Tag Archives: David Hilbert

Perception Deception


John Donne, Holy Sonnet XIX
(on the last line, “make” should be “ſhake”)

This post involves:

  • “the” philosopher –
    • Aristotle;
  • two mathematicians –
    • Euclid,
    • David Hilbert;
  • three persons associated with Black Mountain College –
    • Josef Albers,
    • Dorothea Rockburne,
    • Max Dehn;
  • one person (in addition to myself and Dehn) associated with St John’s College –
    • David Bolotin.

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Math, Maugham, and Man

Note added, August 28, 2023. The main purpose of this post of September 1, 2019, seems to have been to assemble some information about the etymologies of “man” and “woman,” because of ongoing controversy about what the words even mean today. I started to take up the controversy itself on December 30 of that year, in “Sex and Gender.” Meanwhile, this post suggests, or points out:

  • a generic “person” may still be male in people’s minds;
  • becoming a woman may be like becoming Jewish;
  • there are no gendered pronouns in Turkish;
  • the series freshman, sophomore, junior, senior is like pinkie, ring finger, middle finger;
  • Greek does not have such an interesting series for the fingers;
  • Greek mathematics includes Thales’s Theorem and Pappus’s Hexagon Theorem.

There does not seem to be any connection between the mathematics and the etymology here, except that I was studying both at the same time. I must have been reading The Razor’s Edge too, where Maugham

  • places himself in a tradition founded by Herodotus;
  • uses “he/him” for for somebody who can be a woman as well as a man.

More themes I took up:

  • what it means to be natural;
  • that I don’t consider myself ADHD;
  • the etymology of “squirrel”;
  • the Etymological Fallacy.

A dog lying in the shade of a beach umbrella looks at us; behind him are a woman and a man sitting facing away from us, towards the sea
Woman, man, and dog
Friday, August 18, 2023
Altınova, Balıkesir, Türkiye

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On Being Given to Know

  1. What if we could upload books to our brains?
  2. What if a machine could tell us what was true?

We may speculate, and it is interesting that we do speculate, because I think the questions do not ultimately make sense – not the sense that seems to be intended anyway, whereby something can be got for nothing.

Trees, clearings, and houses in the foreground; mountains receding into the background; clouds above
View from Şavşat

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On Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem

This is an appreciation of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem of 1931. I am provoked by a depreciation of the theorem.

I shall review the mathematics of the theorem, first in outline, later in more detail. The mathematics is difficult. I have trouble reproducing it at will and even just confirming what I have already written about it below (for I am adding these words a year after the original publication of this essay).

The difficulty of Gödel’s mathematics is part of the point of this essay. A person who thinks Gödel’s Theorem is unsurprising is probably a person who does not understand it.

Next to a slice from a tree trunk, a worn copy of the book Frege and Gödel: Two Fundamental Texts in Mathematical Logic, edited by Jean van Heijenoort

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