Polytropy

A key passage in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle:

Also Prudence as well as Moral Virtue determines the complete performance of man’s proper function: Virtue ensures the rightness of the end we aim at, Prudence ensures the rightness of the means we adopt to gain that end.

The translation (from 1926, revised 1934) is by Rackham, who does some interpolating or embellishing, in comparison with Bartlett and Collins (2011):

Further, the relevant work is completed in accord with prudence and moral virtue. For virtue makes the target correct, prudence the things conducive to that target.

Even they could have been more literal, by leaving out “relevant” and the second instance of “target”; from Bekker’s 1831 edition, as transmitted by Rackham in the Loeb Classical Library, the Greek is,

ἔτι τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετήν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον.

Even Rackham does not make the second “virtue” (ἀρετή) into “moral virtue” (ἠθικὴ ἀρετή), although it would make sense to do this. Prudence itself (for us, etymologically, “foresight”) is a virtue, but not a moral virtue; it is an example of the virtues called

• διανοητικαί, “intellectual,” in the last section, xiii.20, of Book I;
• τῆς διανοίας, “of thinking,” in § i.4 of the present book.

These virtues are the very subject of Book VI, which we are now completing our reading of.

I noted, when taking up

• Chapters vi–x, the oddity, if not pointlessness, of talking about the intellectual virtues;
• Chapters i–v, the challenge of reading Aristotle without knowing the full provenance of the text.

As we have just seen, that text, in the remaining Chapters xi–xiii of Book VI,

• addresses the value of what we are studying, if not the value of our studying, itself;
• gives us challenges that may be due to the author himself (not to corruption in our text).

The quoted passage was from the first part of § 6 of chapter xii; another illustration comes presently, in § 7, where we are told, according to Bartlett and Collins,

just as we say that some people who do just things are not yet just … so also, as it seems, it is possible for someone to perform each thing in turn while being in a certain state, with the result that he is good …

What is the point here? I see two possibilities.

1. There could be a missing negation, so that the point would be that, as one can do just things without being just, so one can do good things, generally, without being good.
2. Alternatively, one can do good things (for example, just things), both without being good and also while being good.

Context suggests or even establishes the latter, but the actual wording of the translation allows the former. Bartlett and Collins would seem to be faithful to the original text, which Rackham passes along thus:

ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ δίκαια λέγομεν πράττοντάς τινας οὔπω δικαίους εἶναι … οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔστι τὸ πῶς ἔχοντα πράττειν ἕκαστα ὥστ᾽ εἶναι ἀγαθόν …

Rackham does note that [τὸ] πῶς could be οὕτως or οὕτω πως. The suggestion is by Herbert Richards in Aristotelica (1915):

πῶς .. ὥστε is a somewhat odd combination; and, though ἔστι with an infinitive is extremely common, τό is seldom if ever added.

I don’t know, since I have nothing like Richards’s experience of Greek, but perhaps the words are odd because the passage is making not so much an analogy (“as … so …”) as a contrast (“… but …”).

Apparently Richards’s whole book consists of comments like the one quoted. In his own Introduction, Rackham refers to Richards’s remark on a passage in the Politics,

This kind of mistake, by which a word that occurs in the context or is suggested by it gets substituted for the word really intended, is known and to a certain extent generally recognised, but it deserves more attention than it has received.

Thinking about those things is perhaps not the same as thinking about what Aristotle might actually mean. Rackham’s own translation of § VI.xii.7 shows what he thinks Aristotle means:

As some people, we maintain, perform just acts and yet are not just men … on the other hand, it appears, there is a state of mind in which a man may do these various acts with the result that he really is a good man …

We have seen the idea before. Now I wonder whether it can serve as a “luxury belief”; however, the passage itself would seem to warn against this.

I have been reading about the luxury belief in “Agency Is A Life-Defining Skill,” by Holly Mathnerd [sic]. The letter is a gushing review of the forthcoming book, Troubled: A Memoir of Foster Care, Family, and Social Class, by Rob Henderson, himself the originator of the notion of a luxury belief. By the account of Holly M.,

“luxury beliefs” … are beliefs that confer status on people of relative privilege while harming more unfortunate people. Crucially, privileged people rarely live by these espoused beliefs (they decry monogamous marriage as outdated and oppressive for women while rarely having children out of wedlock, as one example). Some other examples: religious community is more socially cohesive and valuable among poor people than the rich, so dismissing it as unnecessary or backward is a luxury belief … a poor woman is more likely to derail her life and the lives of her children through sexual promiscuity than a professional woman … the right-wing luxury belief that parents and childhood environments don’t matter …

The first ellipsis in the Ethics passage is supplied by an explanation of how one can do the just without being just:

– for example, those who do what has been ordered by the laws but do so either involuntarily, through ignorance, or on account of something else and not on account of the orders themselves (though they do do what they should, namely, all the things that the serious human being ought to do) –

οἷον τοὺς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τεταγμένα ποιοῦντας ἢ ἄκοντας ἢ δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν ἢ δι᾽ ἕτερόν τι καὶ μὴ δι᾽ αὐτά (καίτοι πράττουσί γε ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα χρὴ τὸν σπουδαῖον),

(for instance, those who do what the law enjoins but do it unwillingly, or in ignorance, or for some ulterior object, and not for the sake of the actions themselves, although they are as a matter of fact doing what they ought to do and all that a good man should),

– the translations are again by Bartlett and Collins and by Rackham, respectively, and I have bolded where they differ in an important way.

I think Rackham’s words are both the correct interpretation of Aristotle’s and correct in themselves. If ordered things are just, then it is just to do them, not because they are ordered, but because they are just. For Aristotle, “what has been ordered by the laws” or “what the law enjoins” is a participial phrase, τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τεταγμένα. This is based on the passive (or “middle-passive”) voice (and perfect aspect) of the verb τάσσω, which means “order” in the sense of “draw up [troops] in order.” The participial phrase would seem to be the antecedent of the pronoun in Aristotle’s prepositional phrase, δι᾽ αὐτά. In that case, what is referred to is not laws, or orders, but what they order.

Obeying whatever law happens to have been promulgated is not in itself just: this would seem to be a way to express Aristotle’s idea. That idea would seem to be shared by Jesus, as when he says,

The sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath.

That particular saying is near the end of Mark 2:23–8, but for whatever reason, it is not in the versions of the same incident recounted in Matthew 12:1–8 and Luke 6:1–5. One could use the saying as a luxury belief, to distinguish oneself from people who would post the Ten Commandments in courthouses or schools.

I seem to have had something like that concern when writing “‘It Was Good’” in October, 2022, and particularly when quoting Collingwood:

it is only because people already know by experience that rules are sacred and authoritative that they invent the mythology which makes God their author.

That is from Collingwood’s 1940 lectures “Goodness, Rightness, Utility,” included in the 1992 revised edition of The New Leviathan. As I also noted in the earlier post, Collingwood refers to the warning of Aristotle in §§ iii.5–7 of Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, that political philosophy is not for the young.

Difficulties faced by some young people, such as she and Rob Henderson were, are the theme of Holly Mathnerd’s letter:

In order to teach delayed gratification to their kids, parents first need the ability to meet the child’s needs and thus to have gratifying a child’s desires – either immediately or in the future – be an option under consideration at all. Without the stability to make meeting the child’s needs a consistent experience, delayed gratification is something the parents cannot teach their kids, any more than they can teach their kids to speak Mandarin.

Perhaps it ought to have occurred to Holly M. that some American families speak Mandarin.

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The perfect middle-passive participle τεταγμένος used in the phrase τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τεταγμένα “what has been ordered by the laws”: it has an adverbial form τεταγμένως, which is the ultimate origin of technical term “ordinate” for one of two “coordinates,” the other being the “abscissa.” All of these terms were apparently defined by Leibniz, but the concepts go back to Apollonius (if not further). “Ordinate” in particular goes back to the fourth definition at the head of Book I of the Conics, here in the translation of R. Catesby Taliaferro (who supplies also the Greek phrase):

Of any curved line which is in one plane, I call that straight line the diameter which, drawn from the curved line, bisects all straight lines drawn from this curved line parallel to some straight line; and I call the end of the diameter situated on the curved line the vertex of the curved line, and I say that each of these parallels is drawn ordinatewise to the diameter (τεταγμένως ἐπὶ τὴν διάμετρον κατῆχθαι).*

* We shall follow modern usage and generally call these parallels ordinates.

There are plenty of details in my article “Abscissas and Ordinates” in the Journal of Humanistic Mathematics (January, 2015).

---

Near the top of this post, I said prudence was an example of an intellectual virtue. In § 2 of chapter xi of Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle takes up several examples of intellectual virtues – or at least of intellectual habits (ἕξεις):

• γνώμη “judgment, consideration, discernment, thoughtfulness,”
  • συγγνώμη “compassion,”
  • εὐγνωμοσύνη “consideration,”
• σύνεσις “understanding, intelligence, judgment, astuteness, comprehension,”
• φρόνησις “prudence,”
• νοῦς “intelligence.”

He calls them also capacities (δυνάμεις), thus giving us another one of the challenges that I mentioned; for in chapter v of Book II, virtues were found to be habits, precisely because they were neither capacities nor feelings. Perhaps then capacities were for feeling; now they are for thinking.

For the particular capacities or habits just listed, I wrote the single-word translations that are used in the several translations that I consult. Fine distinctions are not important now, because the habits all boil down to one virtue. The word φρόνησις is used for this. I looked at this word and its translations with the first Book-VI reading.

• Ross, Crisp, and Reeve translate φρόνησις as “practical wisdom.” Thus for example Crisp renders the first part of § xiii.20 of Book I,

  Virtue is distinguished along the same lines. Some virtues we say are intellectual, such as wisdom, judgement and practical wisdom, while others are virtues of character, such as generosity and temperance.

  Is practical wisdom then a kind of wisdom? If so, why does Aristotle list it, when he has already named wisdom as a whole? Or by wisdom tout court did he mean, say, theoretical wisdom? Such questions are not raised by the Greek, where the examples of intellectual virtues are simply

  • σοφία,
  • σύνεσις,
  • φρόνησις.

• Sachs translates φρόνησις as “practical judgment.” This would raise similar questions if, like Crisp, he translated σύνεσις as “judgment.” Instead, he uses “astuteness,” so that his version of the same passage reads,

  And virtue as well is divided in accordance with the same distinction, for we speak of virtues as pertaining either to thinking or to character, and speak of wisdom, astuteness, and practical judgment as intellectual virtues, and generosity and temperance as virtues of character.

  Sachs’s choice still blurs a distinction that Crisp highlights in his Introduction:

  Unlike judgement, practical wisdom involves the virtuous person’s commanding himself to perform what is called for in the circumstances.

  This is a paraphrase of the first part of Book VI, § x.2, which Sachs renders as,

  For practical judgment is something that imposes obligations, since the end that belongs to it is what one ought or ought not to do, while astuteness is only something that makes distinctions.

  Even when practical, judgment as such would seem not to impose obligations. Thus, in the judgment of

  • the European Court of Human Rights, Osman Kavala should be free;
  • the Turkish Constitutional Court, Can Atalay should be free;

  and yet each man remains behind bars.

• I follow Rackham, Apostle, and Bartlett and Collins in using “prudence” for φρόνησις. Trying to respect Sachs’s misgivings about the English word, I add the warning that the prudent are as defined in the original OED, without the connotations of “playing it safe” that are suggested in later, concise versions of the dictionary. Thus, the prudent are as in the first definition in the American Heritage Dictionary:

  1. Wise in handling practical matters; exercising good judgment or common sense. 2. Careful in regard to one’s own interests; provident. 3. Careful about one’s conduct; circumspect; discreet.

  In Sachs’s experience, perhaps students or even colleagues have read “prudent” in a translation, looked it up in the AHD, and based an argument on the second or third definition, possibly even concluding that miserliness is a virtue.

As we have already started to observe, we are given several lists: of intellectual habits, of capacities that may be virtues, and of other things, as follows.

Book I, chapter xiii

As we saw, there are three examples of intellectual virtues in § 20:

• σοφία,
• σύνεσις,
• φρόνησις.

There are also virtues called

• ἠθικαί, “moral, ethical” (also in Book VI, § ii.2);
• τοῦ ἤθους, “of custom or character” (in Book VI, §§ i.4 and xiii.2).

Book VI, chapter i

According to §§ 5–7, there are going to be just two intellectual virtues, one for each of the two parts of the rational part of the soul. Those two parts,

• τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν,
• τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν,

contemplate respectively the things whose origins

• cannot,
• can

be otherwise. The virtue of each of these parts is

• ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις “the best habit,”
• πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον “related to its particular work.”

We look now for this work.

Book VI, chapter ii

In the soul are

• αἴσθησις,
• νοῦς,
• ὄρεξις.

This is another one of my “challenges.” These seem to be parts of the soul: the perceiving or sensing, the rational, and the desiring. However:

• One might expect them in a different order.
• What is here νοῦς will presently be called διάνοια, and in later chapters, νοῦς will have a more precise sense.
• In the catalogue of soul-parts in the last chapter (xiii) of Book I, in place of the perceiving part, we were given the vegetative part (τὸ φυτικόν), although the perceiving part was alluded to earlier, in § 12 of chapter vii, as being shared with horses, oxen, and other animals, just as nutrition (ἡ θρεπτική) and growth (ἡ αὐξητική) are shared even with plants (τὰ φυτά); none of these are where to look for our specific work (τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, § 10).

We proceed now to leave perception aside, because, although all three faculties in the list above are called κύρια “governors” of

• πρᾶξις “action,”
• ἀλήθεια “truth,”

nonetheless, the source

• of action is
  • not αἴσθησις,
  • but προαίρεσις “choice,” whose source is
    • ὄρεξις,
    • λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος.

The last, “reasoning directed at some end,” would seem to take the place of νοῦς on the list of parts. We recall

• from Book II, § vi.15, that ethical virtue is a habit (ἕξις) that is προαιρετική “involved with choice”;
• from Book III, § iii.19, that προαίρεσις is βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις “deliberate desire.”

We now have a conjunction:

• ὀρθὴ ὄρεξις,
• ἀληθὴς λόγος,
• σπουδαία προαίρεσις.

That is,

• right desire and
• true reason are required for
• a good or serious choice.

In particular, the work of the rational (νοητικός) parts of the soul is truth.

Book VI, chapter iii

There are five ways in which, as Sachs has it, “the soul discloses truth”; Crisp, “the soul arrives at truth” (ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ):

• τέχνη,
• ἐπιστήμη,
• φρόνησις,
• σοφία,
• νοῦς.

These are distinguished from

• ὑπολήψις “assumption,”
• δόξα.

Book VI, chapter viii

We consider together

• φρόνησις,
• πολιτική;

they are the same, but “not in being” (§ 1).

Book VI, chapter ix

As if it is next on a list of intellectual virtues, or else is a component of φρόνησις, we take up εὐβουλία “good deliberation,” distinguishing it from

• ἐπιστήμη,
• εὐστοχία “good guesswork,”
• ἀγχίνοια “shrewdness,”
• δόξα.

Book VI, chapter x

We now turn to the remaining intellectual virtue on the list at the end (chapter xiii, § 20) of Book I. We distinguish either of

• σύνεσις
• εὐσυνεσία

(which seem to amount to the same thing) from

• ἐπιστήμη,
• δόξα,
• φρόνησις.

Book VI, chapter xi

In § 2, there’s the list we’ve seen:

• γνώμη “thoughtfulness,”
  • συγγνώμη “compassion,”
  • εὐγνωμοσύνη “consideration,”
• σύνεσις “astuteness,”
• φρόνησις,
• νοῦς.

Book VI, chapter xiii

Finally, in § 2, of the part of the soul now (and in § v.8, but nowhere else in Aristotle) called τὸ δοξαστικόν (but in § i.5, τὸ λογιστικόν), the Philosopher notes two forms (εἴδη; they are not at the moment called virtues, habits, or capacities):

• δεινότης “cleverness,”
• φρόνησις.

These correspond to two kinds or grades of ethical virtues:

• τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσική,
• τὸ δ᾽ ἡ κυρία.

Those are the lists that I see in Book VI, a number of them including φρόνησις. Perhaps one should ultimately understand this as the virtue

• “of ultimates and particulars,” or “of ultimate particulars” – τῶν ἐσχάτων … καὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον (§ xi.2 below);
• of “practical matters” (as indeed in the first AHD definition quoted above) – τὰ πρακτά (§ xi.3).

There is then just one more intellectual virtue, σοφία, concerning the permanent and unchanging. This was the subject of part of chapter vii in the previous reading. At the end of Book VI (chapter xiii, § 9), it is suggested that prudence is not lord over wisdom – which is the better part – any more than medicine is over health. Probably we are going to read more about this.

Contents and Summary

• Chapter 11
• Chapter XI
  • Γνώμη “thoughtfulness, judgment” is
    right discernment of the decent or equitable
    (τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς κρίσις ὀρθή, § xi.1).
• Chapter 12
  • The following habits (ἕξεις) run together:
    • γνώμη, with
      • συγγνώμη “compassion, forgiveness,”
      • εὐγνωμοσύνη “consideration”;
    • σύνεσις “astuteness”;
    • φρόνησις “prudence, practical wisdom or judgment”;
    • νοῦς “intellect”;

    for they are all capacities (δυνάμεις)

    • of the ultimate (τῶν ἐσχάτων),
    • of the particular (τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, §§ xi.2, 3).
  • Intellect
    • involves ultimates in both senses:
      • the starting definitions for demonstrations,
      • the particulars from which are inferred
        • final causes of action,
        • universals (§ xi.4);
    • being perception of these, intellect seems to be by nature,
      along with
      • thoughtfulness and
      • astuteness,

      because they come with age;
      but σοφία “wisdom” is not by nature (§§ xi.5, 6).

  • Thus different parts of the soul have the virtues of
    • prudence and
    • wisdom (§ xi.7).
• Chapter 13
• Chapter XII.
  • What’s the use?
    • Wisdom does not contemplate
      • what makes us happy or
      • anything else that comes to be.
    • Prudence
      • does, but,
        virtues being habits (ἕξεις),
        knowing the
        • good,
        • beautiful, and
        • just

        does not make us do them better,
        any more than being a doctor makes one healthy (§ xii.1);

      • is needed – even if it is
        • not for doing those things,
        • but becoming able to do them –
           
        • neither by the serious (σπουδαίοις)
          [who already can do them],
        • nor by others,
          who can obey somebody who can,
          the way we obey doctors (§ xii.2);
      • cannot, with respect to wisdom, be both
        • inferior (χείρων) and
        • more authoritative (κυριωτέρα, § xii.3).
  • Here’s the use.
    1. Even if [wisdom and prudence] produce nothing,
       still, being virtues of their parts [of the soul],
       they are to be chosen (§ xii.4).
    2. Wisdom does produce happiness,
       • not as medicine produces health,
       • but as being healthy does, by (τῷ)
         • being present (ἔχεσθαι) and
         • working (ἐνεργεῖν, § xii.5) –
           the work is completed when made right are
           • the target, by ethical virtue;
           • the related things (τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον), by prudence.

           Of the fourth, nutritive, part of the soul,
           there is no ethical virtue (§ xii.6).

    • As one may do just things – what
      • one must,
      • a serious (σπουδαίοις) person would –

      as the law prescribes, without being just, but

      • involuntarily,
      • through ignorance, or
      • in some other way,

      so one may do good things
      [without being good;
      to be good, one must do them]

      • by choice,
      • for their sake (§ xii.7).

      Virtue makes right

      • the choice,
      • not what is done for its sake –
        that takes some other capacity
        (δύναμις, § xii.8).
    • The capacity called cleverness (δεινότης)
      makes one able to reach one’s aim,
      though it may be wicked.
      Thus the prudent are called
      • clever,
      • villainous (πανοῦργος, § xii.9).
    • Prudence
      • is
        • not without that capacity,
        • not it either;
      • comes as a habit (ἕξις) to the eye of the soul
        not without virtue, since
        the starting point of a demonstration
        of what is to be done
        is evident only to the good; thus
      • belongs to nobody who is not good (§ xii.10).
• Chapter XIII
  • We must examine virtue again.
    • As prudence is to cleverness
      [rather, cleverness is to prudence],
    • so is natural virtue to authoritative
      (ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν).
      • From birth we are
        • just,
        • inclined to moderation,
        • brave, and
        • the rest, but
      • without intellect (νούς),
        the characters are harmful,
        as a strong body may be
        to a blind person who falls (§ xiii.1);
      • with intellect,
        one’s habit (ἕξις) becomes
        authoritative virtue (κυρίως ἀρετή).
  • There are two forms (εἴδη), both
    • concerning opinionating –
      1. cleverness,
      2. prudence; and
    • concerning character –
      1. natural virtue,
      2. authoritative (ἡ κυρία),
         and this requires prudence (§ xiii.2).
  • Socrates was
    • wrong that all virtues are prudences;
    • right that they are not without prudence (§ xiii.3).
  • Everybody admits that virtue is a habit (ἕξις) according with
    • right reason, that is,
    • prudence (§ xiii.4).
  • Virtue is a habit
    • not only according with right reason (κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον),
    • but accompanied by right reason (μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου).

    Virtues are, according to

    • Socrates, reasons or knowledges;
    • us, accompanied by reason (§ xiii.5).
  • Thus one
    • cannot be
      • authoritatively good without prudence,
      • prudent without ethical virtue;
    • can have
      • just one of the natural virtues,
      • only all virtues, if one has prudence (§ xiii.6).
  • Even if prudence were not practical, there would be
    • need of it as a virtue of part [of the soul],
    • no right choice without being made
      • by virtue to frame the end,
      • prudence to frame τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος (§ xiii.7.
  • [Prudence] is not over
    • wisdom or
    • the better part of the soul,

    any more than medicine is over health (§ xiii.8).

Chapter 11

[1143^a]

Chapter XI

§ xi.1

ἡ δὲ καλουμένη γνώμη,
καθ᾽ ἣν

• συγγνώμονας καὶ
• ἔχειν φαμὲν γνώμην,

ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶ κρίσις ὀρθή.

ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη
γνώμη ἐστὶ κριτικὴ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ὀρθή·

ὀρθὴ δ᾽
ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

Chapter 12

§ xi.2

εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ἕξεις εὐλόγως εἰς ταὐτὸ τείνουσαι·

λέγομεν γὰρ

• γνώμην καὶ
• σύνεσιν καὶ
• φρόνησιν καὶ
• νοῦν

ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπιφέροντες

•  
  • γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ
  • νοῦν ἤδη καὶ
• φρονίμους καὶ
• συνετούς.

πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αὗται

• τῶν ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ καὶ
• τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον·

καὶ

• ἐν μὲν τῷ κριτικὸς εἶναι περὶ ὧν ὁ φρόνιμος,
  • συνετὸς
  • καὶ
    • εὐγνώμων ἢ
    • συγγνώμων·

  τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ κοινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον.

§ xi.3

• ἔστι δὲ
  • τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα καὶ
  • τῶν ἐσχάτων

  ἅπαντα τὰ πρακτά·

  • καὶ γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον δεῖ γινώσκειν αὐτά,
  • καὶ
    • ἡ σύνεσις καὶ
    • ἡ γνώμη

    περὶ τὰ πρακτά,
    ταῦτα δ᾽ ἔσχατα.

§ xi.4

καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα·

καὶ γὰρ

• τῶν πρώτων ὅρων καὶ
• τῶν ἐσχάτων [1143^b]

• νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ
• οὐ λόγος,

καὶ

• ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις τῶν
  • ἀκινήτων ὅρων καὶ
  • πρώτων,
• ὁ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς τοῦ
  • ἐσχάτου καὶ
  • ἐνδεχομένου καὶ
  • τῆς ἑτέρας προτάσεως·

ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα
αὗται·

ἐκ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα γὰρ
τὰ καθόλου·

§ xi.5

τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἴσθησιν,
αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστὶ νοῦς.

διὸ καὶ φυσικὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ταῦτα,
καὶ φύσει

• σοφὸς μὲν οὐδείς,

• • γνώμην δ᾽ ἔχειν καὶ
  • σύνεσιν καὶ
  • νοῦν.

§ xi.6

σημεῖον δ᾽ ὅτι

• καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις οἰόμεθα ἀκολουθεῖν,
• καὶ ἥδε ἡ ἡλικία
  • νοῦν ἔχει καὶ
  • γνώμην,

  ὡς τῆς φύσεως αἰτίας οὔσης.

διὸ

• καὶ ἀρχὴ
• καὶ τέλος

νοῦς·

• ἐκ τούτων γὰρ αἱ ἀποδείξεις καὶ
• περὶ τούτων.

ὥστε δεῖ προσέχειν τῶν

• ἐμπείρων καὶ
• πρεσβυτέρων ἢ
• φρονίμων

ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις

• φάσεσι καὶ
• δόξαις

οὐχ ἧττον τῶν ἀποδείξεων·

διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὄμμα
ὁρῶσιν ὀρθῶς.

§ xi.7

Chapter 13

Chapter XII

§ xii.1

• διαπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τί χρήσιμοί εἰσιν.

  • ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία οὐδὲν θεωρήσει
    ἐξ ὧν ἔσται εὐδαίμων ἄνθρωπος
    (οὐδεμιᾶς γάρ ἐστι γενέσεως),

  • ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τοῦτο μὲν ἔχει,
    ἀλλὰ τίνος ἕνεκα δεῖ αὐτῆς;
    εἴπερ

    • ἡ μὲν φρόνησίς ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὰ
      • δίκαια καὶ
      • καλὰ καὶ
      • ἀγαθὰ

      ἀνθρώπῳ,

    • ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶν
      ἃ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς πράττειν,

    οὐδὲν δὲ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ εἰδέναι αὐτά ἐσμεν,
    εἴπερ ἕξεις αἱ ἀρεταί εἰσιν,

    ὥσπερ

    • οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ
    • οὐδὲ τὰ εὐεκτικά,

    ὅσα

    • μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν
    • ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως

    εἶναι λέγεται·
    οὐθὲν γὰρ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ ἔχειν τὴν

    • ἰατρικὴν καὶ
    • γυμναστικήν

    ἐσμεν.

§ xii.2

εἰ δὲ

• μὴ τούτων χάριν φρόνιμον ῥητέον
• ἀλλὰ τοῦ γίνεσθαι,

• τοῖς οὖσι σπουδαίοις οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη χρήσιμος·
• ἔτι δ᾽ οὐδὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν·
  οὐδὲν γὰρ διοίσει
  • αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἢ
  • ἄλλοις ἔχουσι πείθεσθαι,

§ xii.3

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν, εἰ
χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὖσα
κυριωτέρα αὐτῆς ἔσται·

ἡ γὰρ ποιοῦσα

• ἄρχει καὶ
• ἐπιτάττει

περὶ ἕκαστον.

περὶ δὴ τούτων λεκτέον·

νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἠπόρηται περὶ αὐτῶν μόνον. [1144^a]

§ xii.4

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λέγωμεν
ὅτι καθ᾽ αὑτὰς ἀναγκαῖον αἱρετὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι,
ἀρετάς γ᾽ οὔσας ἑκατέραν ἑκατέρου τοῦ μορίου,
καὶ εἰ μὴ ποιοῦσι μηδὲν μηδετέρα αὐτῶν.

§ xii.5

ἔπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι μέν,

οὕτως ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν·

μέρος γὰρ οὖσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς

• τῷ ἔχεσθαι

ποιεῖ καὶ

• †τῷ ἐνεργεῖν

εὐδαίμονα.†

§ xii.6

ἔτι τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ

• τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ
• τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετήν·

• ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν,
• ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον.

τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς
οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τοιαύτη,
τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ·

οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ

• πράττειν ἢ
• μὴ πράττειν.

§ xii.7

περὶ δὲ τοῦ μηθὲν εἶναι πρακτικωτέρους
διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν τῶν

• καλῶν καὶ
• δικαίων,

μικρὸν ἄνωθεν ἀρκτέον,
λαβόντας ἀρχὴν ταύτην.

ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ δίκαια λέγομεν πράττοντάς τινας
οὔπω δικαίους εἶναι,

οὕτως,
ὡς ἔοικεν,
ἔστι τὸ πῶς ἔχοντα
πράττειν ἕκαστα
ὥστ᾽ εἶναι ἀγαθόν,

§ xii.8

• τὴν μὲν οὖν προαίρεσιν ὀρθὴν ποιεῖ ἡ ἀρετή,
• τὸ δ᾽ ὅσα ἐκείνης ἕνεκα πέφυκε πράττεσθαι
  • οὐκ ἔστι τῆς ἀρετῆς
  • ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέρας δυνάμεως.

λεκτέον δ᾽ ἐπιστήσασι σαφέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν.

§ xii.9

ἔστι δὴ δύναμις
ἣν καλοῦσι δεινότητα·

αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστὶ τοιαύτη ὥστε

• τὰ πρὸς τὸν ὑποτεθέντα σκοπὸν συντείνοντα
  δύνασθαι ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ
• τυγχάνειν αὐτοῦ.

• ἂν μὲν οὖν ὁ σκοπὸς ᾖ καλός,
  ἐπαινετή ἐστιν,
• ἐὰν δὲ φαῦλος,
  πανουργία·

διὸ καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους

• δεινοὺς καὶ
• πανούργους

φαμὲν εἶναι.

§ xii.10

ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ φρόνησις

• οὐχ ἡ δύναμις,
• ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης.

ἡ δ᾽ ἕξις τῷ ὄμματι τούτῳ γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς
οὐκ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς,
ὡς

• εἴρηταί τε καὶ
• ἔστι δῆλον·

οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν,
ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε

• τὸ τέλος καὶ
• τὸ ἄριστον,

ὁτιδήποτε ὄν
(ἔστω γὰρ λόγου χάριν τὸ τυχόν)·

τοῦτο δ᾽
εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ,
οὐ φαίνεται·

• διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ
• διαψεύδεσθαι ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρχάς.

ὥστε φανερὸν
ὅτι ἀδύνατον φρόνιμον εἶναι
μὴ ὄντα ἀγαθόν. [1144^b]

Chapter XIII

§ xiii.1

σκεπτέον δὴ πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς·

καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ παραπλησίως ἔχει
ὡς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν δεινότητα –

• οὐ ταὐτὸ μέν,
• ὅμοιον δέ –

οὕτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν.

πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα τῶν ἠθῶν ὑπάρχειν φύσει πως·
καὶ γὰρ

• δίκαιοι καὶ
• σωφρονικοὶ καὶ
• ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ
• τἆλλα

ἔχομεν εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς·

ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ζητοῦμεν

• ἕτερόν τι
• τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν

καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλον τρόπον ὑπάρχειν.

καὶ γὰρ

• παισὶ καὶ
• θηρίοις

• αἱ φυσικαὶ ὑπάρχουσιν ἕξεις,
• ἀλλ᾽ ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὖσαι.

πλὴν τοσοῦτον ἔοικεν ὁρᾶσθαι,
ὅτι

• οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα·

§ xiii.2

ἐὰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν,
ἐν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει·

ἡ δ᾽ ἕξις ὁμοία οὖσα τότ᾽ ἔσται κυρίως ἀρετή.

ὥστε

• καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δύο ἐστὶν εἴδη,
  • δεινότης καὶ
  • φρόνησις,
• οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ δύο ἐστί,
  • τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ
  • τὸ δ᾽ ἡ κυρία,

  καὶ τούτων
  ἡ κυρία οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως.

§ xiii.3

διόπερ τινές φασι
πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς φρονήσεις εἶναι,
καὶ Σωκράτης

• τῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἐζήτει
• τῇ δ᾽ ἡμάρτανεν·

• ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις ᾤετο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς,
  ἡμάρτανεν,
• ὅτι δ᾽ οὐκ ἄνευ φρονήσεως,
  καλῶς ἔλεγεν.

§ xiii.4

σημεῖον δέ·

καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες,
ὅταν ὁρίζωνται τὴν ἀρετήν,
προστιθέασι,

• τὴν ἕξιν εἰπόντες καὶ
• πρὸς ἅ ἐστι,

τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον·

ὀρθὸς δ᾽ ὁ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν.

ἐοίκασι δὴ μαντεύεσθαί πως ἅπαντες ὅτι

• ἡ τοιαύτη ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν,
• ἡ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν.

§ xiii.5

δεῖ δὲ μικρὸν μεταβῆναι.

ἔστι γὰρ

• οὐ μόνον ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον,
• ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου

ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν·

ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων
ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν.

• Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι
  (ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας),
• ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου.

§ xiii.6

δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι

• οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἄνευ φρονήσεως,
• οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς.

ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτῃ λύοιτ᾽ ἄν,
ᾧ διαλεχθείη τις ἂν ὅτι
χωρίζονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρεταί·

οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς εὐφυέστατος πρὸς ἁπάσας,
ὥστε

• τὴν μὲν ἤδη
• τὴν δ᾽ οὔπω εἰληφὼς ἔσται·

τοῦτο γὰρ

• κατὰ μὲν τὰς φυσικὰς ἀρετὰς
  ἐνδέχεται, [1145^a]
• καθ᾽ ἃς δὲ ἁπλῶς λέγεται ἀγαθός,
  οὐκ ἐνδέχεται·

ἅμα γὰρ τῇ φρονήσει μιᾷ ὑπαρχούσῃ
πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν.

§ xiii.7

δῆλον δέ,
κἂν εἰ μὴ πρακτικὴ ἦν,

• ὅτι ἔδει ἂν αὐτῆς διὰ τὸ τοῦ μορίου ἀρετὴν εἶναι, καὶ
• ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται ἡ προαίρεσις ὀρθὴ
  • ἄνευ φρονήσεως οὐδ᾽
  • ἄνευ ἀρετῆς·

• ἣ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τέλος
• ἣ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος

ποιεῖ πράττειν.

§ xiii.8

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία γ᾽ ἐστὶ

• τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ
• τοῦ βελτίονος μορίου,