This essay was long when originally published; now, on November 30, 2019, I have made it longer, in an attempt to clarify some points.
The essay begins with two brief quotations, from Collingwood and Pirsig respectively, about what it takes to know people.
-
The Pirsig quote is from Lila, which is somewhat interesting as a novel, but naive about metaphysics; it might have benefited from an understanding of Collingwood’s Essay on Metaphysics.
-
A recent article by Ray Monk in Prospect seems to justify my interest in Collingwood; eventually I have a look at the article.
Ideas that come up along the way include the following.
-
For C. S. Lewis, the reality of moral truth shows there is something beyond the scope of natural science.
-
I say the same for mathematical truth.
-
Truths we learn as children are open to question. In their educational childhoods, mathematicians have often learned wrongly the techniques of induction and recursion.
-
The philosophical thesis of physicalism is of doubtful value.
-
Mathematicians and philosophers who ape them (as in a particular definition of physicalism) use “iff” needlessly.
-
A pair of mathematicians who use “iff” needlessly seem also to misunderstand induction and recursion.
-
Their work is nonetheless admirable, like the famous expression of universal equality by the slave-driving Thomas Jefferson.
-
Mathematical truth is discovered and confirmed by thought.
-
Truth is a product of every kind of science; it is not an object of natural science.
-
The distinction between thinking and feeling is a theme of Collingwood.
-
In particular, thought is self-critical: it judges whether itself is going well.
-
Students of mathematics must learn their right to judge what is correct, along with their responsibility to reach agreement with others about what is correct. I say this.
-
Students of English must learn not only to judge their own work, but even that they can judge it. Pirsig says this.
-
For Monk, Collingwood’s demise has meant Ryle’s rise: unfortunately so since, for one thing, Ryle has no interest in the past.
-
In a metaphor developed by Matthew Arnold, Collingwood and Pirsig are two of my touchstones.
-
Thoreau is another. He affects indifference to the past, but his real views are more subtle.
-
According to Monk, Collingwood could have been a professional violinist; Ryle had “no ear for tunes.”
-
For Collingwood, Victoria’s memorial to Albert was hideous; for Pirsig, Victorian America was the same.
-
Again according to Monk, some persons might mistake Collingwood for Wittgenstein.
-
My method of gathering together ideas, as outlined above, resembles Pirsig’s method, described in Lila, of collecting ideas on index cards.
-
Our problems are not vague, but precise.
When Donald Trump won the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, which opinion polls had said he would lose, I wrote a post here called “How To Learn about People.” I thought for example that just calling people up and asking whom they would vote for was not a great way to learn about them, even if all you wanted to know was whom they would vote for. Why should people tell you the truth?
Polytropy 