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Pleasure and pain are a guide to something, but there is no sure guide to what is good; this is rather what should guide us.

I am calling this doctrine agathism, though it may not be what the word was coined for. In his account of pleasure then, in chapters iv and v of Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues for agathism, as opposed to hedonism, understood as the doctrine that pleasure as such should guide us.

In the best case, hedonism and agathism coincide. This is when we are already the best we can be.

Near the end of our reading (§ v.10), Aristotle says,

ἔστιν ἑκάστου μέτρον

• ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ
• ἁγαθός, ᾗ τοιοῦτος.

the measure of each thing is

• virtue or
• a good man as such [i.e., as virtuous],

I’m using Apostle’s translation. Strictly speaking, the clause seems to be given as an hypothesis, and the conclusion is,

• καὶ ἡδοναὶ εἶεν ἂν αἱ τούτῳ φαινόμεναι
• καὶ ἡδέα οἷς οὗτος χαίρει.

• those things, too, will be pleasures which appear to him to be pleasures and
• those things will be pleasurable which a good man enjoys.

The measure of all things then is the good man. The teaching of Protagoras is too simple, at least as quoted by Socrates, in conversation with Theaetetus, in the Platonic dialogue of that name (151d–2a):

Theaetetus

Well then, Socrates, since you are so urgent it would be disgraceful for anyone not to exert himself in every way [151e] to say what he can. I think, then, that he who knows anything perceives that which he knows, and, as it appears at present, knowledge is nothing else than perception (οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἴσθησις).

Socrates

Good! Excellent, my boy! That is the way one ought to speak out. But come now, let us examine your utterance together, and see whether it is a real offspring or a mere wind-egg. Perception, you say, is knowledge (αἴσθησις, φῄς, ἐπιστήμη)?

Theaetetus

Yes.

Socrates

And, indeed, if I may venture to say so, it is not a bad description of knowledge [152a] that you have given, but one which Protagoras also used to give. Only, he has said the same thing in a different way. For he says somewhere that man is “the measure of all things, of the existence of the things that are and the non-existence of the things that are not.” (φησὶ γάρ που ‘πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον’ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, ‘τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.’) You have read that, I suppose?

Theaetetus

Yes, I have read it often.

Socrates

Well, is not this about what he means, that individual things are for me such as they appear to me, and for you in turn such as they appear to you – you and I being “man”?

Theaetetus

Yes, that is what he says. [152b]

Socrates

It is likely that a wise man is not talking nonsense; so let us follow after him. Is it not true that sometimes, when the same wind blows, one of us feels cold, and the other does not? or one feels slightly and the other exceedingly cold?

Theaetetus

Certainly.

Aristotle gives such examples in § v.9 of our reading, just before the passages already quoted (again in the translation of Apostle):

the same things delight some men but pain others, and they are painful or hateful to some but pleasant or lovable to others. This happens in the case of sweet things, too; for they do not seem the same to those who have fever and to those who are healthy, nor hot both to a sickly man and to one in good physical condition, and similarly in other cases.

The conclusion is not simply that the same thing is different for different people; rather,

δοκεῖ δ᾽ ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ.

Translators make sense of this, apparently by taking the verbal noun εἶναι as a pure noun rather than a verb, as if the meaning the sentence is,

It appears, in all such [cases], being [is] what appears to the good man.

Here is how some translators smooth it out:

Ross, Brown

But in all such matters that which appears to the good man is thought to be really so.

Rackham

But we hold that in all such cases the thing really is what it appears to be to the good man.

Apostle

In all such cases, then, what is thought to be the case is what appears to a virtuous man.

Crisp

But in all such things, it seems that what is so is what appears so to the good person.

Sachs

But in all such matters, it seems that a thing is what it shows itself to be to a person of serious moral stature.

Bartlett and Collins

In all such cases, then, what is thought to be the case is what appears to a virtuous man.

Reeve

In all such cases, however, it seems that what is so is what appears so to an excellent person.

Aristotle gives this as a preliminary statement of the hypothesis that the good man is the measure of all things, from which follows the special case that the good man knows what is truly pleasant.

What then is pleasure as such? In the last part of Book VII, in § xii.3, we concluded that pleasure was

• not an “aesthetic genesis” (αἰσθητὴς γένεσις),
• but an unimpeded activity (ἀνεμπόδιστος ἐνέργεια)

– or perhaps we should understand pleasure as the being unimpeded of an activity, if it is unimpeded:

διὸ
καὶ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει
τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν,
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον
ἐνέργειαν
τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως,
ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον.

In view of this,
it is also not right to say
that pleasure is a sensible process;
one should rather say
that it is an actuality
of a disposition according to its nature
and call it ‘unimpeded’ instead of ‘sensible’.

In Book X now, we continue to maintain that pleasure is not a genesis, a process, a becoming; but now, rather than the being unimpeded, it is the perfection or completion of an activity. We are told several times that pleasure completes energeia, in §§ iv.8 and 10; in §§ v.1, 2, and 11; and first in § iv.5:

κατὰ πᾶσαν γὰρ αἴσθησίν ἐστιν ἡδονή,
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
διάνοιαν καὶ
θεωρίαν,
ἡδίστη δ᾽
ἡ τελειοτάτη,
τελειοτάτη δ᾽
ἡ τοῦ
εὖ ἔχοντος
πρὸς τὸ σπουδαιότατον
τῶν ὑπ᾽ αὐτήν·
τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή.

for there is pleasure with respect to every faculty of sensation,
and likewise
with thought and
contemplation,
and the most pleasant activity
is the most perfect,
and the most perfect
is that of a [faculty or organ]
which is excellently disposed
towards the best object
coming under it.
Now it is pleasure that makes the activity perfect.

Perhaps scholars compare the Book-VII and Book-X accounts of pleasure to figure out which came first or is more authentic. The accounts are in harmony, if the perfect or complete activity is the unimpeded one. In Book X, Aristotle talks about what the perfection of pleasure is not.

• Pleasure is not something that reaches completion, like the building of a temple (§ iv.2).
• Pleasure is rather complete at every moment (§ iv.4).
• Pleasure completes an activity, not the way a doctor cures disease, but the way health does (§ iv.6).

Perhaps I am stretching to reach that last point. All Aristotle really says is that there are different ways of being a completion, as there are different ways of being a cure. Other ways of being a completion, at least of a perception, are being what is perceived and being the perceiving itself. Perhaps the latter is what is excluded later, in § iv.8:

τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονὴ
οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα,
ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος,
οἷον
τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα.

But pleasure perfects the activity
not as a disposition which resides in the agent
but as an end which supervenes
like
the bloom of manhood to those in their prime of life.

This presents some puzzles.

1. What are the antecedents of the two instances of the relative adverb ὡς?
2. What does the participle ἐπιγινόμενόν really mean here?
3. What example is meant by τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα?

Ὡς

Aristotle has a set a precedent for ambiguity with ὡς. In Book VIII, § xii.2, as I discussed at the time, he said literally,

For, parents love children
as being their own,
while children, parents,
as being from them.

The antecedent of “as” is each time “children,” although this is respectively object and subject of the verb “love.”

In our present example, when Aristotle says, in Sachs’s rendition, “the pleasure brings the activity to completion not as an active condition present in it all along,” is the antecedent of “as” really “pleasure”? The point could be that

• hexis completes (i.e. is created by) energeia;
• energeia completes (i.e. makes active) hexis.

Objections would include that hexis is said to be already present, and that for Sachs at least, it is already active.

Ἐπιγινόμενόν

Perhaps “which supervenes” is the most literal translation of the participle ἐπιγινόμενόν; “that comes over it” is what Sachs has. In “Anthropology of Mathematics,” I took issue with the doctrine or “thesis,” called physicalism, whereby “everything supervenes on the physical”: a simplistic objection is that “supervene” is not a common word with a clear meaning, but a simpler objection is that the physical is what physics studies, and physics does not study everything.

In the example quoted from Daniel Stoljar in the earlier post, an image supervenes on the dots of ink in a printed photograph; is that the way pleasure comes to an activity?

If the image supervenes on the dots, it would seem a painting supervenes on the brushstrokes, and a meaning supervenes on the letters and words of a text.

I can remember being a child, seeing letters on signs all around, while not yet knowing what they meant (but wanting to know); and seeing patches of color that were supposed to represent a bull, but I couldn’t see it – the patches were in a reproduction, in Childcraft, of “Tijuana” by Elaine de Kooning; see “NL VII: ‘Appetite’” and “June in the New World.”

Such examples lead me to question Aristotle’s suggestion that pleasure is complete the way seeing is complete (§ iv.1):

δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὅρασις
καθ᾽ ὁντινοῦν χρόνον τελεία εἶναι·
οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐνδεὴς οὐδενὸς
ὃ εἰς ὕστερον γινόμενον
τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος·
τοιούτῳ δ᾽ ἔοικε καὶ ἡ ἡδονή …

Now seeing is thought
to be complete at any interval of time;
for it needs no thing
which, when it comes into being later,
will complete the form of seeing.
Pleasure, too, resembles a thing such as seeing …

I needed to do some growing, learning, experiencing, in order to see

• the meaning in the letters and
• the bull in the painting.

The eye itself needs to focus.

On the other hand, if we think of seeing as a kind of feeling, then this is complete in the sense of having no aim, no goal, no perfect form. Thinking in the proper sense does have this, as Collingwood has brought to my attention, particularly in The Principles of Art and An Essay on Metaphysics.

Aristotle does not make use of such a distinction between thinking and feeling. He says rather, in the part of § iv.5 already quoted, now in Sachs’s translation,

for there is a pleasure that goes with each of the senses,
and similarly
with thinking and
contemplation,
and its most complete activity is most pleasant,
and it is most complete
when it belongs to a power
that is in good condition
directed toward that which is of most serious worth
among the things apprehended by it,
and the pleasure brings the activity to completion.

Perhaps the rest of Book X will give us an opportunity to think more about this. Collingwood gives such an opportunity, with his discussion (in The Principles of Art) of the “emotional charge” on a sensum.

Meanwhile, thanks to PhiloLogic, we can observe that Aristotle used the participle in question also at the head of Book II, chapter iii (going back to Apostle for the translation):

σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἕξεων
τὴν ἐπιγινομένην ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις·

As a sign of what habits are we may consider
the pleasures and pains which accompany our actions;

ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων σώφρων,
ὁ δ᾽ ἀχθόμενος ἀκόλαστος,
καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένων τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων ἢ μὴ λυπούμενός γε ἀνδρεῖος,
ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός.

for a man who abstains from [excessive] bodily pleasures and enjoys doing so is temperate,
but a man who is oppressed by so doing is intemperate,
and he who faces danger and enjoys it or at least is not pained by so doing is brave,
but he who is pained by so doing is a coward.

περὶ ἡδονὰς γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή·
διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν,
διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα.

Thus ethical virtue is concerned with pleasures and pains;
for we do what is bad for the sake of pleasure,
and we abstain from doing what is noble because of pain.

The Index of Bywater’s edition in the Oxford Classical Texts does not give this earlier instance of ἐπιγινομένην, but only the present one.

Τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα

In the Philosopher’s example, pleasure is like “the bloom of well-being in people who are at the peak of their powers,” as Sachs has it; literally, “the hour for those at the acme.” Probably the translators have good reason to read into Aristotle’s words what they do:

as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of their age (Ross, Brown);

like the bloom of health in the young and vigorous (Rackham);

as the bloom of youth supervenes on those in the prime of life (Bartlett and Collins);

like the bloom on men in their prime of youth (Reeve).

Maugham might have appreciated the bloom on a young man, but he described it on a young woman in The Razor’s Edge:

But Isabel was blooming. With her high colour, the rich brown of her hair, her shining hazel eyes, her clear skin she gave an impression of such youth, of so much enjoyment of the mere fact of being alive that you felt half inclined to laugh with delight. She gave me the rather absurd notion of a pear, golden and luscious, perfectly ripe and simply asking to be eaten. She radiated warmth so that you thought that if you held out your hands you could feel its comfort. She looked taller than when I had last seen her, whether because she wore higher heels or because the clever dressmaker had cut her frock to conceal her youthful plumpness I don’t know, and she held herself with the graceful ease of a girl who has played outdoor games since childhood. She was in short sexually a very attractive young woman. Had I been her mother I should have thought it high time she was married.

Maugham can describe the attraction of a man, but he has to assign the feeling to a woman, here Isabel herself:

Her eyes were fixed on the sinewy wrist with its little golden hairs and on that long, delicate, but powerful hand, and I have never seen on a human countenance such a hungry concupiscence as I saw then on hers. It was a mask of lust. I would never have believed that her beautiful features could assume an expression of such unbridled sensuality.

Aristotle may well be alluding to such passion, with his talk of “acmes” and “hours.” Perhaps also you reach your acme only when the hour comes for showing it.

Greek Architecture

When Aristotle shows that pleasure is not a kind of movement, he means not only movement in place; it could be the construction of a temple (§ iv.2):

But within every part of the time which is required for the whole motion, the corresponding partial motion is incomplete, and the partial motions are different from each other and from the whole motion, for the fitting of the stones is different in kind from the fluting of the columns, and these are different from the construction of the [whole] temple; and the construction of the temple is complete (for nothing is missing from the end proposed), whereas the construction of the foundation (κρηπίς) or of the triglyph is incomplete (for each is a motion of a part of the temple).

One might suppose that the worker who does the fitting, the fluting, or the foundation can and even must complete his own job before the temple itself is complete. Perhaps such completions don’t count, since the worker is not really working out his own plan. Still, they are completions, at least in the view of Ruskin, according to whom “The Greek master-workman” could not

endure the appearance of imperfection in anything; and, therefore, what ornament he appointed to be done by those beneath him was composed of mere geometrical forms, – balls, ridges, and perfectly symmetrical foliage, – which could be executed with absolute precision by line and rule, and were as perfect in their way when completed, as his own figure sculpture.

That is from Volume II of The Stones of Venice, of which I have an excerpt in a little (hundred-page) volume called On Art and Life from the Penguin Books Great Ideas series. I recently rediscovered a selection I had made for another purpose, cutting and pasting from Project Gutenberg; here is the whole passage:

Of Servile ornament, the principal schools are the Greek, Ninevite, and Egyptian; but their servility is of different kinds. The Greek master-workman was far advanced in knowledge and power above the Assyrian or Egyptian. Neither he nor those for whom he worked could endure the appearance of imperfection in anything; and, therefore, what ornament he appointed to be done by those beneath him was composed of mere geometrical forms, – balls, ridges, and perfectly symmetrical foliage, – which could be executed with absolute precision by line and rule, and were as perfect in their way when completed, as his own figure sculpture. The Assyrian and Egyptian, on the contrary, less cognizant of accurate form in anything, were content to allow their figure sculpture to be executed by inferior workmen, but lowered the method of its treatment to a standard which every workman could reach, and then trained him by discipline so rigid, that there was no chance of his falling beneath the standard appointed. The Greek gave to the lower workman no subject which he could not perfectly execute. The Assyrian gave him subjects which he could only execute imperfectly, but fixed a legal standard for his imperfection. The workman was, in both systems, a slave.

But in the mediæval, or especially Christian, system of ornament, this slavery is done away with altogether; Christianity having recognized, in small things as well as great, the individual value of every soul. But it not only recognizes its value; it confesses its imperfection, in only bestowing dignity upon the acknowledgment of unworthiness. That admission of lost power and fallen nature, which the Greek or Ninevite felt to be intensely painful, and, as far as might be, altogether refused, the Christian makes daily and hourly, contemplating the fact of it without fear, as tending, in the end, to God’s greater glory. Therefore, to every spirit which Christianity summons to her service, her exhortation is: Do what you can, and confess frankly what you are unable to do; neither let your effort be shortened for fear of failure, nor your confession silenced for fear of shame. And it is, perhaps, the principal admirableness of the Gothic schools of architecture, that they thus receive the results of the labor of inferior minds; and out of fragments full of imperfection, and betraying that imperfection in every touch, indulgently raise up a stately and unaccusable whole.

If the Greeks did not recognize “the individual value of every soul,” Plato at least suggested, with the Noble Lie in Republic Book III, that there was no telling in advance which souls had value, since the various classes of souls did not always breed true.

Contents and Summary

• Chapter IV
• Chapter 3
  • What, or what sort, is it? (τί δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἢ ποῖόν τι)
    • Pleasure (ἡ ἡδονή) and
    • seeing (ἡ ὅρασις)

    seem to be alike:

    • complete at every moment,
    • lacking nothing
      to complete the form (τὸ εἶδος) later (§ iv.1).
  • Thus it is not moving (κίνησίς), which is
    • always in time,
    • possessed of some end,
    • complete when that is accomplished
      which is aimed at
      • in the whole time or
      • then.
  • In
    • parts and
    • time,

    all motions are

    • incomplete and
    • different in form from
      • the whole and
      • one another.
  • E.g.
    • The making of
      • the temple is complete,
      • the foundation and triglyph, not (§ iv.2)
    • Likewise with bearing (φορά), namely
      moving whence whither (κίνησις πόθεν ποῖ):
      there are formal differences
      • among
        • flying,
        • walking,
        • jumping etc.;
      • in walking, between
        • the complete course and
        • incomplete parts of it.
  • In sum,
    • a moving – the whence and whither making it special (εἰδοποιόν) –
      • is not complete at all times,
      • but its many [parts] are
        • incomplete and
        • formally different (§ iv.3);
    • of pleasure, at every moment, complete is the form
      (τῆς ἡδονῆς δ᾽ ἐν ὁτῳοῦν χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ εἶδος).
  • Except in time, one can
    • not be moved,
    • but be pleased.
  • There is
    • moving and
    • coming about (genesis)

    of none of

    • a seeing,
    • a point,
    • a unity,
    • a pleasure;

    for it is something whole (§ iv.4).

• Chapter 4
  • For every
    • perceiving,
    • thinking,
    • contemplating (theorizing),

    there is a pleasure:

    • sweetest is the most complete,
    • most complete is that
      • by the well conditioned [organ],
      • of the best of its objects.

    Pleasure completes the activity
    (τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή, § iv.5).

  • Not in the same way
    • do they complete,
      • the pleasure,
      • the object, and
      • the perceiving;
    • do they cure,
      • health and
      • the doctor (§ iv.6).
  • There is pleasure in each perception,
    the greatest when they are strongest, both
    1. the perceiving and
    2. what it works on (§ iv.7).
  • Pleasure completes the activity
    • not as does the habit present all along,
    • but as does some end that comes over it,
      as e.g. to those at their peak, the moment
      (τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα),
      when such as they ought to be are both
      • that which is
        • thought (νοητόν) or
        • felt (αἰσθητόν),
      • that which is
        • judging (κρῖνον) or
        • contemplating (θεωροῦν, § iv.8).
  • Why aren’t we pleased continually?
    • Isn’t it because we have to work at it?
    • We can’t do that continually (§ iv.9).
  • One may suppose,
    • as
      • life is an activity, and
      • everybody works on and with what they love best,
    • so they crave pleasure § iv.10
• Chapter 5
  • Do we
    • live for pleasure,
    • enjoy ourselves to live?

    All we’ll say is,

    • no activity, no pleasure,
    • pleasure completes the activity (§ iv.11)
• Chapter V
  • What differ in form, namely
    • products of
      • nature or
      • art,

      e.g.

      • animals,
      • trees,
      • a drawing,
      • a statue,
      • a house,
      • a utensil, or
    • activities,

    are completed by things differing in form (§ v.1).

  • As activities of thinking differ from
    • those of perception and
    • one another,

    so do the pleasures that complete them.

  • This is clear because:
    • Its proper pleasure improves, in
      • judgment and
      • precision,

      the activity, e.g.

      • geometry,
      • music,
      • housebuilding (§ v.2).
    • A foreign pleasure impedes the activity, e.g.
      • the flute enthusiast,
        hearing the instrument,
        cannot attend to speeches (§ v.3);
      • eaters in the theater eat more
        when the acting is bad (§ v.4).
  • The foreign pleasures are like the proper pains, e.g. in
    • writing or
    • calculating (§ v.5).
  • As activities are
    • decent or base,
    • desirable, avoided, or neither,

    and so are the attendent desires –
    they can be praised or blamed –
    all the more so are the pleasures (§ v.6).

  • Pleasure
    • is not
      • thinking (διάνοια) or
      • feeling (αἴσθησις),
    • but seems the same by being inseparable.

    Thus as activities differ,
    so do pleasures, e.g. in

    • sight, touch, hearing, smell, taste,
    • thought (§ v.7)
  • There are proper pleasures of
    • horse,
    • dog,
    • man,

    but those of the last, at least, vary (§ v.8),
    e.g. the same things are not

    • sweet to the
      • feverish and
      • healthy,
    • warm to the
      • sickly and
      • fit (§ v.9).
  • What is in such cases is
    what appears to the good (σπουδαῖος) –
    if so, the measure of each thing is
    • virtue,
    • the good man as such –
      • pleasures are what appear to him,
      • pleasant things are
        • what he enjoys,
        • not what seem so to the maimed or ruined (§ v.10)
  • Those pleasures
    • are the chief human ones
      that complete the activities of the one who is
      • complete and
      • blessed;
    • are secondary that remain (§ v.11).

Text

[1174^a]

Chapter IV

Chapter 3

§ iv.1

τί δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἢ ποῖόν τι, καταφανέστερον γένοιτ᾽ ἂν ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσιν.

• δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὅρασις καθ᾽ ὁντινοῦν χρόνον τελεία εἶναι·

  οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐνδεὴς οὐδενὸς
  ὃ εἰς ὕστερον γινόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος·

• τοιούτῳ δ᾽ ἔοικε καὶ ἡ ἡδονή.

  • ὅλον γάρ τι ἐστί, καὶ
  • κατ᾽ οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν ἡδονὴν
    ἧς ἐπὶ πλείω χρόνον γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ εἶδος.

§ iv.2

διόπερ οὐδὲ κίνησίς ἐστιν.

• ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ

πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ

• τέλους τινός,
  οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομική, καὶ
• τελεία ὅταν ποιήσῃ οὗ ἐφίεται.
  • ἢ ἐν ἅπαντι δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ
  • ἢ τούτῳ.

ἐν δὲ

• τοῖς μέρεσι καὶ
• τῷ χρόνῳ

πᾶσαι

• ἀτελεῖς, καὶ
• ἕτεραι τῷ εἴδει
  • τῆς ὅλης καὶ
  • ἀλλήλων.

• τῷ εἴδει οὖν διαφέρουσι, καὶ
• οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὁτῳοῦν χρόνῳ λαβεῖν κίνησιν τελείαν τῷ εἴδει,
• ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ, ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι.

§ iv.3

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ

• βαδίσεως καὶ
• τῶν λοιπῶν.

εἰ γάρ ἐστιν

• ἡ φορὰ κίνησις
  • πόθεν
  • ποῖ,

  καὶ

• ταύτης διαφοραὶ κατ᾽ εἴδη,

• οὐ μόνον δ᾽ οὕτως,
• ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ βαδίσει·

• τὸ γὰρ
  • πόθεν
  • ποῖ

  οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ

  • ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ καὶ
  • ἐν τῷ μέρει, καὶ
  • ἐν ἑτέρῳ μέρει καὶ
  • ἐν ἑτέρῳ,
• οὐδὲ τὸ διεξιέναι
  • τὴν γραμμὴν
  • τήνδε κἀκείνην· [1174^b]

• οὐ μόνον γὰρ γραμμὴν διαπορεύεται,
• ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τόπῳ οὖσαν,
  ἐν ἑτέρῳ δ᾽ αὕτη ἐκείνης.

• δι᾽ ἀκριβείας μὲν οὖν περὶ κινήσεως ἐν ἄλλοις εἴρηται,
  ἔοικε δ᾽
  • οὐκ ἐν ἅπαντι χρόνῳ τελεία εἶναι,
  • ἀλλ᾽ αἱ πολλαὶ
    • ἀτελεῖς καὶ
    • διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἴδει,

  εἴπερ τὸ

  • πόθεν
  • ποῖ

  εἰδοποιόν.

§ iv.4

• τῆς ἡδονῆς δ᾽ ἐν ὁτῳοῦν χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ εἶδος.

δῆλον οὖν ὡς

• ἕτεραί τ᾽ ἂν εἶεν ἀλλήλων, καὶ
• τῶν
  • ὅλων τι καὶ
  • τελείων

  ἡ ἡδονή.

δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ

• μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ,
• ἥδεσθαι δέ·
  τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν ὅλον τι.

ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ ὅτι
οὐ καλῶς λέγουσι

• κίνησιν ἢ
• γένεσιν

εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν.

οὐ γὰρ πάντων ταῦτα λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ μὴ ὅλων·

• οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁράσεώς ἐστι γένεσις
• οὐδὲ στιγμῆς
• οὐδὲ μονάδος,
• οὐδὲ τούτων
  • οὐθὲν κίνησις
  • οὐδὲ γένεσις·
• οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς·
  ὅλον γάρ τι.

Chapter 4

§ iv.5

αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης

• πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν
  ἐνεργούσης,
• τελείως δὲ τῆς εὖ διακειμένης
  πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν
  (τοιοῦτον γὰρ μάλιστ᾽ εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ τελεία ἐνέργεια·
  • αὐτὴν δὲ λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ
  • ἐν ᾧ ἐστί,

  μηθὲν διαφερέτω),

καθ᾽ ἑκάστην δὴ βελτίστη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια

• τοῦ ἄριστα διακειμένου
• πρὸς τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ὑπ᾽ αὐτήν.

αὕτη δ᾽ ἂν

• τελειοτάτη εἴη καὶ
• ἡδίστη.

κατὰ πᾶσαν γὰρ

• αἴσθησίν ἐστιν ἡδονή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
• διάνοιαν καὶ
• θεωρίαν,

• ἡδίστη δ᾽
  ἡ τελειοτάτη,
• τελειοτάτη δ᾽
  ἡ
  • τοῦ εὖ ἔχοντος
  • πρὸς τὸ σπουδαιότατον τῶν ὑπ᾽ αὐτήν·

τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή.

§ iv.6

• οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον
  • ἥ τε ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ καὶ
  • τὸ αἰσθητόν τε καὶ
  • ἡ αἴσθησις,

  σπουδαῖα ὄντα, ὥσπερ

• οὐδ᾽
  • ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ
  • ὁ ἰατρὸς

  ὁμοίως αἰτία ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν.

§ iv.7

• καθ᾽ ἑκάστην δ᾽ αἴσθησιν
  ὅτι γίνεται ἡδονή,
  δῆλον
  (φαμὲν γὰρ
  • ὁράματα καὶ
  • ἀκούσματα

  εἶναι ἡδέα)·

• δῆλον δὲ καὶ
  ὅτι μάλιστα,
  ἐπειδὰν ἥ τε αἴσθησις
  • ᾖ κρατίστη καὶ
  • πρὸς τοιοῦτον ἐνεργῇ·
     
  • τοιούτων δ᾽ ὄντων
    • τοῦ τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ
    • τοῦ αἰσθανομένου,

  ἀεὶ ἔσται ἡδονὴ

  • ὑπάρχοντός γε
    • τοῦ τε ποιήσοντος καὶ
    • τοῦ πεισομένου.

§ iv.8

τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονὴ

• οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα,
• ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος,
  οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα.

ἕως ἂν οὖν

• τό τε
  • νοητὸν ἢ
  • αἰσθητὸν

  ᾖ οἷον δεῖ καὶ

• τὸ
  • κρῖνον ἢ
  • θεωροῦν, [1175^a]

ἔσται ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἡ ἡδονή·

• ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων καὶ
• πρὸς ἄλληλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐχόντων

• τοῦ τε παθητικοῦ καὶ
• τοῦ ποιητικοῦ

ταὐτὸ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι.

§ iv.9

• πῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἥδεται;
• ἢ κάμνει;

• πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν.
• οὐ γίνεται οὖν οὐδ᾽ ἡδονή·
  ἕπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ.

• ἔνια δὲ τέρπει καινὰ ὄντα,
• ὕστερον δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως

διὰ ταὐτό·

• τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον
  • παρακέκληται ἡ διάνοια καὶ
  • διατεταμένως περὶ αὐτὰ ἐνεργεῖ,

  ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν οἱ ἐμβλέποντες,

• μετέπειτα δ᾽
  • οὐ τοιαύτη ἡ ἐνέργεια
  • ἀλλὰ παρημελημένη·

  διὸ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀμαυροῦται.

§ iv.10

• ὀρέγεσθαι δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς
  οἰηθείη τις ἂν ἅπαντας,
  ὅτι καὶ
• τοῦ ζῆν ἅπαντες ἐφίενται·

• ἡ δὲ ζωὴ ἐνέργειά τις ἐστί, καὶ
• ἕκαστος περὶ ταῦτα καὶ τούτοις ἐνεργεῖ ἃ καὶ μάλιστ᾽ ἀγαπᾷ,

οἷον

• ὁ μὲν μουσικὸς τῇ ἀκοῇ περὶ τὰ μέλη,
• ὁ δὲ φιλομαθὴς τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ θεωρήματα,
• οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕκαστος·

ἡ δ᾽ ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ

• τὰς ἐνεργείας, καὶ
• τὸ ζῆν δή,

οὗ ὀρέγονται.

εὐλόγως οὖν καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐφίενται·

τελειοῖ γὰρ ἑκάστῳ τὸ ζῆν, αἱρετὸν ὄν.

Chapter 5

§ iv.11

• πότερον δὲ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ ζῆν αἱρούμεθα
• ἢ διὰ τὸ ζῆν τὴν ἡδονήν,

ἀφείσθω ἐν τῷ παρόντι.

συνεζεῦχθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ χωρισμὸν οὐ δέχεσθαι·

• ἄνευ τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας οὐ γίνεται ἡδονή,
• πᾶσάν τε ἐνέργειαν τελειοῖ ἡ ἡδονή.

Chapter V

§ v.1

ὅθεν δοκοῦσι καὶ τῷ εἴδει διαφέρειν.

τὰ γὰρ ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει
ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρων
οἰόμεθα τελειοῦσθαι
(οὕτω γὰρ φαίνεται

1. καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ
2. καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τέχνης,

3. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς διαφερούσας τῷ εἴδει
   ὑπὸ διαφερόντων εἴδει τελειοῦσθαι.

§ v.2

διαφέρουσι δ᾽

• αἱ τῆς διανοίας τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ
• αὐταὶ ἀλλήλων

κατ᾽ εἶδος·

καὶ αἱ τελειοῦσαι δὴ ἡδοναί.

---

φανείη δ᾽ ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ
συνῳκειῶσθαι
τῶν ἡδονῶν ἑκάστην
τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἣν τελειοῖ.

συναύξει γὰρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ οἰκεία ἡδονή.

μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕκαστα

• κρίνουσι καὶ
• ἐξακριβοῦσιν

οἱ μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς ἐνεργοῦντες,

• συναύξουσι δὲ αἱ ἡδοναί,
• τὰ δὲ συναύξοντα οἰκεῖα· [1175^b]

• τοῖς ἑτέροις δὲ τῷ εἴδει καὶ
• τὰ οἰκεῖα ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει.

§ v.3

ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦτ᾽ ἂν φανείη ἐκ τοῦ
τὰς ἀφ᾽ ἑτέρων ἡδονὰς
ἐμποδίους
ταῖς ἐνεργείαις εἶναι.

§ v.4

ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει,
ὅταν ἅμα περὶ δύο ἐνεργῇ·

ἡ γὰρ ἡδίων τὴν ἑτέραν ἐκκρούει,
κἂν πολὺ διαφέρῃ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, μᾶλλον,
ὥστε μηδ᾽ ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἑτέραν.

διὸ χαίροντες ὁτῳοῦν σφόδρα
οὐ πάνυ δρῶμεν ἕτερον,
καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦμεν ἄλλοις
ἠρέμα ἀρεσκόμενοι,

§ v.5

ἐπεὶ δ᾽

• ἡ μὲν οἰκεία ἡδονὴ
  • ἐξακριβοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας
  • καὶ
    • χρονιωτέρας καὶ
    • βελτίους

    ποιεῖ,

• αἱ δ᾽ ἀλλότριαι λυμαίνονται,

δῆλον ὡς πολὺ διεστᾶσιν.

σχεδὸν γὰρ αἱ ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ ποιοῦσιν
ὅπερ αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι·

φθείρουσι γὰρ τὰς ἐνεργείας αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι,

συμβαίνει δὴ περὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας τοὐναντίον ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκείων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ λυπῶν·

οἰκεῖαι δ᾽ εἰσὶν αἱ ἐπὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν γινόμεναι.

αἱ δ᾽ ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ εἴρηται ὅτι παραπλήσιόν τι τῇ λύπῃ ποιοῦσιν·

φθείρουσι γάρ, πλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως.

§ v.6

διαφερουσῶν δὲ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν

• ἐπιεικείᾳ καὶ
• φαυλότητι,

καὶ

• τῶν μὲν αἱρετῶν οὐσῶν
• τῶν δὲ φευκτῶν
• τῶν δ᾽ οὐδετέρων,

ὁμοίως ἔχουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί·

καθ᾽ ἑκάστην γὰρ ἐνέργειαν οἰκεία ἡδονὴ ἔστιν.

• ἡ μὲν οὖν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ οἰκεία ἐπιεικής,
• ἡ δὲ τῇ φαύλῃ μοχθηρά·

καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι

• τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἐπαινεταί,
• τῶν δ᾽ αἰσχρῶν ψεκταί.

οἰκειότεραι δὲ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις
αἱ ἐν αὐταῖς ἡδοναὶ
τῶν ὀρέξεων·

• αἳ μὲν γὰρ διωρισμέναι εἰσὶ
  • καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις
  • καὶ τῇ φύσει,
• αἳ δὲ
  • σύνεγγυς ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, καὶ
  • ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως
    ὥστ᾽ ἔχειν ἀμφισβήτησιν
    εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ.

§ v.7

• οὐ μὴν ἔοικέ γε ἡ ἡδονὴ διάνοια εἶναι
• οὐδ᾽ αἴσθησις
  (ἄτοπον γάρ),
• ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι φαίνεταί τισι ταὐτόν.

• ὥσπερ οὖν αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἕτεραι,
• καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί. [1176^a]

διαφέρει δὲ

• ἡ ὄψις ἁφῆς καθαρειότητι, καὶ
• ἀκοὴ καὶ ὄσφρησις γεύσεως·

ὁμοίως δὴ διαφέρουσι

• καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί,
• καὶ τούτων αἱ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν,
• καὶ ἑκάτεραι ἀλλήλων.

§ v.8

δοκεῖ δ᾽ εἶναι ἑκάστῳ ζῴῳ καὶ ἡδονὴ οἰκεία,
ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον·

ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν.

καὶ ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστῳ δὲ θεωροῦντι τοῦτ᾽ ἂν φανείη·

ἑτέρα γὰρ

• ἵππου ἡδονὴ καὶ
• κυνὸς καὶ
• ἀνθρώπου,

• αἱ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἑτέρων τῷ εἴδει διαφέρουσιν εἴδει,
• τὰς δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀδιαφόρους εὔλογον εἶναι.

διαλλάττουσι δ᾽ οὐ σμικρὸν ἐπί γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων·

§ v.9

• τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ
  • τοὺς μὲν τέρπει
  • τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ,
• καὶ
  • τοῖς μὲν
    • λυπηρὰ καὶ
    • μισητά ἐστι
  • τοῖς δὲ
    • ἡδέα καὶ
    • φιλητά.

• καὶ ἐπὶ γλυκέων δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνει·
  οὐ γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκεῖ
  • τῷ πυρέττοντι καὶ
  • τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι,
• οὐδὲ θερμὸν εἶναι
  • τῷ ἀσθενεῖ καὶ
  • τῷ εὐεκτικῷ.

ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ᾽ ἑτέρων συμβαίνει.

§ v.10

δοκεῖ δ᾽ ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι
τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ.

εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται,
καθάπερ δοκεῖ,
καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάστου μέτρον

• ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ
• ἁγαθός, ᾗ τοιοῦτος,

καὶ

• ἡδοναὶ εἶεν ἂν αἱ τούτῳ φαινόμεναι καὶ
• ἡδέα οἷς οὗτος χαίρει.

τὰ δὲ τούτῳ δυσχερῆ
εἴ τῳ φαίνεται ἡδέα,
οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν·

πολλαὶ γὰρ

• φθοραὶ καὶ
• λῦμαι

ἀνθρώπων γίνονται·

• ἡδέα δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν,
• ἀλλὰ τούτοις καὶ οὕτω διακειμένοις.

§ v.11

• τὰς μὲν οὖν ὁμολογουμένως αἰσχρὰς
  δῆλον ὡς

  • οὐ φατέον ἡδονὰς εἶναι,
  • πλὴν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις·

• τῶν δ᾽ ἐπιεικῶν εἶναι δοκουσῶν

  • ποίαν ἢ
  • τίνα

  φατέον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι;

  ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν δῆλον;

  ταύταις γὰρ ἕπονται αἱ ἡδοναί.

  • εἴτ᾽ οὖν μία ἐστὶν
  • εἴτε πλείους

  αἱ τοῦ

  • τελείου καὶ
  • μακαρίου

  ἀνδρός,

  • αἱ ταύτας τελειοῦσαι ἡδοναὶ
    κυρίως λέγοιντ᾽ ἂν ἀνθρώπου ἡδοναὶ εἶναι,
  • αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ
    • δευτέρως καὶ
    • πολλοστῶς,

  ὥσπερ αἱ ἐνέργειαι.