Category Archives: Plato

On Plato’s Republic, 3

Index to this series

We are reading now Book II of Plato’s Republic, Stephanus pages 357–83, covering:

  1. The conventional arguments in favor of injustice and justice, reviewed by Plato’s brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus respectively.
  2. The beginning of the construction of the city in speech, wherein the advent of justice is to be discerned; the guardians of the city are to be like dogs and to be given a traditional education, although with none of the traditional stories, since they talk about things like parricide and bad luck.

A book next to a dog lying on the beach

Dog with copy of Alain Badiou, Plato’s Republic:
A Dialogue in Sixteen Chapters, with a Prologue and an Epilogue, 2012
Profesörler Sitesi, Altınova, Balıkesir, Turkey, September 2, 2021

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On Plato’s Republic, 2

Constituting the latter part of Book I, the second of the Republic readings features the only sustained contribution of Thrasymachus, who argues that, if it can be pursued perfectly, injustice is superior to justice.

According to my electronic search of Jowett’s translation, confirmed with a search of Bloom’s, Socrates will mention Thrasymachus and his argument in Books II, VI, VIII, and IX, but the man himself will speak again only near the beginning of Book V, to agree with the demand of Polemarchus, Adeimantus, and Glaucon that Socrates explain the community of women and children in the imaginary city that Socrates will have been describing.

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On Plato’s Republic, 1

After the Pensées of Pascal and the Canterbury Tales of Chaucer, here begins another series on readings of a classic, now the Republic of Plato. The sections (after this one) of the present post are

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Words

This post is based on recent readings, often on or through Twitter, of the following writers.

  1. Lilith Saintcrow on “Domestic abusers, white supremacists, and religious bigots.”
  2. C. S. Lewis on gulling the educated, and objectivity as a dubious value.
  3. Marilynne Robinson on consensus as concealing the objectively true.
  4. Neil deGrasse Tyson on objectivity as a good value.
  5. Plato on seeming wise, without being so.
  6. Mark Vernon on imagination in William Blake.
  7. whoever wrote an “Open Letter Concerning Transphobia in Philosophy,” signed by many professional philosophers.
  8. Agnes Callard on how philosophers shouldn’t be signing petitions.
  9. Rebecca Reilly-Cooper, on the incoherence of the notion of gender identity.
  10. Christopher Bertram, a signer of the “Open Letter.”
  11. Nathan Oseroff-Spicer, who noticed who had not signed the letter.
  12. Aaden Friday, on what’s wrong with Reilly-Cooper and other such women.
  13. Brian Earp, on why declaring pronouns is not obviously a good thing.
  14. Liam Kofi Bright, another signer of the “Open Letter.”
  15. Masha Gessen, on wishing he could have transitioned as a teen.
  16. John Steinbeck, on being a man.
  17. Christa Peterson, on what gender identity might be.
  18. Holly Lawford-Smith, on third bathrooms and being banned from social media.
  19. Jason Stanley, who signed the “Open Letter,” but also calls for left unity.
  20. Isaac Asimov, on behaviorism.
  21. Dominic Berry, who will block anybody who follows the editor who published Reilly-Cooper’s essay.
  22. Kathleen Stock, the subject of the “Open Letter.”
  23. Caitlin Green, on what people such as Stock should do if they are going to change their research focus.

Having originally posted this essay on January 9, 2021, I edited and augmented it, on January 19 and December 19 of that year. I return to it now, on June 22, 2023, having posted “On Dialectic,” two days ago; this one is another post that quotes lots of people, and I want to check how it reads. It reads fine, to me, although I did have to correct occurrences of “behavior” spelled as “behavor.” Moreover, although I had forgotten what was here, I recognized it instantly as I read; another reader would not experience this recognition.

What stands out most to me now is Christa Peterson’s suggestion,

A representation of our own gender … could … be a means of picking out people as who we are co-gendered with …

As the essay already suggests, if you replaced “gender” with “race,” then the resulting speculation could get you called a racist, and that is supposed to be something bad. However, if we replace “gender” with “sex,” we obtain a proposition that is fundamental to contemporary biology, as I understand it, because evolution is

  • not only by natural selection, or “survival of the fittest” – selection by the rigors of the natural environment,
  • but also by sexual selection, or selection for mating by members of the opposite sex of one’s (sexually reproducing) species.

I think this is why Nina Paley can say, in a blog post called “Why I Don’t Use ‘Preferred Pronouns’,” which I referred to also in “Imagination,”

Like most mammals, I can’t help but identify someone’s sex with +99% accuracy. (… Women, I think, are better at identifying sex than men, either due to instinct or conditioning for survival …)

We know that there are two sexes, and we know who is of which sex, the way we know that some foods are good to eat. However, Peterson seems to think of this knowledge a bit differently:

Trans people’s dignity and legitimacy does not depend on the success of any one attempt to conceptualize their experience. But the most common way, in terms of “gender identity,” is perfectly functional. The commitments of the popular notion are minimal: people have an internal sense of their own gender that can come apart from their knowledge of their assigned sex, and is generally fixed, and certainly not revisable in the way ordinary beliefs are.

What is the word “assigned” doing here? Does whether you are trans depend on whether somebody made a mistake when checking one of the boxes marked “male” and “female” at your birth?


A lot of old PSA’s about drugs are on YouTube and the Web Archive, and sometimes they are linked to by articles that ridicule them. There is one that I have not been able to find, perhaps from around 1970, in which parents confront their teenager with the drug paraphernalia that they have found in his room. The boy storms out of the house, saying, “You don’t understand!”

There’s a lot that I don’t understand. I must not, since it seems childish, but is coming from adults. Some of these adults stormed the US Capitol the other day; others encourage them; still others are professors of philosophy.

Figure in book showing egg and sperm. The circular egg has a fiery corona, and little sperm with wavy flagella come at it from one side. There are also two sperm with parallel straight flagella whose length is the diameter of the egg
“Human egg and sperm cells.”
Asimov’s New Guide to Science (1984), page 600

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Mathematics and Logic

Large parts of this post are taken up with two subjects:

  1. The notion (due to Collingwood) of criteriological sciences, logic being one of them.

  2. Gödel’s theorems of completeness and incompleteness, as examples of results in the science of logic.

Like the most recent in the current spate of mathematics posts, the present one has arisen from material originally drafted for the first post in this series.

In that post, I defined mathematics as the science whose findings are proved by deduction. This definition does not say what mathematics is about. We can say however what logic is about: it is about mathematics quâ deduction, and more generally about reasoning as such. This makes logic a criteriological science, because logic seeks, examines, clarifies and limits the criteria whereby we can make deductions. As examples of this activity, Gödel’s theorems are, in a crude sense to be refined below, that

  • everything true in all possible mathematical worlds can be deduced;

  • some things true in the world of numbers can never be deduced;

  • the latter theorem is one of those things.

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Be Sex Binary, We Are Not

Content warning: suicide.

The following sentence is bold in the last paragraph of an essay: “the science is clear and conclusive: sex is not binary, transgender people are real.” I don’t know what the writer means by this. As far as I can tell, as a biological concept used for explaining reproduction, sex has two kinds or parts or sides or aspects, and the essay tacitly affirms this; at the same time, obviously persons called transgender exist.

☾ ♂ ☿ ♃ ♀ ♄ ☉

The title of the essay is a command: “Stop Using Phony Science to Justify Transphobia.” I can support that. I don’t even need the qualifier “phony.” If transphobia is the kind of morbid fear suggested by the suffix “-phobia,” then science ought to help dispel this, not promote it.

One might also just say, Stop using phony science.

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Return to Narnia

1

My subject is the Chronicles of Narnia of C. S. Lewis (1898–1963). I consider this heptad of books (published 1950–6) as constituting (1) literature (2) for children (3) that I continue to enjoy in my sixth decade, having started in my first.

  1. By literature, I mean a work of art whose medium is prose. Prose may also be a work of craft, intended to fulfil some purpose. This purpose could be to serve a market for fantasy or children’s books. Art as such has no purpose that can be specified in advance.

  2. Writing for children may take certain liberties that annoy adults.

  3. As with any post in this blog, I write out of my own personal interest. As a child, I read other fantasies, such as those of Lloyd Alexander, John Christopher, Ursula LeGuin, and J.R.R. Tolkien. Only the works of C. S. Lewis have stayed with me. This essay may be considered as an exploration of why, or least an example of how.

The seven books of the Chronicles of Narnia, Collier edition

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Donne’s Undertaking

To ease the strain of pandemic restrictions, I was recently called on to recommend a poem. I chose “The Undertaking” of John Donne. I want to say here why. Briefly:

  1. The poem (which I transcribe below) has a sound that impressed me when I first read it, more than thirty years ago.
  2. The poem alludes to ideals:
    • of recognizing what is good for its own sake, and
    • of climbing a rung or two on Diotima’s ladder of love.
  3. The sound of Donne’s poem may seduce one into thinking the ideals worthy.

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I also indulge myself here in reminiscences not obviously relevant to “The Undertaking.” They do conclude with my sitting down to read Donne for myself. (Note added November 3, 2025.)

          ⯆          

Diotima’s ladder, or stairway, is recounted by Socrates in Plato’s Symposium (211c, here in the translation of Jowett, which is the one I read at school, though it may not be the most faithful; the bullets and insertions from the Greek text are mine):

And the true order of going, or being led by another, to the things of love (τὰ ἐρωτικά), is to begin from the beauties of earth and mount upwards for the sake of that other beauty, using these as steps (οἳ ἐπαναβαθμοί) only, and from

  • one going on to
  • two, and from two to
  • all fair forms (τὰ καλὰ σώματα), and from fair forms to
  • fair practices (τὰ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα), and from fair practices to
  • fair notions (τὰ καλὰ μαθήματα), until from fair notions he arrives at
  • the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is (ὃ ἔστι καλόν).

Analytic Geometry and Donne’s complete poetry
Two books that were my mother’s

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Mood

Executive summary. The English grammatical moods – indicative, imperative, subjunctive – were not understood till the nineteenth century, according to an 1882 doctoral dissertation, On the Use of the Subjunctive Mood in Anglo-Saxon. Considering illustrative passages that happen to be from Plato, Alfred Douglas, Evelyn Waugh, and especially John Donne; looking ultimately at John McWhorter’s 2015 essay, “English is not normal”; I review the subjunctive mood, grammar in general, and my own lack of understanding till I was in college.

The copyright page has, with the preceding pages and cover, fallen away from the rest of the book with use
Copyright and contents pages of the Concise Oxford Dictionary, 6th edition

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Doing and Suffering

To do injustice is worse than to suffer it. Socrates proves this to Polus and Callicles in the dialogue of Plato called the Gorgias.

I wish to review the proofs, because I think they are correct, and their result is worth knowing.

Loeb Plato III cover

Or is the result already clear to everybody?

Whom would you rather be: a Muslim in India, under attack by a Hindu mob, or a member of that mob?

You would rather not be involved; but if you had to choose, which option would be less bad: to be driven to an insane murderous fury, or to be the object of that fury?

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