Wealth can keep you from going to hell. At least, that’s what a rich old man tells Socrates, in Book I of the Republic of Plato. Cephalus gives us a prime example of an assertion made not because it is true, but because the speaker fears it might not be true.

Cephalus must be nervous about how he built up his riches in the first place. As he explains, his

• grandfather, also called Cephalus,
  • started out with as much money as his grandson has now, and
  • increased it manifold;
• father, Lysanias, wasted most of the senior Cephalus’s legacy;
• own self has built up the family fortune again.

Cephalus hopes to avoid the punishments meted out in the afterlife to people who have been unjust in this life. If you are rich, he thinks, then you can

• refrain from lying and cheating, and
• pay what you owe, be it
  • sacrifices to gods or
  • sums of money to human beings.

Socrates asks whether that really what justice is,

• telling the truth and
• returning what you have taken.

He suggests a counterexample. If your friend has you hold onto his gun collection, but later asks you to give it back, maybe you shouldn’t do that, if he appears to have gone mad.

I wish everybody had that example on instant recall, as a simple reminder not to automatically give people what they want, even if, or especially if, they are friends.

Though the version by Jimi Hendrix must be best known, particularly by me, a lot of people have sung “Hey Joe,” including students hanging out in a dorm room at St John’s College, Annapolis, in an old black-and-white promotional film that I remember seeing while I was a student there:

1. Hey Joe, where you going with that gun in your hand?

2. I’m going down to shoot my old lady
   You know, I caught her messing around with another man

3. Hey Joe, I heard you shot your woman down
   You shot her down, now

An alternative is possible:

3. Hey Joe, let me have a look at that gun in your hand

4. Now it’s time for me to take that gun back again

5. Hey Joe, I don’t think so, I’d better keep it with me

In Rebel Without a Cause, there’s a character, curiously called Plato, who ends up in a passion with a gun in his hand. I did see that movie once, on video cassette, but perhaps something else is what lets me remember it. As a graduate student at the University of Maryland, I sat in on Colman McCarthy’s course called “Alternatives to Violence.” One student recommended the alternative in the movie, where the character played by James Dean asks to see Plato’s gun, then quietly slips out the cartridge.

The censors would go to town on “Hey Joe” in the city that Socrates describes to Cephalus’s son and his friends, after Cephalus himself has gone off to make ritual sacrifice.

That may only be a metaphor for the individual. At the end, Socrates tells a story of the afterlife like the one that has frightened Cephalus. For Socrates though, the way to prepare for death is not to follow a particular code of ethics, but to figure out what you really want in life.

I don’t think Socrates comes back to the particular question of what to give to people. Perhaps Aristotle regrets this, or sees it as an opportunity to give his own answer. In the present part of Nicomachean Ethics, Book IX, he says,

ὅτι δ᾽ οὐ πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀποδοτέον,
οὐκ ἄδηλον·
καὶ τὰς μὲν εὐεργεσίας ἀνταποδοτέον
ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ
μᾶλλον ἢ χαριστέον ἑταίροις,
ὥσπερ καὶ δάνειον ᾧ ὀφείλει ἀποδοτέον
μᾶλλον ἢ ἑταίρῳ δοτέον.
ἴσως δ᾽ οὐδὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἀεί …

That someone ought not to give back everything to the same person
is not unclear;
nor is it unclear that,
for the most part,
he must repay good deeds
more than gratify his comrades,
just as a person must pay back a loan to someone he owes,
more than he must give away something to a comrade.
But perhaps not even this is always so …

That’s in § ii.3–4, the translation being by Bartlett and Collins. Perhaps such things need to be said, but to whom? In Book I, § iii.5, Aristotle said his lectures were not for the young.

Aristotle’s responses to Socrates’s conundrums can be like Bart Simpson’s to the problem of hearing one hand clapping: “Piece of cake.”

I myself would extract a kōan from what Aristotle says later in this reading, in § iii.1:

ἔχει δ᾽ ἀπορίαν καὶ
περὶ τοῦ διαλύεσθαι τὰς φιλίας ἢ μὴ
πρὸς τοὺς μὴ διαμένοντας.

But there is perplexity also
concerning whether or not to dissolve friendships
with those who do not remain the same as they were.

How do you know whether it is the other person who has changed, or you?

There’s a saying,

When someone shows you who they are,
believe them the first time.

Whoever said it first, the saying should not be used as it is by some people, to justify their prejudices.

Nonetheless, the saying may be useful if you are inclined to make excuses for people with whom you want an ἐρωτικὴ φιλία, an erotic friendship. Aristotle mentioned such friendships in Book VIII, §§ iii.5 and iv.2. In Book IX now, § i.2, he describes them when they are breaking up:

ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ
ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁ ἐραστὴς ἐγκαλεῖ
ὅτι ὑπερφιλῶν
οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖται,
οὐδὲν ἔχων φιλητόν,
εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν,
πολλάκις δ᾽ ὁ ἐρώμενος
ὅτι πρότερον ἐπαγγελλόμενος πάντα
νῦν οὐδὲν ἐπιτελεῖ.

But in erotic [love or friendship],
the lover sometimes levels the accusation
that although he loves beyond measure,
he is not loved in return,
though it may so happen
that he possesses nothing lovable;
the beloved, on the other hand, often levels the accusation
that his lover is not now fulfilling anything
of all that he had earlier promised.

The problem is that the love is not for the person, but for the pleasure or utility that he provides.

The question of when to break up is pursued further in chapter iii, the last of this reading.

If people have deceived us about why they became our friends, then they are worse than counterfeiters, who in Athens deserved the death penalty, according to Rackham’s note on § iii.2 in the Loeb edition.

But did they deceive us, or did we deceive ourselves? I don’t think there’s a surefire way to tell. Nor does Aristotle; for, if he did, wouldn’t he tell us?

The saying about believing the person who “shows you who they are” is commonly attributed to Maya Angelou, but I have not been able to find a proper source. One website seems even to mock my quest:

The Origin and Significance of The Quote, “When someone shows you who they are, believe them the first time.”

Maya Angelou was an American poet, author, and prominent civil rights activist. She is best known for her groundbreaking memoir “I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings.”

This quote comes from her expansive wisdom about human nature and relationships. It encourages trusting your own instincts and observations rather than making excuses for others.

Perhaps that text was written by computer.

If Maya Angelou did make the assertion attributed to her, it ought to be at Wikiquote. It’s not there; but then it’s not even among the seventy or 80 unsourced quotes that have been moved to the talk page for Angelou.

In Conversations with Maya Angelou (1989; page 22), one exchange is pertinent to Aristotle’s comments about motherhood:

Maya Angelou

… we have to thank black women not only for keeping the black family alive but the white family.

Bill Moyers

Why is that?

Angelou

Because black women have nursed a nation of strangers. For hundreds of years they literally nursed babies at their breasts who they knew when they grew up would rape their daughters and kill their sons.

Back in Book VIII, § viii.3, Aristotle talked of the mothers who farmed out nursing to others, while still loving their children. Perhaps he had more in mind, because the children might even be ignorant of their original mothers. I thought Sigrid Undset had something of this idea, when describing the thought of the title character of Kristin Lavransdatter:

Wherever they ended up in the world, wherever they journeyed, forgetting their mother – she thought that for her, their lives would be like a current in her own life.

I quoted more of this in “Paternity,” where the idea was the physical connection of mother and child. The wet nurse also forms such a connection, as Angelou points out.

What led me to Conversations with Maya Angelou was the first selection from it at Wikiquote:

You can’t use up creativity. The more you use, the more you have.

The page did not say that this was quoted in the book’s Introduction, until I added this information. As a footnote in the book reveals, the ultimate source is Bell Telephone Magazine. Quote Investigator has this information, but nothing about the quote about the person who shows you who they are.

I want to preserve something else, pertinent to my “kōan,” that Angelou says to Moyers (page 26):

I think that when we lose the prejudices, the fearful, frightening prejudices, that say a person like a multiple rapist, a murderer, that’s inhuman – when we lose that and accept that that’s human, that’s human.

Hopefully I’ll never do it. But obviously if a human being did it, I have the potential, as human.

And then, conversely, one can say, oh, there is a great masterpiece written, it’s a marvelous composition written by a human being. A human being, only, wrote that. Being I am a human being, I have that potential.

Contents and Summary

In Book IX, the roman and arabic chapters being the same, I am indicating only the former.

• Chapter I
  • Proportion
    • equalizes and
    • preserves

    in heterogeneous (ἀνομοιοειδής) friendships:

    • In the “political” kind,
      recompense (ἀμοιβή) comes e.g. to
      • the shoemaker for his shoes,
      • the weaver,
      • the rest (§ i.1).

      Here money is a common measure.

    • In the erotic kind,
      • the lover of unrequited love,
      • the beloved of unfulfilled promises

      complains (§ i.2), because

      • the lover pleasure,
      • the beloved utility

      wants.

    • [Friendship] of character (ἡ τῶν ἠθῶν),
      being for the person,
      lasts (§ i.3).
  • It’s a problem when you don’t get what you want,
    e.g.
    • you play your cithara for money;
    • the listener says you got pleasure
      [from expecting the money] (§ i.4).
  • Who decides the value of a service?
    • Protagoras left it to his students.
    • Hesiod said,
      Μισθὸς δ’ ἀνδρὶ [φίλῳ εἰρημένος ἄρκιος ἔστω]
      “Let the payment agreed for a man who is your friend be reliable”
      [tr. Glenn Most] (§ i.5).
    • Some people
      • take the money first,
      • then don’t deliver (§ i.6).

      The Sophists are like that.

    • When there’s no agreement,
      if you offer the service for the sake of the recipient,
      he compensates you according to his choice,
      e.g. as the student of philosophy does (§ i.7).
    • When there is an agreement,
      that the recipient decide the value is
      • necessary and
      • just § i.8

      That’s even the law in some cities (§ i.9).

• Chapter II
  • They present an aporia,
    do such things as whether e.g.
    1. to obey
       • your father
       • or
         • a doctor in sickness,
         • a general in war;
    2. to serve
       • your friend
       • or a seriously good man;
    3. to pay
       • your comrade
       • or a lender (§ ii.1).
  • It’s complicated (§ ii.2).
  • Obviously the latter in each of the three cases (§ ii.3).
  • Not always though.
    If e.g. you’ve been redeemed, should you
    • redeem your redeemer,
    • pay him back anyway,
    • redeem your father?

    Obviously the last (§ ii.4).

  • You should repay a debt,
    unless you can do something
    • better or
    • more necessary,

    e.g. a corrupt lender
    is somebody you need not

    • lend to or even
    • repay (§ ii.5).
  • The account is as definite as the subject,
    when this is
    • passion and
    • action.
  • So, you give
    • not everything to
      • the same person,
      • even your father,
      • even Zeus (§ ii.6),
    • but to
      • parents,
      • brothers,
      • comrades,
      • benefactors,

      what is

      • their own (τὰ οἰκεῖα),
      • fitting (τὰ ἁρμόττοντα).
  • People seem to do this.
    • Family arere invited to
      • weddings and
      • funerals (§ ii.7).
    • Parents get
      • sustenance and
      • honor, though not the same for
        • father,
        • mother,
        • wise man,
        • general (§ ii.8).
    • Old men are
      • stood for,
      • given seats.
    • To
      • brothers and
      • comrades

      go

      • frankness and
      • sharing.
    • To
      • relatives,
      • tribesmen,
      • citizens,
      • the rest

      go

      • what is theirs,
      • proper ranking according to
        • kinship,
        • virtue,
        • utility (§ ii.9).
  • The ranking
    • is easier with family,
    • must be done in any case (§ ii.10).
• Chapter III
  • Do you dissolve a friendship with a person who changes?
    • Sure, if it was for
      • utility or
      • pleasure.
    • That person might object,
      if you had made out to be friends for his character –
      such errors are what cause the problems (§ iii.1).
      • The error could be his fault.
      • If it’s yours, you’re worse than a counterfeiter (§ iii.2).
  • If your friend
    • becomes corrupt,
    • or seems to,

    then you can drop the friendship,

    • not immediately,
    • but if the friend is incorrigible (§ iii.3).
  • How can you stay friends with somebody, if
    • you get better,
    • he stays the same, e.g. childish (§ iii.4)?
  • You should still remember the old times,
    as one should gratify
    • friends rather
    • than foreigners,

    if the person did not actually become corrupt (§ iii.5).

Text

Book IX begins near the end of Bekker page, or rather column, 1163^b. On the site of Project Perseus, when I go to the Citation URI for 1163^b, I get only the text of that column that still belongs to Book VIII. If I click “Next,” I get the text of the column that belongs to Book IX; however, the Citation URI is the same as before. The same happens if I go to column 1164^a and click “Previous.” I once obtained a different Citation URI for the intersection of column 1163^b and Book IX, but it no longer works, if it ever did. To link to the text then, all I can see to do is use the page’s own URI.

Chapter I

§ i.1

ἐν πάσαις δὲ ταῖς ἀνομοιοειδέσι φιλίαις
τὸ ἀνάλογον

• ἰσάζει καὶ
• σῴζει τὴν φιλίαν,

καθάπερ εἴρηται,

[1164^a]

§ i.2

• ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν
  • πεπόρισται κοινὸν μέτρον τὸ νόμισμα, καὶ
  • πρὸς τοῦτο δὴ πάντα ἀναφέρεται καὶ τούτῳ μετρεῖται·
• ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ
  • ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁ ἐραστὴς ἐγκαλεῖ
    ὅτι
    ὑπερφιλῶν οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖται,
    οὐδὲν ἔχων φιλητόν, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν,
  • πολλάκις δ᾽ ὁ ἐρώμενος
    ὅτι
    πρότερον ἐπαγγελλόμενος πάντα
    νῦν οὐδὲν ἐπιτελεῖ.

§ i.3

συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐπειδὰν

• ὃ μὲν δι᾽ ἡδονὴν τὸν ἐρώμενον φιλῇ,
• ὃ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον τὸν ἐραστήν,
• ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχῃ.

διὰ ταῦτα γὰρ τῆς φιλίας οὔσης διάλυσις γίνεται,
ἐπειδὰν μὴ γίνηται ὧν ἕνεκα ἐφίλουν·

• οὐ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἔστεργον
• ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα,
  οὐ μόνιμα ὄντα·

διὸ τοιαῦται καὶ αἱ φιλίαι.

ἡ δὲ τῶν ἠθῶν
καθ᾽ αὑτὴν οὖσα
μένει,
καθάπερ εἴρηται.

§ i.4

διαφέρονται δ᾽ ὅταν ἕτερα

• γίνηται αὐτοῖς καὶ
• μὴ ὧν ὀρέγονται·

ὅμοιον γὰρ τῷ μηδὲν γίνεσθαι,
ὅταν οὗ ἐφίεται μὴ τυγχάνῃ,

• ὧν γὰρ δεόμενος τυγχάνει,
• τούτοις καὶ προσέχει,
• κἀκείνου γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσει.

§ i.5

τὴν ἀξίαν δὲ ποτέρου τάξαι ἐστί,

• τοῦ προϊεμένου ἢ
• τοῦ προλαβόντος;

ὁ γὰρ προϊέμενος ἔοικ᾽ ἐπιτρέπειν ἐκείνῳ.

ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν·

ὅτε γὰρ διδάξειεν ἁδήποτε,

• τιμῆσαι τὸν μαθόντα ἐκέλευεν
  ὅσου δοκεῖ ἄξια ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ
• ἐλάμβανε τοσοῦτον.

ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δ᾽ ἐνίοις ἀρέσκει τὸ

μισθὸς δ᾽ ἀνδρί.

§ i.6

οἱ δὲ

• προλαμβάνοντες τὸ ἀργύριον,
• εἶτα μηδὲν ποιοῦντες ὧν ἔφασαν
  διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν,

εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασι γίνονται·

οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτελοῦσιν ἃ ὡμολόγησαν.

§ i.7

§ i.8

• μὴ τοιαύτης δ᾽ οὔσης τῆς δόσεως
• ἀλλ᾽ ἐπί τινι,

• μάλιστα μὲν ἴσως δεῖ
  τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν γίνεσθαι
  δοκοῦσαν ἀμφοῖν κατ᾽ ἀξίαν εἶναι,
• εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνοι,
  • οὐ μόνον ἀναγκαῖον δόξειεν ἂν τὸν προέχοντα τάττειν,
  • ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκαιον·

• ὅσον γὰρ οὗτος ὠφελήθη ἢ
• ἀνθ᾽ ὅσου τὴν ἡδονὴν εἵλετ᾽ ἄν,
• τοσοῦτον ἀντιλαβὼν ἕξει τὴν παρὰ τούτου ἀξίαν.

§ i.9

καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὠνίοις οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμενον,
ἐνιαχοῦ τ᾽ εἰσὶ νόμοι τῶν ἑκουσίων συμβολαίων δίκας μὴ εἶναι, ὡς δέον, ᾧ ἐπίστευσε, διαλυθῆναι πρὸς τοῦτον καθάπερ ἐκοινώνησεν.

ᾧ γὰρ ἐπετράφθη, τοῦτον οἴεται δικαιότερον εἶναι τάξαι τοῦ ἐπιτρέψαντος.

τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ οὐ τοῦ ἴσου τιμῶσιν

• οἱ ἔχοντες καὶ
• οἱ βουλόμενοι λαβεῖν·

• τὰ γὰρ οἰκεῖα καὶ
• ἃ διδόασιν

ἑκάστοις φαίνεται πολλοῦ ἄξια·

ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἡ ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται πρὸς

• τοσοῦτον
• ὅσον ἂν τάττωσιν οἱ λαμβάνοντες.

δεῖ δ᾽ ἴσως

• οὐ τοσούτου τιμᾶν ὅσου ἔχοντι φαίνεται ἄξιον,
• ἀλλ᾽ ὅσου πρὶν ἔχειν ἐτίμα.

Chapter II

§ ii.1

ἀπορίαν δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οἷον

§ ii.2

ἆρ᾽ οὖν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα

• ἀκριβῶς μὲν διορίσαι οὐ ῥᾴδιον;
  • πολλὰς γὰρ καὶ
  • παντοίας

  ἔχει διαφορὰς

  • καὶ
    • μεγέθει καὶ
    • μικρότητι
  • καὶ τῷ
    • καλῷ καὶ
    • ἀναγκαίῳ.

§ ii.3

• ὅτι δ᾽

  1. οὐ πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀποδοτέον,

  οὐκ ἄδηλον·

  2. καὶ
     • τὰς μὲν εὐεργεσίας ἀνταποδοτέον
       ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μᾶλλον
     • ἢ χαριστέον ἑταίροις,
  3. ὥσπερ καὶ
     • δάνειον ᾧ ὀφείλει ἀποδοτέον μᾶλλον
     • ἢ ἑταίρῳ δοτέον.

§ ii.4

• ἴσως δ᾽ οὐδὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἀεί,

  οἷον τῷ λυτρωθέντι παρὰ λῃστῶν πότερα

  • τὸν λυσάμενον ἀντιλυτρωτέον,
    κἂν ὁστισοῦν ᾖ,
  • ἢ
    • μὴ ἑαλωκότι
    • ἀπαιτοῦντι δὲ

    ἀποδοτέον, [1165^a]

  • ἢ τὸν πατέρα λυτρωτέον;

  δόξειε γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον τὸν πατέρα.

§ ii.5

ὅπερ οὖν εἴρηται,

• καθόλου μὲν τὸ ὀφείλημα ἀποδοτέον,

• ἐὰν δ᾽ ὑπερτείνῃ ἡ δόσις

  • τῷ καλῷ ἢ
  • τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ,

  πρὸς ταῦτ᾽ ἀποκλιτέον.

  • ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ᾽ ἐστὶν ἴσον
    τὸ τὴν προϋπαρχὴν ἀμείψασθαι,
    ἐπειδὰν
    • ὃ μὲν σπουδαῖον εἰδὼς
      εὖ ποιήσῃ,
    • τῷ δὲ ἡ ἀνταπόδοσις γίνηται
      ὃν οἴεται μοχθηρὸν εἶναι.
  • οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ δανείσαντι ἐνίοτε ἀντιδανειστέον·
    • ὃ μὲν γὰρ οἰόμενος κομιεῖσθαι ἐδάνεισεν ἐπιεικεῖ ὄντι,
    • ὃ δ᾽ οὐκ ἐλπίζει κομιεῖσθαι παρὰ πονηροῦ.
       
  • εἴτε τοίνυν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτως ἔχει,
    οὐκ ἴσον τὸ ἀξίωμα·
  • εἴτ᾽
    • ἔχει μὲν μὴ οὕτως
    • οἴονται δέ,

    οὐκ ἂν δόξαιεν ἄτοπα ποιεῖν.

§ ii.6

ὅπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται,
οἱ περὶ

• τὰ πάθη καὶ
• τὰς πράξεις

λόγοι ὁμοίως ἔχουσι τὸ ὡρισμένον τοῖς περὶ ἅ εἰσιν.

---

• ὅτι μὲν οὖν
  • οὐ ταὐτὰ πᾶσιν ἀποδοτέον,
  • οὐδὲ τῷ πατρὶ πάντα, καθάπερ
  • οὐδὲ τῷ Διὶ θύεται,

  οὐκ ἄδηλον·

§ ii.7

• ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἕτερα
  • γονεῦσι καὶ
  • ἀδελφοῖς καὶ
  • ἑταίροις καὶ
  • εὐεργέταις,

  ἑκάστοις

  • τὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ
  • τὰ ἁρμόττοντα

  ἀπονεμητέον.

οὕτω δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν φαίνονται·

• εἰς γάμους μὲν γὰρ καλοῦσι τοὺς συγγενεῖς·
  τούτοις γὰρ κοινὸν
  • τὸ γένος καὶ
  • αἱ περὶ τοῦτο δὴ πράξεις· καὶ
• εἰς τὰ κήδη δὲ μάλιστ᾽ οἴονται δεῖν τοὺς συγγενεῖς ἀπαντᾶν
  διὰ ταὐτό.

§ ii.8

δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν

• τροφῆς μὲν γονεῦσι δεῖν μάλιστ᾽ ἐπαρκεῖν,
  ὡς ὀφείλοντας, καὶ
  • τοῖς αἰτίοις τοῦ εἶναι κάλλιον ὂν
  • ἢ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς ταῦτ᾽ ἐπαρκεῖν· καὶ
• τιμὴν δὲ γονεῦσι
  καθάπερ θεοῖς,
  οὐ πᾶσαν δέ·
  • οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν
    • πατρὶ καὶ
    • μητρί,
  • οὐδ᾽ αὖ
    • τὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ
    • ἢ τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ,
    • ἀλλὰ τὴν πατρικήν,
    • ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μητρικήν.

§ ii.9

καὶ

• παντὶ δὲ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ τιμὴν καθ᾽ ἡλικίαν,

  • ὑπαναστάσει καὶ
  • κατακλίσει καὶ
  • τοῖς τοιούτοις·

• πρὸς

  • ἑταίρους δ᾽ αὖ καὶ
  • ἀδελφοὺς
  • παρρησίαν καὶ
  • ἁπάντων κοινότητα.

• καὶ

  • συγγενέσι δὲ καὶ
  • φυλέταις καὶ
  • πολίταις καὶ
  • τοῖς λοιποῖς ἅπασιν

  ἀεὶ πειρατέον

  • τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀπονέμειν, καὶ
  • συγκρίνειν τὰ ἑκάστοις ὑπάρχοντα κατ᾽
    • οἰκειότητα καὶ
    • ἀρετὴν ἢ
    • χρῆσιν.

§ ii.10

• τῶν μὲν οὖν ὁμογενῶν ῥᾴων ἡ σύγκρισις,
• τῶν δὲ διαφερόντων ἐργωδεστέρα.

• οὐ μὴν διά γε τοῦτο ἀποστατέον,
• ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἂν ἐνδέχηται, οὕτω διοριστέον.

Chapter III

§ iii.1

ἔχει δ᾽ ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ

• διαλύεσθαι τὰς φιλίας [1165^b]
• ἢ μὴ

πρὸς τοὺς μὴ διαμένοντας. ἢ

• πρὸς μὲν τοὺς διὰ

  • τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ
  • τὸ ἡδὺ

  φίλους ὄντας,
  ὅταν μηκέτι ταῦτ᾽ ἔχωσιν,
  οὐδὲν ἄτοπον διαλύεσθαι;

  ἐκείνων γὰρ ἦσαν φίλοι·

  ὧν ἀπολιπόντων
  εὔλογον τὸ μὴ φιλεῖν.

• ἐγκαλέσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις,
  εἰ διὰ

  • τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ
  • τὸ ἡδὺ

  ἀγαπῶν προσεποιεῖτο διὰ τὸ ἦθος.

  ὃ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴπομεν,
  πλεῖσται διαφοραὶ γίνονται τοῖς φίλοις,
  ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίως

  • οἴωνται καὶ
  • ὦσι φίλοι.

§ iii.2

• ὅταν μὲν οὖν

  • διαψευσθῇ τις καὶ
  • ὑπολάβῃ φιλεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ ἦθος,

  μηδὲν τοιοῦτον ἐκείνου πράττοντος,
  ἑαυτὸν αἰτιῷτ᾽ ἄν·

• ὅταν δ᾽ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου προσποιήσεως ἀπατηθῇ,

  • δίκαιον ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ ἀπατήσαντι, καὶ
  • μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς τὸ νόμισμα κιβδηλεύουσιν,
    ὅσῳ περὶ τιμιώτερον ἡ κακουργία.

§ iii.3

ἐὰν δ᾽

• ἀποδέχηται ὡς ἀγαθόν,

• • γένηται δὲ μοχθηρὸς καὶ
  • δοκῇ,

ἆρ᾽ ἔτι

• φιλητέον;
• ἢ οὐ δυνατόν, εἴπερ
  • μὴ πᾶν φιλητὸν
  • ἀλλὰ τἀγαθόν;

• οὔτε δὲ φιλητὸν τὸ πονηρὸν
• οὔτε δεῖ·

• φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ οὐ χρὴ εἶναι,
• οὐδ᾽ ὁμοιοῦσθαι φαύλῳ·

εἴρηται δ᾽ ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον.

ἆρ᾽ οὖν

• εὐθὺς διαλυτέον;
• ἢ
  • οὐ πᾶσιν,
  • ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνιάτοις κατὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν;

ἐπανόρθωσιν δ᾽ ἔχουσι

• μᾶλλον βοηθητέον εἰς τὸ ἦθος
• ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν,

ὅσῳ

• βέλτιον καὶ
• τῆς φιλίας οἰκειότερον.

δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν ὁ διαλυόμενος
οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ποιεῖν·

οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοιούτῳ φίλος ἦν·

ἀλλοιωθέντα οὖν ἀδυνατῶν ἀνασῶσαι
ἀφίσταται.

§ iii.4

εἰ δ᾽

• ὃ μὲν διαμένοι
• ὃ δ᾽
  • ἐπιεικέστερος γίνοιτο καὶ
  • πολὺ διαλλάττοι τῇ ἀρετῇ,

ἆρα

• χρηστέον φίλῳ;

• ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται;

  ἐν μεγάλῃ δὲ διαστάσει
  μάλιστα δῆλον γίνεται,

  οἷον ἐν ταῖς παιδικαῖς φιλίαις·

  εἰ γὰρ

  • ὃ μὲν διαμένοι τὴν διάνοιαν παῖς
  • ὃ δ᾽ ἀνὴρ εἴη οἷος κράτιστος,

  πῶς ἂν εἶεν φίλοι

  • μήτ᾽ ἀρεσκόμενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς
  • μήτε
    • χαίροντες καὶ
    • λυπούμενοι;

  οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλους ταῦθ᾽ ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς,
  ἄνευ δὲ τούτων
  οὐκ ἦν φίλους εἶναι·

  συμβιοῦν γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε.

εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων.

§ iii.5

ἆρ᾽ οὖν

• οὐθὲν ἀλλοιότερον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἑκτέον
  ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐγεγόνει φίλος μηδέποτε;

• ἢ δεῖ μνείαν ἔχειν τῆς γενομένης συνηθείας, καὶ
  καθάπερ

  • φίλοις μᾶλλον
  • ἢ ὀθνείοις

  οἰόμεθα δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι,
  οὕτω καὶ τοῖς γενομένοις ἀπονεμητέον τι
  διὰ τὴν προγενομένην φιλίαν,
  ὅταν μὴ δι᾽ ὑπερβολὴν μοχθηρίας διάλυσις γένηται.