Polytropy

According to the current version of a Wikipedia article,

The Nicomachean Ethics is widely considered^{[according to whom?]} one of the most important works of philosophy.

The superscript bracketed italicized question was added by me. I thus took the liberty to edit Wikipedia, as we all may do.

Literature festival at Kireçburnu
September 22, 2023
with displays from the Austrian Consulate
in particular, a quote from Stefan Zweig
in German and Turkish
“Some people must start peace the way they start war”

An alternative way to edit the passage would be to delete the words “widely considered.” I accept that Aristotle’s treatise is important. This is a reason why I am reading it now. Another reason is the people I am reading with. Presumably they consider the Ethics important too. However, none of us may be authorities whom Wikipedia can cite.

A selection from the Ethics is

• given below in Greek, marked up and annotated by me, and
• preceded by a detailed summary in English.

This comprises the final four chapters of Book IV. These are chapters vi–ix by the roman numbering, 12–15 by the arabic. The last of the chapters backs up an assertion that we saw in Book II (§ vii.14): shame or modesty (ἡ αἰδώς) is not a virtue.

Earlier in Book IV (§ i.25), Aristotle suggested that if the liberal or generous man (ὁ ἐλευθέριος) should happen to spend his money wrongly, he would be pained. Perhaps this means he would be ashamed. According to Aristotle now (§ ix.7), the virtuous or decent man (ὁ ἐπιεικὴς) would be ashamed to do something shameful; however, he also wouldn’t do the shameful thing in the first place. Thus, actually being ashamed is no sign of virtue.

I refer to the virtuous man here, rather than to the virtuous person, because Aristotle has given no indication that there might be a virtuous woman. His teacher Plato does give an indication, in the Meno dialogue, the Republic, and perhaps elsewhere.

The first three chapters of the current Ethics reading are about social affairs, but again, there is no suggestion that these might involve women. Nonetheless, Aristotle may be the ancestor of Jane Austen, Judith Martin, and Carolyn Hax: women for whom it also matters how we deal with one another. In any case, the chapters in question are summarized in their last section (§ viii.12). In conversation or other shared activity, there are three ways to be virtuous, as follows.

6. Be pleasant.
7. Be truthful.
8. Be amusing.

I suggest then that Aristotle is a writer on etiquette.

There is an argument that such writers are specific to the United States. The argument appears in a book that was brought to my attention a month ago in a Bluesky post by Jaime Fuller, who describes herself as an editor at Lapham’s Quarterly. What interested her in the book was a way to measure social class by points earned in one’s living room, according to rules such as the following.

New Oriental rug or carpet		subtract 2 (each)
Worn Oriental rug or carpet		add 5 (each)
Threadbare rug or carpet		add 8 (each)

Perhaps I select those lines from the scorecard because our rugs are worn. On the other hand, my wife and I live at the eastern terminus of the Orient Express. The whole scoring system –

245 and above		Upper class
185-245		Upper-middle
100-185		Middle
50-100		High prole
Below 50		Mid- or low prole

– is at the back of Class: A Guide Through the American Status System, published the year I went off to college. I have no specific memory of the book, and neither can I find a review in the Washington Post. The website does have an earlier article about the author himself. According to Paul Fussell in Class,

It seems no accident that, as the British philosopher Anthony Quinton says, “The book of etiquette in its modern form … is largely an American product, the great names being Emily Post … and Amy Vanderbilt.” The reason is that the United States is preeminently the venue of newcomers, with a special need to place themselves advantageously and to get on briskly. “Some newcomers,” says Quinton, “are geographical, that is, immigrants; others are economic, the newly rich; others again chronological, the young.” All are faced with the problem inseparable from the operations of a mass society, earning respect.

Aristotle’s Ethics would seem to be addressed to people who want respect. Meanwhile, Fussell continues on that subject:

The comic Rodney Dangerfield, complaining that he don’t get none, belongs to the same national species as that studied by John Adams, who says, as early as 1805: “The rewards … in this life are esteem and admiration of others – the punishments are neglect and contempt. … The desire of the esteem of others is as real a want of nature as hunger – and the neglect and contempt of the world as severe a pain as the gout or stone. …”

Presumably John Adams here is the second American president; 1805 was perhaps early in the life of his country, but not in his own life, since he turned 70 then. The Adams quotation is unsourced, but is repeated in a 2010 book review in the New York Times:

What are the rewards, on this earth, of a well-lived life? John Adams pared the answer down to six words: “the esteem and admiration of others.”

For Adams, this was an animal and not an intellectual need. “The desire of the esteem of others is as real a want of nature as hunger; and the neglect and contempt of the world as severe a pain as the gout or stone.”

Adams was writing about individuals, not nations. But as Kwame Anthony Appiah argues in his plaintive and elegant new book, “The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen,” countries yearn for the respect of their peers as well, and that yearning can be leveraged.

Aristotle himself mentioned the importance of honor in our previous reading in Book IV (§ iii.10; translation by Bartlett and Collins):

ἡ δ᾽ ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά· μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἂν θείημεν ὃ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ οὗ μάλιστ᾽ ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἆθλον· τοιοῦτον δ᾽ ἡ τιμή·

Worth is spoken of in relation to external goods, and we would posit as the greatest of these that which we assign to the gods, that at which people of worth aim, and that which is the prize conferred on the noblest people. Honor is such a thing …

A problem with valuing “external” goods might be seen in the very title of a recent Carolyn Hax column, “Spouse thinks gifts, favors erase poor anger management” (November 2, 2023). Gifts and favors can be exchanged for one another, if not bought and sold for money; however, not all goods are external in that sense. A late friend of mine once agreed to work for a lawyer who had issues; she did this because he knew he was difficult, and he paid well in return. She wasn’t marrying him.

When Aristotle tells us to behave well with others, the point is to serve our own reputations, not to put other people at ease for their own sake. At least, that is the sense I get. The Philosopher may be tailoring his argument to his audience. Perhaps Judith Martin, “Miss Manners,” was doing that when addressing Steven Colbert and his audience on March 23, 2006. I transcribe from the video:

Manners – it’s the basic bargain of civilization. I will try not to annoy you to the point of violence or retaliation if you will do the same for me. It makes it possible for us to live in communities. And if there were a way where I could be totally free and rude but you’d have to be polite to me, it would be very tempting. But there is no such way.

Manners are part of the social contract. Martin thus corroborates the report of Glaucon in Book II of the Republic (358e–9a, Bloom translation):

They say that doing injustice is naturally good, and suffering injustice bad, but that the bad in suffering injustice far exceeds the good in doing it; so that, when they do injustice to one another and suffer it and taste of both, it seems profitable – to those who are not able to escape the one and choose the other – to set down a compact among themselves (ξυνθέσθαι ἀλλήλοις) neither to do injustice nor to suffer it.

The thing is, Glaucon wants Socrates to refute this argument. He does, and Glaucon concludes that injustice is no more naturally good than an unhealthy body. This is in Book IV (445a–b):

If life doesn’t seem livable with the body’s nature corrupted, not even with every sort of food and drink and every sort of wealth and every sort of rule, will it then be livable when the nature of that very thing by which we live is confused and corrupted, even if a man does whatever else he might want except that which will rid him of vice and injustice and will enable him to acquire justice and virtue?

That’s Plato, expressing his thoughts through the words of his characters. As for Aristotle, his thoughts on justice are in our next readings; at the moment, I have no memory of them from college.

I would observe for now that Miss Manners’s “basic bargain of civilization” can be made only by people who are already civilized to some degree. You can make a deal only with people who already have something in common with you – and who know it. It will never occur to solitary animals that they might be better off in a pack. In the article on sociality, Wikipedia has a sentence,

Sociality is a survival response to evolutionary pressures.

The “pressures” here are metaphorical, as is the “response.” No individual animal is deciding to socialize; rather, animals that naturally socialize may reproduce themselves better than those that don’t. As Yuval Harari says in Sapiens,

Male chimps cannot gather in a constitutional assembly to abolish the office of alpha male and declare that from here on out all chimps are to be treated as equals …

In contrast, ever since the Cognitive Revolution, Sapiens have been able to change their behaviour quickly, transmitting new behaviours to future generations without any need of genetic or environmental change.

I have already looked at this in “Law and History” and again in “On Being Human in the Age of Humanity.” I would add now that we can recognize in nature “a survival response to evolutionary pressures,” only because we have the freedom to respond to the pressures that we face in our lives.

It may worth adding also that Aristotle is a biologist, as Gerard J. Hughes points out in The Routledge Guidebook to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (2013):

The view most popularly ascribed to Aristotle is that he rejected Plato’s ‘Theory of Forms’ … This view is a gross oversimplification … Still, there is an important truth behind the oversimplification. The clue lies in Aristotle’s interest in biology, which perhaps had been first aroused by his parents with their medical background and practice. Much of the research done by Aristotle and his students consisted in the meticulous examination and classification of animals, fish and insects, and in the attempt to explain why they were as they were, and why they behaved as they behaved. Aristotle was convinced that the explanations were to be found not in some super-sensible world of Platonic Forms, but in the internal organization of the organisms themselves.

Like Plato, he believes that ethics must be rooted in a view of the human soul. But unlike Plato, his conception of what a soul is derives in the first instance from biology, rather than from religious views about the incarnation and reincarnation of a disembodied true self. And this difference has profound implications for morality.

We should remember that biology is not one science for all time.

Aristotle’s Repute

In the Wikipedia passage that I quoted at top of this post, the words “widely considered” are given no support, and this is why I added the question about them.

If the Ethics were indeed “widely considered one of the most important works of philosophy,” then I would expect most philosophy undergraduates to read it today. All freshmen at St John’s College read and discuss the whole of the Ethics over the course of three weeks, in six two-hour seminars. In my day, I believe we read most of the Ethics, for only five seminars. Such an experience is still no doubt unusual.

Here, for example, are the “Required courses” for the “Philosophy Concentration” at Harvard University. I imagine they are typical.

1. One course in each of the following four areas, taken by the end of the first term of senior year and passed with a grade of C– or better:
   1. Logic.
   2. Contemporary metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language.
   3. Contemporary ethics, political philosophy, aesthetics.
   4. History of philosophy.
2. Tutorials: Two courses. See item 2 below.
3. Five additional courses in philosophy.

By making the one choice to attend St John’s, I avoided having to choose courses each semester. I feel as if I dodged a bullet, but others may prefer to have courses on the specialized topics that their professors are pursuing for the sake of publishing new research.

During the current semester (fall 2023) in the philosophy department at Harvard, as far as I can tell, your one course in history of philosophy can be PHIL 126s, the Philosophy of Mary Shepard. It seems just possible that somebody could make a philosophical study of Mary Shepard (1909–2000), illustrator of Mary Poppins stories. Probably the Harvard course is on Mary Shepherd (1777–1847), Scottish philosopher; her Wikipedia article twice spells her married name as Shepard, although the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy does not suggest this option. According to the Institute for the Study of Scottish Philosophy at the University of Sioux Falls, South Dakota,

Since [1848], however, Shepherd’s insightful work has been unjustly neglected. There are as yet no scholarly modern editions of her books, and very little secondary literature on her work. Fortunately, this is starting to change, as historians of philosophy begin to attend to the works of the many women philosophers who have been written out of history.

Perhaps Harvard University is part of this change. Meanwhile, the University seems to write Aristotle out of history. It has philosophy courses on Bernard Williams (1929–2003) and Marcel Proust (1871–1922), but none on Aristotle or his teacher Plato. Perhaps one will hear about those old guys in one of the following:

• Introduction to Greek and Roman Philosophy (PHIL 7);
• Morality and the Good Life: An Introduction to Ethics (PHIL 14);
• Human Ethics: A Brief History (PHIL 18);
• Happiness (GENED 1025).

As a philosophy major at Catholic University, perhaps you would read some of the Ethics in one of your twelve required courses:

302 – Introductory Logic
309A – Theories of Ethics
313A Philosophy of Human Nature or 331A – Philosophy of Knowledge
353 – History of Ancient Philosophy
354 – History of Medieval Philosophy
355 – Metaphysics I
356 – Metaphysics II
453 – History of Modern Philosophy
454 – Contemporary Philosophy
455 – Junior Seminar
456 – Senior Seminar
Philosophy Elective (see below)

Even if most universities neglect Aristotle, the Ethics may in fact be one of the most important works of philosophy. One may demonstrate this as Wikipedians have, by mentioning Aristotle’s influence on Thomas Aquinas and listing some people, born in the first half of the 20th century, whose work concerns virtue ethics. That Aristotle is widely considered to be important is a different claim, and I don’t think Wikipedians have justified it. In the future they may – we may – justify it. Meanwhile, the online encyclopedia does cite a 2021 article called “Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Protestantism”; however, the article is in Academia Letters, whose standards for publication are unclear.

I don’t mean to be dissing Wikipedia. One has to learn to watch out for unjustified claims everywhere. These may be more dangerous, and less easily corrected, on for-profit social media such as Facebook and the former Twitter.

Meanwhile, evidence for the importance of Aristotle may be found in the Washington Post article about Paul Fussell that I already mentioned, “A Class Critic Takes Aim at America” (September 28, 1982), where Curt Suplee writes:

Fussell …

• Claims “The Boy Scout Handbook” is “among the very few remaining popular repositories of something like classical ethics, deriving from Aristotle and Cicero” …

Contents and Summary

• Chapter VI = Chapter 12. Pleasure and pain in social intercourse.
  • People may be
    • οἳ ἄρεσκοι (“the obsequious” or perhaps complaisant), seeking never to cause pain (§ vi.1);
    • οἱ δύσκολοι καὶ δυσέριδες (the surly and quarrelsome), who don’t care (§ vi.2).

    They are of blameworthy habit.

  • There must be a praiseworthy habit, of correctly
    • approving and
    • disapproving (§ vi.3).

    It has no name, but is like friendship (§ vi.4),
    except it is without passion (πάθη),
    namely feeling affection (στέργειν).
    The person in question

    • is the same with everybody,
      distinguishing only between
      • friend in the broader sense (συνήθης) and
      • stranger (ὀθνεῖος) (§ vi.5);
    • is guided by
      • beauty (τὸ καλόν) and
      • expediency (τὸ συμφέρον, § vi.6);
    • disapproves of pleasures that
      • to himself are harmful, or not beautiful;
      • to the other are disgraceful, if opposing them is not too painful (§ vi.7);
    • distinguishes also social classes;
    • engages in delayed gratification (§ vi.8).
  • Of the other people,
    • the pleaser is
      • ἄρεσκος (no ulterior motive),
      • κόλαξ (does it for money);
    • the disapprover (ὁ δυσχεραίνων) is
      • δύσκολος,
      • δύσερις (§ vi.9).
• Chapter VII = Chapter 13. Veracity and mendacity in social intercourse.
  • We take up another unnamed virtue of social intercourse,
    • to better know τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦθος,
    • to confirm that virtues are means (§ vii.1).
  • Concerning truth and falseness, there are
    • the boaster (ὁ ἀλαζὼν, § vii.2),
    • the self-depreciator or “ironist” (ὁ εἴρων, § vii.3),
    • the “straightforward sort” (αὐθέκαστός τις), who tells it like it is (ἀληθευτικὸς, § vii.4).
  • When acting with no ulterior motive, each
    • is such as he says and does, and
    • lives that way (§ vii.5).
  • We shall review the possibilities.
    • The lie is wicked and blameworthy;
    • the truth is beautiful and praiseworthy.
    • The sincere person (ὁ ἀληθευτικὸς) is medial and praised;
    • the liar
      • in either sense is blamed,
      • more in the case of the boaster (§ vii.6).
  • The truth-teller.
    • We are looking only at the one who is habitually so (ἀληθεύει τῷ τὴν ἕξιν τοιοῦτος εἶναι § vii.7).
    • The lover of truth (ὁ φιλαλήθης)
      • is decent (ἐπιεικὴς);
      • being truthful when it doesn’t matter, will be so when it does (§ vii.8);
      • will understate, if anything, rather than exaggerate (§ vii.9).
  • The boaster.
    • The one with no reason
      • seems wicked,
      • is more foolish than bad (§ vii.10).
    • The one who does it
      • for reputation or honor is not that blameworthy;
      • for money, is worse (§ vii.11).
    • He is so,
      • not in capacity,
      • but in choice, by habit.
    • The liar tells a lie
      • for itself,
      • for reputation,
      • for profit (§ vii.12).
    • The boaster pretends,
      • for glory, to what is praised and admired;
      • for profit, to what is useful and fakeable: being a seer, a sophist, or a medical doctor (§ vii.13).
  • The “ironist.”
    • He doesn’t like ostentation.
    • He may,
      • like Socrates, disown great things (§ vii.14);
      • like the Spartans, disown small things, thus being ostentatious (§ vii.15).
    • Moderation here is OK (§ vii.16).
  • The boaster
    • is worse than the ironist,
    • thus seems to be the opposite of the sincere (§ vii.17).
• Chapter VIII = Chapter 14. Playfulness in social intercourse.
  • Even in amusing ourselves, it matters
    • what we say,
    • what we listen to,
    • whom we are with (§ viii.1).
  • This it is possible to exceed or fall short of a mean (§ viii.2). Those who
    • exceed are buffoons (βωμολόχοι) and vulgar (φορτικοί);
    • fall short are boorish (ἄγροικοι) and morose (σκληροὶ);
    • get it right are witty, versatile (εὐτράπελοι) – “full of good turns” (εὔτροποι), as it were, for we judge characters (τὰ ἤθη), like bodies, by their motions (§ viii.3).
  • Wittiness.
    • It’s not just buffoonery, though this may not be recognized (§ viii.4).
    • It involves tactfulness or dexterity (ἡ ἐπιδεξιότης), saying, and allowing to be said, only what is suitable for the decent (ἐπιεικής), liberal (ἐλευθέριος) man (§ viii.5).
    • See this by comparing old (crude) and new (refined) comedy (§ viii.6).
    • Is mocking well (τὸν εὖ σκώπτοντα) to be defined
      • as what
        • is not unsuitable for the liberal man,
        • does not pain the hearer, or even
        • gives him pleasure, or
      • not at all (§ viii.7)?
    • It’s the same as for what is to be heard,
      since what one tolerates hearing about,
      one may do (§ viii.8).
    • One will not do everything.
      • Mockery is vilification.
      • Some vilification is outlawed.
      • Therefore perhaps some mockery should be (§ viii.9).
      • The cultivated liberal (ὁ χαρίεις καὶ ἐλευθέριος) outlaws it for himself.
  • Summary.
    • The one in the middle is tactful ἐπιδέξιος) or witty (εὐτράπελος).
    • The buffoon (ὁ βωμολόχος) can’t resist a joke.
    • The boor (ὁ ἄγροικος) is useless (§ viii.10),
      since we gotta play around sometimes (§ viii.11).
  • General summary.
    There are three means involving speech and act in communal life.
    • One concerns truth.
    • Two concern pleasure:
      • in amusement,
      • generally (§ viii.12).
• Chapter IX = Chapter 15. Modesty or shame (ἡ αἰδώς).
  • It’s not a virtue, because,
    • more than a habit,
      it is a fear of disrepute,
      thus a passion (§ ix.1), because
      • bodily:
        it causes blushing,
        as fear of danger causes blanching (§ ix.2).
  • Not the old, but the young should be modest,
    because they are otherwise ruled by passion (§ ix.3).
  • Not for the decent (ἐπιεικής) is shame (ἡ αἰσχύνη),
    if this is for wicked things,
    which are not to be done (§ ix.4),
    be they that in truth or repute (§ ix.5).
  • Shame is for voluntary acts,
    and the decent man (ὁ ἐπιεικὴς) never does wicked things (§ ix.6).
  • Hypothetical shame may be decent.
    Shamelessly doing shameful things is wicked, but
    shamefully doing them is not decent (§ ix.7),
  • any more than self-restraint (ἡ ἐγκράτεια) is a virtue.
    More on that later;
    meanwhile, justice (§ ix.8).

[1126^b]

Chapter VI

Chapter 12

§ vi.1

ἐν δὲ

• ταῖς ὁμιλίαις
• καὶ τῷ συζῆν
• καὶ
  • λόγων καὶ
  • πραγμάτων

  κοινωνεῖν

• οἳ μὲν ἄρεσκοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι,
  οἱ
  • πάντα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ
  • οὐθὲν ἀντιτείνοντες, ἀλλ᾽
  • οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἄλυποι τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν εἶναι·

§ vi.2

• οἱ δ᾽ ἐξ ἐναντίας τούτοις
  • πρὸς πάντα ἀντιτείνοντες καὶ
  • τοῦ λυπεῖν οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν φροντίζοντες

  δύσκολοι καὶ δυσέριδες καλοῦνται.

§ vi.3

ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι ἕξεις ψεκταί εἰσιν,
οὐκ ἄδηλον,
καὶ ὅτι ἡ μέση τούτων ἐπαινετή,
καθ᾽ ἣν

• ἀποδέξεται
  • ἃ δεῖ καὶ
  • ὡς δεῖ,

  ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

• δυσχερανεῖ·

§ vi.4

ὄνομα δ᾽ οὐκ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῇ τι,
ἔοικε δὲ μάλιστα φιλίᾳ.

§ vi.5

διαφέρει δὲ τῆς φιλίας,
ὅτι ἄνευ

• πάθους ἐστὶ καὶ
• τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὁμιλεῖ·

• οὐ γὰρ τῷ
  • φιλεῖν ἢ
  • ἐχθαίρειν

  ἀποδέχεται ἕκαστα ὡς δεῖ,

• ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι.

ὁμοίως γὰρ πρὸς

• ἀγνῶτας καὶ
• γνωρίμους καὶ
• συνήθεις καὶ
• ἀσυνήθεις

αὐτὸ ποιήσει,
πλὴν καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις ὡς ἁρμόζει·

• οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως προσήκει
  • συνήθων καὶ
  • ὀθνείων

  φροντίζειν,

• οὐδ᾽ αὖ λυπεῖν.

§ vi.6

• καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται ὅτι ὡς δεῖ ὁμιλήσει,
• ἀναφέρων δὲ πρὸς
  • τὸ καλὸν καὶ
  • τὸ συμφέρον

  στοχάσεται τοῦ

  • μὴ λυπεῖν ἢ
  • συνηδύνειν.

§ vi.7

ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ περὶ

• ἡδονὰς καὶ
• λύπας

εἶναι τὰς ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις γινομένας·

τούτων δ᾽ ὅσας μὲν αὐτῷ ἐστὶ

• μὴ καλὸν ἢ
• βλαβερὸν

συνηδύνειν,

• δυσχερανεῖ, καὶ
• προαιρήσεται λυπεῖν·

κἂν τῷ ποιοῦντι δ᾽

• ἀσχημοσύνην φέρῃ,
  καὶ ταύτην μὴ μικράν, ἢ
• βλάβην,

ἡ δ᾽ ἐναντίωσις μικρὰν λύπην,

• οὐκ ἀποδέξεται
• ἀλλὰ δυσχερανεῖ.

§ vi.8

διαφερόντως δ᾽ ὁμιλήσει

• τοῖς ἐν ἀξιώμασι καὶ
• τοῖς τυχοῦσι, [1127^a]

καὶ

• μᾶλλον ἢ
• ἧττον γνωρίμοις,

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας διαφοράς,
ἑκάστοις ἀπονέμων τὸ πρέπον,
καὶ

• καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μὲν αἱρούμενος τὸ συνηδύνειν,
• λυπεῖν δ᾽ εὐλαβούμενος,

τοῖς δ᾽ ἀποβαίνουσιν,
ἐὰν ᾖ μείζω,
συνεπόμενος,
λέγω δὲ

• τῷ καλῷ καὶ
• τῷ συμφέροντι.

καὶ ἡδονῆς δ᾽ ἕνεκα τῆς εἰσαῦθις μεγάλης
μικρὰ λυπήσει.

§ vi.9

• ὁ μὲν οὖν μέσος τοιοῦτός ἐστιν,
  οὐκ ὠνόμασται δέ·
• τοῦ δὲ συνηδύνοντος
  • ὁ μὲν τοῦ ἡδὺς εἶναι στοχαζόμενος
    μὴ διά τι ἄλλο
    ἄρεσκος,
  • ὁ δ᾽ ὅπως ὠφέλειά τις αὑτῷ γίνηται εἰς
    • χρήματα καὶ
    • ὅσα διὰ χρημάτων,

    κόλαξ·

• ὁ δὲ πᾶσι δυσχεραίνων εἴρηται ὅτι
  • δύσκολος καὶ
  • δύσερις.

ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ φαίνεται τὰ ἄκρα ἑαυτοῖς διὰ τὸ ἀνώνυμον εἶναι τὸ μέσον.

Chapter VII

Chapter 13

§ vii.1

περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ σχεδόν ἐστι καὶ ἡ τῆς

• ἀλαζονείας καὶ
• εἰρωνείας

μεσότης·

ἀνώνυμος δὲ καὶ αὐτή.

ἐν δὴ τῷ συζῆν

• οἱ μὲν πρὸς

  • ἡδονὴν καὶ
  • λύπην

  ὁμιλοῦντες εἴρηνται,

• περὶ δὲ τῶν

  • ἀληθευόντων τε καὶ
  • ψευδομένων

  εἴπωμεν ὁμοίως ἐν

  • λόγοις καὶ
  • πράξεσι καὶ
  • τῷ προσποιήματι.

§ vii.2

δοκεῖ δὴ

• ὁ μὲν ἀλαζὼν προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι
  • καὶ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων
  • καὶ μειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει,

§ vii.3

• ὁ δὲ εἴρων ἀνάπαλιν
  • ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ
  • ἐλάττω ποιεῖν,

§ vii.4

• ὁ δὲ μέσος αὐθέκαστός τις ὢν ἀληθευτικὸς
  • καὶ τῷ βίῳ
  • καὶ τῷ λόγῳ,

  τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ὁμολογῶν εἶναι περὶ αὑτόν,
  καὶ

  • οὔτε μείζω
  • οὔτε ἐλάττω.

§ vii.5

ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἕκαστα

• καὶ ἕνεκά τινος ποιεῖν
• καὶ μηδενός.

§ vii.6

καθ᾽ αὑτὸ δὲ

• τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν,
• τὸ δ᾽ ἀληθὲς καλὸν καὶ ἐπαινετόν.

οὕτω δὲ καὶ

• ὁ μὲν ἀληθευτικὸς μέσος ὢν ἐπαινετός,
• οἱ δὲ ψευδόμενοι
  • ἀμφότεροι μὲν ψεκτοί,
  • μᾶλλον δ᾽ ὁ ἀλαζών.

περὶ ἑκατέρου δ᾽ εἴπωμεν,
πρότερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀληθευτικοῦ.

§ vii.7

• οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς ὁμολογίαις ἀληθεύοντος λέγομεν,
• οὐδ᾽ ὅσα εἰς
  • ἀδικίαν ἢ
  • δικαιοσύνην

  συντείνει [1127^b]
  (ἄλλης γὰρ ἂν εἴη ταῦτ᾽ ἀρετῆς),

§ vii.8

δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι.

ὁ γὰρ φιλαλήθης, καὶ

ὡς γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τὸ ψεῦδος εὐλαβήσεται,
ὅ γε καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ηὐλαβεῖτο·

ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἐπαινετός.

§ vii.9

ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀποκλίνει·

ἐμμελέστερον γὰρ φαίνεται
διὰ τὸ ἐπαχθεῖς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς εἶναι.

§ vii.10

ὁ δὲ μείζω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιούμενος
μηδενὸς ἕνεκα

• φαύλῳ μὲν ἔοικεν (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔχαιρε τῷ ψεύδει),
• μάταιος δὲ φαίνεται μᾶλλον ἢ κακός·

§ vii.11

εἰ δ᾽ ἕνεκά τινος,

• ὁ μὲν
  • δόξης ἢ
  • τιμῆς

  οὐ λίαν ψεκτός,
  †ὡς ὁ ἀλαζών,†

• ὁ δὲ
  • ἀργυρίου, ἢ
  • ὅσα εἰς ἀργύριον,

  ἀσχημονέστερος

§ vii.12

• (οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζών,
• ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει·

κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν γὰρ καὶ
τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι ἀλαζών ἐστιν)·

ὥσπερ καὶ ψεύστης

• ὃ μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων,
• ὃ δὲ
  • δόξης ὀρεγόμενος ἢ
  • κέρδους.

§ vii.13

• οἱ μὲν οὖν δόξης
  χάριν ἀλαζονευόμενοι
  τὰ τοιαῦτα προσποιοῦνται ἐφ᾽ οἷς
  • ἔπαινος ἢ
  • εὐδαιμονισμός,
• οἱ δὲ κέρδους,
  ὧν
  • καὶ ἀπόλαυσίς ἐστι τοῖς πέλας
  • καὶ διαλαθεῖν ἔστι μὴ ὄντα,
  οἷον

  • μάντιν
  • σοφὸν
  • ἰατρόν.

διὰ τοῦτο οἱ πλεῖστοι

• προσποιοῦνται τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ
• ἀλαζονεύονται·

ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρημένα.

§ vii.14

οἱ δ᾽ εἴρωνες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον λέγοντες
χαριέστεροι μὲν τὰ ἤθη φαίνονται·

• οὐ γὰρ κέρδους ἕνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν,
• ἀλλὰ φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρόν·

μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ ἔνδοξα ἀπαρνοῦνται,
οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης ἐποίει.

§ vii.15

οἱ δὲ τὰ

• μικρὰ καὶ
• φανερὰ

προσποιούμενοι

• βαυκοπανοῦργοι λέγονται καὶ
• εὐκαταφρονητότεροί εἰσιν·

καὶ
ἐνίοτε ἀλαζονεία φαίνεται,
οἷον ἡ τῶν Λακώνων ἐσθής·

• καὶ γὰρ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ
• καὶ ἡ λίαν ἔλλειψις

ἀλαζονικόν.

§ vii.16

οἱ δὲ

• μετρίως χρώμενοι τῇ εἰρωνείᾳ καὶ
• περὶ τὰ μὴ
  • λίαν ἐμποδὼν καὶ
  • φανερὰ

  εἰρωνευόμενοι

χαρίεντες φαίνονται.

§ vii.17

ἀντικεῖσθαι δ᾽ ὁ ἀλαζὼν φαίνεται τῷ ἀληθευτικῷ·

χείρων γάρ.

Chapter VIII

Chapter 14

§ viii.1

• οὔσης δὲ καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ,
• καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ διαγωγῆς μετὰ παιδιᾶς,

δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἶναι ὁμιλία τις ἐμμελής, [1128^a]

• καὶ οἷα δεῖ λέγειν
• καὶ ὥς,

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκούειν.

διοίσει δὲ καὶ τὸ

• ἐν τοιούτοις λέγειν ἢ
• τοιούτων ἀκούειν.

§ viii.2

δῆλον δ᾽ ὡς καὶ περὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἔστιν

• ὑπερβολή τε καὶ
• ἔλλειψις

τοῦ μέσου.

§ viii.3

• οἱ μὲν οὖν τῷ γελοίῳ ὑπερβάλλοντες
  • βωμολόχοι

  δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ

  • φορτικοί,
  • γλιχόμενοι πάντως τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ
  • μᾶλλον στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ γέλωτα ποιῆσαι ἢ τοῦ
    • λέγειν εὐσχήμονα καὶ
    • μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον·
• οἱ δὲ
  • μήτ᾽ αὐτοὶ ἂν εἰπόντες μηδὲν γελοῖον
  • τοῖς τε λέγουσι δυσχεραίνοντες
     
  • ἄγροικοι καὶ
  • σκληροὶ

  δοκοῦσιν εἶναι.

• οἱ δ᾽ ἐμμελῶς παίζοντες
  εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται,
  οἷον εὔτροποι·

τοῦ γὰρ ἤθους αἱ τοιαῦται δοκοῦσι κινήσεις εἶναι,

• ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ σώματα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων κρίνεται,
• οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἤθη.

§ viii.4

• ἐπιπολάζοντος δὲ τοῦ γελοίου,
• καὶ τῶν πλείστων χαιρόντων
  • τῇ παιδιᾷ καὶ
  • τῷ σκώπτειν

  μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ,

καὶ οἱ βωμολόχοι
εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται
ὡς χαρίεντες·

ὅτι δὲ διαφέρουσι,
καὶ οὐ μικρόν,
ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον.

§ viii.5

τῇ μέσῃ δ᾽ ἕξει οἰκεῖον καὶ ἡ ἐπιδεξιότης ἐστίν·

τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιδεξίου ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα

• λέγειν καὶ
• ἀκούειν

οἷα τῷ

• ἐπιεικεῖ καὶ
• ἐλευθερίῳ

ἁρμόττει·

ἔστι γάρ τινα πρέποντα τῷ τοιούτῳ

• λέγειν ἐν παιδιᾶς μέρει καὶ
• ἀκούειν,

καὶ

• ἡ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου παιδιὰ διαφέρει τῆς τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους,
• καὶ πεπαιδευμένου καὶ ἀπαιδεύτου.

§ viii.6

ἴδοι δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ ἐκ τῶν κωμῳδιῶν

• τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ
• τῶν καινῶν·

• τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἦν γελοῖον ἡ αἰσχρολογία,
• τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον ἡ ὑπόνοια·

διαφέρει δ᾽ οὐ μικρὸν ταῦτα πρὸς εὐσχημοσύνην.

§ viii.7

πότερον οὖν τὸν εὖ σκώπτοντα ὁριστέον

• τῷ λέγειν μὴ ἀπρεπῆ ἐλευθερίῳ, ἢ
• τῷ
  • μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν ἀκούοντα ἢ καὶ
  • τέρπειν;

ἢ καὶ τό γε τοιοῦτον ἀόριστον;

ἄλλο γὰρ ἄλλῳ

• μισητόν τε καὶ
• ἡδύ.

§ viii.8

τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ ἀκούσεται·

ἃ γὰρ ὑπομένει ἀκούων,
ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν δοκεῖ.

§ viii.9

οὐ δὴ πᾶν ποιήσει·

τὸ γὰρ σκῶμμα λοιδόρημά τι ἐστίν,
οἱ δὲ νομοθέται ἔνια λοιδορεῖν κωλύουσιν·

ἔδει δ᾽ ἴσως καὶ σκώπτειν.

§ viii.10

ὁ δὴ

• χαρίεις καὶ
• ἐλευθέριος

οὕτως ἕξει,
οἷον νόμος ὢν ἑαυτῷ.

• τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μέσος ἐστίν,
  • εἴτ᾽ ἐπιδέξιος
  • εἴτ᾽ εὐτράπελος

  λέγεται.

• ὁ δὲ βωμολόχος ἥττων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ
  • οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ
  • οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων

  ἀπεχόμενος εἰ γέλωτα ποιήσει,
  καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων [1128^b]
  ὧν οὐδὲν ἂν εἴποι ὁ χαρίεις,
  ἔνια δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἀκούσαι.

• ὁ δ᾽ ἄγροικος εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ὁμιλίας ἀχρεῖος· οὐθὲν γὰρ συμβαλλόμενος
  πᾶσι δυσχεραίνει.

§ viii.11

δοκεῖ δὲ

• ἡ ἀνάπαυσις καὶ
• ἡ παιδιὰ

ἐν τῷ βίῳ εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον.

§ viii.12

τρεῖς οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεσότητες,
εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι περὶ

• λόγων τινῶν καὶ
• πράξεων

κοινωνίαν.

διαφέρουσι δ᾽ ὅτι

• ἣ μὲν περὶ ἀλήθειάν ἐστιν,
• αἳ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ.
  τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν
  • ἣ μὲν ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς,
  • ἣ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὁμιλίαις.

Chapter IX

Chapter 15

§ ix.1

ὁρίζεται γοῦν φόβος τις ἀδοξίας,

§ ix.2

καὶ ἀποτελεῖται τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ παραπλήσιον·

• ἐρυθραίνονται γὰρ οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι,
• οἱ δὲ τὸν θάνατον φοβούμενοι ὠχριῶσιν.

σωματικὰ δὴ φαίνεταί πως εἶναι ἀμφότερα,
ὅπερ δοκεῖ

• πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ
• ἕξεως

εἶναι.

§ ix.3

• οὐ πάσῃ δ᾽ ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος ἁρμόζει,
• ἀλλὰ τῇ νέᾳ.

οἰόμεθα γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικούτους αἰδήμονας εἶναι
διὰ τὸ

• πάθει ζῶντας
  πολλὰ ἁμαρτάνειν,
• ὑπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ
  κωλύεσθαι·

καὶ

• ἐπαινοῦμεν τῶν μὲν νέων τοὺς αἰδήμονας,
• πρεσβύτερον δ᾽ οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν
  ὅτι αἰσχυντηλός·

οὐδὲν γὰρ οἰόμεθα δεῖν αὐτὸν πράττειν
ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνη.

§ ix.4

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσχύνη,
εἴπερ γίνεται ἐπὶ τοῖς φαύλοις
(οὐ γὰρ πρακτέον τὰ τοιαῦτα·

§ ix.5

εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶ

• τὰ μὲν κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν αἰσχρὰ
• τὰ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν,

οὐδὲν διαφέρει·

οὐδέτερα γὰρ πρακτέα,
ὥστ᾽ οὐκ αἰσχυντέον)·

§ ix.6

φαύλου δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πράττειν
τι τῶν αἰσχρῶν.

• τὸ δ᾽ οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστ᾽ εἰ πράξαι τι τῶν τοιούτων αἰσχύνεσθαι, καὶ
• διὰ τοῦτ᾽ οἴεσθαι ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι,

ἄτοπον·

• ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις γὰρ ἡ αἰδώς,
• ἑκὼν δ᾽ ὁ ἐπιεικὴς οὐδέποτε πράξει τὰ φαῦλα.

§ ix.7

εἴη δ᾽ ἂν ἡ αἰδὼς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἐπιεικές·

εἰ γὰρ πράξαι,
αἰσχύνοιτ᾽ ἄν·

οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς.

φαῦλον καὶ

• τὸ μὴ αἰδεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσχρὰ πράττειν,

οὐδὲν μᾶλλον
τὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττοντα αἰσχύνεσθαι
ἐπιεικές.

§ ix.8

οὐκ ἔστι δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή,
ἀλλά τις μικτή·

δειχθήσεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον.

νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἴπωμεν.