Some distinctions are important, some are not. Telling which is which is important for life – and for reading Aristotle, who opens Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics by recalling that κακία

• is something to be avoided,
• is opposed to ἀρετή.

Presently, in § i.4, what is paired with ἀρετή is not κακία, but μοχθηρία. Is there a difference?

The text of chapters i–iii of Book VII of the Ethics is below.

Though occasionally it is excellence, usually ἀρετή is translated as virtue. In that case, κακία is vice. Some translators render μοχθηρία too as vice; others, as corruption, wickedness, or depravity. I talked about this very issue in the context of the first five chapters of Book III; but that was last September (of 2023), when I was just establishing a pattern for my posts on the Ethics, and I hardly remember what I wrote.

Reading that post now, at least my own part in English at the top, I recognize it and agree with it. I am happy with the suggestion

• that there is no excuse for shoddy behavior,
• that this is what Aristotle is saying.

In a note on § i.14 of Book III, I suggested that the adjective μοχθηρός was a synonym for ἀέθλιος. Perhaps I should have used the contraction ἄθλιος, because this is the form actually used in Book I, as an opposite of εὐδαίμων “happy.” (This is in the last section – 11 – of chapter ix, and then in chapter x.)

The uncontracted form ἀέθλιος refers to winning a prize, or at least competing for it; the contraction ἄθλιος refers also to being miserable, presumably because that can be the result of striving. This bit of etymology might usefully be pointed out to somebody who is overly competitive, at least if that person has any respect for the Greeks. Indeed, admonishing my own miserable adolescent self, my mother indicated my radio, from which could be heard the song “Fooling Yourself” by Styx. I don’t know what effect this had on me then, beyond making an impression that has lasted 45 years.

Right now, while there may be no important distinction between κακία and μοχθηρία, there is an important distinction between

• this pair of words, on the one hand, and
• the triplet of ἀκρασία, μαλακία, and τρυφή, on the other.

I’ve listed the translations of those three in my summary and after §§ i.1 and 4; let me use now incontinence, softness, and delicacy, respectively. The term

• τρυφή is used but the once in this reading, not at all in the next;
• μαλακία, twice now and twice (in the adjective form) in the next.

The main word is ἀκρασία.

Briefly, the important distinction now is between

• Acrasia, incontinence, lack of self-control, and
• vice – specifically, ἀκολασία “license,” which is the vice representing one extreme, the opposite extreme being ἀναισθησία “ ‘anaesthesia,’ insensitivity”; the mean is the virtue called σωφροσύνη, which is the subject of “Sanity,” which itself
  • is named for one possible translation of the Greek word, and
  • takes up the last chapters – x, xi, and xii – of Book III.

Incontinence and license are not simply different. As Aristotle puts it in § i.4, now in Rackham’s translation,

περὶ δὲ ἀκρασίας καὶ μαλακίας καὶ τρυφῆς λεκτέον, καὶ περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ καρτερίας· οὔτε γὰρ ὡς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕξεων τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ ἑκατέραν αὐτῶν ὑποληπτέον, οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἕτερον γένος.

We must however discuss Unrestraint and Softness or Luxury, and also Self-restraint and Endurance. Neither of these two classes of character is to be conceived as identical with Virtue and Vice, nor yet as different in kind from them.

Unrestraint and vice overlap, in the terminology that Collingwood uses, as for example in the passage from An Essay on Philosophical Method quoted in “Interconnectedness.” Illustrating now the title I gave it, that post is also about the pensée called “Disproportion de l’homme” (S 230 : L 199 : B 72), where Pascal considers, as Aristotle does, what it means to be a mean between extremes.

For Aristotle, again, virtue is a mean, as in §vi.15 of Book II (translation by Bartlett and Collins):

ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν. μεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ᾽ ἔλλειψιν·

Virtue, therefore, is a characteristic marked by choice, residing in the mean relative to us, a characteristic defined by reason and as the prudent person would define it. Virtue is also a mean with respect to two vices, the one vice related to excess, the other to deficiency.

It is explained in § vi.7 of that book that the “mean relative to us” is not mathematical. Arithmetical and geometrical means are only an analogue or metaphor of what we are trying to describe about virtue.

Pascal describes us as a mean, in two analogous ways. Physically, we are

entre ces deux abîmes de l’infini et du néant.

Moreover,

Notre intelligence tient dans l’ordre des choses intelligibles le même rang que notre corps dans l’étendue de la nature.

Thus for example

Nos sens n’aperçoivent rien d’extrême,

• trop de bruit nous assourdit,
• trop de lumière éblouit,
• trop de distance et trop de proximité empêche la vue.

Sense-perception is not really a subject for Aristotle’s Ethics; but then Pascal goes on to mention things that are:

• Trop de longueur et trop de brièveté de discours l’obscurcit,
• trop de vérité nous étonne.

How long you speak is a concern of chapter vi of Book IV of the Ethics, about an innominate virtue with

• the obsequious or complaisant (οἳ ἄρεσκοι) at one extreme,
• the surly and quarrelsome (οἱ δύσκολοι καὶ δυσέριδες) at the other.

Whether you tell the truth is the concern of chapter vii. The vicious excess is not too much truth, but exaggerating what is true: boasting (ἀλαζονεία). The defect is “irony” (εἰρωνεία), which perhaps developed its modern connotations because Socrates modelled it.

As Aristotle does, as for example in this reading, by taking up premisses and conclusions as such in chapter iii, by way of explaining that incontinence is not entirely irrational, because it respects the principle that all pleasure must be pursued – as Aristotle does, so Pascal refers to beginnings and endings, the initial and the ultimate; but Pascal is skeptical about reaching either one:

• toutes les sciences sont infinies en l’étendue de leurs recherches, car qui doute que la géométrie, par exemple, a une infinité d’infinités de propositions à exposer ?
• Elles sont aussi infinies dans la multitude et la délicatesse de leurs principes, car qui ne voit que ceux qu’on propose pour les derniers ne se soutiennent pas d’eux‑mêmes et qu’ils sont appuyés sur d’autres qui, en ayant d’autres pour appui, ne souffrent jamais de dernier ?

I noted my own doubt that mathematics, at least, has no principes derniers. I might even suggest that any ordinary science has them. Mary Midgley seems to deny this, thus perhaps agreeing with Pascal, when she says, in Evolution as a Religion,

there are not, as Collingwood supposed, any ‘absolute presuppositions’ – since everything involves something else …

I dealt with this in “Two Senses of the Word ‘Society’” (on Chapter XIX of Collingwood’s New Leviathan), but I’m going to bring it up again with reference to § xi.1 (the first section of the fourth and last reading in Book VII of the Ethics).

Now I’ve used Pascal as a way to think about Aristotle. I’m not sure what I think about Aristotle, although the point is to figure this out. Possibly I have been trained to say that, as for example by my eighth grade teacher of political geography, Steven Bowers (or was he Stephen?): he required term papers to include our own thoughts on whatever we were writing about (in my case, communism and communist revolutions).

According to a tutor at St John’s College who had studied in Paris, if you asked your peers there what they thought about something like virtue, they would tell you what various professors thought. “At least you got to hear that,” was the wry conclusion.

On this blog, I have already mentioned a few times a former professor of English at Yale.

• In Donne’s Undertaking, I noted his observation,

  The heyday of public higher ed, the 1960s, was the heyday of the liberal arts. If those middle- and working-class kids were going to college just to get a better job, why did so many of them major in English?

  I hope William Deresiewicz is giving a correct picture here, because I’m not sure whether it is not contradicted by another memory from the same time, albeit in Europe, specifically the University of Bielefeld in Germany:

  Student revolutionaries inspired by the events of 1968 in Paris kicked up quite a fuss. They objected to all sorts of things about the way universities were run and in Fischer’s case even demanded that his favourite subject “Group Theory” – the mathematical study of symmetry – be abandoned as part of the curriculum. The reason? Oh, you didn’t need a good reason, but it was abstract and apparently unconnected with everyday life, though even at that time it was finding valuable uses in physics and cryptography.

  That’s from “The man behind the Monster,” by Mark Ronan, whom I mentioned in “Be Sex Binary, We Are Not” for his explanation of the Ptolemaic universe:

  Aristotle had averred that all cyclic motion must be based on circles, so ellipses were not acceptable.

  I might ask now just when the works of Aristotle started being taken as dogma.

• In the tenth post on The Human Condition of Hannah Arendt, I took up how, in the experience of William Deresiewicz, students today believe they are good at expressing themselves, but have no notion of editing what they say. (Somebody else, Lucas Mann, found students reticent about expressing themselves.)

When I was a freshman at St John’s College in Annapolis, there was a Friday lecture by Mortimer Adler. There was one every year, at Adler’s request, but the seniors always interrupted it with a prank (then they let him continue). In my year, Adler’s topic was the Nicomachean Ethics; but perhaps this was so, every year. Somebody told me Adler had read the Ethics thirty times.

Now I have read William Deresiewicz’s 2014 book, Excellent Sheep. This is from Chapter Nine, “Spirit Guides,” page 179:

I developed a rule of thumb in graduate school. If a professor didn’t mention something personal at least a single time – a reference to a child, an anecdote about a colleague – then it was a pretty good bet that I had nothing to learn from him. It’s not that I needed my teachers to be confessional; I just needed them to be present. “Mortimer Adler had much to tell us about Aristotle’s Ethics,” Saul Bellow wrote about the University of Chicago eminence, “but I had only to look at him to see that he had nothing useful to offer on the conduct of life.”

Deresiewicz makes a lot of brief quotations like that, as well as terse summaries of somebody else’s thoughts, without giving us a way to confirm the attributions. It seems to me, if you judge people by immediate impressions, then they may well have nothing useful to offer you; but I haven’t read Saul Bellow. Regarding what Deresiewicz himself says, I might propose that if you need your professors to be “present,” perhaps you shouldn’t go into mathematics.

Meanwhile, another distinction to think about is between two senses of anger:

• ὀργή, subject of chapter v of Book IV,
• θυμός, a subject of chapter vi of Book VII, part of the next reading after this one.

Contents and Summary

• Chapter I
• Chapter 1
  • Opposed are
    • κακία “vice” to ἀρετή “virtue”;
    • ἀκρασία
      “unrestraint, incontinence, lack of self-restraint of -control”
      to ἐγκράτεια
      “restraint, continence, self-restraint or -control.”
  • Opposed to θηριότης
    “brutishness, bestiality, brutality, an animal-like state”
    is a virtue
    • heroic and
    • godly (§ i.1),
    • even making people into gods;

    for

    • as animals are not vicious or virtuous,
    • so gods are not, but
      theirs is a more honorable virtue (§ i.2).

    Both are rare (§ i.3).

    • We can talk about them later.
    • We talked about vice before.
  • Concerning
    • [what is called variously]
      • unrestraint
      • μαλακία “softness”
      • τρυφή
        “delicacy, effeminacy, luxury, effeteness, luxuriousness,” and
    • [what is called variously]
      • restraint,
      • καρτερία “steadfastness, endurance, resilience,”

    one must assume,
    with respect to

    • virtue and
    • corruption (μοχθηρία),
       
    • neither that they concern the same habits (ἔξεις),
    • nor that they are of a different genus (§ i.4).
  • One must, after
    • positing the phenomena,
    • raising the perplexities,

    bring out the opinions (§ i.5).

• Chapter 2. Opinions:
  1. Belonging to the
     • serious and praiseworthy are restraint and steadfastness,
     • base and blameworthy are unrestraint and softness.
  2. The same are
     • restraint as sticking with one’s calculations,
     • unrestraint as not.
  3. Knowing what is base,
     • the unrestrained does it from passion,
     • the restrained restrains desire through reason;
  4. The temperate is always restrained and steadfast
     (opinions differ on the converse, § i.6).
  5. The prudent (and terribly clever)
     • is never unrestrained,
     • sometimes is.
  6. One may be unrestrained regarding
     • spirit or anger (θυμός),
     • honor,
     • gain (§ i.7).
• Chapter II
• Chapter 3
  • Knowledge (C):
    • How can one be incontinent
      while supposing correctly?
      Socrates said there was no incontinence (§ ii.1).
    • That’s obviously wrong.
      Passion changes us (§ ii.2).
    • One may say that’s true
      when we have
      • not knowledge,
      • only opinion (§ ii.3).
    • We are sympathetic with
      • giving in to strong pleasure,
      • not corruption § ii.4.
  • Prudence (E) ought to prevent those (§ ii.5).
  • Temperance (D) means not having the desires
    that the continent person is supposed to resist (§ ii.6).
  • Base is (A, B)
    • continence, if it makes you respect false opinions;
    • not incontinence, if it keeps you (like Neoptolemus)
      from respecting bad advice (§ ii.7).
  • Opinion (A, C), when opposed both
    • to the truth and
    • by incontinence,

    results in virtue, say the Sophists (§§ ii.8, 9).

  • Better is pursuing pleasure (B, D)
    • by conviction
    • than by incontinence (§ ii.10).
  • In everything (F) can nobody be incontinent (§ ii.11).
• Chapter 4. Questions.
  • Concerning perplexities, one must
    • do away with some,
    • leave others (§ ii.12).
• Chapter III. We ask:
  • Is the [continent or incontinent]
    • knowing or not,
    • how?
  • Are the continent and incontinent so concerning
    • all pleasures and pains,
    • only some?
  • Is the continent, with the steadfast,
    • same,
    • different (§ iii.1)?
  • Are the continent and incontinent distinguished by
    • the what,
    • the how?

    Actually, with the same is one

    • incontinent or
    • licentious,

    but pleasure is pursued by

    • the licentious, by choice;
    • the incontinent, otherwise (§ iii.2).
• Chapter 5
  • What matters is
    • the strength of your conviction (πιστεύειν),
      whether you have
      • true opinion or
      • knowledge (§§ iii.3, 4);
    • whether you are theorizing the knowledge you have –
      if you are, [contradicting] it is terrible (§ iii.5).
  • Premisses, of which one might ignore some, are
    • particular or
    • universal,

    concerning

    • oneself or
    • the thing (§ iii.6).
  • You can “know,” in a way, while being
    • asleep,
    • mad,
    • drunk,
    • overcome by passion, and likewise,
    • incontinent (§ iii.7).
  • You can act as if you knew, e.g. when
    • impassioned,
    • learning,
    • incontinent (§ iii.8).
  • Of the premisses (προτάσεις),
    • the universal is an opinion,
    • the particular is [known] by perception,
    • the conclusion is
      • asserted or
      • done, as in,
        • sweets must be tasted,
        • this is sweet, therefore
        • this must be tasted (§ iii.9).

    There may also be a universal premiss,
    that sweets are forbidden;
    still, incontinence is sort-of rational – (§ iii.10)
    desire is what is contrary to reason –
    thus animals are not incontinent (§ iii.11).

  • Ask the physiologists how recovering knowledge is the same for
    • the drunk,
    • the sleeping,
    • the incontinent (§ iii.12).
  • The
    • final premiss (ἡ τελευταία πρότασις) or
    • ultimate term (τὸ ἔσχατον ὅρον) –
       
    • being
      • an opinion from perception,
      • lord of action,

      the impassioned may have it,

      • not as knowledge,
      • but as a drunk man recites Empedocles;
    • it is
      • not universal,
      • not knowable as a universal is.

    Socrates is vindicated (§§ iii.13, 14).

[1145^a]

Book VII

Chapter I

Chapter 1

§ i.1

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον,
ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν,
ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἤθη φευκτῶν τρία ἐστὶν εἴδη,

• κακία
• ἀκρασία
• θηριότης.

τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία

• τοῖς μὲν δυσὶ δῆλα·

  • τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν
  • τὸ δ᾽ ἐγκράτειαν

  καλοῦμεν·

• πρὸς δὲ τὴν θηριότητα
  μάλιστ᾽ ἂν ἁρμόττοι λέγειν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετήν,

  • ἡρωικήν τινα καὶ
  • θείαν,

  ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος περὶ τοῦ Ἕκτορος πεποίηκε
  λέγοντα τὸν Πρίαμον
  ὅτι σφόδρα ἦν ἀγαθός,

  οὐδὲ ἐῴκει ἀνδρός γε θνητοῦ πάις ἔμμεναι
  ἀλλὰ θεοῖο. (1 Hom. Il. 24.258)

§ i.2

ὥστ᾽ εἰ,
καθάπερ φασίν,
ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γίνονται θεοὶ δι᾽ ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν,
τοιαύτη τις ἂν εἴη δῆλον ὅτι
ἡ τῇ θηριώδει ἀντιτιθεμένη ἕξις·

καὶ γὰρ

• ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρίου ἐστὶ
  • κακία οὐδ᾽
  • ἀρετή,
• οὕτως οὐδὲ θεοῦ,

ἀλλ᾽

• ἣ μὲν τιμιώτερον ἀρετῆς,
• ἣ δ᾽ ἕτερόν τι γένος κακίας.

§ i.3

• ἐπεὶ δὲ σπάνιον καὶ τὸ θεῖον ἄνδρα εἶναι,
  καθάπερ οἱ Λάκωνες εἰώθασι προσαγορεύειν,
  οἳ ὅταν ἀγασθῶσι σφόδρα του,
  σεῖος ἀνήρ φασιν,
• οὕτω καὶ ὁ θηριώδης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις σπάνιος·
  • μάλιστα δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐστίν,
  • γίνεται δ᾽ ἔνια καὶ διὰ
    • νόσους καὶ
    • πηρώσεις·

καὶ τοὺς διὰ κακίαν δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπερβάλλοντας
οὕτως ἐπιδυσφημοῦμεν.

§ i.4

ἀλλὰ

• περὶ μὲν τῆς διαθέσεως τῆς τοιαύτης ὕστερον ποιητέον τινὰ μνείαν,
• περὶ δὲ κακίας εἴρηται πρότερον·
• περὶ δὲ
  • ἀκρασίας καὶ
  • μαλακίας καὶ
  • τρυφῆς λεκτέον,

  καὶ περὶ

  • ἐγκρατείας καὶ

  • καρτερίας· [1145^b]
     

  • οὔτε γὰρ ὡς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕξεων

    • τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ
    • τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ

    ἑκατέραν αὐτῶν ὑποληπτέον,

  • οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἕτερον γένος.

§ i.5

δεῖ δ᾽,
ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων,

• τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ
• πρῶτον διαπορήσαντας

οὕτω δεικνύναι

• μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ ἔνδοξα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη,
• εἰ δὲ μή,
  τὰ
  • πλεῖστα καὶ
  • κυριώτατα·

ἐὰν γὰρ

• λύηταί τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ
• καταλείπηται τὰ ἔνδοξα,

δεδειγμένον ἂν εἴη ἱκανῶς.

Chapter 2

§ i.6

δοκεῖ δὴ

• ἥ τε
  • ἐγκράτεια καὶ
  • καρτερία
     
  • τῶν σπουδαίων καὶ
  • τῶν ἐπαινετῶν

  εἶναι,

• ἡ δ᾽
  • ἀκρασία τε καὶ
  • μαλακία
     
  • τῶν φαύλων καὶ
  • ψεκτῶν,

καὶ

• ὁ μὲν ἀκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα
  πράττει διὰ πάθος,
• ὁ δ᾽ ἐγκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλαι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι
  οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ διὰ τὸν λόγον.

καὶ

• τὸν σώφρονα μὲν
  • ἐγκρατῆ καὶ
  • καρτερικόν,
• τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον
  • οἳ μὲν πάντα σώφρονα
  • οἳ δ᾽ οὔ, καὶ
     
  •  
    • τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀκρατῆ καὶ
    • τὸν ἀκρατῆ ἀκόλαστον

    συγκεχυμένως,

  • οἳ δ᾽ ἑτέρους εἶναί φασιν.

§ i.7

τὸν δὲ φρόνιμον

• ὁτὲ μὲν οὔ φασιν ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι ἀκρατῆ,
• ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἐνίους
  • φρονίμους ὄντας καὶ
  • δεινοὺς

  ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι.

ἔτι ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται

• καὶ θυμοῦ
• καὶ τιμῆς
• καὶ κέρδους.

• τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ταῦτ᾽ ἐστίν.

Chapter II

Chapter 3

§ ii.1

• ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις πῶς
  ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς
  ἀκρατεύεταί τις.

ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν οὔ φασί τινες οἷόν τε εἶναι·

δεινὸν γὰρ
ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης,
ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης,
ἄλλο τι

• κρατεῖν καὶ
• περιέλκειν

αὐτὴν ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον.

Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο
πρὸς τὸν λόγον
ὡς οὐκ οὔσης ἀκρασίας·

οὐθένα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα
πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον,
ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν.

§ ii.2

οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος ἀμφισβητεῖ τοῖς φαινομένοις ἐναργῶς,
καὶ δέον ζητεῖν περὶ τὸ πάθος,
εἰ δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν,
τίς ὁ τρόπος γίνεται τῆς ἀγνοίας.

ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ οἴεταί γε ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος
πρὶν ἐν τῷ πάθει γενέσθαι, φανερόν.

§ ii.3

εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ

• τὰ μὲν συγχωροῦσι
• τὰ δ᾽ οὔ·

• τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης μηθὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον ὁμολογοῦσιν,
• τὸ δὲ μηθένα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ δόξαν βέλτιον οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν,
  καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν ἀκρατῆ φασὶν
  • οὐκ ἐπιστήμην ἔχοντα κρατεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν
  • ἀλλὰ δόξαν.

§ ii.4

ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴγε

• δόξα καὶ
• μὴ ἐπιστήμη,

• μηδ᾽ ἰσχυρὰ ὑπόληψις [1146^a]
• ἡ ἀντιτείνουσα ἀλλ᾽ ἠρεμαία,

καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διστάζουσι,
συγγνώμη τῷ μὴ μένειν ἐν αὐταῖς
πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἰσχυράς·

• τῇ δὲ μοχθηρίᾳ οὐ συγγνώμη,
• οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν.

§ ii.5

φρονήσεως ἄρα ἀντιτεινούσης;

αὕτη γὰρ ἰσχυρότατον.

ἀλλ᾽ ἄτοπον·

ἔσται γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς ἅμα

• φρόνιμος καὶ
• ἀκρατής,

φήσειε δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἂν
εἷς φρονίμου εἶναι
τὸ πράττειν ἑκόντα
τὰ φαυλότατα.

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις δέδεικται πρότερον ὅτι

• πρακτικός γε ὁ φρόνιμος
  (τῶν γὰρ ἐσχάτων τις) καὶ
• τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων ἀρετάς.

§ ii.6

ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχειν

• ἰσχυρὰς καὶ
• φαύλας

ὁ ἐγκρατής,

• οὐκ ἔσται ὁ σώφρων ἐγκρατὴς
• οὐδ᾽ ὁ ἐγκρατὴς σώφρων·

• οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἄγαν σώφρονος
• οὔτε τὸ φαύλας ἔχειν.

ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ γε·

• εἰ μὲν γὰρ χρησταὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι,
  φαύλη ἡ κωλύουσα ἕξις μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν,
  ὥσθ᾽ ἡ ἐγκράτεια οὐ πᾶσα σπουδαία·
• εἰ δ᾽
  • ἀσθενεῖς καὶ
  • μὴ φαῦλαι,

  οὐθὲν σεμνόν, οὐδ᾽ εἰ

  • φαῦλαι καὶ
  • ἀσθενεῖς,

  οὐδὲν μέγα.

§ ii.7

ἔτι

• εἰ πάσῃ δόξῃ ἐμμενετικὸν
  ποιεῖ ἡ ἐγκράτεια,
  φαύλη,
  οἷον εἰ καὶ τῇ ψευδεῖ· καὶ
• εἰ πάσης δόξης ἡ ἀκρασία ἐκστατικόν,
  ἔσται τις σπουδαία ἀκρασία,
  οἷον ὁ Σοφοκλέους Νεοπτόλεμος ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ·
  ἐπαινετὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἐμμένων
  οἷς ἐπείσθη ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως
  διὰ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ψευδόμενος.

§ ii.8

ἔτι ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος ψευδόμενος ἀπορία·

διὰ γὰρ τὸ παράδοξα βούλεσθαι ἐλέγχειν,
ἵνα δεινοὶ ὦσιν ὅταν ἐπιτύχωσιν,
ὁ γενόμενος συλλογισμὸς ἀπορία γίνεται·

δέδεται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια, ὅταν

• μένειν μὴ βούληται
  διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀρέσκειν τὸ συμπερανθέν,
• προϊέναι δὲ μὴ δύνηται
  διὰ τὸ λῦσαι μὴ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον.

§ ii.9

συμβαίνει δὴ ἔκ τινος λόγου
ἡ ἀφροσύνη μετ᾽ ἀκρασίας ἀρετή·

τἀναντία γὰρ πράττει ὧν ὑπολαμβάνει
διὰ τὴν ἀκρασίαν,
ὑπολαμβάνει δὲ τἀγαθὰ

• κακὰ εἶναι καὶ
• οὐ δεῖν πράττειν,

ὥστε

• τἀγαθὰ καὶ
• οὐ τὰ κακὰ

πράξει.

§ ii.10

ἔτι ὁ τῷ πεπεῖσθαι

• πράττων καὶ
• διώκων

τὰ ἡδέα καὶ προαιρούμενος
βελτίων ἂν δόξειεν τοῦ

• μὴ διὰ λογισμὸν
• ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ἀκρασίαν·

εὐιατότερος γὰρ
διὰ τὸ μεταπεισθῆναι ἄν.

ὁ δ᾽ ἀκρατὴς
ἔνοχος τῇ παροιμίᾳ
ἐν ᾗ φαμὲν

ὅταν τὸ ὕδωρ πνίγῃ,
τί δεῖ ἐπιπίνειν;

εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπέπειστο ἃ πράττει, [1146^b]
μεταπεισθεὶς ἂν ἐπαύσατο·

νῦν δὲ ἄλλα πεπεισμένος οὐδὲν ἧττον ἄλλα πράττει.

§ ii.11

ἔτι εἰ περὶ πάντα ἀκρασία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐγκράτεια,
τίς ὁ ἁπλῶς ἀκρατής;

οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἁπάσας ἔχει τὰς ἀκρασίας,
φαμὲν δ᾽ εἶναί τινας ἁπλῶς.

Chapter 4

§ ii.12

αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαι τοιαῦταί τινες συμβαίνουσιν,
τούτων δὲ

• τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν δεῖ
• τὰ δὲ καταλιπεῖν·

ἡ γὰρ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὕρεσίς ἐστιν.

Chapter III

§ iii.1

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον

• πότερον
  • εἰδότες ἢ
  • οὔ, καὶ
• πῶς εἰδότες·

εἶτα περὶ ποῖα

• τὸν ἀκρατῆ καὶ
• τὸν ἐγκρατῆ

θετέον,
λέγω δὲ πότερον

• περὶ πᾶσαν
  • ἡδονὴν καὶ
  • λύπην ἢ
• περί τινας ἀφωρισμένας,

καὶ

• τὸν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ
• τὸν καρτερικόν,

πότερον ὁ

• αὐτὸς ἢ
• ἕτερός

ἐστιν·

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα συγγενῆ τῆς θεωρίας ἐστὶ ταύτης.

§ iii.2

ἔστι δ᾽ ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως,
πότερον

• ὁ ἐγκρατὴς καὶ
• ὁ ἀκρατής

εἰσι

• τῷ περὶ ἃ ἢ
• τῷ ὣς

ἔχοντες τὴν διαφοράν,
λέγω δὲ πότερον

• τῷ περὶ ταδὶ εἶναι μόνον ἀκρατὴς ὁ ἀκρατής, ἢ
• οὒ ἀλλὰ τῷ ὥς, ἢ
• οὒ ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν·

ἔπειτ᾽ εἰ

• περὶ πάντ᾽ ἐστὶν
  • ἀκρασία καὶ
  • ἐγκράτεια ἢ
• οὔ.

• οὔτε γὰρ περὶ ἅπαντ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ ἁπλῶς ἀκρατής,
• ἀλλὰ περὶ ἅπερ ὁ ἀκόλαστος,

• οὔτε τῷ πρὸς ταῦτα ἁπλῶς ἔχειν
  (ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἂν ἦν τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ),
• ἀλλὰ τῷ ὡδὶ ἔχειν.

Chapter 5

§ iii.3

περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ

• δόξαν ἀληθῆ
• ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπιστήμην

εἶναι παρ᾽ ἣν ἀκρατεύονται,
οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον·

ἔνιοι γὰρ τῶν δοξαζόντων

• οὐ διστάζουσιν,
• ἀλλ᾽ οἴονται ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι.

§ iii.4

εἰ οὖν διὰ τὸ ἠρέμα πιστεύειν
οἱ δοξάζοντες
μᾶλλον τῶν ἐπισταμένων παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν
πράξουσιν,
οὐθὲν διοίσει
ἐπιστήμη
δόξης·

ἔνιοι γὰρ πιστεύουσιν οὐδὲν ἧττον
οἷς δοξάζουσιν
ἢ ἕτεροι
οἷς ἐπίστανται·

δηλοῖ δ᾽ Ἡράκλειτος.

§ iii.5

ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεὶ διχῶς λέγομεν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι
(καὶ γὰρ

• ὁ
  • ἔχων μὲν
  • οὐ χρώμενος δὲ

  τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ

• ὁ χρώμενος

λέγεται ἐπίστασθαι),
διοίσει

• τὸ
  • ἔχοντα μὲν
  • μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ καὶ
• τὸ θεωροῦντα

ἃ μὴ δεῖ πράττειν τοῦ

• ἔχοντα καὶ
• θεωροῦντα·

τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖ δεινόν,
ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ εἰ μὴ θεωρῶν. [1147^a]

§ iii.6

ἔτι ἐπεὶ δύο τρόποι τῶν προτάσεων,
ἔχοντα μὲν ἀμφοτέρας
οὐδὲν κωλύει
πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην,
χρώμενον μέντοι

• τῇ καθόλου
• ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος·

πρακτὰ γὰρ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα.

διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου·

• τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ
• τὸ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν·

κατά τε δὴ τούτους διοίσει τοὺς τρόπους ἀμήχανον ὅσον,
ὥστε δοκεῖν

• οὕτω μὲν εἰδέναι μηδὲν ἄτοπον,
• ἄλλως δὲ θαυμαστόν.

§ iii.7

ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην
ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων
ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις·

ἐν τῷ γὰρ

• ἔχειν μὲν
• μὴ χρῆσθαι δὲ

διαφέρουσαν ὁρῶμεν τὴν ἕξιν,
ὥστε

• καὶ ἔχειν πως
• καὶ μὴ ἔχειν,

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω διατίθενται
οἵ γε ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες·

• θυμοὶ γὰρ καὶ
• ἐπιθυμίαι ἀφροδισίων καὶ
• ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων

ἐπιδήλως καὶ

• τὸ σῶμα μεθιστᾶσιν,
• ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ μανίας ποιοῦσιν.

δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἔχειν λεκτέον
τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς
τούτοις.

§ iii.8

τὸ δὲ λέγειν τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης
οὐδὲν σημεῖον·

καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι τούτοις ὄντες

• ἀποδείξεις καὶ
• ἔπη λέγουσιν Ἐμπεδοκλέους,

καὶ οἱ πρῶτον μαθόντες

• συνείρουσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους,
• ἴσασι δ᾽ οὔπω·

δεῖ γὰρ συμφυῆναι,
τοῦτο δὲ χρόνου δεῖται·

ὥστε

• καθάπερ
  τοὺς ὑποκρινομένους,
• οὕτως ὑποληπτέον λέγειν καὶ
  τοὺς ἀκρατευομένους.

§ iii.9

ἔτι καὶ ὧδε φυσικῶς ἄν τις ἐπιβλέψειε τὴν αἰτίαν.

• ἣ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου
  δόξα,
• ἡ δ᾽ ἑτέρα
  περὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστά ἐστιν,
  ὧν αἴσθησις ἤδη κυρία·

ὅταν δὲ μία γένηται ἐξ αὐτῶν,
ἀνάγκη τὸ συμπερανθὲν

• ἔνθα μὲν φάναι τὴν ψυχήν,
• ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς πράττειν εὐθύς·

§ iii.10

ὥστε συμβαίνει ὑπὸ

• λόγου πως καὶ
• δόξης

ἀκρατεύεσθαι,

• οὐκ ἐναντίας δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτήν,
• ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός –

§ iii.11

• ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντία,
• ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἡ δόξα – τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ·

ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῆ,
ὅτι

• οὐκ ἔχει καθόλου ὑπόληψιν
• ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ μνήμην.

§ iii.12

πῶς δὲ

• λύεται ἡ ἄγνοια καὶ
• πάλιν γίνεται ἐπιστήμων ὁ ἀκρατής,

ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος

• καὶ περὶ
  • οἰνωμένου καὶ
  • καθεύδοντος
• καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος τούτου τοῦ πάθους,

ὃν δεῖ παρὰ τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀκούειν.

§ iii.13

ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἡ τελευταία πρότασις

• δόξα τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ
• κυρία τῶν πράξεων,

ταύτην

• ἢ οὐκ ἔχει
  ἐν τῷ πάθει ὤν,
• ἢ οὕτως ἔχει ὡς
  • οὐκ ἦν τὸ ἔχειν ἐπίστασθαι
  • ἀλλὰ λέγειν
    ὥσπερ ὁ οἰνωμένος τὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέους.

καὶ διὰ τὸ

• μὴ καθόλου
• μηδ᾽ ἐπιστημονικὸν

ὁμοίως εἶναι δοκεῖν τῷ καθόλου
τὸν ἔσχατον ὅρον
καὶ ἔοικεν
ὃ ἐζήτει Σωκράτης συμβαίνειν·

§ iii.14

• οὐ γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης παρούσης
  γίνεται τὸ πάθος,
• οὐδ᾽ αὕτη περιέλκεται
  διὰ τὸ πάθος,
• ἀλλὰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς.

• περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ
  • εἰδότα καὶ
  • μή, καὶ
• πῶς εἰδότα ἐνδέχεται ἀκρατεύεσθαι,

τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω.