Does this sound like Aristotle?

It might seem like it’s easier to love others than to love yourself, but it’s tough to build healthy relationships if you don’t love yourself first.

The sentence is from a WikiHow page, “How to Love Yourself: Treat Yourself Like Your Own Best Friend.” Back in in the 1970s, I thought something like it was an excuse for self-indulgence.

In the 1986 film “Clara’s Heart,” a newly divorced woman leaves her adolescent son in Baltimore, so that she herself can be with her lover in California. As I recall, she says she cannot be a good mother if she is not happy herself; but the excuse is condemned by the title character, from Jamaica, played by Whoopi Goldberg. I hadn’t specifically remembered that the Californian lover was a “famed self-help author.” Perhaps then he was just the sort of person who would advise somebody to love herself first. In that case, perhaps what he really meant was, “Love me”; but I cannot say I remember this from the movie.

My ongoing reading of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics has reached chapters iv–vii of Book IX. In each of the first five chapters of Book III, I detected the lesson, “No excuses.” Nonetheless, a page headed “Self-Love Day – February 13, 2025,” has a “Self-Love Day timeline” that starts with our Philosopher:

384 B.C. – 322 B.C.

The Greek Concept of Self-Love
Self-love is discussed in Ancient Greece (‘philautia’) by Aristotle, and it becomes one of his six main types of love.

354 A.D. – 530 A.D.

St. Augustine’s Love and Pride
Augustine, a follower of Aristotle, discusses the love of self and goes as far as saying that the sin of pride is an extreme, a perversion of modest self-love.

Augustine followed Aristotle in time; in thought, he was perhaps more of a follower of the Platonists. In the Confessions, he does mention reading Aristotle’s Categories. He became most of all a follower of Jesus Christ, whom the self-love timeline should not skip over. It should also go back to the Torah, from which Jesus quotes when teaching, as in Matthew 22:37–9,

Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.

The precise sources for the commandments are Deuteronomy 6:5 and Leviticus 19:18. They are thus essential to Augustine’s teaching on self-love, as summarized on the Self-Love Day page – summarized accurately enough otherwise, as I read the current article on Augustine by Christian Tornau in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (summer 2020; references omitted):

love means the overall direction of our will (positively) toward God or (negatively) toward ourselves or corporeal creature. The former is called love in a good sense (caritas), the latter cupidity or concupiscence (cupiditas), i.e., misdirected and sinful love. The root of sin is excessive self-love that wants to put the self in the position of God and is equivalent with pride. It must be distinguished from the legitimate self-love that is part of the biblical commandment and strives for true happiness by subordinating the self to God.

As for Aristotle himself, I was not aware that he had “six main types of love.” He uses at least four verbs for love, namely ἀγαπάω, ἐράω, φιλέω, στέργω, as I noted when taking up the first four chapters of Book VIII of the Ethics. With the reading below, we are halfway through Book IX, which apparently will complete Aristotle’s discussion of love, or friendship.

As for Aristotle’s supposed word for self-love, φιλαυτία is in the Lexicon; however, it is not used in the Ethics, according to the Index of Bywater’s edition. The related adjective φίλαυτος is there, and for this, the LSJ cites the passage

τὸν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι,

which one might interpret as, “the good man must love himself.”

Does today’s “positive psychology” really have its roots in Aristotle? The passage just quoted is in § viii.7 of Book IX. That is part of our next reading, but let us look at more of the section now:

τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι
(καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται
τὰ καλὰ πράττων
καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει),
τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν οὐ δεῖ·
βλάψει γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς πέλας,
φαύλοις πάθεσιν ἑπόμενος.

The good man ought to be a lover of self,
since he will then both benefit himself
by acting nobly
and aid his fellows;
but the bad man ought not to be a lover of self,
since he will follow his base passions,
and so injure both himself and his neighbours.

The translation is Rackham’s. The point is not to love yourself, but to be good.

Again, the present reading is of chapters iv–vii of Book IX of the Ethics. Chapter iv observes that decent people exhibit, towards themselves, five features that people associate with friendship. For example, people say a friend prefers the same things (τὸν φίλον … ταὐτὰ αἱρούμενον), and this turns out to be true of the decent man in himself; for (§ iv.3), such a man

ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ,
καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται
κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν·

is of one mind with himself,
and desires the same things
with every part of his nature.

People who are base (φαυλος) and impious (ἀνοσιουργός) are not like that, but (§ iv.8)

διαφέρονται γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς,
καὶ ἑτέρων μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν
ἄλλα δὲ βούλονται,

are at variance with themselves,
desiring one thing
and wishing another.

If that sounds strange, then people who are incontinent (ἀκρατής) are given as an example. They were the subject of chapters i–x of Book VII, and it was said of them in particular, in § viii.5, that the incontinent person is

βελτίων ὢν τοῦ ἀκολάστου,
οὐδὲ φαῦλος ἁπλῶς·

better than the profligate,
and not absolutely bad.

The reason is that he still knows what is right; he just doesn’t act on it. That is what Aristotle recalls now in Book IX about incontinent people (§ iv.8),

αἱροῦνται γὰρ
ἀντὶ τῶν δοκούντων ἑαυτοῖς
ἀγαθῶν εἶναι
τὰ ἡδέα βλαβερὰ ὄντα·

who choose
what is pleasant but harmful
instead of what they themselves think
to be good.

If one is looking for advice in the present reading, perhaps chapter vii is where to go. If you want to achieve self-actualization, the thing to do is to be a benefactor. Then you will love your beneficiary,

• not the way the lender loves his debtor,
• but the way the artist loves his work.

The lender doesn’t love the debtor, but desires his prosperity only for the sake of getting paid back. The poet loves his poem, and the benefactor his beneficiary, as a way of becoming himself. As Aristotle puts it § vii.4,

τὸ εἶναι πᾶσιν αἱρετὸν καὶ φιλητόν,
ἐσμὲν δ᾽ ἐνεργείᾳ
(τῷ ζῆν γὰρ καὶ πράττειν),
ἐνεργείᾳ
δὲ ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἔστι
πως·
στέργει δὴ τὸ ἔργον,
διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι.
τοῦτο δὲ
φυσικόν·
ὃ γάρ ἐστι δυνάμει,
τοῦτο ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ ἔργον μηνύει.

all things desire and love existence;
but we exist in activity,
since we exist by living and doing;
and in a sense
one who has made something exists
actively,
and so he loves his handiwork
because he loves existence.
This is in fact
a fundamental principle of nature:
what a thing is potentially,
that its work reveals in actuality.

Again the translation is Rackham’s. I have bolded the key term ἐνέργεια, used here three times, always in the dative case, apparently with instrumental meaning. According to Book I, § vii.15, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται, “the human good becomes an energeia of the soul” (according to the virtue, if there is just one, or to the best and most complete virtue, if there are many virtues).

For Sachs, energeia represents “The central notion in all of Aristotle’s philosophy, the activity by which anything is what it is.” Sachs’s translation of the passage from Book IX is (with his italics, my bolding),

one’s being is choiceworthy and lovable for everyone, but we are by being-at-work (since it is by living and acting), and the work is, in a certain way, its maker at-work; so he loves the work because he also loves to be. And this is natural, for that which something is in potency, its work reveals in its being-at-work.

Rackham’s translation is better as English, but perhaps Aristotle’s original is not very good as Greek. I am not sure why Sachs changes the order of the nouns in ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἔστι πως. Nonetheless, his interpretation – “the work is, in a certain way, its maker at-work” – seems better than Rackham’s – “in a sense one who has made something exists actively.”

Instead of Rackham’s “one who has made,” why not “one who makes”? Aristotle’s noun phrase ὁ ποιήσας is based on an aorist participle, not a perfect (πεποιηκώς).

It might seem to make the most sense to say that one who is making exists actively; for, if he leaves off making, this means he is no longer active. However, Aristotle is not using the present participle (ποιέων, ποιῶν) either. Self-actualization, if we can call it that, is not the work of a moment. The idea was already in chapter v, whose subject is εὔνοια, translated as goodwill. This may be a precursor of friendship, but alone is not friendship, or affection, because, for one thing (§ v.2),

ἡ μὲν φίλησις μετὰ συνηθείας,
ἡ δ᾽ εὔνοια καὶ
ἐκ προσπαίου.

affection requires intimate acquaintance,
whereas goodwill
may spring up all of a sudden.

Again the translation is Rackhams’. Bartlett and Collins do not quite incorporate the idea in their own literal translation of the original passage in question from § vii.4:

to exist is for all people something choiceworthy and lovable, and we exist by means of activity (for this consists in living and acting). And in his activity, the maker of something somehow is the work; he therefore feels affection for the work because he feels affection also for his own existence. This is natural, for what he is in his capacity [or potential], the work reveals in his activity.

Instead of “in his activity, the maker of something somehow is the work” (ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἔστι πως), how about this? “By being at work, the one who is a maker is the work, somehow.”

Does Aristotle then advise us to get to work? In that case, what should we work on? According to the conclusion of the chapter (§ vii.7), perhaps one should work on having a baby, at least if one is a woman:

τὰ ἐπιπόνως γενόμενα
πάντες μᾶλλον στέργουσιν …
διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ
αἱ μητέρες φιλοτεκνότεραι·
ἐπιπονωτέρα γὰρ ἡ γέννησις.

everybody loves a thing more
if it has cost him trouble …
This is why
mothers love their children more than fathers,
because parenthood costs the mother more trouble.

Even if Aristotle is right though, love is not always the answer:

Just what was this problem that has no name? What were the words women used when they tried to express it? Sometimes a woman would say “I feel empty somehow … incomplete.” Or she would say, “I feel as if I don’t exist.” Sometimes she blotted out the feeling with a tranquilizer. Sometimes she thought the problem was with her husband, or her children, or that what she really needed was to redecorate her house, or move to a better neighborhood, or have an affair, or another baby.

Thus Betty Friedan in The Feminine Mystique, on page 16 of the tenth anniversary edition (1974), which I bought in a used copy for a quarter, soon after college. The dedication is, “For all the new women, and the new men,” and perhaps I was one of the latter.

It is hard to know what you want, and you cannot work on it unless you know what it is. Such is Collingwood’s argument, anyway, in the “Desire” chapter of The New Leviathan:

11. 38. Thomas Carlyle, posing as the sage he never was, suggested that the impossible maxim ‘know thyself’ should be ‘translated’ into the partially possible one ‘know what thou canst work at’. A wiser man would have seen that the Delphic maxim is not so much impossible as inexaustible.

11. 39. Part, indeed the first part, of knowing yourself is knowing what you want. This is not only the first thing a man can know about himself, it is the first thing he knows at all. It is not impossible, though it is very difficult. But a man who does not know what he wants will never know what he can work at. The Carlylese gospel of work is no substitute for the Delphic gospel of self-knowledge. Either work is based on self-knowledge or it is a form of self-intoxication, and the gospel of work a recommendation to pointless, purposeless activity for men who lack the courage to think and can only dissipate their energies in a blind fury of self-deception.

“The gospel of work [is] a recommendation to pointless, purposeless activity for men who lack the courage to think.” One of my seniors explained to me why he watched TV at night: he wanted to stop all of the thinking he had done at work during the day. He may have explained his drinking habit in the same way. I figured then that his office job was just another “form of self-intoxication.”

The exchange of the Little Prince with the Tippler had impressed me:

– Pourquoi bois-tu? lui demanda le petit prince.

– Pour oublier, répondit le buveur.

– Pour oublier quoi? s’enquit le petit prince qui déjà le plaignait.

– Pour oublier que j’ai honte, avoua le buveur en baissant la tête.

– Honte de quoi? s’informa le petit prince qui désirait le secourir.

– Honte de boire! acheva le buveur qui s’enferma définitivement dans le silence.

As for procreation, Carolyn Hax recently took up the question, “Does the right reason to have kids really exist?”

Here’s what I would call a good reason to have kids: a yearning for family life, with all the risks, rewards and wild cards that entails – plus the means to provide for any children in your care, plus a belief the children you add to the world are, for lack of a better way to phrase it, justifiable.

That sounds Aristotelian, one reason being the practical reference to “the means to provide.” Hax also provides an explicit warning, which might suit a lot of what Aristotle says:

Besides verging on self-parody, that last part also is so malleable as to be meaningless. Each of us can define “justifiable” to suit our own needs.

No excuses.

Contents and Summary

• Chapter IV. ΤΑ ΦΙΛΙΚΑ … ἔοικεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐληλυθέναι
  “The components of friendship seem to come from within”:
  • A friend is defined as one who:
    1. Both
       • wants and
       • does

       what

       • is good or
       • appears so,

       for a [friend]’s sake.

    2. Wants the
       • existing and
       • living

       of the friend,
       for his own sake,
       e.g. like

       • mothers w.r.t. their children,
       • even quarrelling friends.
    3. Lives with [a friend].
    4. Chooses the same things.
    5. Both
       • sorrows and
       • rejoices

       with a friend,
       e.g. as mothers do (§ iv.1).

  • That’s how a decent man is towards himself (§ iv.2):
    • D. He is
      • of one mind with himself,
      • wants the same things with his whole soul.
    • A. He [satisfies A.] for the sake of his own intellect,
      which is his [real] self.
    • B. He wants himself, especially his thinking part,
      • to live and
      • be preserved (§ iv.3).

      Nobody would choose to be a different person
      even to have every good (§ iv.4).

    • C. He wants to live with himself, having good
      • memories,
      • hopes,
      • objects of contemplation.
    • E. He always
      • sorrows over and
      • enjoys

      the same things.

  • That’s why a friend is as described:
    • The decent man is that way towards himself, and
    • a friend is another self (§ iv.5).
  • We don’t ask whether a man can really be his own friend.
    • Maybe if he is two or more.
    • Extreme friendship is as if for oneself (§ iv.6).
  • Most people seem to be thus, but the
    • base and
    • impious

    are not (§ iv.7):

    • D. They differ with themselves,
      • desiring one thing,
      • wishing for another,

      e.g. like the unrestrained.

    • A. They don’t do what they think best for themselves,
      out of cowardice or laziness.
    • B. They who
      • have done many frightful crimes and
      • are hated for their evil,

      they

      • flee life,
      • abscond with themselves (§ iv.8).
    • C. Bad men
      • seek the company of others,
    • avoid themselves.
    • E. They are both pleased and pained by the same thing (§ iv.9),
      At least nearly so.
  • So we shouldn’t be like that (§ iv.10).
• Chapter V. ΕΥΝΟΙΑ (GOODWILL):
  • Seems friendly (φιλική).
  • Is neither
    • φιλία – which is had for those
      • whom one does not know, and
      • who don’t know it – nor
    • φίλησις, which
      • is followed by
        • intensity and
        • longing (§ v.1),
      • and comes with living together.
  • Arises suddenly, as e.g. with competitors.
  • Is superficial (§ v.2).
  • Is, for friendship,
    • necessary, but
    • not sufficient,

    as e.g. pleasure in appearance is for love.

  • Is absent in friendships of
    • pleasure and
    • utility (§ v.3).
  • Arises
    • through
      • virtue and
      • a kind of decency,
    • for somebody who appears
      • noble (“beautiful”), or
      • courageous, or
      • something like that,

    as e.g. with competitors (§ v.4).

• Chapter VI. ΟΜΟΝΟΙΑ (LIKE-MINDEDNESS):
  • Appears friendly.
  • Is not ὁμοδοξία
    (e.g. astronomers have that).
  • Is what’s in cities
    if agreeing on what’s important (§ vi.1),
    e.g.
    • elective offices,
    • alliance with the Lacedaemonians,
    • Pittacus as ruler, if he agrees,

    but not as in The Phoenician Women

  • Appears to be political friendship,
    concerning the advantageous for life (§ vi.2).
  • Is had by
    • the decent (§ vi.3),
    • not the base –
      μὴ γὰρ τηρούντων τὸ κοινὸν ἀπόλλυται (§ vi.4).
• Chapter VII. ΟΙ ΕΥΕΡΓΕΤΑΙ (BENEFACTORS) –
  why do they love the beneficiaries
  more than the latter love the former?
  • Most people think good works are like loans.
    Pace Epicharmus, it’s normal
    to prefer receiving good to doing it (§ vii.1).
  • However,
    • lenders don’t love their debtors;
    • benefactors do love their recipients (§ vii.2).
  • Artists are like that, especially poets;
    they love their works,
    • more than these would love the artists, and
    • as if they were children (§ vii.3).
  • The welldoer loves his work,
    because he is somehow the work,
    by ἐνέργεια:
    • ὃ γάρ ἐστι δυνάμει,
    • τοῦτο ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ ἔργον μηνύει

    – what one can be, one’s work reveals,
    through one’s being-at-work (§ vii.4).

  • To the recipient,
    the work of the benefactor is
    • not beautiful or noble,
    • but useful, thus less
      • pleasing and
      • lovable (§ vii.5).
  • Pleasant are
    • ἡ μνήμη (which is beautiful for the benefactor), and
    • ἡ ἐλπίς (which is beautiful for the recipient), but especially
    • ἡ ἐνέργεια.
  • Loving belongs to the doer, because
    • loving is like doing,
  • being loved is like undergoing (§ vii.6).
  • We love what we labor for, e.g.
    • money we earn, not inherit,
    • children we gestate, not sire (§ vii.7).

Text

[1166^a]

Chapter IV

§ iv.1

τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ

• τὰ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας, καὶ
• οἷς αἱ φιλίαι ὁρίζονται,

ἔοικεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐληλυθέναι.

τιθέασι γὰρ φίλον

1. τὸν βουλόμενον
   καὶ πράττοντα
   • τἀγαθὰ ἢ
   • τὰ φαινόμενα

   ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, ἢ

2. τὸν βουλόμενον
   • εἶναι καὶ
   • ζῆν

   τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν·

οἳ δὲ

3. τὸν συνδιάγοντα καὶ
4. ταὐτὰ αἱρούμενον, ἢ
5. τὸν
   • συναλγοῦντα καὶ
   • συγχαίροντα τῷ φίλῳ·

   μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς μητέρας συμβαίνει.

τούτων δέ τινι καὶ τὴν φιλίαν ὁρίζονται.

§ iv.2

πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον

• τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ ὑπάρχει
• (τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς,
  ᾗ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι·
  ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, μέτρον ἑκάστων
  • ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ
  • ὁ σπουδαῖος

  εἶναι)·

§ iv.3

οὗτος γὰρ [D.]

• ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ
• τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν·

καὶ [A.]

• βούλεται δὴ ἑαυτῷ
  • τἀγαθὰ καὶ
  • τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ
• πράττει
  (τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τἀγαθὸν διαπονεῖν) καὶ

• ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα
• (τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν,
  ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ)·

καὶ [B.]

• ζῆν δὲ βούλεται ἑαυτὸν καὶ
• σῴζεσθαι,

καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο ᾧ φρονεῖ.

§ iv.4

• ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι,
• ἕκαστος δ᾽ ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τἀγαθά,
• γενόμενος δ᾽ ἄλλος αἱρεῖται οὐδεὶς πάντ᾽ ἔχειν
  [ἐκεῖνο τὸ γενόμενον]
  (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τἀγαθόν)
  ἀλλ᾽ ὢν ὅ τι ποτ᾽ ἐστίν·

δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν τὸ νοοῦν ἕκαστος

• εἶναι ἢ
• μάλιστα.

§ iv.5

[C.] συνδιάγειν τε ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑαυτῷ βούλεται·

ἡδέως γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ·

• τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγμένων ἐπιτερπεῖς αἱ μνῆμαι, καὶ
• τῶν μελλόντων ἐλπίδες ἀγαθαί,
  αἱ τοιαῦται δ᾽ ἡδεῖαι. καὶ
• θεωρημάτων δ᾽ εὐπορεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ.

[E.]

• συναλγεῖ τε καὶ
• συνήδεται

μάλισθ᾽ ἑαυτῷ·

• πάντοτε γάρ ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ
  • λυπηρόν τε καὶ
  • ἡδύ, καὶ
• οὐκ ἄλλοτ᾽ ἄλλο·

ἀμεταμέλητος γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν.

τῷ δὴ

• πρὸς αὑτὸν ἕκαστα τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ,
• πρὸς δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς αὑτόν
  (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός),

• καὶ ἡ φιλία τούτων εἶναί τι δοκεῖ,
• καὶ φίλοι οἷς ταῦθ᾽ ὑπάρχει.

§ iv.6

πρὸς αὑτὸν δὲ

• πότερον ἔστιν
• ἢ οὐκ ἔστι

φιλία,
ἀφείσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος·

δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν

• ταύτῃ εἶναι φιλία,
  ᾗ ἐστὶ
  • δύο ἢ
  • πλείω,

  ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, [1166^b] καὶ

• ὅτι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς φιλίας τῇ πρὸς αὑτὸν ὁμοιοῦται.

§ iv.7

φαίνεται δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα

• καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν,
• καίπερ οὖσι φαύλοις.

ἆρ᾽ οὖν ᾗ τ᾽

• ἀρέσκουσιν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ
• ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι,

ταύτῃ μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν;

ἐπεὶ

• τῶν γε κομιδῇ
  • φαύλων καὶ
  • ἀνοσιουργῶν

  οὐδενὶ ταῦθ᾽ ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ᾽

• οὐδὲ φαίνεται.

§ iv.8

• σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς φαύλοις·

[D.] διαφέρονται γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ

• ἑτέρων μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν
• ἄλλα δὲ βούλονται,

[A.] οἳ δ᾽ αὖ διὰ

• δειλίαν καὶ
• ἀργίαν

ἀφίστανται τοῦ πράττειν
ἃ οἴονται ἑαυτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι.

[B.]

• οἷς δὲ
  • πολλὰ καὶ
  • δεινὰ

  πέπρακται καὶ

• διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν μισοῦνται,

• καὶ φεύγουσι τὸ ζῆν
• καὶ ἀναιροῦσιν ἑαυτούς.

§ iv.9

[C.]

• ζητοῦσί τε οἱ μοχθηροὶ μεθ᾽ ὧν συνημερεύσουσιν,
• ἑαυτοὺς δὲ φεύγουσιν·

• • ἀναμιμνήσκονται γὰρ
    • πολλῶν καὶ
    • δυσχερῶν, καὶ
  • τοιαῦθ᾽ ἕτερα ἐλπίζουσι,

  καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς ὄντες,

• μεθ᾽ ἑτέρων δ᾽ ὄντες

  • ἐπιλανθάνονται.

οὐδέν τε φιλητὸν ἔχοντες οὐδὲν φιλικὸν πάσχουσι πρὸς ἑαυτούς.

[E.]

• οὐδὲ δὴ συγχαίρουσιν
• οὐδὲ συναλγοῦσιν

οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς·

στασιάζει γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχή,

• καὶ
  • τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενόν τινων,
  • τὸ δ᾽ ἥδεται,
• καὶ
  • τὸ μὲν δεῦρο
  • τὸ δ᾽ ἐκεῖσε ἕλκει

  ὥσπερ διασπῶντα.

§ iv.10

εἰ δὲ

• μὴ οἷόν τε ἅμα
  • λυπεῖσθαι καὶ
  • ἥδεσθαι,
• ἀλλὰ μετὰ μικρόν γε
  • λυπεῖται ὅτι ἥσθη, καὶ
  • οὐκ ἂν ἐβούλετο ἡδέα ταῦτα γενέσθαι αὑτῷ·

μεταμελείας γὰρ οἱ φαῦλοι γέμουσιν.

---

• οὐ δὴ φαίνεται ὁ φαῦλος
• οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν

φιλικῶς διακεῖσθαι
διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλητόν.

εἰ δὴ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν λίαν ἐστὶν ἄθλιον,

• φευκτέον τὴν μοχθηρίαν διατεταμένως καὶ
• πειρατέον ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι·

οὕτω γὰρ

• καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς ἂν ἔχοι
• καὶ ἑτέρῳ φίλος γένοιτο.

Chapter V

§ v.1

ἡ δ᾽ εὔνοια

• φιλικῷ μὲν ἔοικεν,
  οὐ μὴν ἔστι γε φιλία·
  • γίνεται γὰρ εὔνοια
    • καὶ πρὸς ἀγνῶτας
    • καὶ λανθάνουσα,
  • φιλία δ᾽ οὔ.

  καὶ πρότερον δὲ ταῦτ᾽ εἴρηται.

• ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ φίλησίς ἐστιν.
  • οὐ γὰρ ἔχει διάτασιν
  • οὐδ᾽ ὄρεξιν,

  τῇ φιλήσει δὲ ταῦτ᾽ ἀκολουθεῖ·

§ v.2

καὶ

• ἡ μὲν φίλησις μετὰ συνηθείας,

• ἡ δ᾽ εὔνοια καὶ ἐκ προσπαίου,

  οἷον καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἀγωνιστὰς συμβαίνει· [1167^a]

  • • εὖνοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνονται καὶ
    • συνθέλουσιν,
  • συμπράξαιεν δ᾽ ἂν οὐδέν·

ὅπερ γὰρ εἴπομεν,

• προσπαίως εὖνοι γίνονται καὶ
• ἐπιπολαίως στέργουσιν.

§ v.3

ἔοικε δὴ ἀρχὴ φιλίας εἶναι,

οὕτω δὴ καὶ

• φίλους οὐχ οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι μὴ εὔνους γενομένους,
• οἱ δ᾽ εὖνοι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν·

• βούλονται γὰρ μόνον τἀγαθὰ οἷς εἰσὶν εὖνοι,
• συμπράξαιεν δ᾽ ἂν οὐδέν,
• οὐδ᾽ ὀχληθεῖεν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν.

διὸ μεταφέρων φαίη τις ἂν

• αὐτὴν ἀργὴν εἶναι φιλίαν,

• • χρονιζομένην δὲ καὶ
  • εἰς συνήθειαν ἀφικνουμένην

  γίνεσθαι φιλίαν,

  • οὐ τὴν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον
  • οὐδὲ τὴν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ·

  οὐδὲ γὰρ εὔνοια ἐπὶ τούτοις γίνεται.

• ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐεργετηθεὶς ἀνθ᾽ ὧν πέπονθεν ἀπονέμει τὴν εὔνοιαν,
  τὰ δίκαια δρῶν·
• ὁ δὲ βουλόμενός τιν᾽ εὐπραγεῖν,
  ἐλπίδα ἔχων εὐπορίας δι᾽ ἐκείνου,
  • οὐκ ἔοικ᾽ εὔνους ἐκείνῳ εἶναι,
  • ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἑαυτῷ, καθάπερ
• οὐδὲ φίλος,
  εἰ θεραπεύει αὐτὸν διά τινα χρῆσιν.

§ v.4

ὅλως δ᾽ εὔνοια δι᾽

• ἀρετὴν καὶ
• ἐπιείκειάν τινα

γίνεται,
ὅταν τῳ φανῇ

• καλός τις ἢ
• ἀνδρεῖος ἤ
• τι τοιοῦτον,

καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν εἴπομεν.

Chapter VI

§ vi.1

φιλικὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια φαίνεται.
διόπερ

• οὐκ ἔστιν ὁμοδοξία·
  τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ὑπάρξειεν ἄν·
• οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ ὁτουοῦν ὁμογνωμονοῦντας ὁμονοεῖν φασίν,

ἀλλὰ τὰς πόλεις ὁμονοεῖν φασίν,
ὅταν

• περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὁμογνωμονῶσι καὶ
• ταὐτὰ προαιρῶνται καὶ
• πράττωσι τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα.

§ vi.2

• περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ δὴ ὁμονοοῦσιν, καὶ τούτων
• περὶ τὰ
  • ἐν μεγέθει καὶ
  • ἐνδεχόμενα ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ πᾶσιν,

ὅταν δ᾽ ἑκάτερος ἑαυτὸν βούληται,
ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις,
στασιάζουσιν·

• οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁμονοεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἑκάτερον ἐννοεῖν ὁδήποτε,
• ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ,

πολιτικὴ δὴ φιλία φαίνεται ἡ ὁμόνοια,
καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται·

περὶ

• τὰ συμφέροντα γάρ ἐστι καὶ
• τὰ εἰς τὸν βίον ἥκοντα.

§ vi.3

ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ τοιαύτη ὁμόνοια ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν·

οὗτοι γὰρ

• καὶ ἑαυτοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι
• καὶ ἀλλήλοις,

ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες ὡς εἰπεῖν
(τῶν τοιούτων γὰρ

• μένει τὰ βουλήματα καὶ
• οὐ μεταρρεῖ ὥσπερ εὔριπος),

• βούλονταί τε
  • τὰ δίκαια καὶ
  • τὰ συμφέροντα,
• τούτων δὲ καὶ κοινῇ ἐφίενται.

§ vi.4

τοὺς δὲ φαύλους οὐχ οἷόν τε ὁμονοεῖν πλὴν ἐπὶ μικρόν,
καθάπερ καὶ φίλους εἶναι,

• πλεονεξίας ἐφιεμένους ἐν τοῖς ὠφελίμοις,
• ἐν δὲ
  • τοῖς πόνοις καὶ
  • ταῖς λειτουργίαις

  ἐλλείποντας·

ἑαυτῷ δ᾽ ἕκαστος βουλόμενος ταῦτα
τὸν πέλας

• ἐξετάζει καὶ
• κωλύει·

μὴ γὰρ τηρούντων τὸ κοινὸν
ἀπόλλυται.

συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτοῖς στασιάζειν,

• ἀλλήλους μὲν ἐπαναγκάζοντας,
• αὐτοὺς δὲ μὴ βουλομένους τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν.

Chapter VII

§ vii.1

οἱ δ᾽ εὐεργέται τοὺς εὐεργετηθέντας
δοκοῦσι μᾶλλον φιλεῖν
ἢ οἱ εὖ παθόντες τοὺς δράσαντας, καὶ
ὡς παρὰ λόγον γινόμενον ἐπιζητεῖται.

• τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις φαίνεται ὅτι
  • οἳ μὲν ὀφείλουσι
  • τοῖς δὲ ὀφείλεται·
     
  • καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν δανείων
    • οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες βούλονται
      μὴ εἶναι οἷς ὀφείλουσιν,
    • οἱ δὲ δανείσαντες καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται
      τῆς τῶν ὀφειλόντων σωτηρίας,
  • οὕτω καὶ
    • τοὺς εὐεργετήσαντας βούλεσθαι
      εἶναι τοὺς παθόντας
      ὡς κομιουμένους τὰς χάριτας,
    • τοῖς δ᾽ οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιμελὲς τὸ ἀνταποδοῦναι.
       
  • Ἐπίχαρμος μὲν οὖν τάχ᾽ ἂν φαίη
    ταῦτα λέγειν αὐτοὺς ἐκ πονηροῦ θεωμένους,
  • ἔοικε δ᾽ ἀνθρωπικῷ·
     
  • ἀμνήμονες γὰρ οἱ πολλοί,
  • καὶ
    • μᾶλλον εὖ πάσχειν
    • ἢ ποιεῖν

    ἐφίενται.

§ vii.2

• δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν
  • φυσικώτερον εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον, καὶ
  • οὐδ᾽ ὅμοιον τὸ περὶ τοὺς δανείσαντας·
    • οὐ γάρ ἐστι φίλησις περὶ ἐκείνους,
    • ἀλλὰ τοῦ σῴζεσθαι βούλησις
      τῆς κομιδῆς ἕνεκα·

  οἱ δ᾽ εὖ πεποιηκότες

  • φιλοῦσι καὶ
  • ἀγαπῶσι

  τοὺς πεπονθότας κἂν

  • μηδὲν ὦσι χρήσιμοι
  • μηδ᾽ εἰς ὕστερον γένοιντ᾽ ἄν.

§ vii.3

§ vii.4

τοιούτῳ δὴ ἔοικε καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐεργετῶν·

τὸ γὰρ εὖ πεπονθὸς ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν·

τοῦτο δὴ ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον
ἢ τὸ ἔργον τὸν ποιήσαντα.

τούτου δ᾽ αἴτιον ὅτι

• τὸ εἶναι πᾶσιν
  • αἱρετὸν καὶ
  • φιλητόν,
• ἐσμὲν δ᾽
  • ἐνεργείᾳ
  • (τῷ
    • ζῆν γὰρ καὶ
    • πράττειν),
• ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ
  ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἔστι πως·
  στέργει δὴ
  • τὸ ἔργον, διότι καὶ
  • τὸ εἶναι.

τοῦτο δὲ φυσικόν·

§ vii.5

ἅμα δὲ καὶ

• τῷ μὲν εὐεργέτῃ καλὸν τὸ κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν,
  ὥστε χαίρειν ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο,
• τῷ δὲ παθόντι
  • οὐδὲν καλὸν ἐν τῷ δράσαντι,
  • ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ, συμφέρον·
    τοῦτο δ᾽ ἧττον
    • ἡδὺ καὶ
    • φιλητόν.

§ vii.6

ἡδεῖα δ᾽ ἐστὶ

• τοῦ μὲν παρόντος ἡ ἐνέργεια,
• τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἡ ἐλπίς,
• τοῦ δὲ γεγενημένου ἡ μνήμη·

• ἥδιστον δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ
• φιλητὸν ὁμοίως.

• τῷ μὲν οὖν πεποιηκότι μένει τὸ ἔργον
  (τὸ καλὸν γὰρ πολυχρόνιον),
• τῷ δὲ παθόντι τὸ χρήσιμον παροίχεται.

• ἥ τε μνήμη
  • τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἡδεῖα,
  • τῶν δὲ χρησίμων
    • οὐ πάνυ ἢ
    • ἧττον·
• ἡ προσδοκία δ᾽
  ἀνάπαλιν ἔχειν ἔοικεν.

καὶ

• ἡ μὲν φίλησις ποιήσει ἔοικεν,
• τὸ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ τῷ πάσχειν·

τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι δὲ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ἕπεται

• τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ
• τὰ φιλικά.

§ vii.7

ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἐπιπόνως γενόμενα πάντες μᾶλλον στέργουσιν,
οἷον καὶ τὰ χρήματα οἱ κτησάμενοι τῶν παραλαβόντων·

δοκεῖ δὲ

• τὸ μὲν εὖ πάσχειν ἄπονον εἶναι,
• τὸ δ᾽ εὖ ποιεῖν ἐργῶδες.

διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ αἱ μητέρες φιλοτεκνότεραι·

• ἐπιπονωτέρα γὰρ ἡ γέννησις, καὶ
• μᾶλλον ἴσασιν ὅτι αὑτῶν.

δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς εὐεργέταις οἰκεῖον εἶναι.