In the last chapter of the last book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle prepares us for his next collection of books, the Politics.

We were told last time that happiness was theôrêtikê energeia or theôria: contemplation, or speculation, not clearly distinguished (as far as I could tell) from what Peirce referred to as “star[ing] stupidly at phenomena.”

Aristotle asks now, “Did you think we were finished with what we set out to do?” More precisely (§ ix.1),

τέλος ἔχειν οἰητέον τὴν προαίρεσιν;

an end to have to be supposed is the choice?

– “Is the choice to be supposed to have an end?” As Reeve puts it, “should we think that our deliberate choice has achieved its end?” He interprets this as a reference to Book I, chapter xiii:

Since happiness is some activity of the soul in accord with complete virtue, we must investigate virtue … It seems too that someone who is truly a politician will have worked most on virtue … If this investigation belongs to politics, however, it is clear that our present inquiry will be in accord with the deliberate choice we made at the start.

Reeve sees this as a reference to the end of I.ii:

For even if the good is the same for an individual and for a city, that of a city is evidently a greater and, at any rate, a more complete good to acquire and preserve. For while it should content us to acquire and preserve this for an individual alone, it is nobler and more divine to do so for a nation and city. And so our method of inquiry seeks the good of these things, since it is a sort of politics.

Aristotle may be doing as Socrates does in the Republic: letting on to talk about politics, while admitting that the best city is the one in spirit that one contemplates for oneself. However, in the present reading, to the question of whether we are finished, once we have defined individual happiness, he answers as follows.

ἢ καθάπερ λέγεται,	|	or, just as is said,
οὐκ ἔστιν	|	not is,
ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς	|	in practicable things,
τέλος	|	the end
τὸ θεωρῆσαι ἕκαστα	|	to contemplate them severally
καὶ γνῶναι,	|	and know [them],
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον	|	but rather,
τὸ πράττειν αὐτά·	|	to do them;
οὐδὲ δὴ	|	not then,
περὶ ἀρετῆς	|	about virtue,
ἱκανὸν	|	is it enough
τὸ εἰδέναι,	|	to know,
ἀλλ᾽	|	but
ἔχειν	|	to have
καὶ χρῆσθαι	|	and to use [it] –
πειρατέον.	|	[at least] to try.

Following Aristotle’s word order may be difficult in English, but perhaps he reserves the final position for what is most important: the necessity (implied by the ending -τέον) of trying to be virtuous – or excellent, or good, or as you like. But then, as far as I can tell, the punctuation marks used in the text were not even invented until more than a century after Aristotle’s death; and the text above does continue beyond πειρατέον, as we shall consider.

What Aristotle has been doing is for something, as history is:

what is history for? … history is ‘for’ human self-knowledge … Knowing yourself means knowing what you can do; and since nobody knows what he can do until he tries, the only clue to what man can do is what man has done. The value of history, then, is that it teaches us what man has done and thus what man is.

Thus Collingwood (his italics, my bolding and ellipses) at the end of § 2 of the Introduction of The Idea of History (posthumously edited and published in 1946). I would distinguish what one is from what one can be.

Having sent me to Peirce, whom I quoted near the top of the previous post, “Theory,” Stephen Greenleaf has now sent my attention to the Collingwood passage, because Patrick Wintour of the Guardian quotes Collingwood in “‘We’re in 1938 now’: Putin’s war in Ukraine and lessons from history” (Sat 8 Jun 2024):

When big history is self-evidently being written, and leaders face momentous choices, the urge to find inspiration in instructive historical parallels is overwhelming and natural. “The only clue to what man can do is what man has done,” the Oxford historian RG Collingwood once wrote.

Greenleaf has a response that sounds as if it could be out of our present Aristotle reading:

how do we distinguish between analogies that guide us versus those that lead us astray? I don’t know – nor can I imagine – any formula or heuristic by which to answer this query about the wisdom of applying any particular analogy. Sound judgment and knowledge of the particulars, of both the situation at hand and the analogy proposed as a template, are the only way to go. But no application – or failure to apply – a particular analogy provides foolproof results. Leaders with deep wisdom and knowledge provide our best hope.

Compare §§ ix.20–1 of the reading below. Aristotle has been observing that while the Sophists do not actually engage in politics, they claim to teach it. They are are bad at this, because they think being a good legislator means picking out the best among the laws that already exist.

οἱ δὲ νόμοι	|	The laws
τῆς πολιτικῆς ἔργοις	|	like works of politics
ἐοίκασιν·	|	seem;
πῶς οὖν ἐκ τούτων	|	how indeed from them
νομοθετικὸς	|	legislative
γένοιτ᾽ ἄν τις,	|	would one become,
ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους κρίναι;	|	or judging of the best?
οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται	|	Do they not appear
οὐδ᾽ ἰατρικοὶ	|	not doctors
ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμάτων	|	from books
γίνεσθαι.	|	to become[?]

Here is Reeve’s version:

Laws would seem to be the works of politics, so how could someone become competent in legislative science or discern which laws are best, from them, since it is evident that we do not become doctors from reading textbooks either?

Presumably one becomes a doctor somehow; or was it in oneself all along? I distinguished what one is from what one can be; but an alternative distinction is between what one perceives oneself to be and what one is. Collingwood takes this up in Speculum Mentis (1924):

The concept of perception, like that of a fact, is modern; the Greeks had no name for it, or rather they called it by a name which showed a misconception of its nature, namely, sensation. Sensation is the false or abstract account of perception. In perception we are immediately aware of our object, which is a concrete and therefore historical fact: perception and history are thus identical …

Perhaps the putative misconception is seen, earlier in Book X of the Ethics, in § iv.5:

αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης	|	Each sense [being]
πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν	|	regarding the sensible
ἐνεργούσης,	|	an activity –
τελείως δὲ	|	completely, [being]
τῆς εὖ διακειμένης	|	well disposed
πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον	|	regarding the best
τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν	|	of what fall under the sense …
… καθ᾽ ἑκάστην δὴ	|	in each case then
βελτίστη ἐστὶν	|	best is
ἡ ἐνέργεια	|	the activity
τοῦ ἄριστα διακειμένου	|	of the best disposed
πρὸς τὸ κράτιστον	|	regarding the best
τῶν ὑπ᾽ αὐτήν.	|	of what fall under it.

Reeve’s version:

Since every perceptual capacity is active in relation to its perceptible object, and completely so when it is in good condition in relation to the noblest of its perceptible objects … in the case of each perceptual capacity, the best activity will be, then, the activity of the subject that is in the best condition in relation to the most excellent of its objects.

As far as I can tell, Aristotle is talking literally about the senses, such as sight and sound, without distinguishing them from what we can do with them. Strictly speaking, the eyes and ears have no object, but we can use them to perceive objects.

Collingwood continues:

History is thus, as a specific form of experience, identical with perception. But this may seem paradoxical, because perception appears to be the very humblest and most ordinary of cognitive activities …

… A dialectical series means a series of terms, each one of which is an erroneous description of the next. In a dialectical series A B C, the truth is C; B is a distorted account of it, and A is a distorted account of B. Now if C represents the true nature of a mind, B is a mistake – partial of course; no mistake is a mere mistake – which C makes about itself. This mistake will recoil on C’s own nature …

… If C is the historical experience, and A pure imagination, a mind which calls itself an artist will still be historical at bottom, but this historical nature will be so affected by the description of itself as aesthetic, that even to the dispassionate observer it does not appear as pure or unqualified history. When such a mind discovers its own true nature the distortion in that nature due to error will disappear.

It follows that a mind which is ignorant of its true nature does not in the fullest sense possess this nature.

I quoted that last sentence, and one more, in “On Knowing Ourselves”; now I have given some context.

Of the first long Aristotle quote above, I said it was significant that the necessitative form πειρατέον “one must try” came at the end, as if to be emphasized. I perceive this emphasis to be strengthened by an ensuing rhetorical question, “Or is there any other way to become good?” – literally,

ἢ εἴ πως ἄλλως ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα;

Or if somehow otherwise good do-we-become?

You cannot be good without trying to be. For example, just listening to a lecture won’t make you good, as the Philosopher says presently.

I should like to be able to induce my students to understand this. I recently gave my last lecture in a course of elementary number theory, but the final exam is yet to come. I have hoped that, when I construct tables such as

and

where

so that

• 2 is not a quadratic residue with respect to the modulus 11, and at the same time

  10! ≡ (1⋅2)(3⋅8)(4⋅6)(5⋅7)(9⋅10) ≡ 2⁵ (mod 11),

  and thus, by Wilson’s Theorem,

  (2/11) = 2⁵,

  while

• 3 is a quadratic residue modulo 11, and

  10! ≡ (1⋅3)(2⋅7)(4⋅9)⋅5⋅6⋅(8⋅10) ≡ −3⁵ (mod 11),

  so that

  (3/11) = 3⁵,

and thus we have confirmed Euler’s Criterion, that for odd primes p and non-multiples n of p,

– I wish now that students will work out their own verifications with different primes p and non-multiples n. There is a certain pleasure to be found when, on the first and last rows of the table, each number from 1 to p−1 inclusive appears

• once, if its square is not congruent to n with respect to p;
• twice, if it is.

If this does not happen, one knows that one has made a mistake.

I interpreted Aristotle as saying, “With virtue, the thing is not to know about it, but to have and use it, or at least to try; or is there some other way to be good?” The published translators allow him to be suggesting that there is another way:

Reeve

“Or is it, as the saying goes, that in the case of practical matters the end is not to contemplate and know each of the various things but rather to put it into action, so that knowing about virtue is not enough either, then, but, rather, we must try to have and use it or to become good in whatever other way we can?”

Bartlett and Collins

“Or, just as is said to be the case, is the end in matters of action not contemplating each thing in turn and understanding it, but rather doing them? And so is knowing about virtue not sufficient either, but is it necessary instead to try to possess the virtues and make use of them, unless we become good in some other way?”

Sachs

“Or, as has been said, is the end in matters of action not contemplating and knowing each of them but rather doing them? Then it is not sufficient to know about virtue, but one must try to have it and use it, unless there is some other way that we become good.”

Crisp

“Or is it not true that, as we say, in practical studies the end consists not in contemplating and knowing about each point, but rather in acting upon them? So knowing about virtue is not enough, but we must also try to attain and exercise it, or become good by any other available route.”

Apostle

“or, as the saying goes, is the end in practical matters not speculation and knowledge but rather action? With regard to virtue, to be sure, it is not enough to know what it is, but we should try to acquire and use it or try to become good in some other way.”

Rackham

“Perhaps however, as we maintain, in the practical sciences the end is not to attain a theoretic knowledge of the various subjects, but rather to carry out our theories in action. If so, to know what virtue is is not enough; we must endeavour to possess and to practise it, or in some other manner actually ourselves to become good.”

Ross, revised by Brown

“Surely, as the saying goes, where there are things to be done the end is not to survey and recognize the various things, but rather to do them; with regard to virtue, then, it is not enough to know, but we must try to have and use it, or try any other way there may be of becoming good.”

Is there really another way to be good, besides trying to be virtuous? Reeve and Sachs have notes on this passage, mainly to refer us to Book II, § ii.1 (here with Reeve’s translation):

ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ παροῦσα πραγματεία
οὐ
θεωρίας ἕνεκά ἐστιν
ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι …
ἀναγκαῖον ἐπισκέψασθαι
τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις,
πῶς πρακτέον αὐτάς·
αὗται γάρ εἰσι κύριαι καὶ
τοῦ ποιὰς γενέσθαι τὰς ἕξεις,
καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν.

Since, then, the present work
is not
undertaken for the sake of theoretical knowledge,
as our others are …
we must investigate
what relates to actions,
that is, in what way they are to be done.
For actions also control
what sorts of states will come about,
as we said.

Sachs observes further,

Contemplative activity is identified as our highest and most complete happiness, but it is insufficient for anything that depends on action. The life of action is called a happy life in only a secondary way, but it appears to be an indispensible foundation for a contemplative life …

Only Apostle explicitly takes up the question of whether there is some other way to be good than trying to be virtuous. Although his translation above does not reflect this, his idea seems to be that trying to be virtuous is usually either not possible, because you are not properly motivated, or not sufficient, because you will not be successful, at least on your own. This is why we need laws, and thus politics. Here are Apostle’s own words; I think they summarize this closing chapter of the Ethics:

In what other way? One may try by himself to acquire and then to use virtue, after learning what virtue is and how it can be acquired. Now this assumes that he will learn it, that he will be convinced that virtue is good, and that he will proceed to acquire it in order to use it. But the situation is not so simple. Children hardly form good habits by conviction, and as they grow, it is difficult to change their habits if these are bad, in spite of instruction. So another way is external guidance, and force if necessary, for most people are led by their passions. Thus we are faced with the necessity of a principle which would direct the formation of virtue as far as possible, and this principle is the state, both its laws and the administration of them. Parents can direct the formation of virtue, too, but partly; besides, they are parts of the state. What remains, then, is to discuss the nature of a state, the kinds of states, and other related problems. Politics is concerned with such problems, and Aristotle takes this up in his next book, Politics.

I am glad to be done with the Ethics, because preparing these posts has been a lot of work. Once I started doing the work, I did not know how I could read Aristotle without it. Now I don’t know how to stop, since the Politics remains; however, the Catherine Project group was just for the Ethics.

It is depressing that problems such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine have to be faced. Most of us can take the line that, since we can do nothing about the problem and are far from it anyway, we are free to ignore it.

I am just thinking now of a different kind of hard problem that I once faced. It was not kill or be killed. It was not completing a doctorate in mathematics: this was hard, but when it got really hard, I was so committed that there was no alternative.

Two years before that, I had the alternative of not setting out, in the rain, to traverse the mountains of West Virginia on a bicycle that, with all of my gear, weighted eighty pounds.

In the second spring of the Covid-19 Pandemic, I typed up my old log of a trip from Greenbelt, Maryland, to Sedan, West Virginia, partially along the C&O Canal; see “Cumberland Tour 1994.” A year after that trip and others, I was living in the group house in Washington, DC, described in “Community.” From there, on Tuesday, June 27, 1995, I bicycled 107 miles to Sedan. After resting for a day, I continued west on U.S. Route 50,

• 95 miles on June 29 to Fellowsville, where I camped in a churchyard;
• 105 miles on June 30 to a hotel room in Parkersburg, where I wrote, “Ugh! My butt is raw, my right knee sore, my left Achilles tendon is swollen (and sore).”

Next day I crossed the Ohio River. Back in Sedan, I had written (ellipsis in the original),

It is my intention to continue west to Louisville, Kentucky, to see my father, and thence to ride north, to Harbor Beach, Michigan, where I should like to have at least a few days to relax at the resort before driving home with my mother on 22 July.

It is my intention to do this …, – it has been my intention. But as I rode today through occasional drizzle – as it is raining now – as Elwood told me that it rained two inches here today, in what was like a hurricane, and is predicted to be raining through Saturday – I am having second thoughts.

I was having second thoughts. Now, having showered, eaten, and relaxed, I am feeling re-energized.

I went on writing of various things, such as having felt more stressed by preparing for this trip than for the previous summer’s ride to Harbor Beach through Maryland, Pennsylvania, New York, and Ontario:

this time I knew the difficulties of life on the bicycle, and this time there was more at my home to miss: life in the city proper – last year I was in the suburbs –; my house and housemates; my sweetheart

– with whom I was broken up a year later. Meanwhile, she thought there was a good chance of my being killed:

I’m glad to know that Jill is looking forward to getting certain things done in the free time created by my absence; I am looking forward to surprising her, if I can, by actually surviving this trip.

Describing my ride from DC to Sedan that day, I said,

Early on, with memories fresh of what I was leaving, I wondered what in the hell I was doing. As the distance from home increased though, so did my pleasure in my endeavor. However, I did not like having to mix it up with cars once I reached Purcellville.

Two months later, On August 26, 1995, I recorded more memories of my trip. During the day of rest in Sedan,

After looking at the relief map to see what I was about to do, I really did have second thoughts. I also listened to the weather radio a lot, and was never encouraged.

On July 3, I was sitting outside a diner in Ohio with ice on my knee when a motorcyclist pulled up and invited me to breakfast:

His name was Dave, he was a retired “grinder” salesperson, was a bicyclist himself, but had a late friend who had bicycled all over the country and said that Route 50 through West Virginia was the most difficult road to travel.

For some reason, I had subjected myself to that road.

Contents and Summary

• Chapter IX
• Chapter 10
  • We have studied
    • these [i.e. “happinesses”],
    • virtues,
    • friendship,
    • pleasure –

    however, the point is

    • ∗
      • not just theory,
      • but practice (§ ix.1);
    • concerning virtue,
      • not to know about it,
      • but to
        • have and
        • use it,

    unless we can otherwise become good (§ ix.2).

  • Concerning speeches (οἱ λόγοι),
    • were they enough,
      one should pay for them;
    • they are enough,
      • to make receptive of virtue
        the freeborn (ἐλευθέριος) youth,
      • but not to lead to gentility (καλοκαγαθία)
        the hoi polloi § ix.3),
        who
        • are ruled
          • not by shame (αἰδώς),
          • but by fear (φόβος);
        • avoid
          • not disgrace (τὸ αίσχρόν),
          • but vengeance (τιμωρία);
        • living by passion,
          • pursue pleasure,
          • avoid pain;
        • have
          • no conception of the truly
            • good and
            • pleasant, because
          • no taste of it (§ ix.4);
    • they are unlikely to counteract character or custom (ἦθος, maybe ἔθος).
  • It would be desirable (ἀγαπητόν) to share in virtue,
    having what we think we need (§ ix.5):
    • nature – not up to us;
    • training (διδαχή) – not enough;
    • custom (ἔθος),

    as e.g. land must be prepared for sowing (§ ix.6, 7).

  • Under the right laws, one must
    • be raised to be accustomed to living
      • moderately,
      • patiently (καρτερικῶς, § ix.8);
    • continue as an adult.
  • The hoi polloi obey
    • necessity before reason,
    • penalty (ζημία) before beauty (§ ix.9).
  • Some say the nomothetes must
    • encourage virtue;
    • punish transgressors, as if e.g. beasts of burden;
    • banish the incorrigible (§ ix.10).
  • To be good then, one must live according to
    • intellect,
    • an order (τάξις) that is
      • right,
      • backed by strength (ἰσχύς, § ix.11).
  • Nonetheless, that
    • strength and
    • necessity (τὸ ἀναγχαῖον)

    is possessed by

    • no father or any single man, save a king,
    • but law (ὁ νόμος, (§ ix.12),
  • ∗
    • In Sparta, the nomothete governs
      • nursing (τροφή)
      • practices (ἐπιτηδεύματα).
    • Elsewhere one governs (θεμιστεύω) like e.g. the Cyclops (§ ix.13).

    ∗

    • The former is best if done right.
    • For the latter, one should become a nomothete.
  • The common care (αἱ κοιναὶ ἐπιμέλειαι):
    • it comes about through laws (νόμοι);
    • decent, through good;

    these can be

    • written or not,
    • training
      • one or
      • many,

    as e.g. in

    • music or
    • gymnastics.
  • What holds sway (ἐνισχύω):
    • as in the cities,
      • law (τὰ νόμιμα),
      • custom (τὰ ἤθη),
    • so in the household,
      • the word of the father (οἱ πατρικοὶ λόγοι),
      • [his] customs (τὰ ἔθη),

      the more so because of the family ties (§ ix.14).

  • Individual education differs from common:
    the common approach may not suit a particular person,
    as e.g. in
    • medicine,
    • pugilism,
    • gymnastics.

    It is best to know both,
    as science is of the common (§ ix.15),
    though exceptions may be found (§ ix.16);
    if anybody can do the job,
    it is the knower (ὁ εἰδώς, § ix.17).

  • How does one become nomothetic?
    • In the other
      • sciences and
      • abilities,

      the same people, e.g.

      • doctors,
      • painters,

      both

      • pass along the ability and
      • put it to work.
    • In politics,
      • the Sophists profess to teach it;
      • it is practiced,
        • not by them,
        • but by the politicians –
          • not by thought,
          • but by
            • ability and
            • experience –

          who

          • do not pass along their ability (§ ix.18)
            but would if they could;
          • get political by living in a polity,
            so experience matters (§ ix.19).
  • The sophists professing to teach politics cannot.
    • They put politics
      • on a level with rhetoric,
      • or lower.
    • They think legislation is easy
      from a collection of good laws.
    • They think they can pick out the good laws,
      though this needs
      • comprehension and
      • discernment,

      as e.g. in music.

    • ∗
      • The inexperienced may have a sense
        whether a work is done
        • well or
        • ill,

        as e.g. in painting, but

      • the politician has to do the work (§ ix.20).
  • A treatise
    • of e.g. medicine
      • cannot make you a doctor, but
      • is useful if you are one;
    • of
      • laws and
      • polities,

      likewise:
      if you have not got the habit (ἕξις),

      • you will not judge well,
        unless accidentally (αὐτόματον);
      • you may still learn something (§ ix.21).
  • Transition to the Politics.
    Those before having failed,
    we shall now investigate
    • legislation (νομοθεσία),
    • policy (πολιτεία) in general,

    to complete our humane philosophy
    (τὰ ἀνθρώπεια φιλοσοφία, § ix.22),

    • first reviewing what has been done,
    • then contemplating,
      using the collection of regimes,
      • what
        • preserves and
        • destroys

        ∗

        • cities and
        • regimes, and
      • what causes them to be run
        • well or
        • ill,
    • ultimately knowing
      • what sort of regime is best, and
      • how each is ordered,
      • using what
        • laws and
        • customs (§ ix.23).

Text

[1179^a]

Chapter IX

Chapter 10

§ ix.1

ἆρ᾽ οὖν εἰ περί τε

• τούτων καὶ
• τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ
• φιλίας καὶ
• ἡδονῆς,

ἱκανῶς εἴρηται τοῖς τύποις,
τέλος ἔχειν οἰητέον τὴν προαίρεσιν;

ἢ καθάπερ λέγεται, [1179^b]

• οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ
  • θεωρῆσαι ἕκαστα καὶ
  • γνῶναι,
• ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτά·

§ ix.2

• οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἱκανὸν τὸ εἰδέναι,
• ἀλλ᾽
  • ∗
    • ἔχειν καὶ
    • χρῆσθαι

    πειρατέον,

  • ἢ εἴ πως ἄλλως ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα;

§ ix.3

• εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι αὐτάρκεις
  πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς,

  • ∗

    • πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ
    • μεγάλους

    δικαίως ἔφερον
    κατὰ τὸν Θέογνιν,

  • καὶ ἔδει ἂν τούτους πορίσασθαι·

• νῦν δὲ φαίνονται
  • ∗
    • ∗
      • προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ
      • παρορμῆσαι

      τῶν νέων τοὺς ἐλευθερίους ἰσχύειν,

    • ∗
      • ἦθός τ᾽ εὐγενὲς καὶ
      • ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόκαλον

      ποιῆσαι ἂν κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς,

  • τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι·

§ ix.4

• ∗
  • οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοῖ πειθαρχεῖν
  • ἀλλὰ φόβῳ,
• ∗
  • οὐδ᾽ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν
  • ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας·

• πάθει γὰρ ζῶντες
  • ∗
    • τὰς οἰκείας ἡδονὰς διώκουσι καὶ
    • δι᾽ ὧν αὗται ἔσονται,
  • φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς ἀντικειμένας λύπας,
• τοῦ δὲ
  • καλοῦ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς
  • ἡδέος

  οὐδ᾽ ἔννοιαν ἔχουσιν,
  ἄγευστοι ὄντες.

§ ix.5

τοὺς δὴ τοιούτους τίς ἂν λόγος μεταρρυθμίσαι;

• οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἢ
• οὐ ῥᾴδιον

τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἤθεσι κατειλημμένα
λόγῳ μεταστῆσαι·

ἀγαπητὸν δ᾽ ἴσως ἐστὶν
εἰ πάντων ὑπαρχόντων
δι᾽ ὧν ἐπιεικεῖς δοκοῦμεν γίνεσθαι,
μεταλάβοιμεν τῆς ἀρετῆς.

§ ix.6

γίνεσθαι δ᾽ ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται

• οἳ μὲν φύσει
• οἳ δ᾽ ἔθει
• οἳ δὲ διδαχῇ.

• τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς
  • οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν
    ὑπάρχει,
  • ἀλλὰ διά τινας θείας αἰτίας
    τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν
    ὑπάρχει·
• ∗
  • ∗
    • ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ
    • ἡ διδαχὴ

    μή ποτ᾽ οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἰσχύει,

  • ἀλλὰ δεῖ προδιειργάσθαι
    τοῖς ἔθεσι
    τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ ψυχὴν
    πρὸς τὸ καλῶς
    • χαίρειν καὶ
    • μισεῖν,

    ὥσπερ γῆν τὴν θρέψουσαν τὸ σπέρμα.

§ ix.7

• οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσειε λόγου ἀποτρέποντος
• οὐδ᾽ αὖ συνείη

ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν·

τὸν δ᾽ οὕτως ἔχοντα πῶς οἷόν τε μεταπεῖσαι;

ὅλως τ᾽

• οὐ δοκεῖ λόγῳ ὑπείκειν τὸ πάθος
• ἀλλὰ βίᾳ.

§ ix.8

δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἦθος προϋπάρχειν πως οἰκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς,

• στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ
• δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρόν.

ἐκ νέου δ᾽ ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν πρὸς ἀρετὴν
χαλεπὸν
μὴ ὑπὸ τοιούτοις τραφέντα νόμοις·

τὸ γὰρ

• σωφρόνως καὶ
• καρτερικῶς

ζῆν οὐχ ἡδὺ

• τοῖς πολλοῖς,
• ἄλλως τε καὶ νέοις.

διὸ νόμοις δεῖ τετάχθαι

• τὴν τροφὴν καὶ
• τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα·

οὐκ ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ
συνήθη γενόμενα. [1180^a]

§ ix.9

• οὐχ ἱκανὸν δ᾽ ἴσως νέους ὄντας
  • τροφῆς καὶ
  • ἐπιμελείας

  τυχεῖν ὀρθῆς,

• ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιεδὴ καὶ ἀνδρωθέντας δεῖ
  • ἐπιτηδεύειν αὐτὰ καὶ
  • ἐθίζεσθαι,
• καὶ
  • περὶ ταῦτα δεοίμεθ᾽ ἂν νόμων, καὶ
  • ὅλως δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον·

οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ

• ἀνάγκῃ μᾶλλον
• ἢ λόγῳ

πειθαρχοῦσι καὶ

• ζημίαις
• ἢ τῷ καλῷ.

§ ix.10

διόπερ οἴονταί τινες τοὺς νομοθετοῦντας

• δεῖν μὲν
  • παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ
  • προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν,
    ὡς ἐπακουσομένων τῶν ἐπιεικῶς τοῖς ἔθεσι προηγμένων,
• ∗
  • ἀπειθοῦσι δὲ καὶ
  • ἀφυεστέροις οὖσι
     
  • κολάσεις τε καὶ
  • τιμωρίας

  ἐπιτιθέναι,

• τοὺς δ᾽ ἀνιάτους ὅλως ἐξορίζειν·

• τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντα
  τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχήσειν,
• τὸν δὲ φαῦλον ἡδονῆς ὀρεγόμενον
  λύπῃ κολάζεσθαι
  ὥσπερ ὑποζύγιον.

διὸ καί φασι δεῖν τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι τὰς λύπας
αἳ μάλιστ᾽ ἐναντιοῦνται ταῖς ἀγαπωμέναις ἡδοναῖς.

§ ix.11

• εἰ δ᾽ οὖν,
  καθάπερ εἴρηται,
  τὸν ἐσόμενον ἀγαθὸν
  • ∗
    • τραφῆναι καλῶς δεῖ καὶ
    • ἐθισθῆναι,
  • εἶθ᾽ οὕτως
    • ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἐπιεικέσι ζῆν
    • καὶ
      • μήτ᾽ ἄκοντα
      • μήθ᾽ ἑκόντα

      πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα,

• ταῦτα δὲ γίνοιτ᾽ ἂν βιουμένοις κατά
  • τινα νοῦν καὶ
  • τάξιν
    • ὀρθήν,
    • ἔχουσαν ἰσχύν·

§ ix.12

• ∗
  • ἡ μὲν οὖν πατρικὴ πρόσταξις
    • οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἰσχυρὸν
    • οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον,
  • οὐδὲ δὴ ὅλως ἡ ἑνὸς ἀνδρός,
    μὴ
    • βασιλέως ὄντος ἤ
    • τινος τοιούτου·
• ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν,
  λόγος ὢν ἀπό τινος
  • φρονήσεως καὶ
  • νοῦ.

καὶ

• τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἐχθαίρουσι τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους ταῖς ὁρμαῖς,
  κἂν ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ δρῶσιν·
• ὁ δὲ νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπαχθὴς
  τάττων τὸ ἐπιεικές.

§ ix.13

• ἐν
  • μόνῃ δὲ τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων πόλει ἢ
  • μετ᾽ ὀλίγων

  ὁ νομοθέτης ἐπιμέλειαν δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι

  • τροφῆς τε καὶ
  • ἐπιτηδευμάτων·
• ἐν δὲ ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων

  • ἐξημέληται περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ

  • ζῇ ἕκαστος ὡς βούλεται,

    κυκλωπικῶς θεμιστεύων

    • παίδων ἠδ᾽
    • ἀλόχου.

§ ix.14

• κράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίνεσθαι κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν
  • καὶ ὀρθὴν
  • [καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι·]
• κοινῇ δ᾽ ἐξαμελουμένων
  ἑκάστῳ δόξειεν ἂν προσήκειν
  • τοῖς σφετέροις
    • τέκνοις καὶ
    • φίλοις

    εἰς ἀρετὴν συμβάλλεσθαι, ∗∗

  • ἢ προαιρεῖσθαί γε.

μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἂν τοῦτο δύνασθαι δόξειεν
ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων
νομοθετικὸς γενόμενος.

• αἱ μὲν γὰρ κοιναὶ ἐπιμέλειαι δῆλον ὅτι
  διὰ νόμων γίνονται,
• ἐπιεικεῖς δ᾽ αἱ
  διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων· [1180^b]

• ∗
  • γεγραμμένων δ᾽ ἢ
  • ἀγράφων,

  οὐδὲν ἂν δόξειε διαφέρειν,

• οὐδὲ δι᾽ ὧν
  • εἷς ἢ
  • πολλοὶ

  παιδευθήσονται,

• ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐνισχύει
  • τὰ νόμιμα καὶ
  • τὰ ἤθη,
• οὕτω καὶ ἐν οἰκίαις
  • οἱ πατρικοὶ λόγοι καὶ
  • τὰ ἔθη,

  καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον διὰ

  • τὴν συγγένειαν καὶ
  • τὰς εὐεργεσίας·

  προϋπάρχουσι γὰρ

  • στέργοντες καὶ
  • εὐπειθεῖς

  τῇ φύσει.

§ ix.15

ἔτι δὲ καὶ διαφέρουσιν

• αἱ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον παιδεῖαι
• τῶν κοινῶν,

ἐξακριβοῦσθαι δὴ δόξειεν ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον
ἰδίας τῆς ἐπιμελείας γινομένης·

μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ προσφόρου τυγχάνει ἕκαστος.

(τοῦ κοινοῦ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι

• λέγονταί τε καὶ
• εἰσίν)·

§ ix.16

οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἑνός τινος οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει καλῶς ἐπιμεληθῆναι
καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονα ὄντα,
τεθεαμένον δ᾽ ἀκριβῶς τὰ συμβαίνοντα
ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστῳ
δι᾽ ἐμπειρίαν,

οὐδὲν δ᾽ ἧττον ἴσως
τῷ γε βουλομένῳ

• τεχνικῷ γενέσθαι καὶ
• θεωρητικῷ

• ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου βαδιστέον εἶναι δόξειεν ἄν,
• κἀκεῖνο γνωριστέον ὡς ἐνδέχεται·

εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τοῦθ᾽ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι.

§ ix.17

τάχα δὲ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ δι᾽ ἐπιμελείας βελτίους ποιεῖν,

• εἴτε πολλοὺς
• εἴτ᾽ ὀλίγους,

νομοθετικῷ πειρατέον γενέσθαι,
εἰ διὰ νόμων ἀγαθοὶ γενοίμεθ᾽ ἄν.

ὅντινα γὰρ οὖν καὶ τὸν προτεθέντα διαθεῖναι καλῶς

• οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τυχόντος,
• ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ τινός, τοῦ εἰδότος,

§ ix.18

ἆρ᾽ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον

• πόθεν ἢ
• πῶς

νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ᾽ ἄν τις;

ἢ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων,
παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν;

μόριον γὰρ ἐδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι.

ἢ οὐχ ὅμοιον φαίνεται ἐπὶ

• τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ
• τῶν λοιπῶν
  • ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ
  • δυνάμεων;

• ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις
  οἱ αὐτοὶ φαίνονται
  • τάς τε δυνάμεις παραδιδόντες καὶ
  • ἐνεργοῦντες ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν,
  οἷον

  • ἰατροὶ
  • γραφεῖς·
• τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ
  • ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταί, [1181^a]
  • πράττει δ᾽ αὐτῶν
    • οὐδείς,
    • ἀλλ᾽ οἱ πολιτευόμενοι,
      οἳ δόξαιεν ἂν
      • ∗
        • δυνάμει τινὶ τοῦτο πράττειν καὶ
        • ἐμπειρίᾳ μᾶλλον
        • ἢ διανοίᾳ·
      • ∗
        • οὔτε γὰρ γράφοντες
        • οὔτε λέγοντες

        περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φαίνονται
        (καίτοι

        • κάλλιον ἦν ἴσως
        • ἢ λόγους
          • δικανικούς τε καὶ
          • δημηγορικούς),
      • οὐδ᾽ αὖ πολιτικοὺς πεποιηκότες
        • τοὺς σφετέρους υἱεῖς ἤ
        • τινας ἄλλους τῶν φίλων.

§ ix.19

εὔλογον δ᾽ ἦν, εἴπερ ἐδύναντο·

• οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄμεινον οὐδὲν κατέλιπον ἄν,
• οὔθ᾽ αὑτοῖς ὑπάρξαι προέλοιντ᾽ ἂν μᾶλλον
  τῆς τοιαύτης δυνάμεως,
• οὐδὲ δὴ τοῖς φιλτάτοις.

οὐ μὴν μικρόν γε ἔοικεν ἡ ἐμπειρία συμβάλλεσθαι·

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγίνοντ᾽ ἂν
διὰ τῆς πολιτικῆς συνηθείας πολιτικοί·

διὸ τοῖς ἐφιεμένοις περὶ πολιτικῆς εἰδέναι προσδεῖν ἔοικεν ἐμπειρίας.

§ ix.20

τῶν δὲ σοφιστῶν οἱ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι

• λίαν φαίνονται πόρρω εἶναι τοῦ διδάξαι.
• ὅλως γὰρ
  • οὐδὲ ποῖόν τι ἐστὶν
  • ἢ περὶ ποῖα

  ἴσασιν·

• οὐ γὰρ ἂν
  • τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ
  • οὐδὲ χείρω

  ἐτίθεσαν,

• οὐδ᾽ ἂν ᾤοντο ῥᾴδιον εἶναι τὸ νομοθετῆσαι
  συναγαγόντι τοὺς εὐδοκιμοῦντας τῶν νόμων·

ἐκλέξασθαι γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς ἀρίστους,
ὥσπερ οὐδὲ

• τὴν ἐκλογὴν οὖσαν συνέσεως καὶ
• τὸ κρῖναι ὀρθῶς μέγιστον,

ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μουσικήν.

οἱ γὰρ ἔμπειροι περὶ ἕκαστα

• κρίνουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ ἔργα, καὶ
• δι᾽ ὧν ἢ πῶς ἐπιτελεῖται συνιᾶσιν, καὶ
• ποῖα ποίοις συνᾴδει·

τοῖς δ᾽ ἀπείροις
ἀγαπητὸν τὸ μὴ διαλανθάνειν
εἰ

• εὖ ἢ
• κακῶς

πεποίηται τὸ ἔργον,

ὥσπερ ἐπὶ γραφικῆς.

οἱ δὲ νόμοι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἔργοις ἐοίκασιν· [1181^b]

πῶς οὖν ἐκ τούτων

• νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ᾽ ἄν τις, ἢ
• τοὺς ἀρίστους κρίναι;

§ ix.21

ἴσως οὖν

• καὶ τῶν νόμων
• καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν

αἱ συναγωγαὶ

• τοῖς μὲν δυναμένοις
  • θεωρῆσαι καὶ
  • κρῖναι

  ∗

  • τί
    • καλῶς ἢ
    • τοὐναντίον καὶ
  • ποῖα ποίοις ἁρμόττει

  εὔχρηστ᾽ ἂν εἴη·

• τοῖς δ᾽ ἄνευ ἕξεως τὰ τοιαῦτα διεξιοῦσι
  • τὸ μὲν κρίνειν καλῶς οὐκ ἂν ὑπάρχοι,
    εἰ μὴ ἄρα αὐτόματον,
  • εὐσυνετώτεροι δ᾽ εἰς ταῦτα τάχ᾽ ἂν γένοιντο.

§ ix.22

παραλιπόντων οὖν τῶν προτέρων ἀνερεύνητον τὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας,

• αὐτοὺς ἐπισκέψασθαι μᾶλλον βέλτιον ἴσως, καὶ
• ὅλως δὴ περὶ πολιτείας,

ὅπως εἰς δύναμιν
ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια φιλοσοφία τελειωθῇ.

§ ix.23

• πρῶτον μὲν οὖν
  εἴ τι κατὰ μέρος εἴρηται καλῶς ὑπὸ τῶν προγενεστέρων
  πειραθῶμεν ἐπελθεῖν,
• εἶτα ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν θεωρῆσαι
  • τὰ ποῖα
    • σῴζει καὶ
    • φθείρει

    τὰς πόλεις καὶ

  • τὰ ποῖα
    ἑκάστας τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ
  • διὰ τίνας αἰτίας
    • αἳ μὲν καλῶς
    • αἳ δὲ τοὐναντίον

    πολιτεύονται.

θεωρηθέντων γὰρ τούτων
τάχ᾽ ἂν μᾶλλον συνίδοιμεν

• καὶ ποία πολιτεία ἀρίστη,
• καὶ πῶς ἑκάστη ταχθεῖσα,
• καὶ τίσι
  • νόμοις καὶ
  • ἔθεσι

  χρωμένη.

λέγωμεν οὖν ἀρξάμενοι.