Polytropy

With this third reading (of chapters vii–x) in Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics, we complete the discussion of continence and incontinence, hardness and softness. An explicit notice at the end of chapter x tells us so.

The remaining reading (chapters xi–xiv) will take up pleasure and pain as such. They are already our subject now, as being the objects of the desire and aversion that continence contains. English lets us spell out the meaning of continence that way, but it is slightly misleading. Instead of continence, self-mastery may be better as a translation of ἐγκράτεια; for it is observed now, in § vii.4, that

• ἐγκράτεια is better than καρτερία “hardness, endurance,” just as
• ruling (κρατεῖν) is better than resisting (ἀντέχειν).

There must be audiences who appreciate that profound insight. Perhaps those audiences include people who train in martial arts. Me, I have to ask whether Aristotle’s distinction between endurance and self-mastery is the one seen in some of the 101 Zen Stories of Senzaki and Reps, particularly 6, “No Loving-Kindness,” and 14, “Muddy Road.” (The titles of the stories link to transcriptions found on the website of martial artist Ashida Kim, and the transcriptions seem to be faithful. Another site currently has transcriptions of the first 55 of the 101 stories, but for example “No Loving-Kindness” is missing the hyphen in the title and the last sentence of the story itself.)

The difference of self-mastery from endurance would seem less important than the difference from obstinacy. Aristotle works out the difference in §§ xi.1 and 2. Obstinacy is the habit of the ἰσχυρογνώμων; there is a Greek noun for the habit, ἰσχυρογνωμοσύνη, but Aristotle does not use it.

• The continent sticks by the right choice;
• the obstinate, or stubborn, by whatever his (or perhaps her) choice happens to be.

Distinguishing between these types is not a superficial matter.

There is a corresponding way, which is not incontinence, of not sticking by a wrong choice.

Aristotle somehow echoes what Socrates taught, as to Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic: if you want to rule at all, you have to rule yourself.

Why do even this?

A Nazirite does it, as I learned when reading the Monk’s Tale among Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales, in August of 2021. Like Chaucer himself, the Monk recounts a number of stories. They are all tragedies though, and one of them belongs to Samson (spelled Sampson), who, as a Nazirite, abstains from wine and haircuts. The Monk, that is, Chaucer, is following Judges 13–6, which I included from the Wyclif translation in my post of the Tale.

I am reminded of all of that by a newsletter of Rabbi Danya Ruttenberg called “Taking a Holy Time Out,” dated February 26, 2024. The rules for being a Nazirite are to avoid the grape, the razor, and the corpse, according to Numbers 6:

1 And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying,
2 Speak unto the children of Israel, and say unto them, When either man or woman shall separate themselves to vow a vow of a Nazarite, to separate themselves unto the Lord:
3 He shall separate himself from wine and strong drink, and shall drink no vinegar of wine, or vinegar of strong drink, neither shall he drink any liquor of grapes, nor eat moist grapes, or dried.
4 All the days of his separation shall he eat nothing that is made of the vine tree, from the kernels even to the husk.
5 All the days of the vow of his separation there shall no rasor come upon his head: until the days be fulfilled, in the which he separateth himself unto the Lord, he shall be holy, and shall let the locks of the hair of his head grow.
6 All the days that he separateth himself unto the Lord he shall come at no dead body.

When your days of separation are over, you shave your head at “the door of the tabernacle of the congregation” (verse 18).

The Rabbi emphasizes that anybody can submit to the discipline of the Nazirite, and anybody may want to:

There are times when it may be Correct to take a break from the things we use to numb out – intoxicants, be they alcohol, drugs, (or, depending on your drug of choice, screens, sex, spending, or something else) – so that we can better hear ourselves, and connect to the Big Bigness that surrounds and binds us all.

Those words may somehow be compatible with the Philosopher’s, though addressed to a different audience, particularly one that includes women. Apparently because of the rules about hair, the Rabbi says a bit later,

it may be especially useful to get a reality check on our culture’s expectations about appearance, beauty standards, body image, how we have been showing up in the world and why, how much energy we put into the artifice – and what might happen if we let go of that to focus on the more urgent, primal matters deep within.

I suppose it matters to Aristotle what other people think for at least three reasons:

1. They may have the truth.
2. Virtue tends to involve our relations with them.
3. His listeners care about what other people think of them.

The last reason in particular may explain this in § ix.4, here in Rackham’s translation:

In fact, not everyone whose conduct is guided by pleasure is either profligate and base, or unrestrained, but only those who yield to disgraceful pleasures.

The disgraceful, or shameful, is just what most people think it is.

A point that could use further study is the contrast between §§ vii.5 and viii.3. Here is the latter, again in Rackham’s translation:

That Unrestraint is not strictly a vice (though it is perhaps vice in a sense), is clear; for Unrestraint acts against deliberate choice, Vice in accordance with it. But nevertheless in the actions that result from it it resembles Vice: just as Demodocus wrote of the people of Miletus –

Milesians are no fools, ’tis true,
But yet they act as fools would do.

Similarly the unrestrained are not unjust, but they do unjust things.

It would seem to me, if you go on being unrestrained, incontinent, you become unjust. This may then explain the earlier passage:

One who is deficient in resistance to pains that most men withstand with success, is soft or luxurious (for Luxury is a kind of Softness): such a man lets his cloak trail on the ground to escape the fatigue and trouble of lifting it, or feigns sickness, not seeing that to counterfeit misery is to be miserable.

Acting lazy is not exactly being lazy, but if you do it too much, you will be lazy, if only because you have lost the strength to be anything else.

I was once told a story of an American who avoided Vietnam by feigning schizophrenia, but ended up being schizophrenic.

Contents and Outline

• Chapter VII
• Chapter 8
  • Three ways with
    • touch and
    • taste.

    With them are

    • pleasures and pains,
    • desires and aversions,

    which are the subject of

    • license and
    • moderation.

    You can:

    1. By what most master, be mastered,
       • incontinent (ἀκρατής) with pleasure,
       • soft (μαλακός) with pain.
    2. Of what masters most, be master,
       • continent (ἐγκρατής) with pleasure,
       • hard (enduring, firm, καρτερικός) with pain.
    3. Be of middling habit (ἕξις, § vii.1).
  • Three ways with the
    • unnecessary, or
    • necessary only to a certain extent

    of the

    • pleasures,
    • desires,
    • pains:

    The one who:

    1. Chooses, for their own sake:
       1. An excess of pleasures, is
          • licentious (ἀκόλαστος),
          • impenitent (ἀμεταμέλητος),
          • incurable (ἀνίατος).
       2. A deficiency, the opposite.
       3. A middle amount, temperate (σώφρων).
    2. Flees bodily pain is likewise (§ vii.2) –
       though this is rather
       a form of softness (τὸ μὲν μαλακίας εἶδος).
    3. Does not choose may be led by
       • pleasure,
       • avoidance of pain of unsatisfied desire.
  • The licentious is worse than the incontinent.
    It is thought worse
    • to act shamefully while
      not (or little) desiring (ἐπιθυμῶν),
      than much so;
    • to strike a blow while
      not being enraged (ὀργιζόμενος)
      than being so.

    For, what if you were empassioned (§ vii.3)?

  • Continence is more to be chosen than endurance.
    Opposed are
    • the continent to the incontinent,
    • the firm to the soft,

    and they differ as victory does from not losing:

    • continence means overpowering,
    • enduring means resisting (§ vii.4).
  • The deficient regarding
    what the hoi polloi are able to resist is
    • soft (μαλακὸς)
    • delicate (τρυφῶν)

    (luxury being a kind of softness),
    e.g. whoever

    • lets his himation drag, or
    • imitates illness,

    not realizing that

    • acting wretched (ἄθλιος) is
    • being so (§ vii.5).
  • Likewise with
    • continence and
    • incontinence.

    When one is overcome by

    • pleasures and
    • pains,

    it’s striking (θαυμαστόν),

    • not when they are strong –
      here resistance is sympathetic, e.g. in
      • Philoctetes when snake-bit,
      • Cercyon,
      • Xenophantes,
        who couldn’t contain his laughter –
    • but when they are such as
      • the hoi polloi can resist, and
      • the fault is not in
        • race or
        • disease –

        as it is with e.g.

        • the soft Scythian kings,
        • females vis-à-vis males (§ vii.6).
  • The playful (ὁ παιδιώδης)
    • seems licentious,
    • is soft (§ vii.7).
  • Incontinence is [of two kinds]:
    1. Impetuosity (προπέτεια),
       when, without deliberating,
       you are led by passion, like the
       • keen (ὀξεῖς),
         because of speed (ταχυτής), or the
       • excitable (μελαγχολικοί),
         because of vehemence (σφοδρότης) –

       who

       • do not wait for reason, but
       • follow their imagination (φαντασία).
    2. Weakness (ἀσθένεια),
       when you deliberate,
       but are waylaid by passion.
  • Like e.g. anticipating being tickled,
    those “in advance”
    • προαισθόμενοι “perceiving,”
    • προϊδόντες “seeing,”
    • προεγείραντες “awakening”
      • themselves,
      • calculation,

    are not bested by passion, be it

    • pleasant or
    • painful (§ vii.8).
• Chapter VIII. Licence is worse than incontinence.
• Chapter 9
  • That is contrary to § ii.10.
    • License is
      • not regretted, even
      • not noticed as a vice, hence
      • not curable;
    • Incontinence is.

    Also:

    • The corruption (μοχθηρία) of the former
      is continuous, as in e.g.
      • dropsy (ὕδερος),
      • phthisis (φθίσις).
    • The latter is not, as in e.g.
      • epileptics (ἐπιληπτικοί, § viii.1).
  • Among the [incontinent],
    better off are the
    • impetuous (ἐκστατικοί) than
    • [the weak,] those who
      • can make plans, but
      • cannot stick to them –

      they are bested by a less passion,
      as if e.g. getting drunk on less wine
      then the hoi polloi (§ viii.2).

  • Incontinence is not a vice,
    except in a way,
    since it’s against choice (παρὰ προαίρεσιν).
    Thus the incontinent
    • are not unjust, but
    • do unjust things,

    as in e.g. what Demodocus said of the Milesians:

    • they’re not stupid, but
    • they act like it (§ viii.3).
  • The pursuit of bodily pleasures that are
    • excessive and
    • unreasonable

    is

    • by persuasion in the [licentious],
    • not in the [incontinent], who
      can easily be persuaded otherwise (εὐμετάπειστος).
  • The principle
    • is
      • destroyed by vice (μοχθηρία),
      • preserved by virtue;
    • is
      • what actions are for the sake of,
      • hypotheses in mathematics;
    • is in either case taught
      • not by reason,
      • but by virtue, be it
        • natural or
        • customary (§ viii.4).
  • The incontinent
    • is ruled by passion,
      • so as not to act by right reason, but
      • not so as to think one ought to be that way;
    • is better than the licentious;
    • is not simply base (φαῦλος), since he
    • preserves
      • principle, which is
      • the best thing;
    • is of habit (ἕξις) that is base, whereas
      his opposite’s is serious (σπουδαία, § viii.5).
• Chapter IX
• Chapter 10 The continent, simply, abides by
  • true reason,
  • right choice (§ ix.1).

  [There are two ways to deviate:

  • abiding by any choice;
  • not abiding by a bad one.]
  1. The ἰσχυρογνώμων “obstinate, stubborn”
     • is, to the continent,
       • similar, as is, e.g.
         • the prodigal to the liberal,
         • the reckless to the confident;
       • different in many ways:
         • the continent is
           • not changed by
             • passion and
             • desire, but
           • persuadable (εὔπειστος) [by reason];
         • the obstinate is
           • not persuadable by reason, when seizing desire;
           • usually led by pleasure (§ ix.2);
     • can be one of the
       • ἀμαθεῖς “ignorant,”
       • ἄγροικοι “boorish,”
       • ἰδιογνώμονες “opinionated” – these are
         • [led] by
           • pleasure, as of
             victory, when not being persuaded;
           • pain, as of
             having one’s opinions annulled;
         • more incontinent than continent (§ ix.3).
  2. Acting for pleasure is [bad] –
     • licentious,
     • base,
     • incontinent –

     only if the pleasure is shameful (αἰσχρά);
     e.g. for Neoptolemus,
     telling the truth was a noble (καλός) pleasure (§ ix.4).

• Chapter 11
  • The continent is a mean between
    the people of base habits (φαυλαὶ ἕξεις)
    who fail to abide by reason
    because they enjoy bodily pleasure
    • too much, namely the incontinent,
    • too little.

    The latter are rare, and so,

    • as temperance seems the sole contrary of licence,
    • so continence of incontinence (§ ix.5).
  • The continent and temperate are
    • similar for making (ποιεῖν) nothing
      • against reason
      • for pleasure;
    • different for respectively
      • having base desires (and not acting on them),
      • not having them (§ ix.6).
  • The incontinent and licentious are
    • similar for pursuing bodily pleasure,
    • different for respectively
      • not thinking they ought to,
      • so thinking (§ ix.7).
• Chapter X
  • The same person at the same time is
    • prudent and serious (σπουδαῖος), hence
    • not prudent and incontinent (§ x.1), although
    • prudent and clever (δεινός):
      • the prudent is
        • not only knowing,
        • but practical;
      • the incontinent is
        • impractical (§ x.2),
          • not as if
            • knowing and
            • contemplating,
          • but as if e.g.
            • asleep or
            • drunk;
        • half-wicked (ἡμιπόνηρος), for
          • knowing
            • what he makes and
            • why, but
          • being of decent choice
            (ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής);
        • not unjust, because
          not scheming –
          • the one does not stick to his plans,
          • the “melancholic” doesn’t make them;
        • like e.g. a city whose laws are
          • good, but
          • not obeyed;

          the wicked has bad laws (§ x.3).

  • Incontinence and continence are habits (ἕξεις)
    representing
    • less and
    • more

    consistency [with decisions]
    than most people are capable of.

  • More easily cured, among the incontinent, are
    • the “melancholic” than the one not abiding decisions;
    • the customarily (δι᾽ ἐθισμοῦ) than the naturally,
      since it’s easier to change custom (ἔθος) than nature,
      although even that is hard,
      because custom seems like nature,
      as e.g. Evenus says of practice (μελέτη, § x.4).
  • Thus the habits (ἕξεις), and their relations, of
    • ἐγκράτεια,
    • ἀκρασία,
    • καρτερία,
    • μαλακία (§ x.5).

[1150^a]

Chapter VII

Chapter 8

§ vii.1

περὶ δὲ τὰς δι᾽

• ἁφῆς καὶ
• γεύσεως

• • ἡδονὰς καὶ
  • λύπας καὶ
• • ἐπιθυμίας καὶ
  • φυγάς,

περὶ ἃς

• ἥ τε ἀκολασία καὶ
• ἡ σωφροσύνη

διωρίσθη πρότερον,

• ἔστι μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστε
  ἡττᾶσθαι καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ κρείττους,
• ἔστι δὲ
  κρατεῖν καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἥττους·

τούτων δ᾽

• ὁ μὲν περὶ ἡδονὰς ἀκρατὴς
• ὃ δ᾽ ἐγκρατής,
• ὁ δὲ περὶ λύπας μαλακὸς
• ὃ δὲ καρτερικός.

μεταξὺ δ᾽ ἡ τῶν πλείστων ἕξις,
κἂν εἰ ῥέπουσι μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰς χείρους.

§ vii.2

ἐπεὶ δ᾽

• ἔνιαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀναγκαῖαί εἰσιν
• αἳ δ᾽ οὔ, καὶ

μέχρι τινός,

• αἱ δ᾽ ὑπερβολαὶ οὔ,
• οὐδ᾽ αἱ ἐλλείψεις,

ὁμοίως δὲ

• καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει
• καὶ λύπας,

• ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδέων
  • †ἢ καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὰς†
  • ἢ διὰ προαίρεσιν,
     
  • δι᾽ αὐτὰς καὶ
  • μηδὲν δι᾽ ἕτερον ἀποβαῖνον,

  ἀκόλαστος·

ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοῦτον μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικόν,
ὥστ᾽ ἀνίατος·

ὁ γὰρ ἀμεταμέλητος ἀνίατος.

• ὁ δ᾽ ἐλλείπων ὁ ἀντικείμενος,
• ὁ δὲ μέσος σώφρων.

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ φεύγων τὰς σωματικὰς λύπας

• μὴ δι᾽ ἧτταν
• ἀλλὰ διὰ προαίρεσιν.

§ vii.3

τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων

• ὃ μὲν ἄγεται διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν,
• ὃ δὲ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας,

ὥστε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων.

παντὶ δ᾽ ἂν δόξειε χείρων εἶναι,

• εἴ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἠρέμα πράττοι τι αἰσχρόν,
  ἢ εἰ σφόδρα ἐπιθυμῶν, καὶ
• εἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμενος τύπτοι
  ἢ εἰ ὀργιζόμενος·

τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει ἐν πάθει ὤν;

διὸ ὁ ἀκόλαστος χείρων
τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς.

τῶν δὴ λεχθέντων

• τὸ μὲν μαλακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον,
• ὃ δ᾽ ἀκόλαστος.

§ vii.4

ἀντίκειται δὲ

• τῷ μὲν ἀκρατεῖ ὁ ἐγκρατής,
• τῷ δὲ μαλακῷ ὁ καρτερικός·

• τὸ μὲν γὰρ καρτερεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἀντέχειν,
• ἡ δ᾽ ἐγκράτεια ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν,

ἕτερον δὲ τὸ

• ἀντέχειν καὶ
• κρατεῖν,

ὥσπερ καὶ

• τὸ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι
• τοῦ νικᾶν·

διὸ καὶ αἱρετώτερον ἐγκράτεια
καρτερίας ἐστίν. [1150^b]

§ vii.5

ὁ δ᾽ ἐλλείπων πρὸς ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ

• καὶ ἀντιτείνουσι
• καὶ δύνανται,

οὗτος

• μαλακὸς καὶ
• τρυφῶν·

καὶ γὰρ ἡ τρυφὴ μαλακία τίς ἐστιν·

§ vii.6

ὁμοίως δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ περὶ

• ἐγκράτειαν καὶ
• ἀκρασίαν.

• οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ὑπερβαλλουσῶν

  • ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶται ἢ
  • λυπῶν,

  θαυμαστόν,

• ἀλλὰ συγγνωμονικὸν εἰ ἀντιτείνων,

  • ὥσπερ
    • ὁ Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχεως πεπληγμένος ἢ
    • ὁ Καρκίνου ἐν τῇ Ἀλόπῃ Κερκύων,
  • καὶ ὥσπερ
    • οἱ κατέχειν πειρώμενοι τὸν γέλωτα ἀθρόον ἐκκαγχάζουσιν,
      οἷον συνέπεσε Ξενοφάντῳ·

• ἀλλ᾽ εἴ τις
  πρὸς ἃς οἱ πολλοὶ δύνανται ἀντέχειν,

  • τούτων ἡττᾶται καὶ
  • μὴ δύναται ἀντιτείνειν,

  μὴ

  • διὰ φύσιν τοῦ γένους ἢ
  • διὰ νόσον,
  οἷον

  • ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βασιλεῦσιν ἡ μαλακία διὰ τὸ γένος, καὶ
  • ὡς τὸ θῆλυ πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν διέστηκεν.

§ vii.7

• δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδιώδης ἀκόλαστος εἶναι,
• ἔστι δὲ μαλακός.

ἡ γὰρ παιδιὰ ἄνεσίς ἐστιν, εἴπερ ἀνάπαυσις·

τῶν δὲ πρὸς ταύτην ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ παιδιώδης ἐστίν.

§ vii.8

ἀκρασίας δὲ

• τὸ μὲν προπέτεια
• τὸ δ᾽ ἀσθένεια.

• οἳ μὲν γὰρ βουλευσάμενοι
  οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οἷς ἐβουλεύσαντο
  διὰ τὸ πάθος,
• οἳ δὲ
  διὰ τὸ μὴ βουλεύσασθαι
  ἄγονται
  ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους·

ἔνιοι γάρ,

• ὥσπερ προγαργαλίσαντες οὐ γαργαλίζονται,
• οὕτω καὶ
  • προαισθόμενοι καὶ
  • προϊδόντες καὶ
  • προεγείραντες
    • ἑαυτοὺς καὶ
    • τὸν λογισμὸν

  οὐχ ἡττῶνται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους,

  • οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἡδὺ ᾖ
  • οὔτ᾽ ἂν λυπηρόν.

μάλιστα δ᾽ οἱ

• ὀξεῖς καὶ
• μελαγχολικοὶ

τὴν προπετῆ ἀκρασίαν εἰσὶν ἀκρατεῖς·

• οἳ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὴν ταχυτῆτα
• οἳ δὲ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα

οὐκ ἀναμένουσι τὸν λόγον,
διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθητικοὶ εἶναι τῇ φαντασίᾳ.

Chapter VIII

Chapter 9

§ viii.1

ἔστι δ᾽

• ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, οὐ μεταμελητικός·
  ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει·
• ὁ δ᾽ ἀκρατὴς μεταμελητικὸς πᾶς.

διὸ

• οὐχ ὥσπερ ἠπορήσαμεν, οὕτω καὶ ἔχει,
• ἀλλ᾽
  • ὃ μὲν ἀνίατος
  • ὃ δ᾽ ἰατός·

ἔοικε γὰρ

• ἡ μὲν μοχθηρία τῶν νοσημάτων
  οἷον
  ὑδέρῳ καὶ φθίσει,
• ἡ δ᾽ ἀκρασία
  τοῖς ἐπιληπτικοῖς·

• ἣ μὲν γὰρ συνεχὴς
• ἣ δ᾽ οὐ συνεχὴς

πονηρία.

καὶ ὅλως δ᾽ ἕτερον τὸ γένος

• ἀκρασίας καὶ
• κακίας·

• ἡ μὲν γὰρ κακία λανθάνει,
• ἡ δ᾽ ἀκρασία οὐ λανθάνει. [1151^a]

§ viii.2

αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων
βελτίους

• οἱ ἐκστατικοὶ
• ἢ οἱ τὸν λόγον
  • ἔχοντες μέν,
  • μὴ ἐμμένοντες δέ·
• ὑπ᾽ ἐλάττονος γὰρ πάθους ἡττῶνται, καὶ
• οὐκ ἀπροβούλευτοι ὥσπερ ἅτεροι·

ὅμοιος γὰρ ὁ ἀκρατής ἐστι τοῖς

• ταχὺ μεθυσκομένοις καὶ
• ὑπ᾽
  • ὀλίγου οἴνου καὶ
  • ἐλάττονος ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί.

§ viii.3

ὅτι μὲν οὖν κακία
ἡ ἀκρασία

• οὐκ ἔστι, φανερόν
• (ἀλλὰ πῇ ἴσως)·

• τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ προαίρεσιν
• τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσίν ἐστιν·

οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ὅμοιόν γε κατὰ τὰς πράξεις,

καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς

• ἄδικοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν,
• ἀδικήσουσι δέ.

§ viii.4

ἐπεὶ δ᾽

• ὃ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος
  μὴ διὰ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι
  διώκειν τὰς
  • καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ
  • παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον

  σωματικὰς ἡδονάς,

• ὃ δὲ πέπεισται
  διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι
  οἷος διώκειν αὐτάς,

• ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν εὐμετάπειστος,
• οὗτος δὲ οὔ·

ἡ γὰρ

• ἀρετὴ καὶ
• μοχθηρία

τὴν ἀρχὴν

• ἣ μὲν φθείρει
• ἣ δὲ σῴζει,

ἐν δὲ ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀρχή,
ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις·

• οὔτε δὴ ἐκεῖ ὁ λόγος διδασκαλικὸς τῶν ἀρχῶν
• οὔτε ἐνταῦθα,
• ἀλλ᾽ ἀρετὴ
  • ἢ φυσικὴ
  • ἢ ἐθιστὴ

  τοῦ ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρχήν.

• σώφρων μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος,
• ἀκόλαστος δ᾽ ὁ ἐναντίος.

§ viii.5

ἔστι δέ τις

• διὰ πάθος ἐκστατικὸς
• παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον,

ὃν

• ὥστε μὲν μὴ πράττειν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον
  κρατεῖ τὸ πάθος,
• ὥστε δ᾽ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν ἀνέδην δεῖν τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς
  οὐ κρατεῖ·

οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀκρατής,

• βελτίων ὢν τοῦ ἀκολάστου,
• οὐδὲ φαῦλος ἁπλῶς·

σῴζεται γὰρ

• τὸ βέλτιστον,
• ἡ ἀρχή.

ἄλλος δ᾽ ἐναντίος,

• ὁ ἐμμενετικὸς καὶ
• οὐκ ἐκστατικὸς διά γε τὸ πάθος.

φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι

• ἣ μὲν σπουδαία ἕξις,
• ἣ δὲ φαύλη.

Chapter IX

Chapter 10

§ ix.1

πότερον οὖν ἐγκρατής ἐστιν

• ὁ
  • ὁποιῳοῦν λόγῳ καὶ
  • ὁποιᾳοῦν προαιρέσει

  ἐμμένων ἢ

• ὁ
  • τῇ ὀρθῇ,

καὶ ἀκρατὴς δὲ

• ὁ
  • ὁποιᾳοῦν μὴ ἐμμένων προαιρέσει καὶ
  • ὁποιῳοῦν λόγῳ ἢ
• ὁ
  • τῷ μὴ ψευδεῖ λόγῳ καὶ
  • τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ ὀρθῇ,

ὥσπερ ἠπορήθη πρότερον; ἢ

• κατὰ μὲν συμβεβηκὸς ὁποιᾳοῦν,
• καθ᾽ αὑτὸ δὲ
  • τῷ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ καὶ
  • τῇ ὀρθῇ προαιρέσει
     
  • ὃ μὲν ἐμμένει
  • ὃ δ᾽ οὐκ ἐμμένει;

εἰ γάρ τις

• τοδὶ
• διὰ τοδὶ

• αἱρεῖται ἢ
• διώκει, [1151^b]

• καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μὲν τοῦτο
  • διώκει καὶ
  • αἱρεῖται,
• κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ πρότερον.

ἁπλῶς δὲ λέγομεν
τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτό.

ὥστε

• ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὁποιᾳοῦν δόξῃ
  • ὃ μὲν ἐμμένει
  • ὃ δ᾽ ἐξίσταται,
• ἁπλῶς δὲ ὁ τῇ ἀληθεῖ.

§ ix.2

εἰσὶ δέ τινες

• οἳ ἐμμενετικοὶ τῇ δόξῃ εἰσίν,
• οὓς καλοῦσιν ἰσχυρογνώμονας,

οἱ

• δύσπειστοι καὶ
• οὐκ εὐμετάπειστοι·

οἳ

• ὅμοιον μέν τι ἔχουσι τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ,

  ὥσπερ

  • ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ
  • ὁ θρασὺς τῷ θαρραλέῳ,

• εἰσὶ δ᾽ ἕτεροι κατὰ πολλά.

• ὃ μὲν γὰρ
  • διὰ
    • πάθος καὶ
    • ἐπιθυμίαν

    οὐ μεταβάλλει ὁ ἐγκρατής, ἐπεὶ

  • εὔπειστος, ὅταν τύχῃ,
    ἔσται ὁ ἐγκρατής·
• οἳ δὲ
  • οὐχ ὑπὸ λόγου, ἐπεὶ
  • ἐπιθυμίας γε λαμβάνουσι, καὶ
  • ἄγονται πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν.

§ ix.3

εἰσὶ δὲ ἰσχυρογνώμονες

• οἱ ἰδιογνώμονες καὶ
• οἱ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ
• οἱ ἄγροικοι,

οἱ μὲν ἰδιογνώμονες δι᾽

• ἡδονὴν καὶ
• λύπην·

• χαίρουσι γὰρ νικῶντες
  ἐὰν μὴ μεταπείθωνται, καὶ
• λυποῦνται
  ἐὰν ἄκυρα τὰ αὐτῶν ᾖ
  ὥσπερ ψηφίσματα·

ὥστε

• μᾶλλον τῷ ἀκρατεῖ ἐοίκασιν
• ἢ τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ.

§ ix.4

εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ τοῖς δόξασιν οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν
οὐ δι᾽ ἀκρασίαν,

• οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ὁ δι᾽ ἡδονήν τι πράττων
  • οὔτ᾽ ἀκόλαστος
  • οὔτε φαῦλος
  • οὔτ᾽ ἀκρατής,
• ἀλλ᾽ ὁ δι᾽ αἰσχράν.

Chapter 11

§ ix.5

ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἔστι τις

• καὶ τοιοῦτος οἷος ἧττον ἢ δεῖ τοῖς σωματικοῖς χαίρειν,
• καὶ οὐκ ἐμμένων τῷ λόγῳ,

ὁ τοιοῦτος

• τούτου καὶ
• τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς

μέσος ὁ ἐγκρατής·

• ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρατὴς οὐκ ἐμμένει τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τὸ μᾶλλόν τι,
• οὗτος δὲ διὰ τὸ ἧττόν τι·
• ὁ δ᾽ ἐγκρατὴς ἐμμένει καὶ οὐδὲ δι᾽ ἕτερον μεταβάλλει.

δεῖ δέ,
εἴπερ ἡ ἐγκράτεια σπουδαῖον,
ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ἐναντίας ἕξεις φαύλας εἶναι,
ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνονται·

ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν

• ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ
• ὀλιγάκις

εἶναι φανεράν,

• ὥσπερ ἡ σωφροσύνη τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ δοκεῖ ἐναντίον εἶναι μόνον,
• οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια τῇ ἀκρασίᾳ.

§ ix.6

• ἐπεὶ δὲ καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα πολλὰ λέγεται,
• καὶ
  • ἡ ἐγκράτεια
  • ἡ τοῦ σώφρονος

  καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα ἠκολούθηκεν·

• ὅ τε γὰρ ἐγκρατὴς οἷος
  μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον
  διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς
  ποιεῖν καὶ
• ὁ σώφρων, [1152^a]

ἀλλ᾽

• ὃ μὲν ἔχων
• ὃ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔχων

φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ

• ὃ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ ἥδεσθαι παρὰ τὸν λόγον,
• ὃ δ᾽ οἷος ἥδεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄγεσθαι.

§ ix.7

ὅμοιοι δὲ καὶ

• ὁ ἀκρατὴς καὶ
• ἀκόλαστος,

• ἕτεροι μὲν ὄντες,
• ἀμφότεροι δὲ τὰ σωματικὰ ἡδέα διώκουσιν,

ἀλλ᾽

• ὃ μὲν καὶ οἰόμενος δεῖν,
• ὃ δ᾽ οὐκ οἰόμενος.

Chapter X

§ x.1

• οὐδ᾽ ἅμα
  • φρόνιμον καὶ
  • ἀκρατῆ

  ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν·

• ἅμα γὰρ
  • φρόνιμος καὶ
  • σπουδαῖος

  τὸ ἦθος δέδεικται ὤν.

§ x.2

ἔτι

• οὐ τῷ εἰδέναι μόνον φρόνιμος
• ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πρακτικός·

ὁ δ᾽ ἀκρατὴς οὐ πρακτικός –

τὸν δὲ

• δεινὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει
• ἀκρατῆ εἶναι·

διὸ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἐνίοτε

• φρόνιμοι μὲν εἶναί τινες
• ἀκρατεῖς δέ,

διὰ τὸ

• τὴν δεινότητα διαφέρειν
• τῆς φρονήσεως

τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις, καὶ

• κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον ἐγγὺς εἶναι,
• διαφέρειν δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν –

§ x.3

• οὐδὲ δὴ ὡς ὁ
  • εἰδὼς καὶ
  • θεωρῶν,

καὶ

• ἑκὼν μέν
  (τρόπον γάρ τινα εἰδὼς
  • καὶ ὃ ποιεῖ
  • καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα),
• πονηρὸς δ᾽ οὔ·

ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής·
ὥσθ᾽ ἡμιπόνηρος.

καὶ οὐκ ἄδικος·
οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος·

• ὃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐμμενετικὸς οἷς ἂν βουλεύσηται,
• ὃ δὲ μελαγχολικὸς οὐδὲ βουλευτικὸς ὅλως.

§ x.4

ἔστι δ᾽

• ἀκρασία καὶ
• ἐγκράτεια

περὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ἕξεως·

• ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἐμμένει μᾶλλον
• ὃ δ᾽ ἧττον

τῆς τῶν πλείστων δυνάμεως.

εὐιατοτέρα δὲ τῶν ἀκρασιῶν, ἣν

• οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ ἀκρατεύονται,
• τῶν
  • βουλευομένων μὲν
  • μὴ ἐμμενόντων δέ,

καὶ

• οἱ δι᾽ ἐθισμοῦ ἀκρατεῖς
• τῶν φυσικῶν·

ῥᾷον γὰρ

• ἔθος μετακινῆσαι
• φύσεως·

διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἔθος χαλεπόν,
ὅτι τῇ φύσει ἔοικεν,

§ x.5

• τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐγκράτεια καὶ
• τί ἀκρασία καὶ
• τί καρτερία καὶ
• τί μαλακία, καὶ
• πῶς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἕξεις αὗται πρὸς ἀλλήλας,

εἴρηται. [1152^b]