τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς κεκμηκότας
  εἴ
  • τινος ἀγαθοῦ κοινωνοῦσιν ἢ
  • τῶν ἀντικειμένων. [1101^b]

ἔοικε γὰρ ἐκ τούτων
εἰ καὶ διικνεῖται πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁτιοῦν,

• εἴτ᾽ ἀγαθὸν
• εἴτε τοὐναντίον,

• ἀφαυρόν τι καὶ
• μικρὸν
  • ἢ ἁπλῶς
  • ἢ ἐκείνοις

εἶναι,
εἰ δὲ μή,

• τοσοῦτόν γε καὶ
• τοιοῦτον

ὥστε

• μὴ ποιεῖν εὐδαιμονας τοὺς μὴ ὄντας
• μηδὲ τοὺς ὄντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὸ μακάριον.

§ xi.6

συμβάλλεσθαι μὲν οὖν τι φαίνονται τοῖς κεκμηκόσιν

• αἱ εὐπραξίαι τῶν φίλων,
• ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ δυσπραξίαι,

• τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ
• τηλικαῦτα

ὥστε

• μήτε τοὺς εὐδαιμονας μὴ εὐδαιμονας ποιεῖν
• μήτ᾽ ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων μηδέν.

Chapter XII

Chapter 12

§ xii.1

διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων
ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας πότερα

• τῶν ἐπαινετῶν ἐστὶν ἢ μᾶλλον
• τῶν τιμίων·

δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι

• τῶν γε δυνάμεων οὐκ ἔστιν.

§ xii.2

φαίνεται δὴ πᾶν τὸ ἐπαινετὸν

• τῷ ποιόν τι εἶναι καὶ
• πρός τι πῶς ἔχειν

ἐπαινεῖσθαι·

• τὸν γὰρ δίκαιον καὶ

• τὸν ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὅλως

• • τὸν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ
  • τὴν ἀρετὴν

ἐπαινοῦμεν διὰ

• τὰς πράξεις καὶ
• τὰ ἔργα,

καὶ

• τὸν ἰσχυρὸν δὲ καὶ
• τὸν δρομικὸν καὶ
• τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον

• τῷ ποιόν τινα πεφυκέναι καὶ
• ἔχειν πως πρὸς
  • ἀγαθόν τι καὶ
  • σπουδαῖον.

§ xii.3

δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπαίνων·

γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀναφερόμενοι,
τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει
διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους
δι᾽ ἀναφορᾶς,
ὥσπερ εἴπομεν.

§ xii.4

εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ ἔπαινος τῶν τοιούτων,
δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπαινος,
ἀλλὰ

• μεῖζόν τι καὶ
• βέλτιον,

καθάπερ καὶ φαίνεται·

• τούς τε γὰρ θεοὺς
  • μακαρίζομεν καὶ
  • εὐδαιμονίζομεν καὶ
• τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς θειοτάτους
  • μακαρίζομεν.

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν·

οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπαινεῖ
καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιον,
ἀλλ᾽ ὡς

• θειότερόν τι καὶ
• βέλτιον

μακαρίζει.

§ xii.5

δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὔδοξος καλῶς συνηγορῆσαι
περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων
τῇ ἡδονῇ·

τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπαινεῖσθαι
τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὖσαν
μηνύειν ᾤετο ὅτι
κρεῖττόν ἐστι τῶν ἐπαινετῶν,
τοιοῦτον δ᾽ εἶναι

• τὸν θεὸν καὶ
• τἀγαθόν·

πρὸς ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τἆλλα ἀναφέρεσθαι.

§ xii.6

• ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔπαινος τῆς ἀρετῆς·
  πρακτικοὶ γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης·
• τὰ δ᾽ ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων ὁμοίως
  • καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν
  • καὶ τῶν ψυχικῶν.

§ xii.7

ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως οἰκειότερον ἐξακριβοῦν
τοῖς περὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια πεπονημένοις·

ἡμῖν δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων [1102^a] ὅτι
ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν

• τιμίων καὶ
• τελείων.

ἔοικε δ᾽ οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ
διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχή·

§ xii.8

ταύτης γὰρ χάριν
τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα πάντες πράττομεν,

• τὴν ἀρχὴν δὲ καὶ
• τὸ αἴτιον

τῶν ἀγαθῶν

• τίμιόν τι καὶ
• θεῖον

τίθεμεν.

Chapter XIII

Chapter 13

§ xiii.1

τάχα γὰρ οὕτως ἂν βέλτιον καὶ
περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας θεωρήσαιμεν.

§ xiii.2

δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ
ὁ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν πολιτικὸς
περὶ ταύτην μάλιστα
πεπονῆσθαι·

βούλεται γὰρ τοὺς πολίτας

• ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ
• τῶν νόμων ὑπηκόους.

§ xiii.3

καὶ
εἴ τινες ἕτεροι τοιοῦτοι γεγένηνται.

§ xiii.4

εἰ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις αὕτη,
δῆλον ὅτι
γίνοιτ᾽ ἂν ἡ ζήτησις
κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς προαίρεσιν.

§ xiii.5

περὶ ἀρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον ἀνθρωπίνης δῆλον ὅτι·
καὶ γὰρ

• τἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπινον ἐζητοῦμεν καὶ
• τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀνθρωπίνην.

§ xiii.6

ἀρετὴν δὲ λέγομεν ἀνθρωπίνην

• οὐ τὴν τοῦ σώματος
• ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς·

καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ
ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν λέγομεν.

§ xiii.7

εἰ δὲ ταῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει,
δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ

• τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι πως τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ
• τὸν ὀφθαλμοὺς θεραπεύσοντα καὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα,

καὶ μᾶλλον ὅσῳ τιμιωτέρα καὶ βελτίων
ἡ πολιτικὴ τῆς ἰατρικῆς·

τῶν δ᾽ ἰατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες
πολλὰ πραγματεύονται
περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος γνῶσιν.

§ xiii.8

• θεωρητέον δὴ καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ περὶ ψυχῆς,
• θεωρητέον δὲ
  • τούτων χάριν, καὶ
  • ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἱκανῶς ἔχει
    πρὸς τὰ ζητούμενα·

τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐξακριβοῦν
ἐργωδέστερον ἴσως ἐστὶ
τῶν προκειμένων.

§ xiii.9

• λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς
  καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἔνια,
• καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς·

οἷον

§ xiii.10

ταῦτα δὲ πότερον

• διώρισται
  καθάπερ
  • τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια καὶ
  • πᾶν τὸ μεριστόν, ἢ
• τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα
  καθάπερ ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ
  • τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ
  • τὸ κοῖλον,

οὐθὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ παρόν.

§ xiii.11

τοῦ ἀλόγου δὲ

• τὸ μὲν ἔοικε κοινῷ καὶ φυτικῷ,
  λέγω δὲ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ
  • τρέφεσθαι καὶ
  • αὔξεσθαι·
     
  • τὴν τοιαύτην γὰρ δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς
    • ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς τρεφομένοις
      θείη τις ἂν [1102^b] καὶ
    • ἐν τοῖς ἐμβρύοις,
  • τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην καὶ
    • ἐν τοῖς τελείοις·

  εὐλογώτερον γὰρ ἢ ἄλλην τινά.

§ xiii.12

δοκεῖ γὰρ

• ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις
  ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα
  • τὸ μόριον τοῦτο καὶ
  • ἡ δύναμις αὕτη,
• ὁ δ᾽
  • ἀγαθὸς καὶ
  • κακὸς

  ἥκιστα διάδηλοι καθ᾽ ὕπνον
  (ὅθεν φασὶν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ βίου
  τοὺς εὐδαιμονας
  τῶν ἀθλίων·
  συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο εἰκότως·

§ xiii.13

ἀργία γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ὕπνος
τῆς ψυχῆς ᾗ λέγεται

• σπουδαία καὶ
• φαύλη),

πλὴν εἰ μὴ

• κατὰ μικρὸν καὶ διικνοῦνταί τινες τῶν κινήσεων,
• καὶ ταύτῃ βελτίω γίνεται τὰ φαντάσματα
  • τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἢ
  • τῶν τυχόντων.

§ xiii.14

ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἅλις,
καὶ τὸ θρεπτικὸν ἐατέον,
ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἄμοιρον πέφυκεν.

§ xiii.15

• ἔοικε δὲ καὶ
  ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος εἶναι,
  μετέχουσα μέντοι πῃ λόγου.

  • τοῦ γὰρ
    • ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ
    • ἀκρατοῦς

    τὸν λόγον καὶ

  • τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον

  ἐπαινοῦμεν·

  • ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ
  • ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα

  παρακαλεῖ·
  φαίνεται δ᾽ ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ
  ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός,
  ὃ

  • μάχεται καὶ
  • ἀντιτείνει

  τῷ λόγῳ.

  ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ

  • καθάπερ

    τὰ παραλελυμένα τοῦ σώματος μόρια
    εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ προαιρουμένων κινῆσαι
    τοὐναντίον εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ παραφέρεται,

  • καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως·
    ἐπὶ τἀναντία γὰρ αἱ ὁρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν.

§ xiii.16

ἀλλ᾽

• ἐν τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὁρῶμεν τὸ παραφερόμενον,
• ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ὁρῶμεν.

ἴσως δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ
νομιστέον εἶναί τι

• παρὰ τὸν λόγον,
• ἐναντιούμενον τούτῳ καὶ
• ἀντιβαῖνον.

πῶς δ᾽ ἕτερον, οὐδὲν διαφέρει.

§ xiii.17

λόγου δὲ καὶ τοῦτο φαίνεται μετέχειν,
ὥσπερ εἴπομεν·

• πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς –
  ἔτι δ᾽ ἴσως
• εὐηκοώτερόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ
  • σώφρονος καὶ
  • ἀνδρείου·

πάντα γὰρ ὁμοφωνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ.

§ xiii.18

φαίνεται δὴ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διττόν.

• τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινωνεῖ λόγου,

• τὸ δ᾽

  • ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως
  • ὀρεκτικὸν

  μετέχει πως,

  ᾗ

  • κατήκοόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ
  • πειθαρχικόν·

ὅτι δὲ πείθεταί πως
ὑπὸ λόγου τὸ ἄλογον,
μηνύει

• καὶ ἡ νουθέτησις
• καὶ πᾶσα
  • ἐπιτίμησίς τε καὶ
  • παράκλησις. [1103^a]

§ xiii.19

• τὸ μὲν
  • κυρίως καὶ
  • ἐν αὑτῷ,
• τὸ δ᾽ ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι.

§ xiii.20

λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν

• τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς
• τὰς δὲ ἠθικάς,

• • σοφίαν μὲν
  • καὶ σύνεσιν
  • καὶ φρόνησιν

  διανοητικάς,

• • ἐλευθεριότητα δὲ
  • καὶ σωφροσύνην

  ἠθικάς.

λέγοντες γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἤθους

• οὐ λέγομεν ὅτι
  • σοφὸς ἢ
  • συνετὸς
• ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι
  • πρᾶος ἢ
  • σώφρων·

ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ
τὸν σοφὸν
κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν·