Amity is equality, as Rackham translates it:

ΦΙΛΟΤΗΣ ΙΣΟΤΗΣ.

That’s what they say, anyway (§ v.5). Aristotle only refines it (§ viii.5):

ἡ δ᾽ ἰσότης καὶ ὁμοιότης φιλότης.
equality and similarity is amity.

Of eight readings on amity, or friendship, or love, or philia, we are in our second, comprising chapters v–viii of Book VIII of the Nicomachean Ethics.

Writing on the first reading, I noted Martha Nussbaum’s allusion to Aristotle’s description of pleasure as a particular kind of ἕξις (characteristic or habit). This was in the Ethics reading before that, called by me “Sweetness,” precisely on the subject of pleasure. Nussbaum refers to a mother’s pleasure as being a kind of thinking on her child that is unimpeded. She doesn’t refer to mothers as such, but she may nonetheless be alluding here to the present reading, in which Aristotle describes the mother as somebody whose love is unrequited (§ viii.3, again with Rackham’s translation):

ἔνιαι γὰρ διδόασι τὰ ἑαυτῶν τρέφεσθαι,
καὶ φιλοῦσι μὲν εἰδυῖαι,
ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι δ᾽ οὐ ζητοῦσιν,

Some mothers put their infants out to nurse,
and though knowing and loving them,
do not ask to be loved by them in return.

The example is supposed to show that amity is more in the giving than the taking. Since also people who give it are praised, it follows that

φίλων ἀρετὴ τὸ φιλεῖν ἔοικεν

– the virtue of friends is apparently the loving (§ viii.4). Nonetheless, what the hoi polloi want is φιλεῖσθαι, to be loved (§ viii.1).

I myself love how Aristotle frequently refers to οἱ πολλοί. However, Wikipedia does not trace to him our own use of the term.

I am not aware that any translator does, but one might describe Aristotle’s friendship as requited good will. In the last reading (§ ii.4), the Philosopher gave a definition in four parts, though perhaps the first two should be counted as one (the glosses are mine):

εὐνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις	|	to think well of one another,
καὶ βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ	|	and want good things,
μὴ λανθάνοντας	|	not unawares,
δι᾽ ἕν τι τῶν εἰρημένων.	|	on some one of the [bases] we mentioned

– the bases being utility, pleasure, and goodness. Friends not only have one another’s best interests in mind, but they know it. Thus, it seems, the interest on each side is requited. Normally it is that way with mother and child too; still, a mother may give her child to others to raise, thus renouncing any return for her affection, although she still has the affection. This is why, although true philia means both loving and being loved, the former is the more important.

At least, that is how I understand Aristotle’s argument. From my youth I remember a mother who had her daughter use her high-school Latin to construct a slogan whose English was,

If you want to be loved, love.

Since I was studying Latin too, I tried to correct what the daughter had come up with, as the centurion did with Brian in that Monty Python movie. The daughter did not seem too interested.

Meanwhile, since friendship is supposed to be equality, I wondered whether the latter English word was cognate with requite. Apparently it’s not:

• Requite is re + quit, the latter component representing the Latin verb quiētāre, from the Indo-European *kweyə- or *ku̯ei̯ə-.
• Equal represents the Latin aequālis, from aequus, but we don’t know where this comes from.
• The source of the corresponding Greek adjective ἴσος is also unknown, although speculatively it’s that productive root *weid- or *u̯(e)id- (vision, wit, etc.).

How then is friendship equality? That lack of equality is a perennial problem for friendship is suggested by a letter to Carolyn Hax published recently (March 14, 2024, answers coming six days later):

A good friend recently got married, and her husband is very well-off. Her life has changed practically overnight. Even though I love her as much as I always did, I just feel as if I can’t relate anymore (and vice versa, I feel as if she can’t relate to me).

Aristotle mentions this problem, here in the translation of Bartlett and Collins (§ vii.5):

For although many things may be taken away, the friendship still endures; but when someone is separated from the other to a great degree, as is the god, then the friendship no longer endures.

See my note to Book IX, § iv.6.

Other concerns sent to Hax about inequality include “Spouse thinks gifts, favors erase poor anger management” (November 2, 2023):

My spouse manages anger poorly, often lashing out (verbally) in unkind ways, retreating into sullen withdrawal or making sharp passive-aggressive digs at me. I have tried to explain to him that these behaviors erode my sense of emotional safety and make emotional and sexual intimacy feel impossible. His retort is that, the vast majority of the time, he is an amazing partner: loving, attentive, thoughtful and loyal. He points to his generosity with gifts and the constant favors he does for me.

This response confuses me, because it’s absolutely true; he is usually awesome. So … why does my heart feel so bad?

Hax and readers gave good answers. So perhaps does Aristotle give, but the passage (§ vi.6) is elliptical (again the glosses are mine):

ἡδὺς δὲ καὶ χρήσιμος	|	pleasant and useful
ἅμα	|	at the same time,
εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ σπουδαῖος·	|	it is said that the good man [is];
ἀλλ᾽ ὑπερέχοντι	|	but to the one who exceeds [him]
οὐ γίνεται	|	does not become,
ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλος,	|	such a man, a friend,
ἐὰν μὴ καὶ	|	if not also
τῇ ἀρετῇ ὑπερέχηται·	|	exceeded in virtue;
εἰ δὲ μή,	|	if not,
οὐκ ἰσάζει	|	he does not equalize
ἀνάλογον	|	proportionally
ὑπερεχόμενος.	|	being exceeded.

Who is “exceeded in virtue”? For Bartlett and Collins, it is the one who exceeds in something else, namely power:

It has been said that the serious person is at once pleasant and useful; yet such a person does not become a friend to someone who exceeds him [in power], unless [the person in power] is also exceeded [by the serious person] in virtue. But if this does not occur, [the serious person] is not rendered equal [to the person of greater power], since he is exceeded in the relevant proportion.

The translators attribute their interpretation to Aspasius, the ancient commentator who came up back in “Manliness” (on Book II). In a footnote, Bartlett and Collins give a translation in accord with what “more recent commentators suggest.”

That suggestion is either followed by Sachs or made independently – in his footnote at least, though not explicitly in his translation, which retains the ambiguity, or recasts it:

It has been said that a person of serious stature is pleasing and useful at the same time, but such a person does not become a friend to a superior unless he is also superior in virtue; otherwise he cannot make things equal by being proportionately excelled.

Aristotle has been talking about οἱ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις, men in power (§ vi.5): they have friends, who are of both the pleasant kind and the useful kind, but none is both at once, because what the powerful are really looking for in a friend is not virtue and nobility, but charm and cleverness, which don’t go together.

The good (σπουδαῖος) man can be both pleasant and useful, but he will not be a friend to the man who exceeds him in power, unless somebody also has an excess of virtue.

Who is that somebody? For Bartlett and Collins, he is the “serious” person. However, this person would seem already to exceed the powerful person in virtue, at least normally.

Surely what Aristotle is taking up hypothetically is the exceptional case, where the the powerful person has even more virtue than the weak but “serious” person. Rackham doesn’t hesitate to have his translation reflect this:

The good man, as we have said, is both useful and pleasant, but the good man does not become the friend of a superior, unless his superior in rank be also his superior in virtue; otherwise the good man as the inferior party cannot make matters proportionally equal.

Aristotle began Book VIII by saying, as Bartlett and Collins put it,

those who are wealthy
or have acquired political offices and power
seem to be in need of friends most of all.

καὶ γὰρ πλουτοῦσι
καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δυναστείας κεκτημένοις
δοκεῖ φίλων μάλιστ᾽ εἶναι χρεία.

The translators point out that “and power” (καὶ δυναστείας) “is omitted in the best MS,” but it doesn’t seem to matter. The rich and the rulers can attract the ordinary kind of friend – the kind that Maugham refers to ironically near the beginning of The Razor’s Edge:

When I first met Elliott I was just a young author like another and he took no notice of me. He never forgot a face and when I ran across him here or there he shook hands with me cordially, but showed no desire to further our acquaintance; and if I saw him at the opera, say, he being with a person of high rank, he was apt not to catch sight of me. But then I happened to make a somewhat startling success as a playwright, and presently I became aware that Elliott regarded me with a warmer feeling. One day I received a note from him asking me to lunch at Claridge’s, where he lived when in London. It was a small party and not a very smart one, and I conceived the notion that he was trying me out. But from then on, since my success had brought me many new friends, I began to see him more frequently.

For yet another example of inequality from Carolyn Hax, see “He thinks making more money means less housework for him”:

he hates his job but feels like he has to stay there to finance our “lifestyle” and, therefore, should not be expected to contribute to general cleaning and upkeep. The bulk of the child-rearing duties is on me, because I earn significantly less.

---

I’ve told him multiple times we can make it work if he wants to get a job he’s happier with. Those lifestyle standards are HIS, not mine.

---

In fact, he’s pushing for me to quit my career and be a stay-at-home mom. My career is not something I’m prepared to sacrifice, even if it isn’t making the big bucks.

Does the wife need more virtue, in order to tolerate the husband? Perhaps rather the husband needs more virtue, in order to be worth tolerating. I don’t suppose self-sacrifice is a virtue; rather, one might engage in it in order to learn virtue from somebody who already has it. Then the equality that Aristotle refers to might be achieved.

More points are highlighted in the Summary and talked about in comments added to the Text. That friendship is a hexis, which needs to be maintained by energeia, as through living together: we shall see this again in the first section of the last chapter, number xii, of Book IX.

Contents and Summary

• Chapter 6
  • Friendship of
    • the base is based on
      • pleasure or
      • utility,

      the [only] way the principals are similar;

    • the good, on
      themselves,
      since they are good (§ iv.6).
• Chapter V
  • In friendship as in virtue,
    one can be good

    • by habit (ἕξις)
      (thus simply [ἁπλῶς]) or
    • by activity (ἐνέργεια).

    Without the activity,
    the habit dissolves in time (§ v.1).

  • Not friendly,
    because too unpleasant,
    are the
    • old and
    • sour (§ v.2).
  • The friendliest thing
    is living together
    • (the needy want benefit,
    • the blessed are the least solitary);

    this needs

    • being pleasant and
    • enjoying the same things,

    as in companionship (ἡ ἑταιρική);
    approving from a distance
    is goodwill (§ v.3).

• Chapter 7
  • The strongest friendship is of the good,
    because they are
    • lovable and
    • desirable,

    both

    • simply and
    • to one another (§ v.4).
  • It seems to be (ἔοικε)

    • a passion, does affection (φίλησις);
    • a habit, does friendship (φιλία).

    For,

    • affection can be for the inanimate;
    • friendship, especially of the good, is
      • by habit,
        • being reciprocated by choice,
        • wishing good for the friend’s sake;
      • for what is good for oneself.

    For they say friendship is equality
    λέγεται γὰρ φιλότης ἰσότης (§ v.5).

• Chapter VI
  • The old and surly, or sour,
    • may have goodwill for one another,
    • but are not friends (§ vi.1).
  • Complete friendship,
    like love (ἐρᾶν),
    cannot be with many at once.
    [For,] many admit to being pleasing (ἀρέσκειν) to one,
    • not easily, very (σφόδρα) –
    • nor, perhaps (ἴσως), to being good (§ vi.2) –
      it would need
      • experience and
      • becoming intimate –
    • but through
      • usefulness and
      • pleasure (§ vi.3).
  • Friendship
    • for pleasure
      • seems more like true friendship,
      • is what the young have,
      • is liberal;
    • for utility
      is for businessmen.
  • The blessed need
    • not the useful,
    • but the pleasant,
    • even the good (§ vi.4).
  • People in authority seek,
    as friends, separately,
    • the pleasant,
      • not for virtue,
      • but for wit;
    • the useful,
      • not for beautiful things,
      • but for cleverness.

    They won’t often be the same (§ vi.5).

  • The seriously good (σπουδαῖος)
    • is said to be both
      • pleasant and
      • useful, but
    • does not become such a friend
      to one who exceeds,
      unless exceeded also in virtue;
      if not, the exceeding
      does not equalize proportionally
      (οὐκ ἰσάζει ἀνάλογον, § vi.6).
• Chapter 8
  • We have been talking of friendships of equality.
    If different things are exchanged,
    e.g. pleasure for benefit,
    friendship
    • it is, inasmuch as
      virtuous friendship also involves
      • pleasure and
      • utility;
    • it is not, inasmuch as not
      • secure against slander and
      • stable (§ vi.7).
• Chapter VII
  • A form of friendship based on superiority
    (φιλίας εἶδος τὸ καθ᾽ ὑπεροχήν), e.g.
    • father for son,
    • older for younger,
    • husband for wife,
    • ruler for ruled,

    differs from

    • one of [equality],
    • another form,
    • the [reciprocal];

    for in each case differs

    • the virtue (ἀρετή),
    • the work (ἔργον),
    • the basis (δι᾽ ἃ φιλοῦσιν, § vii.1).
  • The affection:

    • it ought to be proportional;
    • when it accords with merit,
      equality comes about (§ vii.2).
• Chapter 9
  • The equality

    • in justice is based
      • first on merit,
      • second on quantity;
    • in friendship, the other way (§ vii.3).
  • No friendship, no worthiness to be friends,
    when there are big differences,
    • e.g. in
      • virtue,
      • vice,
      • resources,
    • e.g. between
      • gods and [men],
      • king and [people],
      • best and wisest and worthless (§ vii.4).
  • Some difference is tolerated,
    but not as e.g. from a god (§ vii.5).

  • Paradox:
    wishing for a friend all goods would

    • make him
      • a god,
      • not a friend anymore,
      • not good for the former friend;
    • wish away some of one’s own goods (§ vii.6).
• Chapter VIII
  • The hoi polloi
    • love to be honored,
      which is close to being loved, so
    • prefer
      • being loved
      • to loving; hence
    • love flattery.
  • The flatterer
    • is the inferior friend, or
    • pretends to
      • this and
      • preferring
        • loving
        • to being loved (§ viii.1).
  • The hoi polloi love honor
    • incidentally,
    • from authorities,
    • as a sign of faring well.
  • Some love
    • being honored
      • by those who
        • know them and
        • are decent,
      • as a sign of being good;
    • being loved, in itself.
  • Thus, apparently,
    • better is being
      • loved
      • than honored;
    • friendship is desirable in itself (§ viii.2).
  • Yet, as e.g. mothers show,
    friendship consists
    • more in loving
    • than in being loved (§ viii.3).
• Chapter 10
  • Loving is the virtue of friends, and so
    those who have it by merit
    have a stable friendship,
    because
    • friendship is more in loving, and
    • loving your friends is praised (§ viii.4).
  • Thus the unequal could be friends,
    for it would equalize them.
  • Friendship (φιλότης) is
    • equality (ἰσότης) and
    • similarity (ὁμοιότης), especially of virtue.
      • The [virtuous], being
        • stable in themselves, are
        • there for one another.
      • The corrupt are friends
        only a short time (§ viii.5)
      • The
        • useful and
        • pleasant

        remain friends,
        as long as they are that.

  • Useful friendship is based on opposition,
    • apparently
      e.g. of
      • poor with wealthy,
      • ignorant with knowledgable,
      • lover with beloved,
      • ugly with beautiful (§ viii.6);
    • perhaps not really,
      since the aim is
      • not the opposite,
      • but the mean,

      e.g. of the dry to be

      • not wet,
      • but in the middle (§ viii.7).

Text

[1157^b]

Chapter 6

§ iv.6

εἰς ταῦτα δὲ τὰ εἴδη τῆς φιλίας νενεμημένης

• οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι ἔσονται φίλοι δι᾽
  • ἡδονὴν ἢ τὸ
  • χρήσιμον,

  ταύτῃ ὅμοιοι ὄντες,

• οἱ δ᾽ ἀγαθοὶ δι᾽ αὑτοὺς φίλοι·
  ᾗ γὰρ ἀγαθοί.

• οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἁπλῶς φίλοι,
• ἐκεῖνοι δὲ
  • κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ
  • τῷ ὡμοιῶσθαι τούτοις.

Chapter V

§ v.1

• οἱ μὲν γὰρ συζῶντες
  • χαίρουσιν ἀλλήλοις καὶ
  • πορίζουσι τἀγαθά,
• οἱ δὲ
  • καθεύδοντες ἢ
  • κεχωρισμένοι τοῖς τόποις
     
  • οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσι μέν,
  • οὕτω δ᾽ ἔχουσιν
    ὥστ᾽ ἐνεργεῖν φιλικῶς·

ὅθεν εἴρηται

πολλὰς δὴ φιλίας ἀπροσηγορία διέλυσεν.

§ v.2

οὐ φαίνονται δ᾽

• οὔθ᾽ οἱ πρεσβῦται
• οὔθ᾽ οἱ στρυφνοὶ

φιλικοὶ εἶναι·

• βραχὺ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς,
• οὐδεὶς δὲ δύναται συνημερεύειν
  • τῷ λυπηρῷ οὐδὲ
  • τῷ μὴ ἡδεῖ·

μάλιστα γὰρ ἡ φύσις φαίνεται

• τὸ λυπηρὸν φεύγειν,
• ἐφίεσθαι δὲ τοῦ ἡδέος.

§ v.3

οἱ δ᾽

• ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλους,
• μὴ συζῶντες δέ,

• εὔνοις ἐοίκασι
• μᾶλλον ἢ φίλοις.

οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ φίλων ὡς τὸ συζῆν

• (ὠφελείας μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἐνδεεῖς ὀρέγονται,
• συνημερεύειν δὲ καὶ οἱ μακάριοι·
  μονώταις γὰρ εἶναι τούτοις ἥκιστα προσήκει)·

συνδιάγειν δὲ μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἔστι

• μὴ ἡδεῖς ὄντας
• μηδὲ χαίροντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς,

ὅπερ ἡ ἑταιρικὴ δοκεῖ ἔχειν.

Chapter 7

§ v.4

μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φιλία ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν,
καθάπερ πολλάκις εἴρηται·

δοκεῖ γὰρ

• • φιλητὸν μὲν καὶ
  • αἱρετὸν

  τὸ ἁπλῶς

  • ἀγαθὸν ἢ
  • ἡδύ,
• ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ αὑτῷ τοιοῦτον·

ὁ δ᾽ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ δι᾽ ἄμφω ταῦτα.

§ v.5

• ἡ γὰρ φίλησις οὐχ ἧττον πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχά ἐστιν,
• ἀντιφιλοῦσι δὲ μετὰ προαιρέσεως,
• ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀφ᾽ ἕξεως·

καὶ τἀγαθὰ βούλονται τοῖς φιλουμένοις
ἐκείνων ἕνεκα,

• οὐ κατὰ πάθος
• ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ἕξιν.

καὶ φιλοῦντες τὸν φίλον τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν·

ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς φίλος γινόμενος ἀγαθὸν γίνεται ᾧ φίλος.

ἑκάτερος οὖν

• φιλεῖ τε τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθόν, καὶ
• τὸ ἴσον ἀνταποδίδωσι
  • τῇ βουλήσει καὶ
  • τῷ ἡδεῖ·

λέγεται γὰρ φιλότης ἰσότης, [1158^a]

μάλιστα δὲ τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῦθ᾽ ὑπάρχει.

Chapter VI

§ vi.1

ἐν δὲ τοῖς

• στρυφνοῖς καὶ
• πρεσβυτικοῖς

ἧττον γίνεται ἡ φιλία,
ὅσῳ

• δυσκολώτεροί εἰσι καὶ
• ἧττον ταῖς ὁμιλίαις χαίρουσιν·

ταῦτα γὰρ δοκεῖ μάλιστ᾽ εἶναι

• φιλικὰ καὶ
• ποιητικὰ φιλίας.

διὸ

• νέοι μὲν γίνονται φίλοι ταχύ,
• πρεσβῦται δ᾽ οὔ·
  οὐ γὰρ γίνονται φίλοι
  οἷς ἂν μὴ χαίρωσιν·
• ὁμοίως δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ οἱ στρυφνοί.

ἀλλ᾽ οἱ τοιοῦτοι εὖνοι μέν εἰσιν ἀλλήλοις·

βούλονται γὰρ τἀγαθὰ καὶ ἀπαντῶσιν εἰς τὰς χρείας·

φίλοι δ᾽ οὐ πάνυ εἰσὶ
διὰ τὸ

• μὴ συνημερεύειν
• μηδὲ χαίρειν ἀλλήλοις,

ἃ δὴ μάλιστ᾽ εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλικά.

§ vi.2

πολλοῖς δ᾽ εἶναι φίλον κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται,
ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ ἐρᾶν πολλῶν ἅμα
(ἔοικε γὰρ ὑπερβολῇ,
τὸ τοιοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἕνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι)·

• πολλοὺς δ᾽ ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκειν σφόδρα οὐ ῥᾴδιον,
• ἴσως δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι.

§ vi.3

δεῖ δὲ

• καὶ ἐμπειρίαν λαβεῖν
• καὶ ἐν συνηθείᾳ γενέσθαι,

ὃ παγχάλεπον.

διὰ

• τὸ χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ
• τὸ ἡδὺ

πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχεται·

• πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ
• ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ αἱ ὑπηρεσίαι.

§ vi.4

τούτων δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικε φιλίᾳ ἡ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ,
ὅταν

• ταὐτὰ ἀπ᾽ ἀμφοῖν γίνηται καὶ
• χαίρωσιν
  • ἀλλήλοις ἢ
  • τοῖς αὐτοῖς,

οἷαι τῶν νέων εἰσὶν αἱ φιλίαι·

μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ ἐλευθέριον.

ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἀγοραίων.

καὶ οἱ μακάριοι δὲ

• χρησίμων μὲν οὐδὲν δέονται,
• ἡδέων δέ·

• συζῆν μὲν γὰρ βούλονταί τισι,
• τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν
  • ὀλίγον μὲν χρόνον φέρουσιν,
  • συνεχῶς δ᾽
    • οὐδεὶς ἂν ὑπομείναι,
    • οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν,

    εἰ λυπηρὸν αὐτῷ εἴη·

διὸ τοὺς φίλους ἡδεῖς ζητοῦσιν.

δεῖ δ᾽ ἴσως

• καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοιούτους ὄντας,
• καὶ ἔτι αὑτοῖς·

οὕτω γὰρ ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς ὅσα δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις.

§ vi.5

οἱ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις διῃρημένοις
φαίνονται χρῆσθαι τοῖς φίλοις·

• ἄλλοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσὶ χρήσιμοι καὶ
• ἕτεροι ἡδεῖς,
• ἄμφω δ᾽ οἱ αὐτοὶ οὐ πάνυ·

• οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεῖς μετ᾽ ἀρετῆς ζητοῦσιν
• οὔτε χρησίμους εἰς τὰ καλά,
• ἀλλὰ
  • τοὺς μὲν εὐτραπέλους τοῦ ἡδέος ἐφιέμενοι,
  • τοὺς δὲ δεινοὺς πρᾶξαι τὸ ἐπιταχθέν,

  ταῦτα δ᾽ οὐ πάνυ γίνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ.

§ vi.6

εἰ δὲ μή,
οὐκ ἰσάζει ἀνάλογον ὑπερεχόμενος.

οὐ πάνυ δ᾽ εἰώθασι τοιοῦτοι γίνεσθαι. [1158^b]

Chapter 8

§ vi.7

εἰσὶ δ᾽ οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι φιλίαι
ἐν ἰσότητι·

• τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ γίνεται ἀπ᾽ ἀμφοῖν
• καὶ
  • βούλονται ἀλλήλοις, ἢ
  • ἕτερον ἀνθ᾽ ἑτέρου καταλλάττονται,
    οἷον ἡδονὴν ἀντ᾽ ὠφελείας·

ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἧττόν εἰσιν αὗται φιλίαι καὶ μένουσιν, εἴρηται.

δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ δι᾽

• ὁμοιότητα καὶ
• ἀνομοιότητα

ταὐτοῦ

• εἶναί τε καὶ
• οὐκ εἶναι

φιλίαι·

καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα γὰρ τῆς κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν
φαίνονται φιλίαι

• (ἣ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἔχει
• ἣ δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον,

ταῦτα δ᾽ ὑπάρχει κἀκείνῃ),
τῷ δὲ

• τὴν μὲν
  • ἀδιάβλητον καὶ
  • μόνιμον

  εἶναι,

• ταύτας δὲ ταχέως
  • μεταπίπτειν ἄλλοις τε
  • διαφέρειν πολλοῖς,

οὐ φαίνονται φιλίαι,
δι᾽ ἀνομοιότητα ἐκείνης.

Chapter VII

§ vii.1

ἕτερον δ᾽ ἐστὶ φιλίας εἶδος
τὸ καθ᾽ ὑπεροχήν,

διαφέρουσι δ᾽ αὗται καὶ ἀλλήλων·

• ἑτέρα γὰρ ἑκάστου τούτων
  • ἀρετὴ καὶ
  • τὸ ἔργον,
• ἕτερα δὲ καὶ δι᾽ ἃ φιλοῦσιν·
• ἕτεραι οὖν καὶ
  • αἱ φιλήσεις καὶ
  • αἱ φιλίαι.

§ vii.2

• ταὐτὰ μὲν δὴ
  • οὔτε γίνεται ἑκατέρῳ παρὰ θατέρου
  • οὔτε δεῖ ζητεῖν·

ἀνάλογον δ᾽ ἐν πάσαις ταῖς καθ᾽ ὑπεροχὴν οὔσαις φιλίαις
καὶ τὴν φίλησιν δεῖ γίνεσθαι,

Chapter 9

§ vii.3

οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ ἴσον

• ἔν τε τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ
• ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ

φαίνεται ἔχειν·

ἔστι γὰρ

§ vii.4

δῆλον δ᾽, ἂν πολὺ διάστημα γένηται

• ἀρετῆς ἢ
• κακίας ἢ
• εὐπορίας ἤ
• τινος ἄλλου·

• οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι εἰσὶν
• ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἀξιοῦσιν.

• ἐμφανέστατον δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν·
  πλεῖστον γὰρ οὗτοι πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν. [1159^a]
• δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν βασιλέων·
  • οὐδὲ γὰρ τούτοις ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι οἱ πολὺ καταδεέστεροι,
  • οὐδὲ τοῖς
    • ἀρίστοις ἢ
    • σοφωτάτοις

    οἱ μηδενὸς ἄξιοι.

§ vii.5

ἀκριβὴς μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρισμός,
ἕως τίνος οἱ φίλοι·

• πολλῶν γὰρ ἀφαιρουμένων
  ἔτι μένει,
• πολὺ δὲ χωρισθέντος,
  οἷον τοῦ θεοῦ,
  οὐκέτι.

§ vii.6

Chapter VIII

§ viii.1

οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσι διὰ φιλοτιμίαν βούλεσθαι

• φιλεῖσθαι μᾶλλον
• ἢ φιλεῖν·

διὸ φιλοκόλακες οἱ πολλοί·

• ὑπερεχόμενος γὰρ φίλος ὁ κόλαξ, ἢ
• προσποιεῖται τοιοῦτος
• καὶ
  • μᾶλλον φιλεῖν
  • ἢ φιλεῖσθαι·

τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι ἐγγὺς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι,
οὗ δὴ οἱ πολλοὶ ἐφίενται.

§ viii.2

• οὐ δι᾽ αὑτὸ δ᾽ ἐοίκασιν αἱρεῖσθαι τὴν τιμήν,
• ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός·

χαίρουσι γὰρ

• οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις τιμώμενοι
  διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα
  (οἴονται γὰρ τεύξεσθαι παρ᾽ αὐτῶν,
  ἄν του δέωνται·
  ὡς δὴ σημείῳ τῆς εὐπαθείας
  χαίρουσι τῇ τιμῇ)·
• οἱ δ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν
  • ἐπιεικῶν καὶ
  • εἰδότων

  ὀρεγόμενοι τιμῆς
  βεβαιῶσαι τὴν οἰκείαν δόξαν ἐφίενται περὶ αὑτῶν·

χαίρουσι δή,
ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ πιστεύοντες τῇ τῶν λεγόντων κρίσει.

τῷ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ χαίρουσιν·

διὸ δόξειεν ἂν

• κρεῖττον εἶναι τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ
• ἡ φιλία καθ᾽ αὑτὴν αἱρετὴ εἶναι.

§ viii.3

δοκεῖ δ᾽

• ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον
• ἢ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι

εἶναι.

σημεῖον δ᾽ αἱ μητέρες
τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρουσαι·

ἔνιαι γὰρ

• διδόασι τὰ ἑαυτῶν τρέφεσθαι,
• καὶ
  • φιλοῦσι μὲν εἰδυῖαι,
  • ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι δ᾽ οὐ ζητοῦσιν,

  ἐὰν ἀμφότερα μὴ ἐνδέχηται,

• ἀλλ᾽ ἱκανὸν αὐταῖς ἔοικεν εἶναι
  ἐὰν ὁρῶσιν εὖ πράττοντας,
• καὶ αὐταὶ φιλοῦσιν αὐτοὺς
  κἂν ἐκεῖνοι μηδὲν ὧν μητρὶ προσήκει ἀπονέμωσι
  διὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν.

Chapter 10

§ viii.4

• μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς φιλίας οὔσης ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν, καὶ
• τῶν φιλοφίλων ἐπαινουμένων,

φίλων ἀρετὴ τὸ φιλεῖν ἔοικεν, ὥστ᾽
ἐν οἷς τοῦτο γίνεται κατ᾽ ἀξίαν, [1159^b]

• οὗτοι μόνιμοι φίλοι καὶ
• ἡ τούτων φιλία.

§ viii.5

οὕτω δ᾽ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄνισοι μάλιστ᾽ εἶεν φίλοι·

ἰσάζοιντο γὰρ ἄν.

• μάλιστα μὲν ἡ τῶν κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ὁμοιότης·

  μόνιμοι γὰρ ὄντες καθ᾽ αὑτοὺς

  • καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους μένουσι,
  • καὶ
    • οὔτε δέονται φαύλων
    • οὔθ᾽ ὑπηρετοῦσι τοιαῦτα,
    • ἀλλ᾽ ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ διακωλύουσιν·

  τῶν ἀγαθῶν γὰρ

  • μήτ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἁμαρτάνειν
  • μήτε τοῖς φίλοις ἐπιτρέπειν.

• οἱ δὲ μοχθηροὶ

  • τὸ μὲν βέβαιον οὐκ ἔχουσιν·
  • οὐδὲ γὰρ αὑτοῖς διαμένουσιν ὅμοιοι ὄντες·

  ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγον δὲ χρόνον γίνονται φίλοι,
  χαίροντες τῇ ἀλλήλων μοχθηρίᾳ.

§ viii.6

οἱ

• χρήσιμοι δὲ καὶ
• ἡδεῖς ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαμένουσιν·

ἕως γὰρ ἂν πορίζωσιν

• ἡδονὰς ἢ
• ὠφελείας

ἀλλήλοις.

---

ἐξ ἐναντίων δὲ
μάλιστα μὲν δοκεῖ
ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον γίνεσθαι φιλία,

οὗ γὰρ τυγχάνει τις ἐνδεὴς ὤν,
τούτου ἐφιέμενος ἀντιδωρεῖται ἄλλο.

ἐνταῦθα δ᾽ ἄν τις ἕλκοι

• καὶ
  • ἐραστὴν καὶ
  • ἐρώμενον,
• καὶ
  • καλὸν καὶ
  • αἰσχρόν.

διὸ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἐρασταὶ γελοῖοι ἐνίοτε,
ἀξιοῦντες φιλεῖσθαι ὡς φιλοῦσιν·

ὁμοίως δὴ φιλητοὺς ὄντας ἴσως ἀξιωτέον,
μηδὲν δὲ τοιοῦτον ἔχοντας γελοῖον.

§ viii.7

ἴσως δὲ

• οὐδ᾽ ἐφίεται τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ἐναντίου καθ᾽ αὑτό,
• ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός,

ἡ δ᾽ ὄρεξις τοῦ μέσου ἐστίν·

τοῦτο γὰρ ἀγαθόν,

ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω·

καὶ γάρ ἐστιν ἀλλοτριώτερα.