Polytropy

I quoted, last time, a writer I admire, who was in turn quoting a Nobelist in literature on how a certain devotee of Aristotle “had nothing useful to offer on the conduct of life.” I don’t admire that comment. A life spent in devotion to the Philosopher may itself  be well conducted. I don’t know whether it was, in the case of Mortimer Adler.

The sentence by Saul Bellow was,

Mortimer Adler had much to tell us about Aristotle’s Ethics, but I had only to look at him to see that he had nothing useful to offer on the conduct of life.

I don’t know how this is not rank prejudice. It does recall the two exchanges that are all I remember from A Passage to India of E. M. Forster (my father once gave me a copy, but I don’t seem to have kept it):

“You understand me, you know what others feel. Oh, if others resembled you!”

Rather surprised, she replied: “I don’t think I understand people very well. I only know whether I like or dislike them.”

“Then you are an Oriental.”

---

“Don’t you think me unkind any more?”

“No.”

“How can you tell, you strange fellow?”

“Not difficult, the one thing I always know.”

“Can you always tell whether a stranger is your friend?”

“Yes.”

“Then you are an Oriental.”

In “A Note on This Book” – namely Strunk and White, The Elements of Style (New York: Macmillan, 1959; paperback edition, 1962) – E. B. White says that the final chapter, “An Approach to Style,” written by himself alone,

is addressed particularly those who feel that English prose composition is not only a necessary skill but a sensible pursuit as well – a way to spend one’s days.

I am glad to have lived in a time when this could be believed.

A novel or movie might portray an admirable or sympathetic figure as sacrificing everything else for painting, writing, or music. In Good Will Hunting, the title character does set his art aside for love; however, this “art” is mathematics. I heard a complaint about this from a fellow postdoc at the Mathematical Sciences Research Institute in Berkeley in 1998.

Perhaps Carl Friedrich Gauss had nothing useful to offer on the conduct of life, at least to the likes of Saul Bellow, or for that matter William Deresiewicz. Nonetheless, by the age of 24, he had solved a problem that (as far as I know) had stumped mathematicians for two thousand years, even since the time of Aristotle.

Gauss’s achievement is more impressive than the construction of a flying machine. That is the personal opinion of me, whose family used to take summer holidays on the Outer Banks of North Carolina, not far from Kitty Hawk, where the Wright Brothers had flown. It was interesting to visit the site, but perhaps more exciting for my father, who once tried to figure out how hang gliders worked by constructing a scale model (which didn’t work).

It’s too bad my father became a lawyer, the way his mother wanted, rather than an engineer, the way he wanted. When parents today make career plans for their children, I am dismayed. William Deresiewicz spells out reasons to be dismayed, in the book I made a second-order quotation from – Excellent Sheep: The Miseducation of the American Elite and the Way to a Meaningful Life (2014).

It’s also too bad my father did not know much mathematics that he could tell me about. At least I understood that the subject was one that could honorably attract one’s interest. When I asked for a slide rule for my birthday, my father’s cousin gave me the one he had used as a student at MIT – where supposedly all he had learned was to balance the thing on his nose. I still have the device, and I would count it as part of the inspiration for the math-art project described in (and available through) “Discrete Logarithms” (August, 2020).

E. B. White said writing was a sensible pursuit. Unfortunately there are people who think it is the only sensible pursuit, and one of them was the writer who took over the magazine column of my mother’s father. I talked about my encounter with Richard Strout in “Reading Shallow and Deep” (April, 2020).

I sometimes complain, in these Aristotle posts, about the difficulties involved in reading the Philosopher. One may face those difficulties, simply for the sake of facing them, just as Gauss faced the difficulty of constructing an equilateral, equiangular plane figure with seventeen sides.

Euclid achieves the construction when there are five, six, and fifteen sides; this is in Book IV of the Elements. That you can always double the number of sides is implicit in the proof, in Book XII, that circles vary as the squares on their diameters. In “Thales of Miletus” in 2016, I called that proposition the most difficult in Euclid.

Looking recently for something else among my files, I found notes last edited in 2009 on Gauss’s construction. My treatment then was only algebraic, showing how to find the the vertices of a regular heptakaidekagon in a Cartesian coordinate plane by solving quadratic equations.

Now I have worked this out geometrically, showing in Euclidean terms how to perform the construction and demonstrate its correctness. A reason why I have done this is being in a Euclid study group, as well as an Aristotle one. Needing the angle addition formulas for cosines, expressed today by

I was pleased to learn (or be reminded) that Ptolemy had proved them as corollaries of what is still called Ptolemy’s Theorem.

Proposition XII.2 of the Elements, expressed today by the seemingly simple formula

– I say is the most difficult in Euclid, because it uses the logic of calculus. That doesn’t mean Euclid had calculus; he didn’t, because he didn’t have the concept of an arbitrary function. Euclid could not say, or at least (again, as far as I know) he never said anything like, “Let there be a random continuous function on BD.” He could only say, as in Proposition I.5 (that the base angles of an isosceles triangle are equal, and so are the angles below the base),

Εἰλήφθω γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς ΒΔ τυχὸν σημεῖον τὸ Ζ.

Let a point F be taken at random on BD.

The Greek text is from the handy Euclid homepage of Dimitrios Mourmouras. One can download the page, or rather site, as I have done; and it turns out the webmaster also has a text of the Nicomachean Ethics, and much else. The translation of Euclid above is by Heath, although, as I gather from Reviel Netz, it may be better to say,

Be taken on BD a random point, [namely, the point in the diagram labelled] F.

Archimedes could show that a segment of a parabola bore to the inscribed triangle exactly the ratio of four to three; but I don’t think he could have formulated the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus. He obviously could understand, and presumably he thought about, the problem of constructing a regular polygon with seven sides, or seventeen. I don’t know whether he sensed that seven was impossible, but seventeen was possible. He could have worked through Gauss’s Disquisitiones Arithmeticae, even in its original Latin (here I recall his legendary slaying by a Roman soldier). It seems to me that anybody who can understand Euclid in any language can understand, at least step by step, the heptakaidekagon construction that I have written out.

I don’t know how one would, like Gauss, come up with the construction. I only tried to translate the existing construction into ancient terms. Descartes’s Geometry of 1637 may be a watershed, sending today’s mathematics into channels unknown to the Greeks (or to the Babylonians or any other ancient people); but it is not clear (to me) that Gauss’s discovery (published in 1801) required Cartesian notions or symbolism. It may depend more on Fermat’s work in number theory, which in turn depends on – what, besides such curiosity as possessed the likes of Diophantus, in a copy of whose Arithmetica Fermat supposedly made his famous assertion?

I don’t know if the Greek word closest to “curiosity” is φιλομάθεια “love of learning.” We saw this in § x.2 of Book III of the Ethics, but only as being purely mental, not bodily, and thus not something on which to practice temperance or licence.

Calling on the “psycho-analysis” of Plato’s Socrates, I may describe curiosity as needing

• desire, to provoke it;
• “spirit” (anger, irascibility, or drive), to propel it;
• reason, to guide it.

The analysis of the soul, as worked out in the Republic, may be a useful counterpoint to the teaching of Siddhartha Gautama:

The Buddha based his teaching on Four Noble Truths: the existence of Pain, the cause of Pain, the need to avoid the cause of Pain, and the way of ending Pain by the Noble Eightfold Path. The Eightfold Path is a pattern for pure and perfect living: right outlook, right resolve, right speaking, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration.

That’s from Katherine Savage, The Story of World Religions (New York: Henry Z. Walck, 1966; page 75), a book used in a sixth-grade course in world religions (taught by an Episcopal priest).

I must have learned an elaboration of those truths from another source – a library book – whereby the cause of suffering was desire, and to cease from suffering, one must cease one’s desire. That is surely an oversimplication, but it is the one that I remembered, and I would say a better teaching is found in Plato: desire has a job to do, the way workers in a city have.

Maybe one can get that from Buddhism too. In the Glossary of Nikkyō Niwano, Shakyamuni Buddha: A Narrative Biography (Tokyo: Kōsei, 1980; pages 123–4), the Four Noble Truths are:

(1) All existence entails suffering (the Truth of Suffering). (2) Suffering is caused by ignorance, which gives rise to craving and illusion (the Truth of Cause). (3) There is an end to suffering, and this state of no suffering is called nirvana (the Truth of Extinction). (4) Nirvana is attained through the practice of the Eightfold Path (the Truth of the Path).

It may be better to say that suffering is caused by ignorance than by desire, but it’s still not all right, unless suffering means some suffering. Reading Aristotle prompts me to ask, with him, as in § ix.1 of Book I (translation by Bartlett and Collins),

πότερόν [ἡ εὐδαιμονία] ἐστι μαθητὸν ἢ ἐθιστὸν ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἀσκητόν, ἢ κατά τινα θείαν μοῖραν ἢ καὶ διὰ τύχην παραγίνεται.

whether happiness is something that can be gained through learning or habituation or through some other practice, or whether it comes to be present in accord with a sort of divine allotment or even through chance.

At the end of the chapter comes Priam, who by the account of Homer in the Iliad sees a happy life collapse into misery through no fault of his own.

In “Doing and Suffering” (March, 2020), I tried to corroborate the teaching of Plato, or of Socrates through Plato, that it is worse to do than to suffer injustice. What about Aristotle? He and his teacher are distinguished by gestures, in Raphael’s School of Athens.

What simple formula can be derived from Aristotle? The one I suggested in “Excuses,” as I recalled in “Anarchy,” is that there is no excuse for shoddy behavior. Even here though, Aristotle makes distinctions, as below, in

• § iv.4: in the pursuit of excessive pleasure, the less desire you have, the more licentious you are;
• § v.7: if you have a morbid or bestial condition, it may not rule you, but then again it may (here though, the only example is of somebody, Phalaris, who apparently was ruled by his perversions, but might not have been).

Perhaps then the only simple formula to be derived from Aristotle, at least by me, right now, is that life is complicated. We are reading the second part, chapters iv–vi, of Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics. The ongoing theme is the difference, or whether there is one, between

• moderation, with its attendant vice, licence, and
• continence, or self-control, with its attendant vice, incontinence or unrestraint.

The theme will continue into the next reading.

---

It was observed last time, in § i.4, that licence and incontinence are not obviously the same or different.

Right now, bodily desires, or the corresponding pleasures, are described as both necessary things (ἀναγκαῖα) and unnecessary. They are

• necessary for the maintenance of the kind of life that we share with animals,
• unnecessary when out of all proportion to that maintenance.

That is how I propose to interpret an apparent conflict between §§ iv.2 and vi.2. I may be following Socrates in Republic VIII, 558d–6a. In any case, according to § iv.2, in Rackham’s translation (1934, 1926),

the things that give pleasure are of two kinds:

• some are necessary pleasures (τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα),
• others are desirable in themselves but admit of excess.

• The necessary sources of pleasures are those connected with the body (ἀναγκαῖα μὲν τὰ σωματικά): I mean such as
  • the functions of nutrition and sex, in fact
  • those bodily functions which we have indicated as the sphere of Profligacy and Temperance.
• The other sources of pleasure are not necessary, but are desirable in themselves: I mean for example victory, honour, wealth, and the other good and pleasant things of the same sort.

In § iv.5, a threefold distinction is made, but translators have conflicting interpretations; see the note on that section.

In § vi.2, we are investigating a distinction between two kinds of incontinence: of bodily desires, and of the “spirit” as distinct from these. And yet θυμός also seems to be considered as one of the desires (ἐπιθυμίαι) or longings (ὀρέξεις). Here again is Rackham:

Again, when impulses are natural, it is more excusable to follow them, since even with the desires it is more excusable to follow those that are common to all men, and in so far as they are common. But anger (ὁ θυμός) and bad temper (ἡ χαλεπότης) are more natural than desire for excessive and unnecessary pleasures (τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων); witness the man who was had up for beating his father …

Also Sachs:

Also, there is more forgiveness for following natural tendencies, since even among desires, there is more forgiveness for those that are of a sort that is common to all people, and to the extent that they are common. But spiritedness and aggressiveness are more natural than desires that are for excess or desires that are not for necessary things, as with the man who defended himself on the charge that he beat his father …

Perhaps Aristotle is going to clarify necessity in the next reading, in §vii.2; in Sachs’s translation,

some pleasures are necessary and others are not, and the former up to a certain amount and not as excesses nor as deficiencies, and it is the same way with desires and pains …

Meanwhile, there is also the question, for us at least, of whether, or when, to translate θυμός as anger. Anger was the subject of chapter v of Book IV, when the question was what virtue and vices pertained to it. Then, the Greek word was ὀργή; but Aristotle uses that word also now, in § vi.4.

Translators interpret that section in three different ways, as I record below. It would seem most likely that anger is a response to pain, since acts that provoke an angry response are described as unjust, and perhaps we are supposed to infer that pain is the means of provocation.

In particular then, Rackham does not seem justified in his interpretation,

an act done in anger always causes [the doer] a feeling of pain.

And yet his long footnote makes sense:

ὕβρις means any injury that is insulting to the victim, but here the writer is thinking specially of outrage prompted by lust. The argument is based on the feelings of both agent and victim. Anger, being a painful feeling, does not show wantonness or insolence, for wanton acts are pleasant to the doer. An injury done in anger therefore arouses less anger in return, less resentment in the victim, than does wanton outrage due to unrestrained desire. Therefore it is less ‘unjust,’ less of an injury. Cf. Rhetoric, ii. iii. 1380 a 34 (anger is not so much resented, because it does not show contempt for its victim).

I will just note that the four uses of ὕβρις and the related verb in § vi.4, and the one each in §§ v.3 and vi.6, are the last uses in the Ethics; we have seen the others in

• Book III, § vi.5 (I have a note there),
• Book IV, §§ iii.21 and 31,
• Book V, § i.14.

Contents

• Chapter IV
• Chapter 6
  • Can you be ἀκρατής
    “incontinent, unrestrained,
    lacking self-restraint or -control”
    • simply, or only
    • partially, and in this case,
    • with respect to what?
  • With respect to
    • pleasures and
    • pains –

    that is how all are who are

    • • ἐγκρατής
        “continent, self-restrained, -controlled” or
      • καρτερικός “enduring, steadfast, resilient,”
    • • incontinent or
      • μαλακός “soft” (§ iv.1).
  • Of pleasures (τῶν ποιούντων ἡδονήν) are two kinds:
    1. Necessary (ἀναγκαῖα),
       namely bodily (σωματικά) –
       • eating,
       • sex,
       • the concern of
         • profligacy (ἀκολασία),
         • temperance (σωφροσύνη).
    2. To be chosen (τὰ αἱρετά),
       perhaps excessively –
       • victory,
       • honor,
       • wealth,
       • such
         • goods and
         • pleasures.
  • If excessive with the latter,
    you are incontinent,
    • regarding money (or whatever),
    • not viciously, as if simply incontinent –
      • no more are you a typical incontinent
      • than e.g. Anthropos was a typical anthropos.

    A sign:

    • such incontinence is not called vice;
    • the next kind is (§ iv.2).
  • You are simply incontinent if
    • excessive with bodily pleasures,
    • shunning of pains,

    against

    • deliberate choice (προαίρεσις) and
    • thought (διάνοια, § iv.3).

    A sign:

    • While the others are not,
    • you are
      • called soft,
      • classified with the profligate,
        though you differ from them
        by not choosing your condition.
        • To pursue excessive [pleasures],
        • to avoid measured pains

        is called profligate

        • more when without desire
        • than with (§ iv.4).
  • Of pleasant things (τῶν … ἡδέων) are three kinds:
    1. Naturally to be chosen (φύσει αἱρετά).
    2. The opposite.
    3. In the middle (μεταξύ).
  • With those of the
    • desires and
    • pleasures

    that are

    • καλά “noble, beautiful,”
    • σπουδαία “serious, good,”
       
    • Blame occurs for excess, as in the cases of
      • Niobe,
      • Satyrus.
    • Corruption (μοχθηρία) is not the issue (§ iv.5).
    • Incontinence either,
      although people say
      “incontinent in θυμός ‘anger, spirit’ ” –
      or “honor,” or “gain” –
      the way they say e.g.
      • “bad doctor (ἰατρός),”
      • “bad actor (ὑποκριτής)” (§ iv.6).
• Chapter V
  • Of pleasures,
    • some are natural, either
      • simply or
      • to races of
        • animals or
        • humans;
    • others are not, but come about through
      • maimings (πηρώσεις),
      • customs (ἔθη),
      • bad natures (μοχθηρὰς φύσεις).
  • To each of the latter correspond habits (ἕξεις, § v.1),
    namely the bestial ones (θηριώδεις), e.g.
    • eating
      • children
        • unborn or
        • born, or
      • raw meat;
    • being like Phalaris (§ v.2).
  • Of [unnatural habits] then:
    • Some are bestial.
    • Others come about by
      • disease (νόσος) or
      • madness (μανία), e.g. eating
        • your mother as a sacrifice,
        • a fellow slave’s liver.
    • Still others are
      • morbid (νοσηματώδεις) or
      • habitual (ἐξ ἔθους),

      e.g.

      • trichotillomania (τριχῶν τίλσεις),
      • onychophagia (ὀνύχων τρώξεις),
      • eating coal (ἀνθράκων <τρώξεις>),
      • geophagia (γῆς <τρώξεις>),
      • male homosexuality (§ v.3).

      These occur

      • by nature (φύσει) in some,
      • by habituation (ἐξ ἔθους) in others,
        e.g. those abused from childhood.
  • If
    • nature is the cause,
      you are not called incontinent,
      any more than
      e.g. a woman is for being passive in sex;
    • likewise if you are morbidly habituated (§ v.4).
  • Vicious
    • is neither case, and
    • neither is the bestial case.
  • Overcoming it, or not, is a question
    • not of simple continence,
    • but only by similarity,
      as with e.g. the “incontinent in θυμός.”
  • Either
    • bestial or
    • morbid

    is each case of excessive

    • ἀφροσύνη “foolishness, thoughtlessness” – e.g.
      • bestial are the barbarians living
        • not by reason, but
        • by sense alone,
      • morbid is epilepsy –;
    • δειλία “cowardice” – e.g.
      • fear of even a mouse is bestial,
      • fear of weasels, morbid –;
    • ἀκολασία “licentiousness”;
    • χαλεπότης “harshness” (§§ v.5, 6).
  • You can have a condition and
    • not be overcome
      (as e.g. Phalaris might not have been),
    • be overcome (§ v.7).
  • Like corruption, incontinence can be
    • simple
      (when having the same concern as licentiousness),
    • metaphorical, being
      • bestial or
      • morbid (§§ v.8, 9).
• Chapter 7
  • § v.9
• Chapter VI
  • That less shameful is incontinence
    • of θυμός “anger, spirit(edness)” than
    • of ἐπιθυμίαι “desires, appetites,”

    we now contemplate.

  • Apparently anger
    • hears reason,
    • mishears it as an order (to seek revenge),

    like e.g.

    • hasty servants,
    • watch-dogs.
  • Desire is more shameful because
    • anger
      • sees an insult,
      • reasons it means war,
      • gets on it,

      thus somewhat following reason;

    • desire
      • hears of a pleasure,
      • gets on it,

      following reason not at all (§ vi.1).

  • More sympathy is got by
    • longings (ὀρέξεις) and
    • desires (ἐπιθυμίαι)

    for

    • anger,
    • χαλεπότης
      “harshness, aggressiveness, bad temper,”

    as being more

    • natural,
    • common (e.g. son beating father),

    than by those for the

    • excessive,
    • unnecessary (μὴ ἀναγκαῖα, § vi.2).
  • The more scheming, e.g. Aphrodite,
    is the more unjust.
  • Thus incontinence of desire is
    • than incontinence of anger, more
      • unjust,
      • shameful;
    • incontinence tout court;
    • even a vice (§ vi.3).
  • There is in anger no insult (ὕβρις).
    • The one
      • making [something] from rage (ὀργή) makes,
        pained;
      • insulting insults,
        • not pained,
        • but with pleasure.
    • If that from which being enraged is most just
      is the more unjust,
      this is incontinence of desire (§ vi.4).
  • It is clear
    • that more shameful is incontinence about
      • desires
      • than anger;
    • that
      • continence,
      • incontinence

      are about somatic (σωματικαί)

      • desires,
      • pleasures (§ vi.5).
  • Of those, as we saw, some are respectively
    • human and natural – sole concern of
      • temperance (σωφροσύνη),
      • intemperance (ἀκολασία) –,
    • morbid and diseased,
    • bestial – animals are
      • not
        • temperate or
        • intemperate,
      • except metaphorically –
        e.g. as madmen among men –

      since they lack

      • choice (προαίρεσις),
      • calculation (λογισμός, § vi.6).
  • Bestiality is
    • less [vicious] than vice –
      e.g. as 1 < 10,000 –
    • albeit more fearsome (§ vi.7).

[1147^b]

Chapter IV

Chapter 6

§ iv.1

• πότερον δ᾽
  • ἐστί τις ἁπλῶς ἀκρατὴς ἢ
  • πάντες κατὰ μέρος, καὶ εἰ ἔστι,
• περὶ ποῖά ἐστι,

λεκτέον ἐφεξῆς.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν περὶ

• ἡδονὰς καὶ
• λύπας

εἰσὶν

• οἵ τ᾽
  • ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ
  • καρτερικοὶ

  καὶ

• οἱ
  • ἀκρατεῖς καὶ
  • μαλακοί,

φανερόν.

§ iv.2

ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶ

• τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ποιούντων ἡδονήν,
• τὰ δ᾽
  • αἱρετὰ μὲν καθ᾽ αὑτὰ
  • ἔχοντα δ᾽ ὑπερβολήν,

• ἀναγκαῖα μὲν τὰ σωματικά

  (λέγω δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα,

  • τά τε περὶ
    • τὴν τροφὴν καὶ
    • τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρείαν, καὶ
  • τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωματικῶν περὶ ἃ
    • τὴν ἀκολασίαν ἔθεμεν καὶ
    • τὴν σωφροσύνην),

• τὰ δ᾽

  • ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὐχί,

  • αἱρετὰ δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτά

    (λέγω δ᾽ οἷον

    • νίκην
    • τιμὴν
    • πλοῦτον καὶ
    • τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν
      • ἀγαθῶν καὶ
      • ἡδέων)·

• τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον ὑπερβάλλοντας τὸν ἐν αὑτοῖς

  • ἁπλῶς μὲν οὐ λέγομεν ἀκρατεῖς,
  • προστιθέντες δὲ τὸ
    • χρημάτων ἀκρατεῖς καὶ
    • κέρδους καὶ
    • τιμῆς καὶ
    • θυμοῦ,

• ἁπλῶς δ᾽ οὔ,
  ὡς ἑτέρους καὶ καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα λεγομένους,

  ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος ὁ τὰ Ὀλύμπια νικῶν· [1148^a]
  ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ὁ κοινὸς λόγος

  • τοῦ ἰδίου μικρὸν διέφερεν,
    ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως
  • ἕτερος ἦν.

σημεῖον δέ·

• ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρασία ψέγεται
  • οὐχ ὡς ἁμαρτία μόνον
  • ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς κακία τις
    • ἢ ἁπλῶς οὖσα
    • ἢ κατά τι μέρος,
• τούτων δ᾽ οὐδείς.

§ iv.3

τῶν δὲ περὶ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις,
περὶ ἃς λέγομεν τὸν

• σώφρονα καὶ
• ἀκόλαστον,

ὁ

• μὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι
  • τῶν ἡδέων διώκων τὰς ὑπερβολάς – καὶ
  • τῶν λυπηρῶν φεύγων,
     
  • πείνης καὶ
  • δίψης καὶ
  • ἀλέας καὶ
  • ψύχους καὶ
  • πάντων τῶν περὶ
    • ἁφὴν καὶ
    • γεῦσιν –
• ἀλλὰ παρὰ
  • τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ
  • τὴν διάνοιαν,

ἀκρατὴς λέγεται,

• οὐ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν,
  ὅτι περὶ τάδε,
  καθάπερ ὀργῆς,
• ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλῶς μόνον.

§ iv.4

σημεῖον δέ·

καὶ γὰρ

• μαλακοὶ λέγονται περὶ ταύτας,
• περὶ ἐκείνων δ᾽ οὐδεμίαν.

καὶ διὰ τοῦτ᾽ εἰς ταὐτὸ

• τὸν ἀκρατῆ καὶ
• τὸν ἀκόλαστον

τίθεμεν καὶ

• ἐγκρατῆ καὶ
• σώφρονα,

ἀλλ᾽

• οὐκ ἐκείνων οὐδένα,

διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς αὐτάς πως

• ἡδονὰς καὶ
• λύπας

εἶναι·

οἳ δ᾽

• εἰσὶ μὲν περὶ ταὐτά, ἀλλ᾽
• οὐχ ὡσαύτως εἰσίν, ἀλλ᾽
  • οἳ μὲν προαιροῦνται
  • οἳ δ᾽ οὐ προαιροῦνται.

διὸ

• μᾶλλον ἀκόλαστον ἂν εἴποιμεν
  ὅστις
  • μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ
  • ἠρέμα
     
  • διώκει τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ
  • φεύγει μετρίας λύπας,
• ἢ τοῦτον ὅστις διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν σφόδρα·

τί γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιήσειεν,
εἰ προσγένοιτο

• ἐπιθυμία νεανικὴ καὶ
• περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδείας λύπη ἰσχυρά;

§ iv.5

ἐπεὶ δὲ

• τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ
• τῶν ἡδονῶν

• αἳ μέν εἰσι <τῶν> τῷ γένει

  • καλῶν καὶ
  • σπουδαίων

  τῶν γὰρ ἡδέων

  • ἔνια φύσει αἱρετά,
  • τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία τούτων,
  • τὰ δὲ μεταξύ, καθάπερ διείλομεν πρότερον,
  οἷον

  • χρήματα καὶ
  • κέρδος καὶ
  • νίκη καὶ
  • τιμή·

• πρὸς ἅπαντα δὲ

  • καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα
  • καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ  
  • οὐ τῷ
    • πάσχειν καὶ
    • ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ
    • φιλεῖν

    ψέγονται,

  • ἀλλὰ τῷ
    • πῶς καὶ
    • ὑπερβάλλειν

  (διὸ ὅσοι μὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον

  • ἢ κρατοῦνται
  • ἢ διώκουσι

  τῶν φύσει τι

  • καλῶν καὶ
  • ἀγαθῶν,
  οἷον οἱ

  • περὶ τιμὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ σπουδάζοντες ἢ
  • περὶ
    • τέκνα καὶ
    • γονεῖς·

καὶ γὰρ

• ταῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ
• ἐπαινοῦνται οἱ περὶ ταῦτα σπουδάζοντες·

ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἔστι τις ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐν τούτοις,
εἴ τις

• ὥσπερ ἡ Νιόβη μάχοιτο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, ἢ
• ὥσπερ Σάτυρος [1148^b] ὁ φιλοπάτωρ ἐπικαλούμενος περὶ τὸν πατέρα·
  λίαν γὰρ ἐδόκει μωραίνειν)·

μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ
διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον, ὅτι

• φύσει τῶν αἱρετῶν ἕκαστόν ἐστι δι᾽ αὑτό,

• • φαῦλαι δὲ καὶ
  • φευκταὶ

  αὐτῶν εἰσὶν αἱ ὑπερβολαί.

§ iv.6

ὁμοίως δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἀκρασία·

ἡ γὰρ ἀκρασία

• οὐ μόνον φευκτὸν
• ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν ἐστίν·

δι᾽ ὁμοιότητα δὲ τοῦ πάθους
προσεπιτιθέντες τὴν ἀκρασίαν περὶ ἕκαστον λέγουσιν,

• ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ᾽ ἐνταῦθα,
  διὰ τὸ
  • μὴ κακίαν εἶναι ἑκάστην αὐτῶν
  • ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνάλογον ὁμοίαν,
• οὕτω δῆλον ὅτι κἀκεῖ ὑποληπτέον μόνην
  • ἀκρασίαν καὶ
  • ἐγκράτειαν

  εἶναι ἥτις ἐστὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ τῇ

  • σωφροσύνῃ καὶ
  • ἀκολασίᾳ,

  περὶ δὲ θυμοῦ καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα λέγομεν·

διὸ καὶ προστιθέντες ἀκρατῆ

• θυμοῦ ὥσπερ
• τιμῆς καὶ
• κέρδους

φαμέν.

Chapter V

§ v.1

ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶν

• ἔνια μὲν ἡδέα φύσει, καὶ τούτων
  • τὰ μὲν ἁπλῶς
  • τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένη
    • καὶ ζῴων
    • καὶ ἀνθρώπων,
• τὰ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ
  • τὰ μὲν διὰ πηρώσεις
  • τὰ δὲ δι᾽ ἔθη γίνεται,
  • τὰ δὲ διὰ μοχθηρὰς φύσεις,

ἔστι καὶ περὶ τούτων ἕκαστα παραπλησίας ἰδεῖν ἕξεις·

§ v.2

λέγω δὲ τὰς θηριώδεις,

§ v.3

• αὗται μὲν θηριώδεις,

• αἳ δὲ

  • διὰ νόσους γίνονται (καὶ

  • διὰ μανίαν ἐνίοις,

    ὥσπερ

    • ὁ τὴν μητέρα
      • καθιερεύσας καὶ
      • φαγών, καὶ
    • ὁ τοῦ συνδούλου τὸ ἧπαρ)

• αἳ δὲ

  • νοσηματώδεις ἢ
  • ἐξ ἔθους,
  οἷον

  • τριχῶν τίλσεις καὶ
  • ὀνύχων τρώξεις, ἔτι δ᾽
    • ἀνθράκων καὶ
    • γῆς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις
  • ἡ τῶν ἀφροδισίων τοῖς ἄρρεσιν·
  • τοῖς μὲν γὰρ φύσει
  • τοῖς δ᾽ ἐξ ἔθους

  συμβαίνουσιν,

  οἷον τοῖς ὑβριζομένοις ἐκ παίδων.

§ v.4

• ὅσοις μὲν οὖν φύσις αἰτία,
  • τούτους μὲν οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴπειεν ἀκρατεῖς,
  • ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰς γυναῖκας,
    ὅτι οὐκ ὀπύουσιν ἀλλ᾽ ὀπύονται·
• ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅσοι νοσηματώδως ἔχουσι δι᾽ ἔθος.

§ v.5

τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ἕκαστα τούτων [1149^a] ἔξω τῶν ὅρων ἐστὶ τῆς κακίας,
καθάπερ καὶ ἡ θηριότης·

τὸν δ᾽ ἔχοντα

• κρατεῖν ἢ
• κρατεῖσθαι

• οὐχ ἡ ἁπλῆ ἀκρασία
• ἀλλ᾽ ἡ καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα,

καθάπερ καὶ τὸν περὶ τοὺς θυμοὺς ἔχοντα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τοῦ πάθους,
ἀκρατῆ δ᾽ οὐ λεκτέον.

πᾶσα γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσα

• καὶ ἀφροσύνη
• καὶ δειλία
• καὶ ἀκολασία
• καὶ χαλεπότης

• αἳ μὲν θηριώδεις
• αἳ δὲ νοσηματώδεις εἰσίν·

§ v.6

καὶ τῶν ἀφρόνων

• οἱ μὲν ἐκ φύσεως
  • ἀλόγιστοι καὶ
  • μόνον τῇ αἰσθήσει ζῶντες

  θηριώδεις,
  ὥσπερ ἔνια γένη τῶν πόρρω βαρβάρων,

• οἱ δὲ διὰ
  • νόσους,
    οἷον τὰς ἐπιληπτικάς, ἢ
  • μανίας

  νοσηματώδεις.

§ v.7

τούτων δ᾽

• ἔστι μὲν
  • ἔχειν τινὰ ἐνίοτε μὲν μόνον,
  • μὴ κρατεῖσθαι δέ,

  λέγω δὲ οἷον εἰ Φάλαρις κατεῖχεν ἐπιθυμῶν

  • παιδίου φαγεῖν ἢ
  • πρὸς ἀφροδισίων ἄτοπον ἡδονήν·
• ἔστι δὲ καὶ
  • κρατεῖσθαι,
  • μὴ μόνον ἔχειν·

§ v.8

• ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ μοχθηρίας
  • ἡ μὲν κατ᾽ ἄνθρωπον ἁπλῶς λέγεται μοχθηρία,
  • ἣ δὲ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι
    • θηριώδης ἢ
    • νοσηματώδης,
    • ἁπλῶς δ᾽ οὔ,
• τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἀκρασία ἐστὶν
  • ἣ μὲν θηριώδης
  • ἣ δὲ νοσηματώδης,
  • ἁπλῶς δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀκολασίαν μόνη.

Chapter 7

§ v.9

• ὅτι μὲν οὖν
  • ἀκρασία καὶ
  • ἐγκράτειά

  ἐστι μόνον περὶ ἅπερ

  • ἀκολασία καὶ
  • σωφροσύνη, καὶ
• ὅτι περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐστὶν ἄλλο εἶδος ἀκρασίας,
  λεγόμενον
  • κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ
  • οὐχ ἁπλῶς,

δῆλον.

Chapter VI

§ vi.1

ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἧττον αἰσχρὰ

• ἀκρασία ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ
• ἢ ἡ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν,

θεωρήσωμεν.

ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς

• ἀκούειν μέν τι τοῦ λόγου,
• παρακούειν δέ,

καθάπερ

• οἱ ταχεῖς τῶν διακόνων,
  οἳ πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι πᾶν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκθέουσιν,
  εἶτα ἁμαρτάνουσι τῆς προστάξεως, καὶ
• οἱ κύνες,
  πρὶν σκέψασθαι εἰ φίλος,
  ἂν μόνον ψοφήσῃ, ὑλακτοῦσιν·

οὕτως ὁ θυμὸς διὰ

• θερμότητα καὶ
• ταχυτῆτα

τῆς φύσεως

• ἀκούσας μέν,
• οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δ᾽ ἀκούσας,
  ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν τιμωρίαν.

• ὁ μὲν γὰρ
  • λόγος ἢ ἡ
  • φαντασία

  ὅτι

  • ὕβρις ἢ
  • ὀλιγωρία

  ἐδήλωσεν,
  ὃ δ᾽ ὥσπερ συλλογισάμενος
  ὅτι δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ πολεμεῖν
  χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὐθύς·

• ἡ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμία,
  ἐὰν μόνον εἴπῃ
  ὅτι ἡδὺ
  • [ὁ λόγος ἢ]
  • ἡ αἴσθησις,

  ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν. [1149^b]

ὥσθ᾽

• ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ πως,
• ἡ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμία οὔ.

αἰσχίων οὖν·

• ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατὴς τοῦ λόγου πως ἡττᾶται,
• ὃ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ οὐ τοῦ λόγου.

§ vi.2

ἔτι ταῖς φυσικαῖς μᾶλλον συγγνώμη ἀκολουθεῖν ὀρέξεσιν,
ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις μᾶλλον

• ὅσαι κοιναὶ πᾶσι, καὶ
• ἐφ᾽ ὅσον κοιναί·

• ὁ δὲ θυμὸς φυσικώτερον καὶ
• ἡ χαλεπότης

τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν

• τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ
• τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων,

§ vi.3

ἔτι ἀδικώτεροι οἱ ἐπιβουλότεροι.

• ὁ μὲν οὖν θυμώδης

  • οὐκ ἐπίβουλος, οὐδ᾽ ὁ θυμός,
  • ἀλλὰ φανερός·

• ἡ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμία,
  καθάπερ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην φασίν·

  δολοπλόκου γὰρ κυπρογενοῦς·

  καὶ τὸν κεστὸν ἱμάντα Ὅμηρος·

  πάρφασις, ἥ τ᾽ ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονέοντος. (1 Hom. Il. 14.217.)

ὥστ᾽ εἴπερ

• ἀδικωτέρα καὶ
• αἰσχίων

ἡ ἀκρασία αὕτη
τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμόν ἐστι, καὶ

• ἁπλῶς ἀκρασία καὶ
• κακία πως.

§ vi.4

ἔτι οὐδεὶς ὑβρίζει λυπούμενος,

• ὁ δ᾽ ὀργῇ ποιῶν πᾶς ποιεῖ λυπούμενος,
• ὁ δ᾽ ὑβρίζων μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς.

εἰ οὖν

• οἷς ὀργίζεσθαι μάλιστα δίκαιον, ταῦτα ἀδικώτερα, καὶ
• ἡ ἀκρασία ἡ δι᾽ ἐπιθυμίαν·

οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν θυμῷ ὕβρις.

§ vi.5

ὡς μὲν τοίνυν

• αἰσχίων
  • ἡ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἀκρασία
  • τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμόν, καὶ
• ὅτι ἔστιν
  • ἐγκράτεια καὶ
  • ἡ ἀκρασία

  περὶ

  • ἐπιθυμίας καὶ
  • ἡδονὰς σωματικάς,

δῆλον·

§ vi.6

αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰς διαφορὰς ληπτέον.

ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται κατ᾽ ἀρχάς,

• αἳ μὲν
  • ἀνθρώπιναί εἰσι καὶ
  • φυσικαὶ καὶ
    • τῷ γένει καὶ
    • τῷ μεγέθει,
• αἳ δὲ θηριώδεις,
• αἳ δὲ διὰ
  • πηρώσεις καὶ
  • νοσήματα.

τούτων δὲ περὶ τὰς πρώτας

• σωφροσύνη καὶ
• ἀκολασία

μόνον ἐστίν·

διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία

• οὔτε σώφρονα
• οὔτ᾽ ἀκόλαστα λέγομεν
• ἀλλ᾽ ἢ
  • κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ
  • εἴ τινι ὅλως ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο διαφέρει γένος τῶν ζῴων
    • ὕβρει καὶ
    • σιναμωρίᾳ καὶ
    • τῷ παμφάγον εἶναι·

    οὐ γὰρ ἔχει

  • προαίρεσιν οὐδὲ
  • λογισμόν,

  ἀλλ᾽ ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως,
  ὥσπερ οἱ μαινόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. [1150^a]

§ vi.7

• ἔλαττον δὲ θηριότης κακίας,
• φοβερώτερον δέ·

• οὐ γὰρ διέφθαρται τὸ βέλτιον,
  ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ,
• ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔχει.

ἀσινεστέρα γὰρ ἡ φαυλότης ἀεὶ ἡ τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος ἀρχήν,
ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀρχή.

παραπλήσιον οὖν τὸ συμβάλλειν

• ἀδικίαν
• πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἄδικον.

ἔστι γὰρ ὡς ἑκάτερον κάκιον·

μυριοπλάσια γὰρ ἂν κακὰ ποιήσειεν

• ἄνθρωπος κακὸς
• θηρίου.