Thanks to Stephen Greenleaf, whom I met through this blog in the first place, my attention has lit on some words of Charles S. Pierce:

When a man desires ardently to know the truth, his first effort will be to imagine what that truth can be … there is, after all, nothing but imagination that can ever supply him an inkling of the truth. He can stare stupidly at phenomena; but in the absence of imagination they will not connect themselves together in any rational way.

I am not sure now that “staring stupidly at phenomena” is not Aristotle’s definition of perfect happiness.

The words of Peirce are in some notes gathered posthumously as “The Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism,” Chapter IV of Philosophical Writings of Peirce (Dover, 1955). I bought an old copy of this from a junk shop in Rio, West Virginia, when I was in high school. The book is apparently a republication of The Philosophy of Peirce: Selected Writings (Routledge, 1940), and the editor is Justus Buchler, “an active opponent of McCarthyism.”

We have reached the apparent climax of other notes not seen through publication by their author. Of the Nicomachean Ethics, we are in Book X, the last, and only chapter ix is left. Chapters vi–viii are below, and in § viii.7, Aristotle says (with my translation),

ἡ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία	Perfect happiness –
ὅτι θεωρητική τις ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια,	that it is a “staring” activity
καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανείη …	would also appear hence …
τῷ δὴ ζῶντι	for the living thing,
τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρουμένου,	its acting being taken away,
ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον	and even more,
τοῦ ποιεῖν,	its making,
τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρία;	what remains, save “staring”?
ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια,	thus the activity of the god,
μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα,	distinct in blessedness,
θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἴη·	would be “staring.”

The gods make and do nothing, at least not the way humans do. We have the chance to show justice, courage, liberality, and temperance, but the gods do not. They must do something; they are not asleep like Endymion. Therefore what they do is what I am calling “staring.”

Such is the way that we take up (ὑπειλήφαμεν) the gods, according to Aristotle. His conclusions are drawn from our beliefs about the gods, not necessarily from the gods themselves. Thus he is making historical claims, which we cannot refute by saying that nobody believes in those gods anymore.

Did even Aristotle’s contemporaries believe in such gods as he describes? I am not sure he did not expect his listeners to question his assertions about what they believed.

Aristotle describes what the gods do as θεωρητική ἐνέργεια, or simply θεωρία. If we prefer a fancier term than “staring,” a good translation of θεωρητική would seem to be “speculative,” because it shares with the Greek adjective the root sense of looking or seeing. We could also use “theoretical,” but how many readers would recognize the connection with “theatrical”? At least with “speculative,” one may think of “inspection” and “spectacle,” as well as “spectacles” in the sense of glasses to see through.

Nonetheless, all of the published translations that I have consulted render theôretikê as “contemplative”:

Ross, revised by Brown

“But that perfect happiness is a contemplative activity will appear from the following consideration as well … Now if you take away from a living being action, and still more production, what is left but contemplation? Therefore the activity of god, which surpasses all others in blessedness, must be contemplative.”

Rackham

“The following considerations also will show that perfect happiness is some form of contemplative activity … But for a living being, if we eliminate action, and a fortiori creative action, what remains save contemplation? It follows that the activity of God, which is transcendent in blessedness, is the activity of contemplation.”

Apostle

“That perfect happiness is contemplative activity would be evident also from the following … So if action, and production even more so, are omitted from their life, is not contemplation the only activity left? ¶ The activity of a god, then, which surpasses all other activites in blessedness, would be contemplative.”

Sachs

“That complete happiness is a contemplative activity would also be made clear by the following consideration … But when someone who is living is deprived of acting, and still more of making anything, what remains except contemplation? So the being-at-work of a god, surpassing in blessedness, would be contemplative.”

Crisp

“That complete happiness consists in some contemplative activity is also apparent from the following … So if we remove from a living being the possibility of action, and furthermore the very possibility of producing anything, what is left apart from contemplation? So the god’s activity, which is superior in blessedness, will be contemplative.”

Bartlett and Collins

“But that complete happiness is a certain contemplative activity would appear also from this … So for one who is living, when his acting is taken away, and, still more, his making something, what remains except contemplation? As a result, the activity of the god, because it is superior in blessedness, would be contemplative.”

Reeve

“But that complete happiness is some contemplative activity will also be evident from the following considerations … If, then, living has doing actions taken away from it and still more so producing, what is left except contemplating? So the activity of a god, superior as it is in blessedness, will be contemplative.”

According to an automated search of the electronic files that I have, the string specul appears not at all in Ross, Crisp, or Bartlett and Collins. Apostle uses the string only in “speculation,” and this only

• twice in his translation, both times in our one reading to come, Book X, chapter ix (his chapter 10):

  • to translate θεωρῆσαι in § 1,
  • to fill out the meaning of ἄνευ ἕξεως as “without the habit of speculation or judgment” in § 21;

• twice in notes, both times on the present reading, in §§ vii.2, 3 (bolding mine, italics his):

  θεωρεῖν τε γὰρ δυνάμεθα συνεχῶς μᾶλλον ἢ πράττειν ὁτιοῦν … εὔλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν ζητούντων ἡδίω τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι.

  we are more able to be engaged continuously in theoretical activity than to perform any action continuously* … it is reasonable for men who have understanding to pass their time more pleasantly than those who [merely] inquire.†

  * Actions require greater physical effort than speculation and are therefore more tiring and more painful.

  † In speculation, inquiry is for the sake of knowledge.

Reeve uses specul only in a note on his translation of theôrêtikos as “contemplative”:

For what makes something praktikos for Aristotle is that it is appropriately related to praxis or action, considered as an end choiceworthy because of itself, and not – as with “practical” – that it is opposed to what is theoretical, speculative, or ideal. Hence theôrêtikos activities are more praktikos than those that are widely considered to be most so …

Rackham uses “speculative” and “speculation” several times in both his translation and his own words. In his translation,

• in Book VI, § vi.3, θεωρητικὴ διάνοια is “speculative thought”;
• in Book VIII, § i.7, τὰ φυσικά is “scientific speculations”;
• in Book X, § iv.5, θεωρία is “speculation” (we shall look at the passage later).

In his outline of the Ethics, Rackham notes that, in Book VI,

The higher mental excellence of Theoretic or Speculative Wisdom is more scantily described [than is Prudence], and is not explicitly shown to be the highest of the Virtues, as the general argument of the treatise requires.

Perhaps then the Nicomachean Ethics is not a single treatise with a general argument. In Book X, after “a second and unconnected excursus on Pleasure …,”

Then follows the conclusion of the whole argument: as Speculative Wisdom is the highest of the Virtues, Happiness ex definitione consists in the activity in which it is manifested, and this activity is Theoria, the disinterested contemplation of truth.

If that is really what Aristotle means by θεωρία, then Robert Pirsig may be justified in his criticism. In the “new philosophy” or even “new spiritual rationality” that his former self Phaedrus tried to develop (Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, chapter 29),

Reason was to be subordinate, logically, to Quality, and he was sure he would find the cause of its not being so back among the ancient Greeks, whose mythos had endowed our culture with the tendency underlying all the evil of our technology, the tendency to do what is “reasonable” even when it isn’t any good.

Thus it seems reasonable to some of us to value only what can be measured in dollars, and we can trace this idea to Aristotle. George Monbiot described the problem in 2007, after visiting an estuary in Wales:

several hundred people had come to enjoy its beauty and tranquillity and, as is usual, two or three people on jet skis were spoiling it for everyone else. Most economists will tell us that human welfare is best served by multiplying the number of jet skis.

When I searched for Monbiot’s article, some criticism came up, but I find it dishonest:

[Monbiot] goes on to complain that some people on jet skis had recently spoilt his visit to an estuary and that the world is getting too noisy. This, he argues, is because people are getting too rich.

Writing thus in 2017 for the “educational charity and free market think tank” called IEA (“Institute of Economic Affairs”), Christopher Snowdon does not dispute Monbiot’s assertion that “several hundred [other] people” were disturbed by the jet skiers; Snowdon leaves out those other people, as if to suggest that Monbiot is just being selfish. Snowdon ignores also Monbiot’s argument that the hardships of recession

are the avoidable results of an economy designed to maximise growth rather than welfare …

---

Governments love growth because it excuses them from dealing with inequality …

The rich are having to spend more and more to distinguish themselves from the herd …

Writing in The Affluent Society in 1959, John Kenneth Galbraith described vacuum cleaners and wall-to-wall carpets as needless extravagances. So reports Snowdon, who goes on to say,

Nobody outside the lunatic fringe would claim today that a vacuum cleaner was a luxury, or call for economic growth to be wound back to the point at which wall-to-wall carpeting is unaffordable.

I guess I’m in the lunatic fringe. According to Meghan Shouse and Natalie Stoclet in House Beautiful (May 23, 2024),

Like jeans and haircuts, home decor goes in and out of style. Wall-to-wall carpet, once a mainstay in American homes, is ripe to cycle back into fashion.

Anything that can go in and out of style is a luxury, it seems to me. If you are going to spurge on wall-to-wall carpeting, then you will probably want a vacuum cleaner; however, we had the former, but not the latter, in the first group house I lived in during graduate school. We cleaned up sometimes with a carpet sweeper.

Somewhere I read that when we had no vacuum cleaner, then our houses may have been dirtier, but we did not see this as a problem. I have not been able to find the argument in The Feminine Mystique, but have found something perhaps better:

The material details of life, the daily burden of cooking and cleaning, of taking care of the physical needs of husband and children – these did indeed define a woman’s world a century ago when Americans were pioneers, and the American frontier lay in conquering the land. But the women who went west with the wagon trains also shared the pioneering purpose. Now the American frontiers are of the mind, and of the spirit. Love and children and home are good, but they are not the whole world, even if most of the words now written for women pretend they are. Why should women accept this picture of a half-life, instead of a share in the whole of human destiny? Why should women try to make housework “something more,” instead of moving on the frontiers of their own time, as American women moved beside their husbands on the old frontiers?

A baked potato is not as big as the world, and vacuuming the living room floor – with or without makeup – is not work that takes enough thought or energy to challenge any woman’s full capacity.

Betty Friedan may have a more palatable argument than Monbiot’s, but I’m not sure they are ultimately different. We cannot infer household wellbeing from household income. The idea that we can is in Nicomachean Ethics V, § v.10 (the translation is by Bartlett and Collins):

διὸ πάντα συμβλητὰ δεῖ πως εἶναι, ὧν ἐστὶν ἀλλαγή.
ἐφ᾽ ὃ τὸ νόμισμ᾽ ἐλήλυθε,
καὶ γίνεταί πως μέσον·
πάντα γὰρ μετρεῖ,
ὥστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν,
πόσα ἄττα δὴ ὑποδήματ᾽ ἴσον
οἰκίᾳ ἢ
τροφῇ.

Hence all that is exchanged must somehow be capable of being compared.
For this purpose, money has arisen
and become in a way a middle term.
For it measures everything
– both excess and deficiency –
so that it measures however many sandals are equal
to a house or
to food.

Peirce sees the problem here, in the notes quoted in the beginning:

The old-fashioned political economist adored, as alone capable of redeeming the human race, the glorious principle of individual greed … the only kind of science this principle would favour would be such as is immediately remunerative with a great preference for such as can be kept secret, like the modern sciences of dyeing and perfumery.

Add the sciences of soft drinks; I was just reading about the “mystery” of Dr Pepper in the Washington Post (June 4, 2024), which does not seem to have run a news story about the recent Mexican election.

Peirce continues with a subject dear to my heart:

Kepler’s discovery rendered Newton possible, and Newton rendered modern physics possible, with the steam engine, electricity, and all the other sources of the stupendous fortunes of our age. But Kepler’s discovery would not have been possible without the doctrine of conics. Now contemporaries of Kepler – such penetrating minds as Descartes and Pascal – were abandoning the study of geometry … because they said it was so utterly useless. Thus was the future of the human race almost trembling in the balance; for had not the geometry of conic sections already been worked out in large measure, and had their opinion that only sciences apparently useful ought to be pursued [prevailed], … the nineteenth century would have had none of those characters which distinguish it from the ancien régime.

In La Géometrié of 1637, Descartes made the case for algebra by showing it was modelled by geometry. He was so successful that, two-and-a-half centuries later, in order to show the consistency of Euclid’s postulates, David Hilbert created a model out of algebra. Meanwhile, since Kepler died in 1630 (having been born in 1571), I suppose he knew the conic sections from Apollonius. There was a lot more work on the conics after Descartes had given the world a new way to think about them.

In any case, by Peirce’s account, the useful relies on the useless; but perhaps still the useless has to be pursued in the right way, and this is a way that Aristotle does not distinguish. At any rate, he is not at pains to clarify, to me anyway, what he means by θεωρητική ἐνέργεια, “contemplative activity.” Perhaps it has not got all of the connotations of our “contemplation.” Or can θεωρία indeed be interpreted to mean omphaloskepsis?

The source of our word “theory” is used six times in the present reading (Book X, chapters vi–viii), and I have highlighted them below. The noun θεωρία appeared also a few times earlier, but not as a name for an object of study itself. Here is Book II, § ii.1, with Sachs’s translation:

ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ παροῦσα πραγματεία
οὐ θεωρίας ἕνεκά ἐστιν
ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι
(οὐ γὰρ ἵνα εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα,
ἀλλ᾽ ἵν᾽ ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα,
ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ὄφελος αὐτῆς),
ἀναγκαῖον ἐπισκέψασθαι
τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις,
πῶς πρακτέον αὐτάς·
αὗται γάρ εἰσι κύριαι καὶ
τοῦ ποιὰς γενέσθαι τὰς ἕξεις,
καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν.

Now since our present occupation
is not for the sake of contemplation,
as the other kinds of study are
(for we are investigating not that we might know what virtue is,
but in order that we might become good,
since otherwise there would be no benefit from it),
it is necessary to investigate,
with respect to the things involved in actions,
how one ought to perform them,
since these actions also determine
the sorts of active states that come into being,
as we have said.

Aristotle used θεωρία next in Book IV, § ii.10. I said that section was challenging, because it took up a distinction that one might try to make with the words “value” and “worth.” I try to supply a literal translation of the key passage for us now (seven published translations are in the earlier post):

οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ	For, there is not the same virtue
κτήματος	of a possession
καὶ ἔργου.	as of a work.
κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ	For, the possession
τὸ πλείστου ἄξιον	that is worthy of the most
τιμιώτατον,	is the one most esteemed,
οἷον χρυσός,	such as gold;
ἔργον δὲ	but the work
τὸ μέγα καὶ καλόν	that is great and lovely
(τοῦ γὰρ τοιούτου	(for, of such
ἡ θεωρία θαυμαστή,	the contemplation is wondrous;
τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυμαστόν)·	magnificence is wondrous too).

The point seems to be that what impresses people about

• a possession is the price tag;
• an achievement, the wonder it produces directly in them.

Book VII, § iii.1, with Rackham’s translation:

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον
πότερον
εἰδότες
ἢ οὔ,
καὶ πῶς εἰδότες·
εἶτα
περὶ ποῖα τὸν ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ θετέον,
λέγω δὲ πότερον περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην
ἢ περί τινας ἀφωρισμένας,
καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ τὸν καρτερικόν, πότερον ὁ αὐτὸς
ἢ ἕτερός ἐστιν·
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ
τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα συγγενῆ τῆς θεωρίας ἐστὶ ταύτης.

We have then to consider, first (i)
whether men fail in self-restraint
knowing what they do is wrong,
or not knowing,
and if knowing, knowing in what sense;
and next (ii)
what are to be set down as the objects with which Self-restraint and Unrestraint are concerned:
I mean, are they concerned with pleasure and pain of all sorts,
or only with certain special pleasures and pains?
and (iii) is Self-restraint the same as Endurance
or distinct from it?
and so on with (iv)
the other questions akin to this subject.

Finally (until now), the word appeared once in the previous reading, Book X, § iv.5, now with Sachs’s translation:

κατὰ πᾶσαν γὰρ αἴσθησίν ἐστιν ἡδονή,
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
διάνοιαν καὶ
θεωρίαν,

for there is a pleasure that goes with each of the senses,
and similarly with
thinking and
contemplation.

Aristotle argued last time (e.g. § iv.4) that seeing was not a process (γένεσις). Is contemplation not either? Is there no possibility of missing the mark?

Contents and Summary

• Chapter VI = Chapter 6
  • We take up happinesses,
    this being the “aim of the humanities”
    (τέλος … τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων),
    having reviewed
    • virtues,
    • friendships,
    • pleasures (§ vi.1).
  • Happiness is
    • not a habit (ἕξις), which can be had e.g. by
      • the sleeping or
      • the unlucky,
    • but an activity (ἐνέργεια),
      • not necessary,
      • but chosen for itself (§ vi.2).
  • Play is like that, since
    among those thought happy, e.g. tyrants,
    the hoi polloi engage in it (§ vi.3).
  • That’s no sign (σημεῖον).
    • Different things are worthwhile (τίμιος)
      • to children and grownups,
      • to the base and the decent (§ vi.4).
    • That is really
      • worthwhile and
      • pleasant

      which is so to the “serious.”

    • The activity of one’s own habit is most desirable.
    • The habit of the “serious” is virtue (§ vi.5).
    • Play is like relaxation (ἀνάπαυσις), and this is
      • not an end,
      • but for the sake of activity (§ vi.6).
    • We say the serious are better than
      the laughable and playful (§ vi.7).
    • Bodily pleasures can be enjoyed even by
      • the random person,
      • the slave (§ vi.8).
• Chapter VII = Chapter 7. Happiness is
  • contemplative activity (θεωρητικὴ [ἐνέργεια])
  • of our best part (τοῦ ἀρίστου), be it
    • intellect (νοῦς) or
    • something else,
  • according to the most excellent virtue
    (κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην [ἀρετή], (§ vii.1).

  Thus it is

  • most continuous (§ vii.2);
  • most pleasant, thus
    according to wisdom (§ vii.3);
  • most self-sufficient, though
    having others to work with is good (§ vii.4);
  • loved for its own sake (§ vii.5);
  • residing in leisure (§ vii.6, § vii.7);
  • according to the divine in us (§ vii.8),
    namely intellect (νοῦς, § vii.9).
• Chapter VIII
• Chapter 8.
  • Activities, e.g.
    • contracts,
    • services,
    • those involving passions,

    according to another virtue, e.g.

    • justice,
    • courage,

    are

    • secondary,
    • [merely] human (§ viii.1).
    • bodily (some at least).
  • Of the virtues,
    • the ethical (τοῦ ἤθους) is/are connected to
      • passions,
      • prudence (§ viii.2),
      • our being composite;
    • the intellectual (τοῦ νοῦ) is separate (§ viii.3).
  • With respect to
    • necessities, be there little difference;
    • activities, there is great.
  • On
    • the [ethical, practical] side,
      • the liberal needs money to give away;
      • the just needs money for repayment;
      • the brave needs power;
      • the moderate needs freedom (§ viii.4) –

      at least if the main thing is

      • the deeds (αἱ πράξεις) rather than
      • the will (ἡ προαίρεσις, § viii.5);
    • the theoretical side,
      • one doesn’t need such things,
      • they are even impediments,
      • except insofar as one is still human (§ viii.6).
  • The gods are most
    • happy and
    • blessed –

    another reason why
    perfect happiness is some theoretical activity
    (ἡ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία ὅτι θεωρητική τις ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια).
    The gods

    • don’t do what is
      • just,
      • brave,
      • liberal,
      • moderate;
    • do something – they aren’t e.g. Endymion;
    • must do theory (§ viii.7).
  • Animals aren’t happy,
    because they don’t contemplate (§ viii.8).
• Chapter 9
  • You still need some stuff;
    it doesn’t mean you need a lot (§ viii.9, § viii.10).
    This is confirmed by
    • Solon and
    • Anaxagoras (§ viii.11).
  • However, one has to judge from
    • works and
    • life (§ viii.12).
  • Most “theophilous” would seem to be the one who
    • works with his mind,
    • takes care of it,
    • has the best one,

    since the gods like what is most like them (§ viii.13).

Text

[1176^a]

Chapter VI

Chapter 6

§ vi.1

εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ

• τὰς ἀρετάς τε καὶ
• φιλίας καὶ
• ἡδονάς,

ἀναλαβοῦσι δὴ τὰ προειρημένα συντομώτερος ἂν εἴη ὁ λόγος.

§ vi.2

εἴπομεν δὴ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἕξις·

εἰ δὴ

• ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει,
• ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰς ἐνέργειάν τινα θετέον,
  καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται,
• τῶν δ᾽ ἐνεργειῶν
  • αἳ μέν εἰσιν
    • ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ
  • δι᾽ ἕτερα αἱρεταὶ
  • αἳ δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτάς,

• οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεὴς ἡ εὐδαιμονία
• ἀλλ᾽ αὐτάρκης.

§ vi.3

καθ᾽ αὑτὰς δ᾽ εἰσὶν αἱρεταὶ
ἀφ᾽ ὧν μηδὲν ἐπιζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν.

τοιαῦται δ᾽ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν
αἱ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν πράξεις·

τὰ γὰρ

• καλὰ καὶ
• σπουδαῖα

πράττειν τῶν δι᾽ αὑτὰ αἱρετῶν.

---

καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδεῖαι·

οὐ γὰρ δι᾽ ἕτερα αὐτὰς αἱροῦνται·

• βλάπτονται γὰρ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν μᾶλλον
• ἢ ὠφελοῦνται,

ἀμελοῦντες

• τῶν σωμάτων καὶ
• τῆς κτήσεως.

καταφεύγουσι δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγὰς
τῶν εὐδαιμονιζομένων οἱ πολλοί,

διὸ παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις εὐδοκιμοῦσιν
οἱ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς εὐτράπελοι·

ὧν γὰρ ἐφίενται,
ἐν τούτοις παρέχουσι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἡδεῖς,

δέονται δὲ τοιούτων.

• δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν εὐδαιμονικὰ ταῦτα εἶναι
  διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐν δυναστείαις ἐν τούτοις ἀποσχολάζειν,

§ vi.4

• οὐδὲν δ᾽ ἴσως σημεῖον οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν·

• οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ δυναστεύειν ἡ ἀρετὴ
• οὐδ᾽ ὁ νοῦς,

ἀφ᾽ ὧν αἱ σπουδαῖαι ἐνέργειαι·

οὐδ᾽ εἰ ἄγευστοι οὗτοι ὄντες ἡδονῆς

• εἰλικρινοῦς καὶ
• ἐλευθερίου

ἐπὶ τὰς σωματικὰς καταφεύγουσιν,
διὰ τοῦτο ταύτας οἰητέον αἱρετωτέρας εἶναι·

καὶ γὰρ οἱ παῖδες τὰ παρ᾽ αὑτοῖς τιμώμενα κράτιστα οἴονται εἶναι.

εὔλογον δή,

• ὥσπερ
  • παισὶ καὶ
  • ἀνδράσιν

  ἕτερα φαίνεται τίμια,

• οὕτω καὶ
  • φαύλοις καὶ
  • ἐπιεικέσιν.

§ vi.5

καθάπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται,

• καὶ
  • τίμια καὶ
  • ἡδέα

  ἐστὶ τὰ τῷ σπουδαίῳ

• τοιαῦτα ὄντα·

• ἑκάστῳ δ᾽ ἡ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἕξιν αἱρετωτάτη ἐνέργεια, καὶ
• τῷ σπουδαίῳ δὴ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν.

§ vi.6

οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία·

καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον

• τὸ τέλος εἶναι παιδιάν,
• καὶ
  • πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ
  • κακοπαθεῖν

  τὸν βίον ἅπαντα τοῦ παίζειν χάριν.

• ἅπαντα γὰρ
  ὡς εἰπεῖν
  ἑτέρου ἕνεκα αἱρούμεθα
• πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας·

  • τέλος γὰρ αὕτη.

  • • σπουδάζειν δὲ καὶ
    • πονεῖν

    παιδιᾶς χάριν

    • ἠλίθιον φαίνεται καὶ
    • λίαν παιδικόν.

παίζειν δ᾽ ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατ᾽ Ἀνάχαρσιν, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ·

• ἀναπαύσει γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ παιδιά,
• ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν
  ἀναπαύσεως δέονται.

οὐ δὴ τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυσις· [1177^a]

γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας.

δοκεῖ δ᾽

• ὁ εὐδαίμων βίος κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν εἶναι·
• οὗτος δὲ
  • μετὰ σπουδῆς, ἀλλ᾽
  • οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ.

§ vi.7

• βελτίω τε λέγομεν
  τὰ σπουδαῖα
  τῶν γελοίων καὶ μετὰ παιδιᾶς, καὶ
• τοῦ βελτίονος ἀεὶ
  • καὶ μορίου
  • καὶ ἀνθρώπου

  σπουδαιοτέραν τὴν ἐνέργειαν·

ἡ δὲ τοῦ βελτίονος

• κρείττων καὶ
• εὐδαιμονικωτέρα ἤδη.

§ vi.8

ἀπολαύσειέ τ᾽ ἂν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν
ὁ

• τυχὼν καὶ
• ἀνδράποδον

οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ ἀρίστου·

εὐδαιμονίας δ᾽ οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδῳ μεταδίδωσιν,
εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου.

• οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς ἡ εὐδαιμονία,
• ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ταῖς κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείαις,

καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται.

Chapter VII

Chapter 7

§ vii.1

αὕτη δ᾽ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου.

• • εἴτε δὴ νοῦς τοῦτο
  • εἴτε ἄλλο τι,

  ὃ δὴ κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ

  • ἄρχειν καὶ
  • ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ
  • ἔννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων,
• • εἴτε θεῖον ὂν καὶ αὐτὸ
  • εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον,

ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν
εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία.

ὅτι δ᾽ ἐστὶ θεωρητική, εἴρηται.

§ vii.2

ὁμολογούμενον δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι

• καὶ τοῖς πρότερον
• καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ.

κρατίστη τε γὰρ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια

• (καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν,
• καὶ τῶν γνωστῶν, περὶ ἃ ὁ νοῦς)·

ἔτι δὲ συνεχεστάτη·

• θεωρεῖν τε γὰρ δυνάμεθα συνεχῶς μᾶλλον
• ἢ πράττειν ὁτιοῦν.

§ vii.3

οἰόμεθά τε δεῖν ἡδονὴν παραμεμῖχθαι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ,

δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία θαυμαστὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχειν

• καθαρειότητι καὶ
• τῷ βεβαίῳ,

εὔλογον δὲ

• τοῖς εἰδόσι
• τῶν ζητούντων

ἡδίω τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι.

§ vii.4

ἥ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστ᾽ ἂν εἴη·

• τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαίων
  • καὶ σοφὸς
  • καὶ δίκαιος
  • καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ

  δέονται,

• τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένων
  • ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται πρὸς οὓς δικαιοπραγήσει καὶ μεθ᾽ ὧν,
  • ὁμοίως δὲ
    • καὶ ὁ σώφρων
    • καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος,
  • ὁ δὲ σοφὸς
    • καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὸν ὢν δύναται θεωρεῖν,
    • καὶ
    • ὅσῳ ἂν σοφώτερος ᾖ,
    • μᾶλλον·

βέλτιον δ᾽ ἴσως συνεργοὺς ἔχων,
ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως αὐταρκέστατος. [1177^b]

§ vii.5

δόξαι τ᾽ ἂν αὐτὴ μόνη δι᾽ αὑτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι·

• οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι,
• ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν
  • ἢ πλεῖον
  • ἢ ἔλαττον

  περιποιούμεθα παρὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν.

§ vii.6

δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι·

• ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ
• πολεμοῦμεν ἵν᾽ εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν.

• τῶν μὲν οὖν πρακτικῶν ἀρετῶν
  • ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἢ
  • ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς

  ἡ ἐνέργεια,

• αἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις δοκοῦσιν ἄσχολοι εἶναι,
  • αἱ μὲν πολεμικαὶ καὶ παντελῶς
    • (οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἱρεῖται τὸ πολεμεῖν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἕνεκα,
    • οὐδὲ παρασκευάζει πόλεμον·

    δόξαι γὰρ ἂν παντελῶς μιαιφόνος τις εἶναι,
    εἰ τοὺς φίλους πολεμίους ποιοῖτο,
    ἵνα μάχαι καὶ φόνοι γίνοιντο)·

  • ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἄσχολος,
    καὶ παρ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι
    περιποιουμένη
    • δυναστείας καὶ
    • τιμὰς ἢ
    • τήν γε εὐδαιμονίαν
      • αὑτῷ καὶ
      • τοῖς πολίταις,

      ἑτέραν οὖσαν τῆς πολιτικῆς,
      ἣν καὶ ζητοῦμεν δῆλον ὡς ἑτέραν οὖσαν.

§ vii.7

• εἰ δὴ τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεων
  αἱ
  • πολιτικαὶ καὶ
  • πολεμικαὶ
     
  • κάλλει καὶ
  • μεγέθει

  προέχουσιν,

• αὗται δ᾽
  • ἄσχολοι καὶ
  • τέλους τινὸς ἐφίενται καὶ
    οὐ δι᾽ αὑτὰς αἱρεταί εἰσιν,
• ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια
  • σπουδῇ τε διαφέρειν δοκεῖ
    θεωρητικὴ οὖσα, καὶ
  • παρ᾽ αὑτὴν οὐδενὸς ἐφίεσθαι τέλους, καὶ
  • ἔχειν τὴν ἡδονὴν οἰκείαν
    (αὕτη δὲ συναύξει τὴν ἐνέργειαν), καὶ

  τὸ

  • αὔταρκες δὴ καὶ
  • σχολαστικὸν καὶ
  • ἄτρυτον ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῷ μακαρίῳ ἀπονέμεται,

  τὰ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν φαίνεται ὄντα·

ἡ τελεία δὴ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπου,
λαβοῦσα μῆκος βίου τέλειον·

οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελές ἐστι τῶν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας.

§ vii.8

• οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν οὕτω βιώσεται,
• ἀλλ᾽ ᾗ θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει·

• ὅσον δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου,
• τοσοῦτον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν.

• εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς
  πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον,
• καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος
  πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον.

• οὐ χρὴ δὲ
  κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας
  ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον
  ὄντα
• οὐδὲ θνητὰ
  τὸν θνητόν,
• ἀλλ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται
  • ἀθανατίζειν καὶ
  • πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν
    κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ·

εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν ἐστι, [1178^a]

• δυνάμει καὶ
• τιμιότητι

πολὺ μᾶλλον πάντων ὑπερέχει.

§ vii.9

δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο,
εἴπερ τὸ

• κύριον καὶ
• ἄμεινον.

ἄτοπον οὖν γίνοιτ᾽ ἄν,
εἰ

• μὴ τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον αἱροῖτο
• ἀλλά τινος ἄλλου.

τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότερον ἁρμόσει καὶ νῦν·

τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἑκάστῳ τῇ φύσει

• κράτιστον καὶ
• ἥδιστόν

ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ·

οὗτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος.

Chapter VIII

Chapter 8

§ viii.1

δευτέρως δ᾽ ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν·

αἱ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτην ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρωπικαί.

• δίκαια γὰρ καὶ
• ἀνδρεῖα καὶ
• τὰ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς

πρὸς ἀλλήλους πράττομεν

• ἐν
  • συναλλάγμασι καὶ
  • χρείαις καὶ
  • πράξεσι παντοίαις
• ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι

διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἑκάστῳ·

ταῦτα δ᾽ εἶναι φαίνεται πάντα ἀνθρωπικά.

§ viii.2

• ἔνια δὲ καὶ συμβαίνειν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος δοκεῖ, καὶ
• πολλὰ συνῳκειῶσθαι τοῖς πάθεσιν ἡ τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετή.

συνέζευκται δὲ

• καὶ ἡ φρόνησις τῇ τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετῇ,
• καὶ αὕτη τῇ φρονήσει,

εἴπερ

• αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς ἠθικάς εἰσιν ἀρετάς,
• τὸ δ᾽ ὀρθὸν τῶν ἠθικῶν κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν.

§ viii.3

συνηρτημέναι δ᾽ αὗται καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι
περὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἂν εἶεν·

αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνθέτου ἀρεταὶ
ἀνθρωπικαί·

• καὶ ὁ βίος δὴ ὁ κατὰ ταύτας
• καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία.

ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κεχωρισμένη·

τοσοῦτον γὰρ περὶ αὐτῆς εἰρήσθω·

διακριβῶσαι γὰρ μεῖζον τοῦ προκειμένου ἐστίν.

§ viii.4

δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς χορηγίας

• ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ
• ἐπ᾽ ἔλαττον δεῖσθαι τῆς ἠθικῆς.

• τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων
  ἀμφοῖν χρεία καὶ ἐξ ἴσου ἔστω,
  εἰ
  • καὶ μᾶλλον διαπονεῖ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὁ πολιτικός,
  • καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα·

  μικρὸν γὰρ ἄν τι διαφέροι·

• πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας πολὺ διοίσει.

• τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθερίῳ δεήσει χρημάτων
  πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια, καὶ
• τῷ δικαίῳ δὴ εἰς τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις
  • (αἱ γὰρ βουλήσεις ἄδηλοι,
  • προσποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλεσθαι δικαιοπραγεῖν),
• τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ δυνάμεως,
  εἴπερ ἐπιτελεῖ τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ
• τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσίας·

πῶς γὰρ δῆλος ἔσται ἢ οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις;

§ viii.5

ἀμφισβητεῖταί τε πότερον κυριώτερον τῆς ἀρετῆς

• ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ
• αἱ πράξεις,

ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν οὔσης· [1178^b]

τὸ δὴ τέλειον δῆλον ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἂν εἴη·

πρὸς δὲ τὰς πράξεις πολλῶν δεῖται, καὶ

• ὅσῳ ἂν
  • μείζους ὦσι καὶ
  • καλλίους,
• πλειόνων.

§ viii.6

τῷ δὲ θεωροῦντι

• οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων πρός γε τὴν ἐνέργειαν χρεία,
  ἀλλ᾽ ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ
• ἐμπόδιά ἐστι πρός γε τὴν θεωρίαν·

ᾗ δ᾽

• ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ
• πλείοσι συζῇ, αἱρεῖται

τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν πράττειν·

δεήσεται οὖν τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι.

§ viii.7

ἡ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία
ὅτι θεωρητική τις ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια,
καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανείη.

τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφαμεν

• μακαρίους καὶ
• εὐδαίμονας

εἶναι·

πράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονεῖμαι χρεὼν αὐτοῖς;

• πότερα τὰς δικαίας;

  ἢ γελοῖοι φανοῦνται

  • συναλλάττοντες καὶ
  • παρακαταθήκας
  • ἀποδιδόντες καὶ
  • ὅσα τοιαῦτα;

• ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους ∗∗

  ὑπομένοντας τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ κινδυνεύοντας ὅτι καλόν;

• ἢ τὰς ἐλευθερίους; τίνι δὲ δώσουσιν;

  ἄτοπον δ᾽ εἰ καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς

  • νόμισμα ἤ
  • τι τοιοῦτον.

• αἱ δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν εἶεν;

  ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσι φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας;

διεξιοῦσι δὲ πάντα φαίνοιτ᾽ ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις

• μικρὰ καὶ
• ἀνάξια

θεῶν.

---

ἀλλὰ μὴν

• ζῆν γε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν αὐτοὺς καὶ
• ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα·

οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὥσπερ τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα.

τῷ δὴ ζῶντι

• τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρουμένου,
• ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον
  τοῦ ποιεῖν,

τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρία;

ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια,
μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα,
θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἴη·

καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δὴ
ἡ ταύτῃ συγγενεστάτη
εὐδαιμονικωτάτη.

§ viii.8

σημεῖον δὲ καὶ

• τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα εὐδαιμονίας,
• τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἐστερημένα τελείως.

• τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς
  ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος,
• τοῖς δ᾽ ἀνθρώποις,
  ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει·
• τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων ζῴων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονεῖ,
  ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίας.

• ἐφ᾽ ὅσον δὴ διατείνει ἡ θεωρία,
• καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ

• οἷς μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν,
• καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν,
  • οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
  • ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν·

αὕτη γὰρ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν τιμία.

ὥστ᾽ εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις.

Chapter 9

§ viii.9

δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς εὐημερίας ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντι·

• οὐ γὰρ αὐτάρκης ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν,
• ἀλλὰ δεῖ
  • καὶ τὸ σῶμα ὑγιαίνειν
  • καὶ
    • τροφὴν καὶ
    • τὴν λοιπὴν θεραπείαν

    ὑπάρχειν. [1179^a]

οὐ μὴν οἰητέον γε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων δεήσεσθαι τὸν εὐδαιμονήσοντα,
εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακάριον εἶναι·

• οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ αὔταρκες
• οὐδ᾽ ἡ πρᾶξις,

§ viii.10

δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ ἄρχοντα

• γῆς καὶ
• θαλάττης

πράττειν τὰ καλά·

καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναιτ᾽ ἄν τις πράττειν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν

(τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐναργῶς·

οἱ γὰρ ἰδιῶται τῶν δυναστῶν

• οὐχ ἧττον δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ πράττειν,
• ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον)·

ἱκανὸν δὲ τοσαῦθ᾽ ὑπάρχειν·

ἔσται γὰρ ὁ βίος εὐδαίμων τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργοῦντος.

§ viii.11

• καὶ Σόλων δὲ τοὺς εὐδαίμονας ἴσως ἀπεφαίνετο καλῶς,
  εἰπὼν μετρίως τοῖς ἐκτὸς κεχορηγημένους,

  • πεπραγότας δὲ τὰ κάλλισθ᾽, ὡς ᾤετο, καὶ
  • βεβιωκότας σωφρόνως·

  ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μέτρια κεκτημένους πράττειν ἃ δεῖ.

• ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας

  • οὐ πλούσιον
  • οὐδὲ δυνάστην

  ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν εὐδαίμονα,
  εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειεν
  εἴ τις ἄτοπος φανείη τοῖς πολλοῖς·

  οὗτοι γὰρ κρίνουσι τοῖς ἐκτός, τούτων αἰσθανόμενοι μόνον.

§ viii.12

συμφωνεῖν δὴ τοῖς λόγοις ἐοίκασιν αἱ τῶν σοφῶν δόξαι.

• πίστιν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει τινά,
• τὸ δ᾽ ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πρακτικοῖς ἐκ
  • τῶν ἔργων καὶ
  • τοῦ βίου

  κρίνεται·

ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τὸ κύριον.

σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προειρημένα χρὴ
ἐπὶ

• τὰ ἔργα καὶ
• τὸν βίον

φέροντας, καὶ

• συνᾳδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις ἀποδεκτέον,
• διαφωνούντων δὲ λόγους ὑποληπτέον.

§ viii.13

ὁ δὲ

• κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ
• τοῦτον θεραπεύων καὶ
• διακείμενος ἄριστα καὶ
• θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν.

• εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται,
  ὥσπερ δοκεῖ,
• καὶ εἴη ἂν εὔλογον
  • χαίρειν τε αὐτοὺς τῷ
    • ἀρίστῳ καὶ
    • συγγενεστάτῳ

    (τοῦτο δ᾽ ἂν εἴη ὁ νοῦς)
    καὶ

  • τοὺς
    • ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ
    • τιμῶντας

    ἀντευποιεῖν
    ὡς

    • τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους
    • καὶ
      • ὀρθῶς τε καὶ
      • καλῶς

      πράττοντας.

ὅτι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα τῷ σοφῷ μάλισθ᾽ ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἄδηλον.

θεοφιλέστατος ἄρα.

τὸν αὐτὸν δ᾽ εἰκὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατον·

ὥστε κἂν οὕτως εἴη ὁ σοφὸς μάλιστ᾽ εὐδαίμων.