According to the last three chapters of Book VIII of the Nicomachean Ethics:

12. All friendship (φιλία) derives from that between
    • parent and child or
    • man and woman.
13. The friendship of utility is unstable, because inevitably the principals believe they don’t get what they deserve.
14. Fathers deserve all honor – the reward of the superior in any relationship.

In this first of two books on friendship, a theme has been that we make friends before polities. As Aristotle told us in § 4 of chapter i,

ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰς πόλεις συνέχειν ἡ φιλία …
φίλων μὲν ὄντων
οὐδὲν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης,
δίκαιοι δ᾽ ὄντες
προσδέονται φιλίας,
καὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ.

Friendship seems also to hold cities together …
And when people are friends,
they have no need of justice,
while when they are just,
they need friendship as well;
and the highest form of justice seems to be a matter of friendship.

The translation is by Crisp. In the present reading, we go back further, not only to friendship as such, but to friendship with, and of, those who make us: I mean

• our friendship with our parents and
• their friendship with one another.

These are examples of unequal friendship, introduced in § vii.1:

ἕτερον δ᾽ ἐστὶ φιλίας εἶδος
τὸ καθ᾽ ὑπεροχήν,
οἷον πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν
καὶ ὅλως πρεσβυτέρῳ πρὸς νεώτερον,
ἀνδρί τε πρὸς γυναῖκα
καὶ παντὶ ἄρχοντι πρὸς ἀρχόμενον.
διαφέρουσι δ᾽ αὗται καὶ ἀλλήλων·

There is another species of friendship,
that involving superiority –
for example, that of father to son,
and of older to younger in general,
of man to woman,
and of any ruler to his subject.
These friendships also differ from one another.

Grammatically speaking, when Adam loves Eve, the love is not the property of Adam, but is given to him, for Eve; that is,

• “Adam” takes
  • not the genitive case,
  • but the dative;
• “Eve” takes the accusative case with the preposition πρός.

The grammar then symbolizes what Aristotle is going to say in Book XI, chapter ix, § 5, that the happy man needs friends, because happiness is an activity (ἐνέργεια), not a possession (κτῆμα).

Meanwhile, the friendship between parents and children came up earlier in the present Book VIII, in § i.3:

φύσει τ᾽ ἐνυπάρχειν ἔοικε
πρὸς τὸ γεγεννημένον τῷ γεννήσαντι
καὶ πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν τῷ γεννηθέντι,
οὐ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώποις …

And there seems to be a natural friendship
of a parent for a child,
and of a child for a parent,
and this occurs not only among human beings …

Parent and child here are more literally begetter and begotton: τὸ γεννῆσαν and τὸ γεγεννημένον, which are neuter cases of participles, respectively active and passive, of γεννάω “engender.” When human instances are meant, different words are used, ὁ γονεὺς and τὸ τέκνον, as in § xii.2 below:

οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα
ὡς ἑαυτῶν τι ὄντα,
τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς
ὡς ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνων τι ὄντα.

… : a parent is fond of his child
as being a part of himself,
and children are fond of a parent
as being their originator.

Thus Aristotle’s γὰρ becomes a preceding colon for Crisp, who also clears up the Philosopher’s grammar. I do not know why he changes the grammatical numbers, since a literal translation would be more like,

For, parents love children
as being something from themselves,
while children, parents,
as being something out of those [people].

In particular, the antecedents of “as” (ὡς) are the children in each case.

We saw the idea earlier. After starting chapter xi with the relation of a king to his subjects, the Philosopher pointed out,

τοιαύτη δὲ καὶ ἡ πατρική,
διαφέρει δὲ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν εὐεργετημάτων·
αἴτιος γὰρ τοῦ εἶναι,
δοκοῦντος μεγίστου,
καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας.

The friendship of a father is similar to this,
though it differs in the magnitude of the benefits conferred.
He is responsible for his children’s existence,
which seems to be the greatest of benefits,
as well as for their nurture and education.

The translator is still Crisp, who fleshes out the bare bones of the Greek text. Keeping them bare may be more suggestive:

Like that [is] also the paternal [friendship],
and it differs in the greatness of [its] benefits.
For [it is] cause of being –
seemingly the greatest thing –
as well as of nourishing and teaching.

Aristotle doesn’t name the father, but only his friendship. Strictly, he does not name even this, except implicitly, through the adjective πατρικός, given in feminine form (πατρική) to agree with φιλία, which, though missing here, was used in the previous section. Perhaps our existence is caused not by our father as an individual, but by his friendship, or love – grammatically, as we said, the love that comes to him, for us.

A counterargument is that the word for cause here, αἴτιος, is normally an adjective, and Aristotle uses it in masculine form, as if to agree with πατήρ, so that the sense of the clause is more like, “He is causative of being.” If the Philosopher had meant cause to be understood as a noun, perhaps he would have used the article, as in ὁ αἴτιος. I don’t know how strong that argument is.

I also don’t know how strongly the notion of πατρική φιλία alludes to a father as such, rather than a parent, who could be a mother as well. Are we talking about paternal friendship precisely, or only “anagrammatically,” so to speak, while our real topic is parental friendship?

In § xiv.4, Aristotle seems to be quite specific about sex, though perhaps for reasons of law, not biology:

διὸ κἂν δόξειεν οὐκ ἐξεῖναι υἱῷ πατέρα ἀπείπασθαι,
πατρὶ δ᾽ υἱόν·

This is why it seems a son may not disown his father,
though a father may disown his son.

Perhaps a more literal translation of ἀπείπασθαι than disown is renounce, if not tell off. The root idea seems to be of speaking. I suppose the speech of the female had little or no legal value in Aristotle’s milieu, though Aristophanes had imagined that it could have, in the Assemblywomen (to name the only Aristophanes that I have read, aside from the Clouds).

Elsewhere Aristotle treats both our mother and our father as causes of us, though in different senses, so that there are analogies as follows:

This is in Generation of Animals I.20–1:

If, then, the male stands for the effective and active, and the female, considered as female, for the passive, it follows that what the female would contribute to the semen of the male would not be semen but material for the semen to work upon. This is just what we find to be the case, for the catamenia have in their nature an affinity to the primitive matter.

---

But the female, as female, is passive, and the male, as male, is active, and the principle of the movement comes from him. Therefore, if we take the highest genera under which they each fall, the one being active and motive and the other passive and moved, that one thing which is produced comes from them only in the sense in which a bed comes into being from the carpenter and the wood, or in which a ball comes into being from the wax and the form. It is plain then that it is not necessary that anything at all should come away from the male, and if anything does come away it does not follow that this gives rise to the embryo as being in the embryo, but only as that which imparts the motion and as the form; so the medical art cures the patient.

The Philosopher distinguished mothers In our second reading from Ethics VIII, in § viii.3:

δοκεῖ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον
ἢ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι εἶναι.
σημεῖον δ᾽ αἱ μητέρες τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρουσαι·
ἔνιαι γὰρ διδόασι τὰ ἑαυτῶν τρέφεσθαι,
καὶ φιλοῦσι μὲν εἰδυῖαι,
ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι δ᾽ οὐ ζητοῦσιν,
ἐὰν ἀμφότερα μὴ ἐνδέχηται.

But friendship seems to consist more in loving
than in being loved,
as is indicated by the enjoyment a mother finds in love.
Sometimes she will give her own child to others to bring up,
and though she loves him because she knows him,
she does not seek to be loved in return,
if it is impossible to have both.

Fathers can be notorious for their lack of interest in their children, and it seems reasonable to trace this to a “material” cause, so to speak. Children start out as parts of their mothers’ bodies, not their fathers’. Sigrid Undset makes the connection in Kristin Lavransdatter (translation of Tiina Nunnally, page 628):

With each son added to the flock she recognized that her responsibility had grown for ensuring the prosperity and secure position of the lineage … Wherever they ended up in the world, wherever they journeyed, forgetting their mother – she thought that for her, their lives would be like a current in her own life; they would be one with her, just as they had been when she alone on this earth knew about the new life hidden inside, drinking from her blood and making her cheeks pale.

On the other hand, as an adoptee, I was never part of my mother’s body. Expecting this to make a difference is the mistake called biological history in my post of that name. As I noted in the end though, Lauren Burns made a good case in Triple Helix: My donor-conceived story that one has, or should have, a right to know one’s material origins.

I went into these things more in “Cavafy in Istanbul,” where I observed that, however people become parents, they can believe either that they are in debt to their child, or that the child is in debt to them. It is the belief that makes all the difference.

Back in 2022 (August 23), Carolyn Hax lambasted the belief of the reader who wrote,

My wife and I discovered by chance that my brother’s wife was impregnated through IVF. They chose not to mention that to us, at least.

It now occurs to us she may have used donor sperm. I can’t think of a good reason the family should not have a right to the truth, but I suspect you probably can.

I would like to add, I’m not impressed with a superior claim to privacy, because we’re talking about a permanent addition to our families, and this amounts to a blurring of our identity.

To the righteous responses of Hax and readers, I can only add that you never know what recessive genes, or for that matter what mutations, might get expressed in a new baby. Or maybe you do, with technology; but then the genes don’t define the family – do they?

More recently (March 13, 2024), Amy Dickinson did not question the logic of the reader who reported of her mother,

She said that my dad was sterile, so she and my dad used IVF to have my brother and me. I was not too surprised to learn that my brother and I are only half-siblings because we were never that close.

Dickinson did allow a reader to question the logic, two weeks later:

The letter about DNA from “Unsure” revealed that the writer’s dad was not their biological father. I recently found out that my half brother is not biologically related to me at all. My dad and stepmom used a sperm donor 36 years ago to bring one of my absolute favorite people into the world. It was a shock when I found out that we weren’t related by blood, but he is 100 percent the brother I love!

Letters to advice columnists sometimes mention estranged siblings, and I assume these siblings are biologically related, at least in most cases. Another example is in the memoir by Lisa Morrow that I took up at the beginning of “Poetry and Mathematics”:

Home is not my immediate family, a disjointed unit comprising two adults and three children. What wasn’t torn asunder by divorce has since been buried by death. With both parents deceased the blood ties of the three adult children who remain are completely and forever undone. The grownup sequel to their childhood, filed under the wrong Dewey decimal number while they were still young, has been lost.

I suggested at the top of this post that for Aristotle, family friendships are somehow the original friendships. I’m not aware that he means to explain this biologically. Even if he does, his biology is different from ours, as is shown by the quotations from Generation of Animals. Nonetheless, the real point seems to be made by Susan Cain, who says in a newsletter inspired by poetry of Czesław Miłosz,

all my life I have intensely loved individuals, and intensely mistrusted groups, specifically their capacity to descend into mob violence.

Cain goes on to suggest what Aristotle may mean to say about family:

Of course, groups can do great things too, and of course, we all have our tribal allegiances, via family, religion, nationality, sports team, etc. For better and for worse, that’s part of what it means to be human. The word “kind” derives from “kin.” Humans seem to love their kin above all else. It’s from our kin that we learn how to love in the first place. We enter the world naked and bewildered, and our kin feed us and hug us and keep us warm.

It was because of an earlier newsletter of Cain’s, on the poetry of Constantine Cavafy, that I made the post already mentioned, “Cavafy in Istanbul.”

---

Contents and Summary

• Chapter XII = Chapter 14
  • All friendship is in community (ἐν κοινωνίᾳ), but

    • some cases are more like that
      (i.e. κοινωνικός “communicative”)
      for being by agreement (καθ᾽ ὁμολογίαν τινά):

      • political (πολιτική),
      • tribal (φυλετική),
      • naval (συμπλοϊκή), even
      • hospitable (ξενική = ξένια);
    • special are friendships

      • familial (συγγενική),
      • comradely (ἑταιρική, § xii.1).
  • Family friendships are
    • of many kinds, but
    • based on the fatherly kind. They love,
      • do parents, especially mothers,
        their children,
        • as their own;
        • knowing them as their own,
          as one does e.g.
          • teeth,
          • hair;
        • immediately;
      • do children,
        their parents,
        • as being their source,
        • once they learn this (§ xii.2).
  • They love,
    • do parents, their children,
      as themselves,
      for, what is from you is another you;
    • do children, their parents,
      because coming from them;
    • do brothers, one another,
      • having the same parents,
        for, identity with them
        produces the same with one another;
      • sharing
        • blood and
        • root;
      • being the same in different [bodies] (§ xii.3);
      • being
        • brought up together,
          e.g. like comrades;
        • of the same age,
          e.g. “like age gladdens like age”;
    • do cousins et al., one another,
      depending on distance
      from the dynast (ἀρχηγός, § xii.4).
  • [The family friendships in detail.]
    • Of children for parents:
      • Like e.g. that of men for gods,
        it is for what is
        • good and
        • superior,

        namely the providers of

        • being,
        • feeding,
        • educating (§ xii.5).
      • Better than friendship of strangers,
        it has
        • pleasure and
        • utility.
    • Of brothers:
      • It is comradely,
        moreso in those who are
        • decent or
        • similar,

        because:

      • those belong more to one another
        who love one another from birth;
      • those are more alike
        who are
        • brought up together and
        • educated similarly.
    • Of more distant relations,
      analogously (§ xii.6).
    • Of man and woman:
      • It is natural,
        humans by nature forming
        • pairs, rather than
        • polities,

        inasmuch as:

        • the household,
          than the city, is
          • earlier and
          • more necessary;
        • even animals have children;
        • humans share
          • not only children,
          • but the work of life,
            which is different for
            • man and
            • woman.
      • It is based on
        • utility and
        • pleasure, and even
        • virtue, if the partners are decent.
      • Children strengthen it (§ xii.7).
  • Seeking how to live together,

    • man with woman,
    • friend with friend,

    is not different from
    seeking justice.
    It’s not the same between

    • friends,
    • strangers,
    • comrades,
    • schoolmates (§ xii.8).
• Chapter XIII = Chapter 15
  • We recall that of friendship there are
    • three kinds, based on
      • goodness,
      • pleasure,
      • utility;
    • two kinds, of
      • equals, who equalize those things;
      • unequals, who exchange them in proportion (§ xiii.1).
  • Complaints happen most or only in the friendship of utility.
    • Not in the friendship of goodness,
      where each tries to give more than the other (§ xiii.2).
    • Nor in the pleasure-friendship –
      if they don’t like what they get,
      why are they together (§ xiii.3)?
    • But in the friendship of utility,
      where each always thinks he deserves more (§ xiii.4).
  • As what is just is either
    • unwritten (ἀραφογον) or
    • codified (κατὰ νόμον),

    so the friendship of utility is either

    • moral (ἠξική) or
    • legal (νομική).
  • Complaints arise most when not on the same terms do they
    • come together and
    • separate (§ xiii.5).
  • The legal type is on stated terms,
    • completely mercenary and immediate, or
    • more liberal as to time of repayment,
      hence unenforceable in some jurisdictions (§ xiii.6).
  • The moral type is
    • not on stated terms,
    • but somebody gives something,
      • as if to a friend,
      • but expecting back
        • equal or
        • more (§ xiii.7).

        If it doesn’t happen,
        there’s a complaint, because all or most people

        • want the beautiful and noble (τὰ καλά), and
          that’s what giving with no strings attached is;
        • choose the beneficial, and
          that’s what being benefited is (§ xiii.8).
  • One should pay back what is agreed to, willingly (§ xiii.9).
    • How much is that?
      It’s as much as the recipient has actually benefited (§ xiii.10).
    • In friendships of virtue,
      the question doesn’t arise (§ xiii.11).
• Chapter XIV = Chapter 16

  • In a friendship of superiority,
    each side thinks he deserves more:

    • the superior, because
      he gives more;
    • the inferior, because
      that’s the whole point of the friendship (§ xiv.1).
  • Each side is right:

    • the superior gets
      • honor (τιμή), which is the
      • reward (γέρας) of
        • virtue and
        • benefaction (εὐεργεσία);
    • the needy (ἐνδεής) gets
      • gain (κέρδος), which is the
      • aid (ἐπικουρία) of neediness (§ xiv.2).

  • It’s the same in a polity:

    • to him who gives up money,
      honor from the common stock;
    • to him who takes money (as a bribe),
      that!

  • To each according to his merit: this

    • equalizes and
    • preserves friendship.
  • Thus in relations of unequals,
    in return for

    • money or
    • virtue,

    one must give honor,
    as far as possible (§ xiv.3).

  • That’s what friendship seeks, the possible.
    It isn’t always possible, e.g. with

    • gods and
    • fathers,

    but it’s decent to do what one can.

  • Thus can renounce

    • not the son, the father;
    • but the father, the son,
      though except for corruption,
      he won’t, because of
      • natural friendship,
      • the inhumanity of rejecting aid (§ xiv.4).

Text

[1161^b]

Chapter XII

Chapter 14

§ xii.1

• ἐν κοινωνίᾳ μὲν οὖν πᾶσα φιλία ἐστίν,
  καθάπερ εἴρηται.
  ἀφορίσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις

  • τήν τε συγγενικὴν καὶ
  • τὴν ἑταιρικήν.

• αἱ δὲ

  • πολιτικαὶ καὶ
  • φυλετικαὶ καὶ
  • συμπλοϊκαί, καὶ
  • ὅσαι τοιαῦται,

εἰς ταύτας δὲ τάξειεν ἄν τις καὶ τὴν ξενικήν.

§ xii.2

καὶ ἡ συγγενικὴ δὲ φαίνεται

• πολυειδὴς εἶναι,
• ἠρτῆσθαι δὲ πᾶσα ἐκ τῆς πατρικῆς·

• οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα
  ὡς ἑαυτῶν τι ὄντα,
• τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς
  ὡς ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνων τι ὄντα.

μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἴσασιν

• οἱ γονεῖς
  τὰ ἐξ αὑτῶν
• ἢ τὰ γεννηθέντα
  ὅτι ἐκ τούτων,

καὶ μᾶλλον συνωκείωται

• τὸ ἀφ᾽ οὗ
  τῷ γεννηθέντι
• ἢ τὸ γενόμενον
  τῷ ποιήσαντι·

τὸ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ
οἰκεῖον τῷ ἀφ᾽ οὗ, οἷον

ἐκείνῳ δ᾽

• οὐδὲν τὸ ἀφ᾽ οὗ,
• ἢ ἧττον.

καὶ τῷ πλήθει δὲ τοῦ χρόνου·

• οἳ μὲν γὰρ εὐθὺς γενόμενα στέργουσιν,
• τὰ δὲ προελθόντος χρόνου τοὺς γονεῖς,
  • σύνεσιν ἢ
  • αἴσθησιν λαβόντα.

ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ
δι᾽ ἃ φιλοῦσι μᾶλλον αἱ μητέρες.

§ xii.3

• γονεῖς μὲν οὖν τέκνα φιλοῦσιν ὡς ἑαυτούς
  (τὰ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν οἷον ἕτεροι αὐτοὶ τῷ κεχωρίσθαι),

• τέκνα δὲ γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνων πεφυκότα,

• ἀδελφοὶ δ᾽ ἀλλήλους τῷ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πεφυκέναι·

  ἡ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ταυτότης ἀλλήλοις ταὐτὸ ποιεῖ·
  ὅθεν φασὶ ταὐτὸν

  • αἷμα καὶ
  • ῥίζαν καὶ
  • τὰ τοιαῦτα.

  εἰσὶ δὴ

  • ταὐτό πως καὶ
  • ἐν διῃρημένοις.

§ xii.4

μέγα δὲ πρὸς φιλίαν

• καὶ τὸ σύντροφον
• καὶ τὸ καθ᾽ ἡλικίαν·

• ἧλιξ γὰρ ἥλικα, καὶ
• οἱ συνήθεις ἑταῖροι·

διὸ καὶ ἡ ἀδελφικὴ
τῇ ἑταιρικῇ ὁμοιοῦται.

[1162^a]

• ἀνεψιοὶ δὲ καὶ
• οἱ λοιποὶ συγγενεῖς

ἐκ τούτων συνῳκείωνται·
τῷ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι.

γίνονται δ᾽

• οἳ μὲν οἰκειότεροι
• οἳ δ᾽ ἀλλοτριώτεροι

τῷ

• σύνεγγυς ἢ
• πόρρω

τὸν ἀρχηγὸν εἶναι.

§ xii.5

ἔστι δ᾽

ἡ μὲν

• πρὸς γονεῖς φιλία τέκνοις, καὶ
• ἀνθρώποις πρὸς θεούς,

ὡς πρὸς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὑπερέχον·

εὖ γὰρ πεποιήκασι τὰ μέγιστα·

• τοῦ γὰρ
  • εἶναι καὶ
  • τραφῆναι

  αἴτιοι, καὶ γενομένοις

• τοῦ παιδευθῆναι·

§ xii.6

ἔχει δὲ

• καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ
• καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον

ἡ τοιαύτη φιλία
μᾶλλον τῶν ὀθνείων,
ὅσῳ καὶ κοινότερος ὁ βίος αὐτοῖς ἐστίν.

---

ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀδελφικῇ
ἅπερ

• καὶ ἐν τῇ ἑταιρικῇ
• καὶ μᾶλλον
  • ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι, καὶ ὅλως
  • ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις,

• ὅσῳ οἰκειότεροι καὶ
  • ἐκ γενετῆς ὑπάρχουσι στέργοντες ἀλλήλους, καὶ
• ὅσῳ ὁμοηθέστεροι οἱ
  • ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ σύντροφοι καὶ
  • παιδευθέντες ὁμοίως·

καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον δοκιμασία

• πλείστη καὶ
• βεβαιοτάτη.

ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς τῶν συγγενῶν τὰ φιλικά.

§ xii.7

ἀνδρὶ δὲ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν·

ἄνθρωπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει

• συνδυαστικὸν μᾶλλον
• ἢ πολιτικόν,

ὅσῳ

•  
  • πρότερον καὶ
  • ἀναγκαιότερον

  οἰκία πόλεως, καὶ

• τεκνοποιία κοινότερον τοῖς ζῴοις.

• τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἄλλοις ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡ κοινωνία ἐστίν,
• οἱ δ᾽ ἄνθρωποι
  • οὐ μόνον τῆς τεκνοποιίας χάριν συνοικοῦσιν,
  • ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον·

• εὐθὺς γὰρ διῄρηται τὰ ἔργα, καὶ
• ἔστιν ἕτερα
  • ἀνδρὸς καὶ
  • γυναικός·

ἐπαρκοῦσιν οὖν ἀλλήλοις,
εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθέντες τὰ ἴδια.

διὰ ταῦτα δὲ

• καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι δοκεῖ
• καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ

ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ.

εἴη δ᾽ ἂν καὶ δι᾽ ἀρετήν,
εἰ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶεν·

• ἔστι γὰρ ἑκατέρου ἀρετή, καὶ
• χαίροιεν ἂν τῷ τοιούτῳ.

σύνδεσμος δὲ τὰ τέκνα δοκεῖ εἶναι·

διὸ θᾶττον οἱ ἄτεκνοι διαλύονται·

• τὰ γὰρ τέκνα κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀμφοῖν,
• συνέχει δὲ τὸ κοινόν.

§ xii.8

Chapter XIII

Chapter 15

§ xiii.1

• τριττῶν δ᾽ οὐσῶν φιλιῶν,
  καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, καὶ
• καθ᾽ ἑκάστην
  • τῶν μὲν ἐν ἰσότητι φίλων ὄντων
  • τῶν δὲ καθ᾽ ὑπεροχήν

(καὶ γὰρ

• ὁμοίως ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι γίνονται καὶ
• ἀμείνων χείρονι, [1162^b]

ὁμοίως δὲ

• καὶ ἡδεῖς
• καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον,

• ἰσάζοντες ταῖς ὠφελείαις καὶ
• διαφέροντες),

• τοὺς ἴσους μὲν κατ᾽ ἰσότητα δεῖ
  • τῷ φιλεῖν καὶ
  • τοῖς λοιποῖς

  ἰσάζειν,

• τοὺς δ᾽ ἀνίσους τὸ ἀνάλογον
  ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ἀποδιδόναι.

§ xiii.2

---

οἱ μὲν γὰρ δι᾽ ἀρετὴν φίλοι ὄντες
εὖ δρᾶν ἀλλήλους προθυμοῦνται
(τοῦτο γὰρ

• ἀρετῆς καὶ
• φιλίας),

πρὸς τοῦτο δ᾽ ἁμιλλωμένων

• οὐκ ἔστιν ἐγκλήματα
• οὐδὲ μάχαι·

• τὸν γὰρ
  • φιλοῦντα καὶ
  • εὖ ποιοῦντα

  οὐδεὶς δυσχεραίνει,

• ἀλλ᾽ ἂν ᾖ χαρίεις,
  ἀμύνεται εὖ δρῶν.

ὁ δ᾽ ὑπερβάλλων,
τυγχάνων οὗ ἐφίεται,
οὐκ ἂν ἐγκαλοίη τῷ φίλῳ·

ἕκαστος γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὀρέγεται.

§ xiii.3

οὐ πάνυ δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐν τοῖς δι᾽ ἡδονήν·

ἅμα γὰρ ἀμφοῖν γίνεται οὗ ὀρέγονται,
εἰ τῷ συνδιάγειν χαίρουσιν·

γελοῖος δ᾽ ἂν φαίνοιτο καὶ ὁ ἐγκαλῶν τῷ μὴ τέρποντι,
ἐξὸν μὴ συνημερεύειν.

§ xiii.4

ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐγκληματική·

ἐπ᾽ ὠφελείᾳ γὰρ χρώμενοι ἀλλήλοις

• ἀεὶ τοῦ πλείονος δέονται, καὶ
• ἔλαττον ἔχειν οἴονται τοῦ προσήκοντος, καὶ
• μέμφονται ὅτι
  οὐχ ὅσων δέονται
  τοσούτων τυγχάνουσιν
  ἄξιοι ὄντες·

οἱ δ᾽ εὖ ποιοῦντες οὐ δύνανται ἐπαρκεῖν τοσαῦτα
ὅσων οἱ πάσχοντες δέονται.

§ xiii.5

ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι διττόν,

• τὸ μὲν ἄγραφον
• τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον,

καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλίας

• ἣ μὲν ἠθικὴ
• ἣ δὲ νομικὴ

εἶναι.

γίνεται οὖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα μάλισθ᾽ ὅταν
μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν

• συναλλάξωσι καὶ
• διαλύωνται.

§ xiii.6

ἔστι δ᾽

ἡ νομικὴ μὲν ἡ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς,

• ἡ μὲν πάμπαν ἀγοραία ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα,
• ἡ δὲ
  • ἐλευθεριωτέρα εἰς χρόνον,
  • καθ᾽ ὁμολογίαν δὲ τί ἀντὶ τίνος.
     
  • δῆλον δ᾽ ἐν ταύτῃ τὸ ὀφείλημα
  • κοὐκ ἀμφίλογον,

  φιλικὸν δὲ τὴν ἀναβολὴν ἔχει·
  διόπερ ἐνίοις

  • οὐκ εἰσὶ τούτων δίκαι,
  • ἀλλ᾽ οἴονται δεῖν
    στέργειν τοὺς κατὰ πίστιν συναλλάξαντας.

§ xiii.7

ἡ δ᾽ ἠθικὴ

• οὐκ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς,
• ἀλλ᾽
  • ὡς φίλῳ δωρεῖται
  • ἢ ὁτιδήποτε ἄλλο·

  κομίζεσθαι δὲ ἀξιοῖ

  • τὸ ἴσον
  • ἢ πλέον,

  ὡς

  • οὐ δεδωκὼς
  • ἀλλὰ χρήσας·

§ xiii.8

οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ

• συναλλάξας καὶ
• διαλυόμενος

ἐγκαλέσει.

τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ

§ xiii.9

• δυναμένῳ δὴ ἀνταποδοτέον τὴν ἀξίαν ὧν ἔπαθεν καὶ
• ἑκόντι

(ἄκοντα γὰρ φίλον οὐ ποιητέον·

ὡς δὴ

• διαμαρτόντα ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ
• εὖ παθόντα
  • ὑφ᾽ οὗ οὐκ ἔδει –
  • οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ φίλου,
  • οὐδὲ δι᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δρῶντος –

καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς εὐεργετηθέντα διαλυτέον)·

καὶ †ὁμολογήσαι δ᾽† ἂν δυνάμενος ἀποδώσειν·

ἀδυνατοῦντα δ᾽
οὐδ᾽ ὁ διδοὺς ἠξίωσεν ἄν.

ὥστ᾽ εἰ δυνατόν,
ἀποδοτέον.

ἐν ἀρχῇ δ᾽ ἐπισκεπτέον

• ὑφ᾽ οὗ εὐεργετεῖται καὶ
• ἐπὶ τίνι,

ὅπως ἐπὶ τούτοις

• ὑπομένῃ
• ἢ μή.

§ xiii.10

ἀμφισβήτησιν δ᾽ ἔχει πότερα δεῖ

• • τῇ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφελείᾳ μετρεῖν καὶ
  • πρὸς ταύτην ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν,
• ἢ τῇ τοῦ δράσαντος εὐεργεσίᾳ.

• οἱ μὲν γὰρ παθόντες τοιαῦτά φασι λαβεῖν παρὰ τῶν εὐεργετῶν ἃ
  • μικρὰ ἦν ἐκείνοις καὶ
  • ἐξῆν παρ᾽ ἑτέρων λαβεῖν,

  κατασμικρίζοντες·

• οἳ δ᾽ ἀνάπαλιν
  • τὰ μέγιστα τῶν παρ᾽ αὑτοῖς, καὶ
  • ἃ παρ᾽ ἄλλων οὐκ ἦν, καὶ
  • ἐν
    • κινδύνοις ἢ
    • τοιαύταις χρείαις.

§ xiii.11

ἆρ᾽ οὖν

• διὰ μὲν τὸ χρήσιμον τῆς φιλίας οὔσης
  ἡ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφέλεια μέτρον ἐστίν;
  • οὗτος γὰρ ὁ δεόμενος, καὶ
  • ἐπαρκεῖ αὐτῷ ὡς κομιούμενος τὴν ἴσην·
     
  • τοσαύτη οὖν γεγένηται ἡ ἐπικουρία
  • ὅσον οὗτος ὠφέληται,

  καὶ ἀποδοτέον δὴ αὐτῷ

  • ὅσον ἐπηύρετο,
  • ἢ καὶ πλέον·

  κάλλιον γάρ.

• ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν
  • ἐγκλήματα μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν,
  • μέτρῳ δ᾽ ἔοικεν ἡ τοῦ δράσαντος προαίρεσις·
     
  • τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ
  • τοῦ ἤθους

  ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει τὸ κύριον.

Chapter XIV

Chapter 16

§ xiv.1

διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς καθ᾽ ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαις·

• ἀξιοῖ γὰρ ἑκάτερος πλέον ἔχειν,
• ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο γίνηται,
  διαλύεται ἡ φιλία.

οἴεται γὰρ

• ὅ τε βελτίων προσήκειν αὑτῷ πλέον ἔχειν·
  τῷ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ νέμεσθαι πλέον·
  ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
• ὁ ὠφελιμώτερος·

ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ὄντα
οὔ φασι δεῖν ἴσον ἔχειν·

• λειτουργίαν τε γὰρ γίνεσθαι καὶ
• οὐ φιλίαν,

εἰ μὴ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν τῶν ἔργων ἔσται
τὰ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας.

οἴονται γάρ,

• καθάπερ ἐν χρημάτων κοινωνίᾳ
  πλεῖον λαμβάνουσιν
  οἱ συμβαλλόμενοι πλεῖον,
• οὕτω δεῖν καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ.

---

• ὁ δ᾽ ἐνδεὴς καὶ
• ὁ χείρων

ἀνάπαλιν·
φίλου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι
τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν τοῖς ἐνδεέσιν·

τί γάρ, φασίν, ὄφελος

• σπουδαίῳ ἢ
• δυνάστῃ

φίλον εἶναι,
μηδέν γε μέλλοντα ἀπολαύειν; [1163^b]

§ xiv.2

ἔοικε δ᾽ οὖν

• οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δέ,

• ἀλλὰ

  • τῷ μὲν ὑπερέχοντι τιμῆς
  • τῷ δ᾽ ἐνδεεῖ κέρδους·

• τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἡ τιμὴ γέρας,
• τῆς δ᾽ ἐνδείας ἐπικουρία τὸ κέρδος.

§ xiv.3

οὕτω δ᾽ ἔχειν τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαίνεται·

οὐ γὰρ τιμᾶται ὁ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ πορίζων·

• τὸ κοινὸν γὰρ δίδοται τῷ τὸ κοινὸν εὐεργετοῦντι,
• ἡ τιμὴ δὲ κοινόν.

οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅμα

• χρηματίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ
• τιμᾶσθαι.

ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον οὐδεὶς ὑπομένει·

• τῷ δὴ περὶ χρήματα ἐλαττουμένῳ
  τιμὴν ἀπονέμουσι καὶ
• τῷ δωροδόκῳ
  χρήματα·

---

τὸ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν γὰρ

• ἐπανισοῖ καὶ
• σῴζει

τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται.

§ xiv.4

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς

• τοὺς θεοὺς τιμαῖς καὶ
• τοὺς γονεῖς·

• οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὴν ἀξίαν ποτ᾽ ἂν ἀποδοίη,
• εἰς δύναμιν δὲ ὁ θεραπεύων ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι δοκεῖ.

διὸ κἂν δόξειεν

• οὐκ ἐξεῖναι υἱῷ πατέρα ἀπείπασθαι,
• πατρὶ δ᾽ υἱόν·

• ὀφείλοντα γὰρ ἀποδοτέον,
• οὐδὲν δὲ ποιήσας ἄξιον τῶν ὑπηργμένων δέδρακεν,
• ὥστ᾽ ἀεὶ ὀφείλει.

οἷς δ᾽ ὀφείλεται, ἐξουσία ἀφεῖναι·
καὶ τῷ πατρὶ δή.

ἅμα δ᾽ ἴσως οὐδείς ποτ᾽ ἂν ἀποστῆναι δοκεῖ μὴ ὑπερβάλλοντος μοχθηρίᾳ·

χωρὶς γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς φιλίας
τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ἀνθρωπικὸν μὴ διωθεῖσθαι.

τῷ δὲ

• φευκτὸν ἢ
• οὐ σπουδαστὸν

τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν,
μοχθηρῷ ὄντι·

• εὖ πάσχειν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ βούλονται,
• τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν φεύγουσιν ὡς ἀλυσιτελές.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.