Aristotle sets the example that Thomas Aquinas follows in the Summa. We are reading chapters viii and ix of Book IX of the Nicomachean Ethics. The Philosopher makes the best case against two positions that he ultimately argues for:

1. One should be selfish.
2. One needs friends anyway.

We had a preview of the first position last time. “Selfish” is how I’m translating the term φίλαυτος, although the published translations use “self-lover.” For example, here is the opening section of chapter viii of Book IX, along with Apostle’s translation (my bolding, his italics):

ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ
πότερον δεῖ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα ἢ ἄλλον τινά.
ἐπιτιμῶσι γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς μάλιστ᾽ ἀγαπῶσι,
καὶ ὡς ἐν αἰσχρῷ φιλαύτους ἀποκαλοῦσι,
δοκεῖ τε ὁ μὲν φαῦλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν,
καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μοχθηρότερος ᾖ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον –
ἐγκαλοῦσι δὴ αὐτῷ
οἷον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ πράττει –
ὁ δ᾽ ἐπιεικὴς διὰ τὸ καλόν,
καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν βελτίων ᾖ, μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ καλόν,
καὶ φίλου ἕνεκα,
τὸ δ᾽ αὑτοῦ παρίησιν.

Another problem raised is
whether one should love himself most or someone else.
For people censure those who love themselves most
and call them ‘self-lovers’, using the term in a disgraceful sense.
And a bad man is thought to do everything for his own sake,
and the more so if he is more evil
(and people criticize him
for never going out of his way to do something for others),
while a good man is thought to act for the sake of what is noble,
more so if he is better,
and for the sake of his friend,
disregarding his own good.

What the bad man tries to do for himself is acquire useful and pleasant things. The hoi polloi condemn him out of jealousy, the way they are said to condemn injustice in Book II of the Republic. According to Glaucon there, if you have a magic ring that makes you invisible, you will use it in order to take what you want, with impunity. To inhibit you, the hoi polloi put out the story that you would be ignoble to be so selfish, and nobility is what you really want.

That’s a true story, Aristotle will say; but then nobility is a good, and thus increasing your own is a way of loving yourself (§ viii.6):

ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις
τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστ᾽ εἶναι δοκεῖ
καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα,
οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπος·
καὶ φίλαυτος δὴ μάλιστα
ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν καὶ τούτῳ χαριζόμενος.
καὶ ἐγκρατὴς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατὴς λέγεται
τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν
ἢ μή,
ὡς τούτου ἑκάστου ὄντος·
καὶ πεπραγέναι δοκοῦσιν αὐτοὶ
καὶ ἑκουσίως
τὰ μετὰ λόγου μάλιστα.

And just as a state
or any other systematic whole
is thought to be that which is its supreme part most of all,
so is a man;
and so a self-lover in the highest sense
is he who loves and favors this part.
Again, a man is called ‘continent’ or ‘incontinent’
according as his intellect rules
the other parts of the soul or not, respectively,
as if he were this part;
and men are thought to have acted on their own
and to have acted voluntarily
when they have done so with reason most of all.

Thus, in terms that the hoi polloi should understand, there is another kind of selfishness, and the good man ought to pursue this.

What if you are Thrasymachus, for whom selfishness in the usual sense is what one ought to pursue? This is where reason comes in, as I suggested during the Republic reading. It’s not reasonable to think you can just get whatever you want. At least, it’s not reasonable to think you can go on doing so; for this would require your experience to be a trustworthy guide to the future, even as you are showing yourself not to be trustworthy.

Maybe you avoid thinking about all of that. I don’t know what can be done then, except to seduce you into thinking. That’s really what education is for, as I tried to argue in “All You Need Is Love.”

In that post, I was supplementing Robert Pirsig’s vision of education as something you had to pursue for yourself. Pirsig overlooks the social aspect of education. As Aristotle observes in § ix.3 of our reading,

ἄτοπον δ᾽ ἴσως καὶ
τὸ μονώτην ποιεῖν τὸν μακάριον·
οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἕλοιτ᾽ ἂν καθ᾽ αὑτὸν τὰ πάντ᾽ ἔχειν ἀγαθά·
πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος
καὶ συζῆν πεφυκός.

Perhaps it is absurd, too,
to regard the blessed man as a solitary man;
for no man with all the other goods would choose to live alone,
seeing that man is a political being
and is disposed by nature to live with others.

That’s part of the argument for why the happy man needs friends, even though he is supposed to be self-sufficient (αὐτάρκης, § ix.1). Possibly the full argument becomes obscure by being long, and the main idea is in § ix.5, where Book I is recalled:

ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ εἴρηται
ὅτι ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργειά τις ἐστίν,
ἡ δ᾽ ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι γίνεται
καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὥσπερ κτῆμά τι.

for we have stated at the outset
that happiness is an activity of a certain kind,
and clearly an activity is something in progress
and not something like a possession.

The grammar of friendship tends to confirm this; see my discussion in “Paternity” (on the last three chapters of Book VIII, namely xii–xiv).

Since energeia is “The central notion in all of Aristotle’s philosophy,” according to Sachs (as we noted last time), let’s look at his translation:

For it was said at the beginning
that happiness is a certain way of being-at-work,
and it is clear that being-at-work is something that happens,
and not something that is present like some possession.

Understanding the aspect of γίνεται to be progressive, one might say that ἐνέργειά is something that is happening. Happiness is not having what you want, it’s wanting what you have.

• If you had what you wanted, you could take it off with you, as a possession.
• If you want what you have, that is not the same as wanting it to stay the same, as if it were a possession.

I am reminded of the section of The Principles of Art called “The Curse of the Ivory Tower.” As Collingwood argues there, you can be an artist under whatever condition you find yourself in, even if this is a condition of being isolated like Jane Austen (perhaps the Brontë sisters would be a better example). If you deliberately isolate yourself, because you think it will make you a better artist, then it may make you a worse, if it confirms your delusion that you already know your business as an artist. Being an artist, in the modern sense of word, is not having an art, in the old sense, as if it were a possession; it is something “in progress,” something “that happens” or “that is happening.”

Pirsig’s Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance has now been out for fifty years, and the Robert Pirsig Association is celebrating the anniversary. One way is by collecting testimonials, among which there is now mine. From a recent announcement in an email and on the Association website, I have learned that the Association’s namesake is quoted by Salman Rushdie in Knife: Meditations After an Attempted Murder. As I interpret the passage that starts around 5:11 on a BBC recording (“Released On: 24 Apr 2024. Available for [a month]”),

“Are you OK in there?” the nurse wants to know.

“Yes, I just need some time.”

“No rush. Pull the cord when you’re done.”

The first rehab

Gumption, Robert M. Pirsig tells us in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, is what the spirit needs to get itself into a good place, and the spirit acquires gumption by being in contact with Quality. He writes,

I like the word “gumption” … A person filled with gumption doesn’t sit around dissipating and stewing about things. He’s at the front of the train of his own awareness, watching to see what’s up the track and meeting it when it comes.

For a long time after I left my parents’ home to make a life in London, I wasn’t at the front of the train of my own awareness. I had a job, but it wasn’t a job I wanted. I tried to write, but wrote nothing worth reading. Even when I published a novel, a lot of it soon felt wrong to me. I didn’t hear myself in most of its sentences, and I wasn’t sure what, or who, the self I was trying to hear might actually be. Only after I found my way into the book that became Midnight’s Children did I connect with Quality, and after that, self-knowledge arrived, and the gumption tank filled up. I learned that, through literature, I could repair myself.

The second rehab

That’s my transcription from what I have heard. I assume “The first rehab” and “The second rehab” are section headings. Just before the quoted passage, Rushdie says his experience after the knife attack of August, 2022, was the fourth rehabilitation of his life; the first was after he moved to London, as described above; the second, after the fatwa on his life; the third, after he moved to New York.

Audio books seem to be increasingly popular, for reasons I do not understand, unless it’s that people are spending more time driving cars. However, listening to Rushdie’s words brings out to me the awkwardness of the parenthetical clause that cuts off the subject “Gumption” from its predicate, just after “The first rehab.” It seems to me Rushie could better have said something like,

As Robert M. Pirsig tells us in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, gumption is what the spirit needs to get itself into a good place …

or

Gumption is what the spirit needs to get itself into a good place. That is what Robert M. Pirsig tells us in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance.

It might be even better to rearrange the main clause:

To get itself into a good place, the spirit needs gumption, which it acquires by being in contact with Quality. That’s what Robert M. Pirsig tells us in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance …

Last time I talked about the strange idea that before we can love others, we have to love ourselves. When this idea is promoted, the aim could be to give gumption to people who usually defer to others. Girls are said to be raised to do this, and I assume it was a woman who wrote to Carolyn Hax:

My mom really wants to be close to me and to spend a lot of time with my young children, but she is so constantly critical of me, my appearance, my parenting and other intangible aspects of my life that I find her difficult to be around as often as she wants.

As I understand Hax’s advice, it’s to cut off the mother’s criticisms, just like that:

You don’t have to stand there and take any of it. Ever. Not in person, either. “I’m going to stop you there, Mom.” Calmly. When she picks at you, she undermines your kids – so model for them how to stand up for themselves.

Six years earlier, when a man’s father was mad that his son’s child would not bear the family name exclusively, it was the gestating child’s mother who felt pressed by her in-laws not to attach her own family name to her offspring’s.

Another recent example was sent to Amy Dickinson: it is the husband’s parents who pop in, but the wife who is embarrassed by the state of the house.

An even more recent example sent to Carolyn Hax takes up a problem that I seem to have heard about all my life:

I live with my husband, our preteen child and my mother-in-law, who popped in for “a weekend” during covid and simply never left. My husband and I both work demanding jobs, but he returned to the office a while ago and I’m still teleworking.

No one EVER attempts to deal with anything in the kitchen – not the cooking, cleaning, maintenance, nothing – except me.

The writer has had the gumption to go on strike, but feels “like a petulant child,” which is why she is writing for advice. What Hax tells her, and I agree, is not to let others take the ease they desire, with the idea that she herself will then have something better.

Contents and Summary

• Chapter VIII. Should one love oneself most?
  • Being selfish (φίλαυτος) is
    • disgraceful:
      • the base (φαῦλος) does all for himself,
      • the decent (ἐπιεικής),
        • for the friend,
        • on account of the beautiful (§ viii.1);
    • yet required by
      • the characteristics of friendship and
      • the proverbs:
        • μία ψυχή,
        • κοινὰ τὰ φίλων,
        • ἰσότης φιλότης,
        • γόνυ κνήμης ἔγγιον (§ viii.2).
  • We have to distinguish (§ viii.3):
    • The hoi polloi condemn, justly,
      and call selfish, those who
      gratify their own desires above all (§ viii.4).
    • The person who seeks to be virtuous – just, moderate –
      • is not called selfish (§ viii.5),
      • but is most of all,
        for gratifying his most important part,
        namely nous (§ viii.6).
  • Thus
    • the good person ought to be selfish,
    • the wicked, not (§ viii.7).
  • Every nous chooses the best for itself.
    • The decent person does what he must;
    • the wicked person, not (§ viii.8).
  • The serious (σπουδαῖος) person
    • acts, even to death, for
      • friends and
      • country;
    • to do himself a greater good, gives up
      • money,
      • honors,
      • the goods people fight over;
    • chooses
      • taking pleasure
        • briefly, but intensely, rather than
        • mildly, for a long time;
      • living
        • beautifully for one year, rather than
        • haphazardly for many;
      • of actions,
        • one that is
          • noble and
          • great over
        • many little ones

        (maybe that’s what martyrs are doing);

    • gets the greater good for himself
      by letting his friend get more of
      • money (§ viii.9),
      • honor,
      • rule,
      • even doing noble deeds (§ viii.10);
    • takes more of the noble for himself
      in all praiseworthy things.
  • One should be selfish
    • that way,
    • not the way the hoi polloi are (§ viii.11).
• Chapter IX. Does the happy man need friends?
  • The answer seems to be:
    • No, since being
      • blessed and
      • autarkic

      means you need nothing else (§ ix.1).

    • Yes, since
      • of good things,
        • the happy man has all, and
        • a friend is the greatest of the external ones;
      • the good, virtuous, serious man is a benefactor,
        and that is what a friend is –
        thus one may need friends
        • more in good times
        • than bad (§ ix.2);
      • man is
        • political, that is,
        • born to live with others;
      • it is better to spend one’s days
        • with decent friends
        • than with random strangers (§ ix.3).
  • The blessed man has need
    • not at all of useful friends
      (what the hoi polloi think friends are);
    • little of pleasant friends (§ ix.4);
    • but of good friends, if
      • he will contemplate his own decent deeds,
      • we contemplate better another’s actions;
      • what is a good man’s own is pleasant;
      • his energeia is
        • serious and
        • pleasant in itself;
      • happiness is an energeia, which
        • comes about, but
        • is not present like a possession.
  • Living with others
    • makes it easier to ἐνεργεῖν continuously (§ ix.5),
      as the blessed man should do;
    • who are
      • vicious is as painful to the serious
        as e.g. discord to the musical (§ ix.6);
      • good is training (ἄσκησις) in virtue,
        as e.g. Theognis says.
  • The serious (σπουδαῖος) man needs serious friends.
    • Natural science says that, since
      the good by nature is in itself
      • good and
      • pleasant

      to the serious man. For,

      • living (τὸ ζῆν) is defined as a capacity (δύναμις) for
        • perceiving or
        • (in case of humans) thinking;
      • capacity leads to activity (ἐνέργεια);
      • authority is in activity;
      • living, being a definite thing, is itself
        • good and
        • pleasant;
      • the good by nature
        • is good for the decent man (ἐπιεικής), and so
        • seems pleasant to all (§ ix.7).
    • We must discount life (ζωή) that is
      • corrupt (μοχθερά),
      • ruined (διεφθαρμένη)
      • pained (ἐν λύπαις) – see X.i–v (§ ix.8).
    • If
      • life is itself
        • good and
        • pleasant

        (as it seems to be, since it is craved by

        • everybody, especially
        • the decent and
        • the blessed);
      • we
        • perceive that we are perceiving,
        • think that we are thinking, and thus
        • perceive and think that we are existing;
      • perceiving that we are living
        is a pleasure in itself;
      • living is desirable,
        especially for the good (§ ix.9);
      • a friend being a different self,
        the serious man is
        • so to his friend
        • as to himself;

      then

      • as one’s own existence is desirable,
      • so, or nearly so, is a friend’s –
        desirable through the perception of being good,
        this being pleasant in itself.
    • One must “synaesthetically” perceive
      a friend’s existence, through
      • sharing
        • talk and
        • thought by
      • living together, as do
        • humans,
        • not e.g. cattle (§ ix.10).

Text

[1168^a]

Chapter VIII

§ viii.1

ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ πότερον δεῖ φιλεῖν

• ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα ἢ
• ἄλλον τινά.

• ἐπιτιμῶσι γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς μάλιστ᾽ ἀγαπῶσι, καὶ
• ὡς ἐν αἰσχρῷ φιλαύτους ἀποκαλοῦσι,

δοκεῖ τε

• ὁ μὲν φαῦλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν, καὶ
  • ὅσῳ ἂν μοχθηρότερος ᾖ,
  • τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον –
    ἐγκαλοῦσι δὴ αὐτῷ οἷον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ πράττει –
• ὁ δ᾽ ἐπιεικὴς διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ
  • ὅσῳ ἂν βελτίων ᾖ,
  • μᾶλλον
    • διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ
    • φίλου ἕνεκα,

    τὸ δ᾽ αὑτοῦ παρίησιν.

§ viii.2

τοῖς λόγοις δὲ τούτοις τὰ ἔργα διαφωνεῖ, οὐκ ἀλόγως. [1168^b]

φασὶ γὰρ

• δεῖν φιλεῖν μάλιστα τὸν μάλιστα φίλον,
• φίλος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ βουλόμενος
  ᾧ βούλεται τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, καὶ
  εἰ μηδεὶς εἴσεται·

• ταῦτα δ᾽ ὑπάρχει μάλιστ᾽ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτόν, καὶ
• τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ πάνθ᾽ οἷς ὁ φίλος ὁρίζεται·

εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι

• ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ φιλικὰ καὶ
• πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους διήκει.

καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ πᾶσαι ὁμογνωμονοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ

πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα πρὸς αὑτὸν μάλιστ᾽ ἂν ὑπάρχοι·

μάλιστα γὰρ φίλος αὑτῷ·

καὶ φιλητέον δὴ μάλισθ᾽ ἑαυτόν.

ἀπορεῖται δὴ εἰκότως ποτέροις χρεὼν ἕπεσθαι,
ἀμφοῖν ἐχόντοιν τὸ πιστόν.

§ viii.3

ἴσως οὖν

• τοὺς τοιούτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαιρεῖν καὶ
• διορίζειν
  • ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἑκάτεροι καὶ
  • πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν.

εἰ δὴ λάβοιμεν τὸ φίλαυτον πῶς ἑκάτεροι λέγουσιν,
τάχ᾽ ἂν γένοιτο δῆλον.

§ viii.4

οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς ὄνειδος ἄγοντες
αὐτὸ φιλαύτους καλοῦσι
τοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐν

• χρήμασι καὶ
• τιμαῖς καὶ
• ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς·

τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ

• ὀρέγονται, καὶ
• ἐσπουδάκασι

περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα ὄντα,
διὸ καὶ περιμάχητά ἐστιν.

οἱ δὴ περὶ ταῦτα πλεονέκται χαρίζονται

• ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως
• τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ
• τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς·

τοιοῦτοι δ᾽ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί·

διὸ καὶ ἡ προσηγορία γεγένηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ φαύλου ὄντος·

δικαίως δὴ τοῖς οὕτω φιλαύτοις ὀνειδίζεται.

§ viii.5

ὅτι δὲ

• τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦθ᾽ αὑτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας
  εἰώθασι λέγειν οἱ πολλοὶ
• φιλαύτους,

οὐκ ἄδηλον·

εἰ γάρ τις ἀεὶ

• σπουδάζοι
  • τὰ δίκαια πράττειν αὐτὸς μάλιστα πάντων ἢ
  • τὰ σώφρονα ἢ
  • ὁποιαοῦν ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, καὶ ὅλως ἀεὶ
• τὸ καλὸν ἑαυτῷ περιποιοῖτο,

οὐδεὶς

• ἐρεῖ τοῦτον φίλαυτον
• οὐδὲ ψέξει.

§ viii.6

δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος μᾶλλον εἶναι φίλαυτος·

• ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὰ
  • κάλλιστα καὶ
  • μάλιστ᾽ ἀγαθά, καὶ
• χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ, καὶ
• πάντα τούτῳ πείθεται·

• ὥσπερ δὲ
  • καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστ᾽ εἶναι δοκεῖ
  • καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα,
• οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπος·

καὶ φίλαυτος δὴ μάλιστα ὁ

• τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν καὶ
• τούτῳ χαριζόμενος.

καὶ

• ἐγκρατὴς δὲ καὶ
• ἀκρατὴς

λέγεται τῷ κρατεῖν

• τὸν νοῦν
• ἢ μή,

ὡς τούτου ἑκάστου ὄντος· [1169^a]

καὶ πεπραγέναι δοκοῦσιν

• αὐτοὶ καὶ
• ἑκουσίως

τὰ μετὰ λόγου μάλιστα.

• ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦθ᾽ ἕκαστός ἐστιν ἢ μάλιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ
• ὅτι ὁ ἐπιεικὴς μάλιστα τοῦτ᾽ ἀγαπᾷ.

διὸ φίλαυτος μάλιστ᾽ ἂν εἴη,
καθ᾽ ἕτερον εἶδος τοῦ ὀνειδιζομένου, καὶ διαφέρων τοσοῦτον ὅσον

• τὸ
  • κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ
  • κατὰ πάθος,
• καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι
  • ἢ τοῦ καλοῦ
  • ἢ τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν.

§ viii.7

• τοὺς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις διαφερόντως σπουδάζοντας
  πάντες
  • ἀποδέχονται καὶ
  • ἐπαινοῦσιν·
• πάντων δὲ
  • ἁμιλλωμένων πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ
  • διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν
     
  • κοινῇ τ᾽ ἂν πάντ᾽ εἴη τὰ δέοντα καὶ
  • ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν,

  εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν.

ὥστε

• τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι
  • (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων
  • καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει),
• τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν οὐ δεῖ·
  βλάψει γὰρ
  • καὶ ἑαυτὸν
  • καὶ τοὺς πέλας,

  φαύλοις πάθεσιν ἑπόμενος.

§ viii.8

• τῷ μοχθηρῷ μὲν οὖν διαφωνεῖ
  • ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ
  • ἃ πράττει·
• ὁ δ᾽ ἐπιεικής,
  • ἃ δεῖ,
  • ταῦτα καὶ πράττει·

• πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αἱρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ,
• ὁ δ᾽ ἐπιεικὴς πειθαρχεῖ τῷ νῷ.

§ viii.9

ἀληθὲς δὲ περὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου καὶ τὸ

• τῶν φίλων ἕνεκα πολλὰ πράττειν καὶ
• τῆς πατρίδος,

κἂν δέῃ ὑπεραποθνήσκειν·

προήσεται γὰρ

• καὶ χρήματα
• καὶ τιμὰς
• καὶ ὅλως τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθά,

περιποιούμενος ἑαυτῷ τὸ καλόν·

• ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἡσθῆναι σφόδρα μᾶλλον ἕλοιτ᾽ ἂν
  ἢ πολὺν ἠρέμα, καὶ
• βιῶσαι καλῶς ἐνιαυτὸν
  ἢ πόλλ᾽ ἔτη τυχόντως, καὶ
• μίαν πρᾶξιν
  • καλὴν καὶ
  • μεγάλην

  ἢ

  • πολλὰς καὶ
  • μικράς.

τοῖς δ᾽ ὑπεραποθνήσκουσι τοῦτ᾽ ἴσως συμβαίνει·
αἱροῦνται δὴ μέγα καλὸν ἑαυτοῖς.

καὶ χρήματα προοῖντ᾽ ἂν
ἐφ᾽ ᾧ πλείονα λήψονται οἱ φίλοι·
γίνεται γὰρ

• τῷ μὲν φίλῳ χρήματα,
• αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ καλόν·

τὸ δὴ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἑαυτῷ ἀπονέμει.

§ viii.10

καὶ περὶ τιμὰς δὲ καὶ ἀρχὰς ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος·
πάντα γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ ταῦτα προήσεται·

• καλὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦτο καὶ
• ἐπαινετόν.

εἰκότως δὴ δοκεῖ σπουδαῖος εἶναι,
ἀντὶ πάντων
αἱρούμενος τὸ καλόν.

ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ

• πράξεις τῷ φίλῳ προΐεσθαι, καὶ
• εἶναι κάλλιον τοῦ αὐτὸν πρᾶξαι
  τὸ αἴτιον τῷ φίλῳ γενέσθαι.

§ viii.11

ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τοῖς ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἑαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλέον νέμων. [1169^b]

• οὕτω μὲν οὖν φίλαυτον εἶναι δεῖ, καθάπερ εἴρηται·
• ὡς δ᾽ οἱ πολλοί, οὐ χρή.

Chapter IX

§ ix.1

ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰ

• δεήσεται φίλων
• ἢ μή.

οὐθὲν γάρ φασι δεῖν φίλων τοῖς

• μακαρίοις καὶ
• αὐτάρκεσιν·

ὑπάρχειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τἀγαθά·

αὐτάρκεις οὖν ὄντας
οὐδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι,

τὸν δὲ φίλον,
ἕτερον αὐτὸν ὄντα,
πορίζειν ἃ δι᾽ αὑτοῦ ἀδυνατεῖ·

ὅθεν

ὅταν ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων; [1 Eur. Orest. 665]

§ ix.2

ἔοικε δ᾽ ἀτόπῳ

• τὸ πάντ᾽ ἀπονέμοντας τἀγαθὰ τῷ εὐδαίμονι
• φίλους μὴ ἀποδιδόναι,
  ὃ δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μέγιστον εἶναι.

εἴ τε

• φίλου
  • μᾶλλόν ἐστι τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν
  • ἢ πάσχειν, καὶ
• ἔστι
  • τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ
  • τῆς ἀρετῆς

  τὸ εὐεργετεῖν,

• κάλλιον δ᾽ εὖ ποιεῖν
  • φίλους
  • ὀθνείων,

τῶν εὖ πεισομένων δεήσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος.

διὸ καὶ ἐπιζητεῖται πότερον

• ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον δεῖ φίλων
• ἢ ἐν ἀτυχίαις,

ὡς

• καὶ τοῦ ἀτυχοῦντος δεομένου τῶν εὐεργετησόντων
• καὶ τῶν εὐτυχούντων οὓς εὖ ποιήσουσιν.

§ ix.3

ἄτοπον δ᾽ ἴσως καὶ τὸ μονώτην ποιεῖν τὸν μακάριον·

οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἕλοιτ᾽ ἂν καθ᾽ αὑτὸν τὰ πάντ᾽ ἔχειν ἀγαθά·

• πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ
• συζῆν πεφυκός.

καὶ τῷ εὐδαίμονι δὴ τοῦθ᾽ ὑπάρχει·

• τὰ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἔχει,
• δῆλον δ᾽ ὡς
  • μετὰ φίλων καὶ ἐπιεικῶν κρεῖττον
  • ἢ μετ᾽ ὀθνείων καὶ τῶν τυχόντων συνημερεύειν.

δεῖ ἄρα τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλων.

§ ix.4

• τί οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ πρῶτοι, καὶ
• πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν;

ἢ ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ φίλους οἴονται τοὺς χρησίμους εἶναι;

• τῶν τοιούτων μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν δεήσεται ὁ μακάριος,
  ἐπειδὴ τἀγαθὰ ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ·
• οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ,
  ἢ ἐπὶ μικρόν
  (ἡδὺς γὰρ ὁ βίος ὢν
  οὐδὲν δεῖται ἐπεισάκτου ἡδονῆς)·
• οὐ δεόμενος δὲ τῶν τοιούτων φίλων οὐ δοκεῖ δεῖσθαι φίλων.
• τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἀληθές.

§ ix.5

• ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ εἴρηται ὅτι
  ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργειά τις ἐστίν,
• ἡ δ᾽ ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι
  • γίνεται καὶ
  • οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὥσπερ κτῆμά τι.

εἰ δὲ

• τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν,
• τοῦ δ᾽ ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια
  • σπουδαία καὶ
  • ἡδεῖα καθ᾽ αὑτήν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται,
• ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον τῶν ἡδέων,
• θεωρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον
  • τοὺς πέλας δυνάμεθα ἢ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ
  • τὰς ἐκείνων πράξεις ἢ τὰς οἰκείας,

αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων δὲ πράξεις φίλων ὄντων
ἡδεῖαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς [1170^a]
(ἄμφω γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ τῇ φύσει ἡδέα)·

ὁ μακάριος δὴ φίλων τοιούτων δεήσεται,
εἴπερ θεωρεῖν προαιρεῖται πράξεις ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ οἰκείας,
τοιαῦται δ᾽ αἱ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλου ὄντος.

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οἴονταί τε δεῖν ἡδέως ζῆν τὸν εὐδαίμονα.

• μονώτῃ μὲν οὖν χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος·
  οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον καθ᾽ αὑτὸν ἐνεργεῖν συνεχῶς,
• μεθ᾽ ἑτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ῥᾷον.

§ ix.6

ἔσται οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια συνεχεστέρα,
ἡδεῖα οὖσα καθ᾽ αὑτήν,
ὃ δεῖ περὶ τὸν μακάριον εἶναι·

ὁ γὰρ σπουδαῖος,
ᾗ σπουδαῖος,

• ταῖς κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν πράξεσι χαίρει,
• ταῖς δ᾽ ἀπὸ κακίας δυσχεραίνει,

§ ix.7

γίνοιτο δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἄσκησίς τις τῆς ἀρετῆς
ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς,
καθάπερ καὶ Θέογνίς φησιν.

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τὸ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν εἴρηται ὅτι
τῷ σπουδαίῳ

• ἀγαθὸν καὶ
• ἡδύ

ἐστι καθ᾽ αὑτό.

• τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὁρίζονται τοῖς
  • ζῴοις δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως,
  • ἀνθρώποις δ᾽
    • αἰσθήσεως ἢ
    • νοήσεως·
• ἡ δὲ δύναμις εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται,
• τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ·

ἔοικε δὴ τὸ ζῆν εἶναι κυρίως τὸ

• αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ
• νοεῖν.

τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ

• ἀγαθῶν καὶ
• ἡδέων·

• ὡρισμένον γάρ,
• τὸ δ᾽ ὡρισμένον τῆς τἀγαθοῦ φύσεως·

τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν
καὶ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ·

διόπερ ἔοικε πᾶσιν ἡδὺ εἶναι·

§ ix.8

• οὐ δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν
  • μοχθηρὰν ζωὴν καὶ
  • διεφθαρμένην,
• οὐδ᾽ ἐν λύπαις·

ἀόριστος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη,
καθάπερ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῇ.

ἐν τοῖς ἐχομένοις δὲ περὶ τῆς λύπης ἔσται φανερώτερον.

§ ix.9

εἰ δ᾽

• αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν
  • ἀγαθὸν καὶ
  • ἡδύ

  (ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ

  • πάντας ὀρέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ,
    καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς
  • ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ
  • μακαρίους·
     
  • τούτοις γὰρ ὁ βίος αἱρετώτατος, καὶ
  • ἡ τούτων μακαριωτάτη ζωή),
• • ὁ δ᾽ ὁρῶν ὅτι ὁρᾷ αἰσθάνεται καὶ
  • ὁ ἀκούων ὅτι ἀκούει καὶ
  • ὁ βαδίζων ὅτι βαδίζει, καὶ

  ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἔστι τι
  τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν,
  ὥστε

  • ἂν αἰσθανώμεθ᾽, ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα,
  • κἂν νοῶμεν, ὅτι νοοῦμεν,
• τὸ δ᾽ ὅτι
  • αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ
  • νοοῦμεν,

  ὅτι ἐσμέν
  (τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἦν

  • αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ
  • νοεῖν), [1170^b]
• τὸ δ᾽ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ζῇ,
  τῶν ἡδέων καθ᾽ αὑτό
  • (φύσει γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ζωή,
  • τὸ δ᾽ ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡδύ),
• αἱρετὸν δὲ τὸ ζῆν καὶ
  μάλιστα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς,
  ὅτι τὸ εἶναι
  • ἀγαθόν ἐστιν αὐτοῖς καὶ
  • ἡδύ

  (συναισθανόμενοι γὰρ τοῦ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἀγαθοῦ
  ἥδονται),

§ ix.10

• • ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει ὁ σπουδαῖος,
  • καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον
    (ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ φίλος ἐστίν)·

• καθάπερ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι αἱρετόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ,
• οὕτω καὶ τὸ τὸν φίλον, ἢ παραπλησίως.

τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι ἦν αἱρετὸν διὰ
τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὑτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος,
ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη αἴσθησις ἡδεῖα καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν.

συναισθάνεσθαι ἄρα δεῖ καὶ τοῦ φίλου ὅτι ἔστιν,
τοῦτο δὲ γίνοιτ᾽ ἂν ἐν τῷ

• συζῆν καὶ
• κοινωνεῖν
  • λόγων καὶ
  • διανοίας·

οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δόξειε τὸ συζῆν

• ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι,
• καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν βοσκημάτων τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι.

εἰ δὴ τῷ μακαρίῳ

• τὸ εἶναι αἱρετόν ἐστι καθ᾽ αὑτό,
  • ἀγαθὸν τῇ φύσει ὂν καὶ
  • ἡδύ,
• παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐστίν,

κἂν ὁ φίλος τῶν αἱρετῶν εἴη.

ὃ δ᾽ ἐστὶν αὐτῷ αἱρετόν,
τοῦτο δεῖ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ,
ἢ ταύτῃ ἐνδεὴς ἔσται.

δεήσει ἄρα τῷ εὐδαιμονήσοντι φίλων σπουδαίων.

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